What's the best and most realistic PoD for having the Soviet Union perform better in 1941?

[stevep]

I know for a fact me or @sillygoose have repeatedly pointed out to you before that none of this has a basis in truth. Stalin did not go into any funk; that's Post-War mythmaking, we have the Kremlin logs that show he was in his office everyday. He increased VVS overflights over German territory to gain intelligence, ordered a mobilization in April that saw numerous armies arriving to the front by June including force transfers from the Asian USSR, and rapidly escalated military construction-especially of airfields-in the months coming up to the invasion. The American military attaches noted this intense military activity and thought at the time, until the picture became clear, that the Soviets had pre-empted the invasion. The USSR had, also, been in a war economy mode since 1940.

Actually not, other than possibly the 1st point. My argument was that you deploy the bulk of the forces further back so that the initial German onslaught to a large degree hits thin air and their mobile units are separated from the bulk of their forces and their air support when they hit the primary defensive lines. Rather than deploying them where they can be hammered.

 

[stevep]

Cut a deal with Hitler at the Berlin Meeting in November of 1940, with the USSR joining the Axis and having a free hand to expand South into the Middle East and Southern Asia. In of itself, it's a decent deal on top of the existing agreements, and makes it more likely it will build up trust with Hitler so that later on they can push more on Bulgaria, Finland, etc. If not, you can always tear up the agreement after you've been generously provided the time to complete your mobilization.

That leaves the Soviets even more exposed if, as is quite possible, the Germans still attack in summer 41. Now the Soviets have isolated themselves politically from the western powers and a lot of their forces are way out of place. As such it survives the initial German attack but the latter are now facing minimal opposition until the Soviet forces deployed to attack the allies can be withdrawn - which also requires some sort of agreement with the allies which would be difficult.

 

[sillygoose]

Or Stalin initiates a pull back in the lead up to the invasion.

Yes

 

[WolfBear]

Yes

But I don't actually want that. He needs to at least keep a token force stationed in the newly conquered territories.

 

[sillygoose]

But I don't actually want that. He needs to at least keep a token force stationed in the newly conquered territories.

So keep the NKVD border patrol there with some mobile divisions to keep order and deploy the army to the rear.

 

[WolfBear]

So keep the NKVD border patrol there with some mobile divisions to keep order and deploy the army to the rear.

Makes sense. Specifically to the two defensive lines that I mentioned earlier here?

 

[WolfBear]

That leaves the Soviets even more exposed if, as is quite possible, the Germans still attack in summer 41. Now the Soviets have isolated themselves politically from the western powers and a lot of their forces are way out of place. As such it survives the initial German attack but the latter are now facing minimal opposition until the Soviet forces deployed to attack the allies can be withdrawn - which also requires some sort of agreement with the allies which would be difficult.

Yeah, if Hitler actually makes a formal alliance with Stalin, the West might want to keep Stalin at an arm's length even if Hitler will subsequently invade the Soviet Union, wondering "Can we really trust this guy? How do we know that he won't try cozying up to Hitler again sometime in the future?"

Interestingly enough, I wonder if Hitler, in the event that he'll fail to achieve a quick victory over the Soviet Union in this TL, will offer the Soviet Union Brest-Litovsk-style peace terms while also offering the Soviet Union compensation in the Middle East and/or other parts of Asia at Britain's expense.

 

[History Learner]

Yes

Kinda eliminates the need for the invasion then if Stalin is no longer threatening Bulgaria and Romania. Local forces can also restore the Baltic countries, adding a further buffer and allowing Germany to regain much of its trade bloc.

 

[History Learner]

That leaves the Soviets even more exposed if, as is quite possible, the Germans still attack in summer 41. Now the Soviets have isolated themselves politically from the western powers and a lot of their forces are way out of place. As such it survives the initial German attack but the latter are now facing minimal opposition until the Soviet forces deployed to attack the allies can be withdrawn - which also requires some sort of agreement with the allies which would be difficult.

Or, Hitler decides upon the Med strategy and there is no Barbarossa. Nothing about the invasion was set in stone and Hitler only decided upon the course of action because Stalin refused to cut a deal.

 

[History Learner]

Actually not, other than possibly the 1st point. My argument was that you deploy the bulk of the forces further back so that the initial German onslaught to a large degree hits thin air and their mobile units are separated from the bulk of their forces and their air support when they hit the primary defensive lines. Rather than deploying them where they can be hammered.

I personally don't see it as making much of a difference tactically and strategically it creates buffer between the two powers which suits Hitler's interests equally.

 

[WolfBear]

Kinda eliminates the need for the invasion then if Stalin is no longer threatening Bulgaria and Romania. Local forces can also restore the Baltic countries, adding a further buffer and allowing Germany to regain much of its trade bloc.

For Stalin to completely withdraw from his 1939-1940 would be a complete loss of face, though.

 

[WolfBear]

Arguably sooner, as the Five Year Plans had been about building up the industries that had major military applications and mechanizing agriculture so that men could be freed up for factory or military work.
Also from January 1st 1939 to June 22nd 1941 the Red Army more than doubled:

Рабоче-крестьянская Красная армия — Википедия

ru.wikipedia.org

Deploy away from the 1941 border and instead assemble behind the 1939 border and build up defensive positions. As it was, despite what many of the naysayers have been pushing since the Icebreaker thesis, it really seemed as though the Soviets were deploying offensively and Zhukov's May offensive plan was being implemented, but Hitler preempted them. You'd really have to change the views of the Soviet military away from offensive, or at least defensive-offensive, planning to a more defense in depth/deep deployment mentality to be able to survive the shock of the initial invasion while retaining sufficient combat power.

By the way, would this have actually resulted in the Germans being halted at the Stalin Line? Or at least on the Dnieper River? Or would they have still been able to advance east of this, and, if so, just how far to the east?