My apologies for the delay in responding,
@raharris1973. I'm working 14-hour days this week, and that plus commuting time makes for a tired Skall!
Hope my response is still somewhat legible, regardless.
This isn't for lack of trying on the part of both Bismarck, and then Wilhelm, and Wilhelm's Ministers.
The stars never aligned that way, and not solely because of Wilhelm's gaffes and his Ministers' initiatives - also because incompatible priorities or expectations that Russia and Britain had.
I certainly won't dispute this. Although
some seem to think that if you don't think Britain was hell-bent on war, then you
must think Britain to always be angelically innocent, there simply are a lot of nuances here.
Of course, Britain served its own interests. An empire is not a charity, after all!
For Russia, even more so. I think Russia was in a difficult situation, and indeed distrusted Germany and Austria immensely. Maintaining good relations as much as possible would be in Germany's favour -- if only to make Russia the undeniable aggressor and guilty party if war
did come -- I personally have little faith in the prospect of a German-Russian Alliance. I still think it's an option to consider, but as this thread (and other threads, I suppose) must surely show: I am a proponent of Anglo-German friendship.
The main point I have attempted to make here is that, contrary to the borderline perverse claims of some, Germany is neither innocent victim nor evil aggressor. German interests were going to clash with those of either Russia or Britain. The point is... Germany should (and could) have forged an alliance with one of those two. The reason this didn't happen isn't purely Germny's fault, and to some extent it's just poor luck and circumstances never aligning.
But I would still point to Wilhelm II as the main obstacle. His personality made enemies by the bucket-load, and his mercurial character made him appear very dangerous to practically all foreign observers. Let me put it this way: if we had to change
one thing to improve the chances of either Russo-German or Anglo-German alliance... would we effect a change pertaining to Russia or Britain? I don't see it. No. The change is obvious: make Wilhelm II a different man. Calm, stable, genial, enjoying warm and good relations with all his cousins, with no colonial ambitions (instead known as a mediator and peace-maker between others), and with the clear understanding that Germany is a land power that must focus on its army,
not its navy.
I can imagine nothing else that could possibly bring us closer to this particular goal. Which suggests that Wilhelm II, and nothing else, was indeed the crux here. Not British foreign policy. Not even the clear Russian hankering after a French alliance. I don't deny those factors, certainly! I just consider them secondary to the elephant in the room, who is named Wilhelm II.
First, Russia:
Unfortunately for Germany (and Austria-Hungary!), by 1892, Russia was able to make a compatible long term deal with France. By 1904, Britain was able to make a long-term compatible deal with France. And by 1907, Britain and Russia were able able to make a compatible deal that went the distance the 1914, the outbreak of the July Crisis of 1914 and WWI.
First consider Russia - Bismarck rode good Prussian relations with Russia (and a dollop of bad Russian relations with Austria) to great effect for the early part of his Chancellorship in the 1860s. Despite these good relations, and the Three Emperor's League of 1873, and the mutual personal admiration of Kaiser Wilhelm I and his nephew Tsar Alexander II, the Russians meddled diplomatically in the German-French 'War in Sight' scare of 1875 [though actual Russian military follow-through had there been a war would have been extremely, extremely unlikely].
Bismarck gave clearance to Russian plans for the Russo-Turkish war, as did the Austrians when consulted and the Russians outlined their plan.
After winning the war, the Russians broke their promises and imposed a more aggressive settlement at San Stefano, so Austria and Britain complain. Sure the Russians won the war, but they tired themselves out and couldn't afford it and are not in great shape to get into an immediate follow-up war with Austria and Britain. Bismarck offers to hold a conference as honest-broker.
That Berlin Congress ends putting the settlement back to what the Russians promised everyone they would do at the beginning.
Instead of thanking the Germans for saving them from a ruinous war, or taking their lumps, Russian opinion now starts flipping out against Germany like its a cheating girlfriend that owed Russia total loyalty and support for its over-sized claims at the European Congress. So Russia was demonstrating if it was going to be an ally, it was only willing to be one on a jealous, one-sided, and psychotic basis.
Later on, after Bismarck shows the Russians they risk isolation (by making his alliance with Austria), he gets to revive the Three Emperor's League a couple times. Even so, Russia complains about German immigration law and tariffs and its press and court circles start calling Germany an enemy and agitating for an alliance with France. Russia quits the Three Emperors League and only signs the secret Reinsurance Treaty.
So Bismarck is patiently keeping up a connection with Russia here, but Russia is still showing signs of psycho animus, bringing racial Slavism into it, and none of the terms of the treaties really truly *guarantee* a free hand to Germany if Germany chose to go attack France.
I agree completely with all these points, and this in fact does an excellent job outlining why I think a Russo-German alliance, while possibly -- is by far the longer shot, and would be far less stable anyway.
I've heard it suggested that Germany and Russia could join forces in a tacit understanding to throw Austria under the bus when the time came. Then they'd both be equally mercenary and betrayal-minded, with their shared goal being "we grab what we can and fuck everybody else". I think this would be a suicide pact, and that it would align literally everybody else against them, but I just wanted to bring up the notion.
OK, then we move on to Wilhelm. Encouraged by his Ministers, he drops the Reinsurance Treaty. [On balance, I think it was a mistake to toss it aside for nothing rather than just keep re-signing it. Benefits, even if meagre, outweighed harms. Let's fairly acknowledge that willingness to sign is no guarantee that Russia would a) not have made a French alliance anyway, b) Russia might not have dropped the treaty with Germany on its end]
I agree with the assessment.
Between 1891-1894 the Franco-Russian alliance solidifies, codifying the great German fear of a two-front war.
Ironically, tensions in continental Europe *do not* increase. From 1890, through 1904 in fact, relations between France-Germany-Austria-Russia get more quiet and cordial than they had been since before 1848, while they all pursue adventures outside Europe.
Wilhelm in 1895, tries becoming Russia's friend again, and he keeps trying through 1905-1906.
But it just doesn't work, because the Russians are hooked on French cash and loans, and have taken the hint that those will dry up if they make any treaties with Germany.
So Wilhelm's first 17 years in charge he drops the Reinsurance treaty (oops) and tries to win over Russia (but fails - can't outbid sugar daddy), but it hardly matters because things aren't that tense on Russia's western border. From 1908 and after, problems start with Russia, because it's boxed out of the Far East (by losing a war - not Germany's fault), and the Near East (by diplomacy with Britain - not directly Germany's fault).
I think we shouldn't ignore the role of Wilhelm's mercurial behaviour here. Everything you say about Russia is true, and I completely agree that as soon as the FRanco-Russian understanding was reached, all hope for a Russo-German alliance was in vain. However, note that the Russians started shopping around for the French alliance the year after Wilhelm (then still prince) made his visit to Russia. He made a
terrible impression. And then they really put the efforts into over-drive when Wilhelm became Kaiser. His callous willingness to let the Reinsurance treaty lapse only confirmed the Russian impression of him.
Sure, we may call the Russians hypocritical here. But they were not the only ones who were worried about Wilhelm II.
Wilhelm was starting off his reign seeking alliance with Britain. He succeeded in making small-scale colonial deals at multiple points - The Helgoland-Zanzibar Treaty, the Samoan Condominium of 1889 and a broader Pacific agreement on the Caroline islands boundary at that time, 10 years later the partition of Samoa and the Solomons, then the Yangtze agreement. Even up through 1914 he had a hypothetical contingency agreement going for the partition of Portuguese Africa if the Portuguese defaulted on their debt.
The underlying problem is that he was seen as unreliable, and not without good reason. He wants Britain to love him, but he also wants to show them up -- to be seen as the greatest. This is the man who hated that his uncle Edward didn't love him, but also chafed at the fact that Edward treated him as a cousin, without formality, and responded to
that by deliberately lording his position as Kaiser over the 'mere' Prince of Wales. (Which is not a good way to get the love he initially wanted.)
Wilhelm's character is well-illustrated by that example, and this carried over into his role as sovereign. It's not entirely unsurprising that the friendly overtures of such a man are, at the very least, approached with wariness...
Apparently by the 1890s, the British were ready to sign an alliance but they insisted that among its casus foederis be included protecting China's territorial integrity. The Germans, not wanting to offend Russia unduly, would not extend such a commitment north of the Great Wall into Manchuria. The British insisted any deal included all of China be guaranteed, including Manchuria, or no deal at all.
The Germans were afraid taking this deal put them at too much risk of them being called into a war by Britain over a colonial issue (like China or India) that they didn't care too much about, yet suffering most of the fighting in a two front-war on the continent with France and Russia, while Britain has fun getting all the colonies, kind of like what happened to Prussia in the 7 Years War.
So in the end, they didn't accept the alliance Britain offered, because the terms seemed too unattractive.
I'd call this foolish on Germany's part, although given Wilhelm's priorities (and the reasoning of those who enjoyed his support), I also do understand the reasoning.
Put me in his place, though, and I'll accept that deal in a heartbeat. Risk war with Russia? Delay favours
them. If the war must come, let it come sooner rather than later. As for fighting on the continent while Britain gets the colonies -- let them. Germany's prize here is a continental empire, which victory would produce.
Why would I begrudge Britain getting the French colonies, if I can carve out puppet states in Finlan, the Baltics, Poland, Belarus and the rich bread-basket to the Ukraine? (While, presumably, Austria-Hungary gets to lord it over the Balkans, so it's not like they go home empty-handed, either.)
As for doing the bleeding in a two-front war: that's true. But that has been a given of alliance with Britain since time immemorial. You put the bodies in the field, and Britain pays the bills. You know that going in.
Yet Britain, which was so picky about the terms of the proposed alliance with Germany, was ultimately less picky when it made its Ententes with Japan, France, and Russia, accepting, for example, de facto Russo-Japanese partition of Manchuria. So Britain had its own incoherency and improvisation.
Once Britain formed the entente with France, the shift in attitude towards Russia (allied to France) made more sense, I'd say. By that point, the chance for actual Anglo-German alliance had passed.
Also, short of actually getting involved in the Russo-Japanese War, the outcome of that conflict wasn't exactly Britain's to dictate. As far as reasonably hemming in Russia was concerned, Japan actually did a good job of that, and Britain sought good relations with Japan.
You know in some ways, WWI happened the way it did, because the two strongest European powers, Britain and Germany, didn't have the confidence to stay aloof, and instead allowed themselves to be led by the nose by their weaker partners into conflict.
I agree.
off-topic but related to Bismarck's fall- on the domestic issues Bismarck and Wilhelm disputed, from most of what I've read, Wilhelm sounds rationale and Bismarck the lunatic. Wilhelm opposed making the anti-Socialist laws more severe and Bismarck's advocacy of suspending the Reichstag and moving to direct military dictatorial rule. I can't a imagine a timeline where Bismarck's solution to domestic German politics leads to a more stable Germany from 1890-1914, and probably beyond, than what we got in OTL. I don't give an 'eff if you hate Socialism or not, it's bad news to give Socialist, or any other Party politicians practice how to work in underground and conspiratorial ways instead of parliamentary ones. But extra-constitutional government gives them exactly that kind of practice.
I wouldn't call Bismarck a lunatic. The whole assumption that forcing the socialists underground will make things worse, I think, gives too much credit to the socialists. The late 19th and early 20th century comprised a period when far-left radicals were murdering people on the regular. Luigi Lucheni murdering Empress Elizabeth. Alexander Soloviev attempting to murder Tsar Alexander II. The Narodnaya Volya terrorists repeatedly attempting to murder Tsar Alexander II, and ultimately succeeding. Jean-Baptiste Sipido attempting to murder the Prince of Wales. Ivan Kalyayev murdering Grand Duke Sergei. Mateu Morral attempting to murder Alfonso XIII and Victoria Eugenie during their wedding, and killing 30 others in the process. Examples abound.
Bismarck was justified in seeking the utter extinction of the socialist movement. These were not reasonable people. Giving them democratic ways to gain power would not make them love you. It would just give them one more knife to stick in your back. Indeed, most people agreed about this at the time, and the Kartell ultimately split about
one single article of the anti-socialist bill. (And we must note, that bill was already in effect: the question was whether to make it permanent
with that article, or
without it.)
I do agree that Bismarck, when faced with the danger of the anti-socialist powers being limited, set out on a wild scheme: to deliberately sink the whole bill, in the hope of causing social agitation, which could then be used to form an emergency government and definitively crush the socialists with armed forced. I don't interpret that proposal exactly as you appear to, but I still disapprove of it. However... this is something he raised
once, in discussion with Wilhelm. He immediately realised his error, knew he'd over-played his hand, and the very next morning, he attempted to reach a compromise with Wilhelm by agreeing to the Kaiser's proposed social policies towards industrial workers. He even suggested a European council on working conditions, presided over by the Kaiser. (Which would actually be smart, but which
Wilhelm then shot down out of personal animosity for Bismarck.)
(I stress again that what Bismarck proposed as a one-off, while a bad idea, was in nor way as radical a proposal as some have suggested. Nor was it som serious plan. It was a single remark, of which nothing came. It's even been suggested, in this thread, that Bismarck brought Germany "to the brink of civil war". It should be clear that such claims are hysterical nonsense.)
My own reasoning here is that Bismarck was correct to want the entire anti-socialist bill made permanent, although doing this in conjunction with attemt to improve working class conditions would be smart. Wilhelm II and Bismarck could have productively worked together on this. things went wrong, not beause of Bismarck, but because Wilhelm II deliberately undermined him on this topic, and did so for months.
Had Wilhelm II supported Bismarck, the Kartell wouldn't have broken up over it, Bismarck would have gotten his way, and extra-constitutional government would never have come up. They could have agreed to make the unaltered bill permanent, and then the Kaiser could have presided over a European council on working conditions, making him look good.
(Incidentally, Bismarck was ultimately forced to resign, not over thi matter directly, but because he sought a new legislative majority and Wilhelm felt insulted that Bismarck dared such a thing without consulting him first. The Kartell had been voted from power as a consequence of the anti-socialist bill mess-up, and Bismarck had informal talks with the (Catholic) Centre Party. Wilhelm despised the Catholics.[1] Wilhelm had the power to force Bismarck to resign over it. [2])
[1] There is some irony here, since, again, some have claimed here that Bismarck was horribly divisive. He was, at times, but his record shows that he was also willing to make alliances. It was Wilhelm who was far more hunkered down in his hatred for perceived "enemies".
[2] So much for Wilhelm having no real powers, and having to rely on his ministers and on the legislature. Some have claimed that in this thread as well, but the facts prove that Wilhelm held very real power, and that even Bismarck, and even with a legislative majority behind him, could not contradict the Kaiser's wishes.
The Manila Bay incident - What really happened here- observational positioning for the battle. And we have basically just Dewey's braggadocious account of it. I wonder how much was said about this after the incident, but *before* WWI started and US and UK propagandists were trying to dig up a lineage of US-German incidents.
The Huns Speech - There's some allegations this was selectively quoted - who knows what types of tough guy pep talks the troops of any of the Boxer suppressing countries heard. Almost all (except for the most the Japanese) engaged in loot and murder while putting down the Boxers.
The Bjorko Treaty - The attempt at a German-Russian Treaty in 1905. I put this in the "at least Willy was trying" category. It's an example of Willy, and even Nicky, temporarily being wiser than their Ministers and trying to come to an agreement to stay at peace with each other. It only looks like an embarassment or 'blunder' because it didn't work and because the monarchs didn't have the political chops/savvy/leverage to prevent their respective ministers from overriding the initiative. A world with the Bjorko Treaty, much better for both countries.
Bosnia Crisis - Russian diplomat proposes a deal with the Austrians. Austrians leap at it to stabilize and clarify their situation. Russian diplomat goes home to find a) it's deeply unpopular at home, and b) his new Entente partner, Britain, isn't agreeing to be helpful in collecting on Russia's straits part of the bargain. Russian diplomat reacts by lying about the whole thing and riding along with and stoking domestic and Serbian outrage. Serbia mobilizes and threatens war with one or more neighbors. So again, we have more of Russia being psycho, not questioning its British Entente, but using Austria as a whipping boy and scapegoat, and letting tensions rise, hoping somebody else gives way to calm the trouble. Austria, seeing regicidal militarists next door threaten the OE or itself says "simmer down now or war". Germany backs them up. Serbs and Russians simmer down.
I agree with these points.
The Kruger Telegram - The British getting outraged over the Boers being congratulated for enforcing their own laws, for an action that even Britain prosecuted people for? Sure it's not exactly friendly or solicitous for Britain's feelings in its embarrassed state, but a cause for British geopolitical realignment? Gimme a break.
I really feal that you're kind of downplaying that things
do have different implications when a foreign monarch does it. Even Wilhelm himself, in his memoirs, recognised what a terrible blunder it was, and how obvious it was that this could do nothing but anger Britain for no good reason. He immediately goes on to unconvincingly blame his foreign secretary for the telegram, and outright claims he was always against it. This is, it goes without saying, demonstrably a bald-faced lie. But it does demonstrate that the guy who did the thing, though trying to shift the blame, never tries to pretend that it was just a minor thing. If it had been as minor as you make it out to be,
that would be a far easier excuse for him to use.
The first Morocco Crisis - the Kaiser personally intervening and sending a ship was overdramatic. It was an attempt to divide the Entente that clearly backfired, mistake. Delcasse was trying to deliberately snub, even provoke Germany by compensating every other interested power, except Germany, but Germany's better response probably would have been a no drama, quiet, economic form of retaliation, related to finance and coal exports or something.
Your phrasing rather makes it seem as if Delcasse is the instigator here, and Germany just "reacted poorly". I assume that's unintentional. The fact is that Wilhelm II meddled in Morocco, where he had no business meddling, and then made statements that amounted to an outright challenge to existing French influence in Morocco. This played out terribly for Germany, of course. To Britain, this exact kind of unstable, provocative action confirmed the image of Wilhelm II that had become ever more clear: that of an unguided projectile, who was actively out to force himself into the colonial affairs and spheres of interest of other nations.
Daily Telegraph Crisis - Britain oh so offended when the Kaiser is interviewed and says that he was behind the scenes relatively pro-British and working against other European countries (like France and Russia) attempts during the Boer War to form anti-British continental coalition. So the Kaiser is saying in public that eight years before Britain's current allies sucked and planned to do Britain dirty, and the Kaiser is tweeting like he was Britain's secret hero, and he wants the world to know it, which shows he cheesily wants attention. But if you boil away any bullshit about manners and propriety he's basically just saying, "hey I wasn't trying to screw you over when others were inviting me to help screw you over." And Britain's outraged about this?
Well maybe, but not because represents Germany hurting or intending to hurt Britain in any way, but only because it embarrasses the diplomats in the foreign office who made the decision to prioritize Ententes with France and Russia and justify domestically. [and so they start tampering with diplomatic documents to starting putting hostile Russian words during the Boer War into German mouths].
Again, some pretty severe downplaying here. The Daily Telegraph affair was such a disaster that it even had major political consequences for Wilhelm back home. You make it appear as if he was basically a jovial fellow who was just misconstrued due to por phrasing, when the general reception at the time -- in Britain and Germany alike -- was "
Good God, there's a raving lunatic in charge of Germany!"
It's worth noting that, again, Wilhelm even admitted what a adisaster it really was. He angrily blamed his ministers for
not censoring the interview in the German domestic press. When the guy who says the crazy stuff doesn't even try to pretend that it's not crazy, and is instead claiming his people should have censored it
because it's crazy... then it was really crazy.
2nd Morocco Crisis - Sending the Panther is an over-dramatic escalation. But France's moves in Morocco are going beyond the letter of what was agreed at the Algeciras conference. Germany's got an argument for compensation. You can argue about the spirit of that conference. Maybe the cynical, naked spirit of that conference that everybody should have understood was France gets to do whatever the eff it wants with Morocco whenever it wants, and that's it, full stop. Germany took the spirit to mean, France follows the letter of the Algeciras terms, which we signed, and was a diplomatic hit for us, or we get something.
The Germans do walk out of the conference with something, compensated with hundreds of square kilometers of additional territory from French Equatorial Africa.
In one sense it's a bad blunder, because it strengthens Entente solidarity against German bullying. On the other hand, it's an example of Germany using a pressure tactic, walking away with colonial compensation, and no war happening, and no irrevocable decisions for war being made, so its a success.
Overall I'd say it wasn't worth the costs or opportunity costs, because the timing was bad in terms of French politics - it weakened Caillaux, who was the most peace-minded mainstream French premier of that time. Also, it encouraged the Anglo-French fleet talks which deepened those two powers' "moral commitments" to each other by making the British responsible for the French channel coast in ensuing negotiations. Plus it led to the rise of Poincare and his worries about Russian reliability in a crisis over French interests, leading him to emphasize France's readiness, even eagerness to support Russia, not only in Russia's self-defense, but in support of Russia's Balkan interests.
The analysis of the events themselves seems even-handed to me, and I agree with you. My only critique here is that it cannot be seen in isolation. As I have attempted to clarify here, Wilhelm's behaviour was hardly innocent and more-or-less "misunderstood". He was a veritable bull in a china shop, and a very unpredictable bull at that. All his actions must be viewed as part of an emerging pattern, and by this stage, he couldn't afford to be anything other than careful. (Yet he chose to be anything
but.)
Paryicularly regarding Britain, it mut be noted that Grey was, by this point, extremely worried about a German naval port being established in Morocco, and this fear made him inclined to back French interests againt German ones. Even then, though, he wrote that "what the French contemplate doing is not wise", and he strongly argued against them sending troops. I notice that, once more, these are not the actions one would expect from an empire of evil scumbags who are rearing to declare war on Germany.
In fact, I'd argue that it's a pretty good indication that the German naval ambitions must not be down-played. It was the min reason for Britain to not
explicitly turn against the French plan. And, we may note, a major reason to oppose Germany. Which supports my thesis that if Wilhelm hadn't been so insistent on trying to have a fleet that he wanted to threaten Britain with, a
lot of room would have existed for Anglo-German alliance.
In fact, this whole event strongly supports the case that Britain only really pursued the entente because it perceived Germany as such an imminent threat. The thesis that Britain was a big bully, loo
Liman Von Sanders Affair - Germans and Russians were viewing their situation in hopelessly zero-sum terms by this point.
I agree, and I think this whole thing is mostly Russia trying to push Britain and France into a more firm anti-German partnership with Russia. In context of this ongoing debate, it's perhaps worth noting that it was Britain who refused to go along with it. The French were just hesitant, but the British explicitly came out about the point that they had ctually made quite similar arrangements with the Ottomans as the Germans had. And as such they felt it improper to begrudge Germany this.
That's... pretty telling, considering how "late in the game" we are at this stage. The reading that Britain was looking for war, and would use any excuse to crush Germany, can pretty much be resigned to the dustbin after this.
Berlin-Baghdad railway - Not doing it isn't going to be the thing that gets Russia to not champion Serbia, or not mobilize, or it won't be the thing that keeps Britain off the western front. All it does is weaken Germany's attraction to the Ottomans and make them slightly less likely to commit, making it more likely for Germany to lose WWI sooner.
I actually agree with you completely, most especially in regards to Russia. As I've stated before: all attempts at Russo-German alliance were moot after the Russians sided with France. (There
were possibilities before then, but regardless, I repeat that I structurally cosider a British alliance to be a far more realistic prospect for Germany.)
Regarding Britain: the attempts, by
some, to make it appear as if Britain just automatically wanted to crush Germany's efforts here... that's bullshit.
Britain was initially strongly
supportive of the project. (Not exactly the attitude of a bunch of German-hating war mongers.)
Only once the Germans revealed plans to extend the railway a bit more, onward to Basra and then along the Persian Gulf, did the British become alarmed. At this point, a project that at most offered a prospect of future economic competition became... something a bit more than that. More of a strategic threat in a region in which Britain had a vested interest. Particularly, it began to look
suspiciously like a dagger aimed at the developing British-owned oil fields in Persia.
At that point, with Wilhelm's attitude about Morocco still fresh in the memory, it's not exactly surprising that there would be some alarm about this.
In short: Russia would be opposed to the railway no matter what, but Britain would have had no problem -- in fact, may reasonably be assumed to have remained supportive -- if Germany hadn't decided to "alter the deal (pray I don't alter it any further)" and extend their project to aim squerely at those British-owned oil-fields.