WI: No Lend Lease

History Learner · Oct 26, 2020

PoD: Zangara successfully kills FDR in 1933, resulting in a Garner Presidency until 1940 followed by Huey Long in that year. With Garner a lame duck and Long having no interest in the European war, no Lend Lease comes to pass and the U.S. maintains a strict Cash and Carry policy. Without Lend Lease, what are the effects on World War II?

History Learner · Oct 26, 2020

For my own take, with regards to the UK, I cite from Denis Havlat (2017) Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part I, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies:

Between January 1939 and June 1940, the combined French and British orders of military planes had amounted to 10,800 machines; yet from January to May 1940 Britain had received only 104 and France 557 aircraft.19 While these deliveries were certainly helpful for the Allies, they were not enough to stem the advance of the Germans into Western Europe. In fact, after the disaster at Dunkirk, where the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) narrowly escaped capture by the German army, the demand for American deliveries increased significantly. The soldiers evacuated from the beaches of Dunkirk had left behind vast amounts of materiel and equipment, which was impossible to quickly replace. BEF equipment abandoned in France included 120,000 vehicles, 600 tanks, 1,000 field guns, 500 anti-aircraft guns, 850 antitank guns, 8,000 Bren machine guns, 90,000 rifles, and half a million tons of stores and ammunition.20 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill sent a desperate message to Roosevelt asking for more deliveries, a request Roosevelt made possible by exporting ‘outdated’ weapons from US Army stocks.21

A dozen ships fully loaded with weapons and supplies sailed for Britain in June and a further 15 from July to early August.22 In total, Britain received 500,000 rifles, 85,000 machine guns, nine hundred 75 mm field guns, 25,000 automatic rifles, and 21,000 revolvers, including substantial amounts of ammunition.23 In order to comprehend the value of these deliveries, one has to compare them to British production of these items, which amounted to 193,712 rifles and 85,924 machine guns in the years 1939–1941.24 Within eight weeks, the United States had delivered two and a half times as many rifles and the same amount of machine guns as British industry had managed to produce in three years.

But infantry weapons and guns were not the only items that Britain needed in order to survive. The nation needed aircraft to defend itself from the bombing raids conducted by the Luftwaffe and warships for the escort of merchant vessel convoys. Both of these items were readily supplied by the Americans. Through the so-called Destroyers for Bases agreement, Britain received 50 renewed World War I destroyers from American stocks. Of these, nine were in service by the end of 1940 and a further 20 by May 1941.25 These ships were of immense value, in view of the fact that by the end of 1940 fully 70 percent of the British destroyer fleet was laid up for repairs and that domestic production had turned out just 88 of these vessels from 1939 to 1941.26 By the summer of 1943, only five of these destroyers had been sunk, while the other 45 were still providing escort duty.27

With the Battle of Britain raging in the summer and autumn of 1940, British demand for aircraft reached new heights as well. By 1 December 1940, Britain had ordered a staggering 23,000 aircraft from the American industry, of which only 2,100 had been delivered to the beleaguered island.28 Domestic production of aircraft for that year had been 15,049 aircraft.29 While these shipments were invaluable for Britain’s survival, they came at great financial cost. In order to purchase the 50 destroyers offered by the United States, the British had to sell their possessions in the West Indies and Newfoundland, leasing them to the Americans for 99 years.30 Even then, the strains of war were too great a burden for the British economy:

British industry was incapable of producing the range and quantity of armaments required to win the war. Even those items that could be manufactured domestically were heavily dependent on imports of raw materials and products such as steel. Most of these imports came from the United States and had to be paid for either in gold or dollars… . The day of reckoning was rapidly approaching. From a total of £775 million at the beginning of 1940, Britain’s gold and dollar reserves … had fallen [by August 1940] by over a third to £490 million… . They would last another three to four months at most. By the end of 1940, therefore, Britain would be unable to carry on the war by its own efforts.31

By September 1940, British orders in the United States amounted to 10 billion dollars, of which only a fraction could be paid for.32 The country was nearing financial collapse: ‘ … by the beginning of 1941 it had less than £3 million left in its gold and dollar reserves. This was as near to bankruptcy as it was possible to go without actual default’. 33 Realizing that without American aid Britain would have to surrender or negotiate with Germany, Roosevelt devised the so-called Lend-Lease law, which took effect on 11 March 1941. This law gave the President the authority to supply any country that was considered vital for the defense of the United States.34 For the duration of the war, Britain would receive supplies free of charge, which would be handed back or repaid once the war had ended.

Further on:

Even with the deliveries received from the United States, Britain’s military position in 1941 was close to hopeless. During the first half of this year the Luftwaffe continued its bombing raids against the island, Rommel’s forces were steadily advancing in North Africa, British forces sustained yet again humiliating defeats in Greece and Crete, and the German U-boats were sinking ever more British ships. Luckily, the Americans were now supplying Britain for free. In 1941 the United States delivered 4,473 aircraft either directly to Britain, to British overseas commands, or to British colonies and dominions.35 British production of aircraft in 1941 had been 20,094 units; whereas the colonies and dominions produced around 15 percent of this number.36 Other substantial military deliveries were tanks and trucks. Around 13,000 trucks and 1,390 tanks were shipped to Britain and its overseas forces before the end of 1941.37 Domestic production in 1941 had manufactured 4,841 tanks and 88,161 military trucks.38 Food represented the most crucial non-military supply. Before the war Britain had to import twice as many tons of food from overseas sources as raised on her own land.39 However, by the summer of 1940 Britain could no longer import food from continental Europe and had to cut down its food imports from other parts of the world in order to free shipping capacity for military supplies and resources. In combination with the many shiploads of food lost to the German U-boats, this created a situation where the British nation was close to starvation. Between the fall of France and the passing of the Lend-Lease act, the average British adult lost around 4.5 kilogram of weight due to the rapidly shrinking diet.40 Between 16 April and 25 December 1941, the Americans supplied Britain with over one million tons of food, including millions of concentrated vitamin tablets to counter a vitamin shortage caused by strict rationing.41 Shipments continued to increase, delivering 1.427 million tons in 1942, 1.705 million tons in 1943, 1.28 million in 1944, and 709,000 tons in 1945.42 On average, this amount of food was sufficient to feed over 4 million people during the years 1941–1945, around 10 percent of the British population.43

Besides the deliveries sustaining the British population and industry, American aid contributed decisively in stopping Rommel’s advance in North Africa. By 24 October 1942, American deliveries to North Africa and the Middle East amounted to 900 medium tanks, including 300 Sherman tanks that were of better quality than anything the British had before, as well as ninety 105 mm self-propelled anti-tank guns, 800 light tanks, 25,000 trucks and jeeps, over 700 twin-engine medium bombers, and nearly 1,100 fighters.44 The percentage of military equipment supplied to the British armed forces from American sources was 11.5 percent in 1941, 16.9 percent in 1942, 26.9 percent in 1943, and 28.7 percent in 1944.45 Even these figures understate the full magnitude of American aid to the British Empire. In 1942 the United States supplied 9,253 tanks and 5,898 aircraft, while British industry had turned out just 8,611 tanks and 23,672 aircraft.46 In 1943 American supplies had increased to 15,933 tanks and 6,710 aircraft, while British manufacture of tanks had decreased to 7,476 and aircraft production increased only modestly to 26,263 machines.47 In 1944, at the height of these deliveries, the United States supplied the British Empire with a staggering 11,414 aircraft, while the British produced 26,461 during that year.48 Total US deliveries of aircraft to the British Commonwealth amounted to nearly 34,000 units.49 Throughout the years 1941–1944 the United States delivered between one-fifth and one-third of total British Empire aircraft production. The share of American tanks was even greater; it increased from approximately 20 percent in 1941, to 100 percent in 1942, and to 200 percent of the total British Empire production in 1943. During the last two years of the war, Britain alone received, among other things, 76,737 Jeeps, 98,207 trucks, 12,431 tanks, and 6,715 000 tons of steel and iron.50 By 1944 around two-thirds of the tanks and trucks in the British army came from the United States.51 The total value of the aid delivered to the British Empire amounted to slightly more than 30 billion dollars.52

By the summer of 1941, the island nation was fully dependent on American deliveries, having been transformed into a giant unsinkable aircraft carrier similar to the ‘Airstrip One’ described in George Orwell’s novel 1984. Without American deliveries, Britain would either have been starved into submission or collapsed financially. Even if these two scenarios could somehow have been avoided, British industry would have produced fewer weapons than historically, since it was dependent on overseas deliveries of resources from the United States. The absence of these resources, combined with the lack of Lend-Lease tanks, aircraft, motor vehicles, small arms, and artillery, would have meant a far weaker and far worse-equipped British army, navy, and air force. British victory in North Africa would have thus become unlikely, a successful Bomber Offensive improbable, and an invasion of continental Europe impossible.

Without American aid, the UK would've thus been compelled to seek a peace deal with the Germans no later than early 1941 IMHO.

PsihoKekec · Oct 26, 2020

British take even more conservative military strategy and probably stalemate the Germans and Italians in North Africa at El Alamein. Malta is most likely eventually lost. You are correct that UK is unlikely to have good outlook for victory in this scenario, even with the resources of the empire at their disposal. While they were outproducing the Germans&Italians in pretty much every aspect, they were unable to concentrate resources in a way that could ensure victories they needed. While starvation was unlikely, the mere existence of Lend-Lease was bolstering the British morale helping them to carry on the fight. Without it, it is possible they would have given up the fight, even if Churchill was holding out for German-Soviet war. And there is the crux of the issue, the negotiations would drag out, Hitler was not as Anglophilic as he was before the war and Ribentropp would seek to humiliate the British which would lead to complications that could extend the negotiations up to 22.6.1941, when the opening of the Eastern Front would gave them a new hope.

Also, the British about to give up the fight might influence the Stalin to take the warnings seriously, so the Wehrmacht might encounter fully mobilized Red Army, leading to much different Barbarossa.

History Learner · Oct 26, 2020

With regards to the Soviets:

Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II by Denis Havlat:

During World War II the Soviet Union received large amounts of aid from the Western world in the form of supplies and military intervention, both of which were declared to have been irrelevant for the Soviet Union’s victory over Nazi Germany by Soviet historians. This article examines the claim made by Soviet historiography, and it comes to the conclusion that both Western supplies and military intervention were far more helpful than claimed by the Soviets. Without this aid the Red Army would not have been able to perform as well as it did historically, tilting the balance in Germany’s favor. Soviet claims about the irrelevance of Western aid can thus be dismissed as propaganda and inaccurate.

Havlat also goes further, noting how the lack of the U.S. would have further effects:

Overall, the Western Allies were responsible only for a small fraction of the losses sustained by German infantry and armor between 1941 and 1943 (around 10 percent); however, their contribution in the destruction and occupation of the Luftwaffe was overwhelming. The same applies to their contribution in forcing the Germans to leave most heavy artillery in the Reich as anti-aircraft weapons, preventing them from being used as anti-tank weapons in the East. Without Allied military intervention, the Germans could have sent at least 2,000 additional tanks, some 5,000 additional 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, around 15,000 additional aircraft, tens of thousands of additional motor vehicles, and up to half a million additional soldiers to the Eastern Front in the years 1941–1943, which would have shifted the balance in their favor.

Further on:

Without the need to fight in the Atlantic; to transport large amounts of troops, equipment, and supplies across the entire continent; and the necessity to defend against Allied bombing, Germany could have massively reduced its U-boat, locomotive, and anti-aircraft gun and ammunition production and converted at least part of these capacities into the production of more aircraft and equipment for land warfare. Additionally, without bombing, and the need to maintain a large enough army to fight on several fronts, there would have been less need to use forced labor in the factories, thus boosting production. Historically, Germany already outproduced the USSR in certain areas like locomotives, trucks, and even bombers, with 12,664 produced by Germany in the years 1941–1943 as compared to 11,359 built by the USSR.170 Without Allied intervention and Lend-Lease, Soviet margins in these areas would most likely have widened, while margins in areas such as tanks would have shrunk significantly. If Germany and its industry could have concentrated on one single front from 1941 onwards, it most likely would have vastly changed the outcome of the war in the East.

The USSR and Total War: Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942? by Mark Harrison:

Roosevelt also contributed to Soviet stabilization. The first installment of wartime Allied aid that reached the Soviet Union in 1942, although small by later standards, amounted to some 5 per cent of Soviet GNP in that year. Although Allied aid was used directly to supply the armed forces with both durable goods and consumables, indirectly it probably released resources to households. By improving the balance of overall resources it brought about a ceteris paribus increase in the payoff to patriotic citizens. In other words, Lend-Lease was stabilizing. We cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it seems beyond doubt that collapse was near. Without Lend-Lease it would have been nearer. Stalin himself recognized this, although he expressed himself more directly. He told Khrushchev several times that the Soviet Union had suffered such heavy losses that without Allied aid it would have lost the war.19

Boris V. Sokolov (2007). The role of lend‐lease in Soviet military efforts, 1941–1945, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies: Vol. 7, issue 3, pages 567-586:

In general, we can conclude that without Western supplies, the Soviet Union not only could not have won the Great Patriotic War, but was not even able to resist the German invasion, not being able to produce a sufficient amount of weapons and military equipment and provide it with fuel and ammunition. This dependence was well understood by the Soviet leadership at the beginning of the war. For example, the special envoy of President F.D. Roosevelt, G. Hopkins, reported in a message dated July 31, 1941, that Stalin believed it was impossible without American assistance from Great Britain and the USSR to resist the material might of Germany, which had the resources of occupied Europe. {70}Roosevelt, back in October 1940, announcing his decision to allow the military department to provide weapons and equipment that are surplus for the needs of the American armed forces, as well as strategic materials and industrial equipment to those countries that could protect American national interests, allowed the inclusion of these countries and Russia. {71} Without such an attitude on the part of the president, the pre-war placement in the United States of Soviet orders for equipment important for the production of weapons and military equipment would hardly have been possible.

PsihoKekec · Oct 26, 2020

Lend-Lease didn't matter much in 1941, if Soviets mobilize before Barbarossa starts, they would be able to limit the depth of German advance and evacuate more of the industry, so the lack of Lend-Lease wouldn't be so pressing.

Husky_Khan · Oct 26, 2020

If the information as cited is true and Britain won't have much cash reserves for the cash and carry system that the United States established and the United States won't give any aid free of charge up to and including not even going into combat zones with their own shipping, Great Britain might be compelled to pursue a negotiated settlement with Nazi Germany since they literally won't be able to pay for sustaining such a costly conflict. If not they'll probably feel that they're putting their holdings in North Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East at risk.

And I think the doom would be just as bad even if the Germans make the folly of following up with their invasion of the Soviet Union as per OTL. Britain and the United States did support Soviet Union right from the beginning and while they would be co-belligerents in this conflict Britain won't really be able to do nearly as much to support the Soviet Union. They will be without aid (beyond intelligence work I suppose) though having the Soviet Union there might convince Great Britain to stay in the conflict if they hadn't decided to pursue a negotiated settlement before the Invasion of Russia.

It's going to be a dark year for Great Britain between the Fall of France and the Invasion of Russia. With the Garner/Long Presidencies offering no real long term solutions beyond a stalemate at best, Great Britain might be convinced to talk with the Germans. And if the Axis are keen on it, they might try to pursue that negotiated settlement before they focus on the Soviet Union, in which case if there is peace in the West, Germany can then focus even more of their military power on bringing an even more isolated Soviet Union to heel since it would put them at even more of a disadvantage.

I have doubts that the Soviet Union would fall apart by and large in the end 1941 even if the British had come to terms with Germany by then and even if Germany did do something like capture Moscow, that might interest Japan in opening up a second front (as minimal impact as that might be) sometime in 1942 if the odds come in its own favor instead of striking South, which in turn would really doom any prospects for the Soviet Union (and positive outcomes for Great Britain if the peace ends) if the United States still isn't dragged into the war thanks to Japanese aggression in the Pacific.

stevep · Oct 26, 2020

History Learner said:
PoD: Zangara successfully kills FDR in 1933, resulting in a Garner Presidency until 1940 followed by Huey Long in that year. With Garner a lame duck and Long having no interest in the European war, no Lend Lease comes to pass and the U.S. maintains a strict Cash and Carry policy. Without Lend Lease, what are the effects on World War II?

With a POD in 33m especially removing FDR the entire world is likely to change by 1939 so difficult to tell what would be happening. Germany, assuming the Nazis still gain power are going to be a big threat but apart from anything what sort of state would the US be in? If there's no or markedly less New Deal the country could still be in deep depression or even a fairly total economic and social collapse. That could well be the biggest butterfly of all and would drastically alter many aspects of the world.

Assuming that the US has still pulled out of depression but is even more clearly isolationist then does Britain and France spend less in the US in the late 30's, which might also alter things. If WWII starts similarly to OTL and France still falls then Britain would be forced to make peace without major butterflies, which would probably best be done in the aftermath of winning the BoB.

This would give Britain peace but also concerns in both a Europe dominated by the Nazis and the growing expansionism of Japan in Asia. [Although with the US still deeply isolationist you might see no embargo on Japan resulting in the war in China continuing until probably Japan collapses. ]

You are definitely going to see Germany invade the USSR but the Soviets are less likely to be caught by surprise. The big question might be whether Stalin is therefore avoids the big mistakes of OTL Barbarossa in allowing such massive forces to be encircled. Also does Germany do that much better that they reach and start fighting for Moscow as winter comes in. In which case there's a good chance that the German army suffers a markedly bigger Stalingrad disaster a year earlier. The following war could then possibly end up as a war of mutual exhaustion as Germany will have access to greater resources than OTL but will struggle after such losses to defeat a still largely unbroken Soviet Union.

Bascially however there are so many variables that just about anything can happen. You could see democracy possibly even being eclipsed across most of the world or things not going much worse for it eventually than OTL. However with a WWII like start and France still defeated its going to be very, very bad for Europe and probably other parts of the world with a much higher death rate.

PsihoKekec · Oct 26, 2020

I reckon you most likely would see some sort of embargo on Japan, as China lobby was quite strong, but USA probably wouldn't lean on DEI like it did OTL. However with their internal dynamics, it's quite possible that Japan would still invade British and Dutch Asian colonies to secure the resources they crave.

Firebat · Oct 26, 2020

As previously noted, too many variables.

To take the easiest example, FDR was not only the daddy of Lend-Lease, but also an enthusiastic supporter of Munich Treaty - the one that enabled Hitler to rise high in the first place.
So on one hand you take away a politician whose Germany stance was nowhere nearly as hard as it might seem post-factum through the lens of WW2.
On the other hand, you get a bunch of replacements who can not be essentialized to "not FDR". Otherwise you risk falling in the same pit as popular opinion on Wilson's opponents post WW1- they were retroactively labeled "isolationists" despite the fact that their key leaders were anything but and some were much more interventionist than Wilson himself.

ATP · Oct 26, 2020

PsihoKekec said:
Lend-Lease didn't matter much in 1941, if Soviets mobilize before Barbarossa starts, they would be able to limit the depth of German advance and evacuate more of the industry, so the lack of Lend-Lease wouldn't be so pressing.

Problem is,that soviet mobilize - but to attack germans,not defend.They had 6:1 in tanks and 3:1 in planes numerical advantage.
Problem is - for first three weeks they practically surrender or run without fight.
For example - soviets ordered counter attack 24.6.42 on Belaruss with 2 armored,2 motorized and one calvary dyvisions.They had 1200 tanks including 114 KW1,6 regiments of infrantry ,calvary and few artillery regiments.
Attacked one german dyvision and regiment from another.German reported attack of 200-300 light tanks without infrantry and calvary supported by ONE battery.
And we knew that soviet had that tanks working,becouse it was reported 20.6.41 how many is working - and even if commanders lied,NKWD who checked them would not lie.

Soviet corps commanders gave orders to attack,shut their radios and hide,dyvision commanders did the same.And all that units disappered without a fight,becouse german mentioned only 8 KW1 there - used by soviet infrantry dyvision,which found them abadonned by crews.What with 106 others ? they found them later - all abadonned without fight.

History Learner · Oct 27, 2020

stevep said:
With a POD in 33m especially removing FDR the entire world is likely to change by 1939 so difficult to tell what would be happening. Germany, assuming the Nazis still gain power are going to be a big threat but apart from anything what sort of state would the US be in? If there's no or markedly less New Deal the country could still be in deep depression or even a fairly total economic and social collapse. That could well be the biggest butterfly of all and would drastically alter many aspects of the world.

Assuming that the US has still pulled out of depression but is even more clearly isolationist then does Britain and France spend less in the US in the late 30's, which might also alter things. If WWII starts similarly to OTL and France still falls then Britain would be forced to make peace without major butterflies, which would probably best be done in the aftermath of winning the BoB.

This would give Britain peace but also concerns in both a Europe dominated by the Nazis and the growing expansionism of Japan in Asia. [Although with the US still deeply isolationist you might see no embargo on Japan resulting in the war in China continuing until probably Japan collapses. ]

You are definitely going to see Germany invade the USSR but the Soviets are less likely to be caught by surprise. The big question might be whether Stalin is therefore avoids the big mistakes of OTL Barbarossa in allowing such massive forces to be encircled. Also does Germany do that much better that they reach and start fighting for Moscow as winter comes in. In which case there's a good chance that the German army suffers a markedly bigger Stalingrad disaster a year earlier. The following war could then possibly end up as a war of mutual exhaustion as Germany will have access to greater resources than OTL but will struggle after such losses to defeat a still largely unbroken Soviet Union.

Bascially however there are so many variables that just about anything can happen. You could see democracy possibly even being eclipsed across most of the world or things not going much worse for it eventually than OTL. However with a WWII like start and France still defeated its going to be very, very bad for Europe and probably other parts of the world with a much higher death rate.

Adolf Hitler had already become Chancellor on January 30, 1933 while Zangara's assassination attempt was in February of 1933, so it wouldn't affect that. As far as political differences between FDR and how that relates to the economic recovery:

President Roosevelt had an extremely ambitious agenda for his first term and used Garner's knowledge and experience to help him execute it. Throughout the first term, Garner was an invaluable member of the new administration as it pursued revolutionary solutions to address the Great Depression. Garner used his political contacts in both the House and Senate to assist passage of Roosevelt's agenda. As presiding officer of the Senate, he sometimes descended to the Senate floor to personally lobby for bills. Although he provided essential assistance to Roosevelt throughout the first term, differences between the two men began to sour the relationship. While Garner generally supported emergency legislation to address the Depression, he was not comfortable with all of the New Deal programs. He was particularly critical of the Wagner Labor Relations Act, the Social Security Act, and the Revenue Act. Furthermore, Roosevelt's attempts to direct the legislative agenda offended Garner's deeply held belief in the importance of an independent Congress. While he was renominated in 1936, his role within the administration changed profoundly.

The First New Deal, which stabilized the economy and allowed for renewed growth would still pass, but the Second New Deal and other elements wouldn't. This would likely result in a President Huey Long for the Farmer Labor Party in 1940, would would have no interest in dealing with Europe or the Pacific given his domestic focus:

A political poll by the Roosevelt re-election team, the first national poll of its kind, revealed that Long was siphoning key Democratic support from FDR's campaign. Democratic National Committee Chairman James Farley estimated that Huey could draw up to 6 million popular votes in the 1936 election. According to aides, Roosevelt hoped to “steal Long’s thunder” by embracing some of his causes.

Long’s rapid rise in national popularity is credited with Roosevelt’s Second New Deal of 1935, a more liberal version of his New Deal agenda, which included proposals for Social Security (old age pensions), the Works Progress Administration (public works projects), the National Youth Administration (financial aid and employment for students), the National Labor Relations Board (rights of unions to organize, minimum wage and 40-hour work week), the Public Utility Holding Company Act (regulation of public utilities), the Farm Security Administration (assistance to farmers), and the Wealth Tax Act (graduated income and inheritance taxes).

Now, focusing in on the USSR angle of this, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler by David Glantz:

Many of the same logistical problems that plagued German planners also limited the Soviet defenders. Despite consistent efforts throughout the interwar period, the railway network in the western USSR, like its 1914 predecessor in Imperial Russia, was inadequate for a rapid mobilization and projection of forces from the interior to the border. The only solution that Soviet staff officers could develop was to concentrate forces and supplies near the border prior to hostilities, a process that was still ongoing when the war began. This railroad restriction goes far to explain the apparently aggressive and even foolhardy forward deployment of Red Army and Air Force elements in 1941.

Further on:

Soviet infantry organization was superficially similar to that of the Germans. Each rifle division was authorized 14,483 men organized into three rifle regiments of three battalions each, plus two artillery regiments and supporting services. Three rifle divisions formed a rifle corps, with two or three rifle corps and one mechanized corps generally composing a field army. In practice, however, the Red Army was woefully understrength, with most divisions numbering 8,000 or less even before the German attack; such divisions had significant shortages in machine guns, 120mm mortars, and antiaircraft guns, not to mention ammunition. 42 In late May 1941, the Soviet government attempted to remedy the personnel shortage by calling up 800,000 additional reservists and accelerating the graduation of various military schools. These additional personnel were just joining their units when the attack came.

On paper, a 1941 field army was supposed to have three rifle corps, each with five divisions, plus a mechanized corps and several separate artillery and engineer regiments. In practice, many of these armies had only six to ten divisions in two rifle corps with an incomplete mechanized corps and little maintenance or fire support. The logistical support base for these field armies was even weaker. 43 The General Staff was responsible for “rear services” of this type, but it failed to establish an effective organization in the newly acquired regions. This meant not only that the forward units received poor support but also that there was no mechanism to evacuate the existing supplies before the Germans overran the area.

In essence, the Soviets were attempting a mobilization but the logistical network could not support such. How about the VVS?

The Red Air Force (Voenno-vozdushnye sily, or VVS) suffered from many of the same problems as the Red Army, and it posed only a limited immediate threat to the Luftwaf e. 47 Although its 10,743 aircraft (9,099 operable), of which 10,266 (8,696 operable) were combat models, made it the largest air force in the world, much of this equipment was obsolescent and suffering from prolonged use. 48 The Great Purges had struck aircraft manufacturers and designers as well as aviation commanders, ending the Soviet lead in aeronautics. At least one designer was shot for sabotage when an experimental aircraft crashed, and other engineers were put to work in prison design shops.

Despite such limitations, some newer aircraft—such as the swift MiG-1 and MiG-3 fighters and the excellent Il-2 Sturmovik ground attack airplane—were equal or superior to their German counterparts. These aircraft were just entering service in 1941, and many units had a mixture of old and new equipment. A massive increase in the size of the air force combined with the purges to dilute the number of trained leaders, pilots, administrators, and mechanics, so that 25 percent of VVS regiments existed only on paper.

In an atmosphere where a plane crash would result in the commander’s arrest for sabotage, VVS leaders were very cautious about allowing their pilots to train on the new aircraft or fly at night. Pilots in the Baltic Special Military District averaged only 15.5 flight hours in the first three months of 1941; their counterparts in Kiev averaged 4 hours. Only 932 of 2,800 pilots had completed transition training to their new aircraft by 22 June. 49 Many soldiers and airmen were so unfamiliar with the new designs that they fired on their own aircraft when the war began.

The VVS also suffered from a host of other problems, many arising from overexpansion. There were severe shortages of ordnance and spare parts. The movement of the Soviet frontier had led to the construction of numerous new air bases, but many of these were poorly equipped in terms of supplies or revetments; the best-prepared airfields were also the farthest to the west and therefore the first to fall to the enemy. Air regiments had little practice in dispersing aircraft, displacing between bases, or coordinating bombers with fighter escorts.

Soviet air units were divided between a number of different commands: some air divisions supported specific ground armies, or fronts; others were directly subordinate to the General Staff; and still others were dedicated to the regional air defense of the homeland. In the context of the chaotic opening campaign, where tenuous communications and chains of command evaporated, such divisions made it difficult to bring coordinated airpower to bear at key points. Few Soviet aircraft had radios in 1941.

Given the lack of radios and a support network, dispersing the Soviet Air Force (VVS) would've been impossible, rendering the entire force inoperable even if the Germans failed to catch it on the ground and destroy it. Finally, what about the Germans, without a Western Front due to no Anglo Americans? Western Aid for the Soviet Union During World War II: Part II by Denis Havlat:

Overall, the Western Allies were responsible only for a small fraction of the losses sustained by German infantry and armor between 1941 and 1943 (around 10 percent); however, their contribution in the destruction and occupation of the Luftwaffe was overwhelming. The same applies to their contribution in forcing the Germans to leave most heavy artillery in the Reich as anti-aircraft weapons, preventing them from being used as anti-tank weapons in the East. Without Allied military intervention, the Germans could have sent at least 2,000 additional tanks, some 5,000 additional 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, around 15,000 additional aircraft, tens of thousands of additional motor vehicles, and up to half a million additional soldiers to the Eastern Front in the years 1941–1943, which would have shifted the balance in their favor.

Further on:

Without the need to fight in the Atlantic; to transport large amounts of troops, equipment, and supplies across the entire continent; and the necessity to defend against Allied bombing, Germany could have massively reduced its U-boat, locomotive, and anti-aircraft gun and ammunition production and converted at least part of these capacities into the production of more aircraft and equipment for land warfare. Additionally, without bombing, and the need to maintain a large enough army to fight on several fronts, there would have been less need to use forced labor in the factories, thus boosting production. Historically, Germany already outproduced the USSR in certain areas like locomotives, trucks, and even bombers, with 12,664 produced by Germany in the years 1941–1943 as compared to 11,359 built by the USSR.170 Without Allied intervention and Lend-Lease, Soviet margins in these areas would most likely have widened, while margins in areas such as tanks would have shrunk significantly. If Germany and its industry could have concentrated on one single front from 1941 onwards, it most likely would have vastly changed the outcome of the war in the East.

stevep · Oct 27, 2020

HL

Sorry posting in a bit of an hurry but you are right about Hitler already securing power before the assassination.

How the rest goes depends on circumstances. The US was in a very bad way in Feb 33 and with the sudden death of the President that's going to make matters worse. Also as you say Garner was willing to support some New Deal measures but opposed a lot of others. With him suddenly becoming President before FDR actually took power its unclear how much he would support of a radical policy and you might see for instance the total banking collapse that was widely feared. Even a small delay in action is likely to be bad.

In that case Long could well emerge as a significant candidate in 36 as Roosevelt was fearing and with a more conservative Democrat establishment the likely result - after 4 years of Democratic 'failure' and division would be a split vote and the Republicans regaining power. Long, presuming his own assassination is avoided, might then emerge as a possibly successful candidate in 40 if the Republicans had continued with their policy of 29-32 which is unlikely to resolve the economic and social issues. Assuming enough people aren't desperate enough by then to look at more extreme options. Most/all of those events are likely to keep the US looking inwards but will have big impacts on the wider world event.

With the comment from Glantz

Many of the same logistical problems that plagued German planners also limited the Soviet defenders. Despite consistent efforts throughout the interwar period, the railway network in the western USSR, like its 1914 predecessor in Imperial Russia, was inadequate for a rapid mobilization and projection of forces from the interior to the border. The only solution that Soviet staff officers could develop was to concentrate forces and supplies near the border prior to hostilities, a process that was still ongoing when the war began. This railroad restriction goes far to explain the apparently aggressive and even foolhardy forward deployment of Red Army and Air Force elements in 1941.[\QUOTE]

Never heard that before but could explain the forward deployment. so interesting. However its noted that this is from the interior to the borders. Which means its only really relevant in terms of logistics while the fighting is on the borders. As the Germans advance into Russia their problems increase while the Soviet ones ease somewhat. Given that as Glantz has noted elsewhere the Soviets put up fierce resistance and the Germans quickly had logistical problems, especially given the separation between motorised and foot units most of the problems they face are still going to be there. After all the titile of the book is "When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler"

Ignoring of course how much might have changed in the period 1933-41. Germany might be less or more powerful, might not have gone to war at all, say if one of the earlier attempts to assassinate Hitler had succeeded, or might have been forced to back down over the Rhineland for instance, or have failed to conquer France. Similarly the status of all the other great powers could have changed significantly and some of them almost certainly would have.

Steve

History Learner · Oct 27, 2020

stevep said:
HL

Sorry posting in a bit of an hurry but you are right about Hitler already securing power before the assassination. How the rest goes depends on circumstances. The US was in a very bad way in Feb 33 and with the sudden death of the President that's going to make matters worse. Also as you say Garner was willing to support some New Deal measures but opposed a lot of others. With him suddenly becoming President before FDR actually took power its unclear how much he would support of a radical policy and you might see for instance the total banking collapse that was widely feared. Even a small delay in action is likely to be bad.

In that case Long could well emerge as a significant candidate in 36 as Roosevelt was fearing and with a more conservative Democrat establishment the likely result - after 4 years of Democratic 'failure' and division would be a split vote and the Republicans regaining power. Long, presuming his own assassination is avoided, might then emerge as a possibly successful candidate in 40 if the Republicans had continued with their policy of 29-32 which is unlikely to resolve the economic and social issues. Assuming enough people aren't desperate enough by then to look at more extreme options. Most/all of those events are likely to keep the US looking inwards but will have big impacts on the wider world event.

For ease of reply, I'm gonna split this post in two if that's okay?

At this time in American politics, the inauguration is in March so Hoover was still President in February of 1933. Thus, the transfer of power would be seamless to Garner in that respect, so no lost time. As far as what Garner supported and didn't, he supported the First New Deal which was the following:

The First New Deal (1933–1934) dealt with the pressing banking crises through the Emergency Banking Act and the 1933 Banking Act. The Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) provided $500 million ($9.88 billion today) for relief operations by states and cities, while the short-lived CWA gave locals money to operate Make-work projects in 1933–1934.[5] The Securities Act of 1933 was enacted to prevent a repeated stock market crash. The controversial work of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) was also part of the First New Deal.

So the banks would still be stabilized. He didn't support the Second New Deal, which didn't deal with the banks and included things like Social Security.

Never heard that before but could explain the forward deployment. so interesting. However its noted that this is from the interior to the borders. Which means its only really relevant in terms of logistics while the fighting is on the borders. As the Germans advance into Russia their problems increase while the Soviet ones ease somewhat. Given that as Glantz has noted elsewhere the Soviets put up fierce resistance and the Germans quickly had logistical problems, especially given the separation between motorised and foot units most of the problems they face are still going to be there. After all the titile of the book is "When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler"

I think there might be some confusion, as the original point as I understood it was arguing the USSR would mobilize with Britain withdrawing from the conflict? With regards to the logistical situation of the Germans, Glantz says the following:

On 12 and 15 November 1940, the army quartermaster general, Major General Edouard Wagner, presented his logistical calculations to General Franz Halder, the Chief of the General Staff. In hindsight, these calculations were remarkably accurate. Wagner estimated that the army had sufficient fuel to advance to a maximum depth of only 500 to 800 kilometers (300 to 500 miles), with enough food and ammunition for a twenty-day operation. 23 After that, Wagner concluded, the army would have to pause for several weeks for resupply, and it would be dependent on the captured Soviet rail network to support a deeper penetration.

Historically, this point was reached in September, of 1941. The problem for the Soviets, however, is that the German advance had overrun critical economic areas by that juncture or was in the process of doing so. The loss of the Ukraine and other occupied areas had already engendered shortages of coal (The Donbass was home to roughly 60% of Soviet output by itself), aluminum (Main Soviet facility was along the Dnieper, about 60-80% of production), iron ore (60% of production), steel (50% of production), electric power (30% of output), manganese ore (30% of production), and nickel (30% of production). Overall output of the machinery and metal goods sector had fallen by 40%. In addition, the USSR was also unable to meet the demand for copper, tin, zinc, lead, aluminum, and nickel with remaining sources; Lend Lease was sufficient to meet all of these demands except for aluminum and nickel. Antimony, tungsten, cobalt, vanadium, molybdenum, tin, and magnesium were also almost entirely lacking.

The situation in food was also terrible:

The Bread of Affliction: The Food Supply in the USSR during World War II, by William Moskoff -

The central fact behind the increased importance of the collective farm market was the drastic drop in food production, especially in 1942 and 1943, and the diminished proportion that went to the civilians. In 1943 overall agricultural production was only 38 percent of the 1940 level. In 1943, however, the Red Army began to recapture agricultural areas of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Caucasus and by the next year, 1944, agricultural output had risen to 54 percent of the 1940 level. Not surprisingly, the collapse of the food economy led to astonishing increases in prices. The most rapid rate [Emphasis by author] of increase in prices took place in 1942 and began to taper off in mid-1943.

The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945 by Walter Scott Dunn -

By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals.

Lend Lease was beyond critical given the situation. To quote from Hunger and War: Food Provisioning in the Soviet Union During World War II -

Ignoring of course how much might have changed in the period 1933-41. Germany might be less or more powerful, might not have gone to war at all, say if one of the earlier attempts to assassinate Hitler had succeeded, or might have been forced to back down over the Rhineland for instance, or have failed to conquer France. Similarly the status of all the other great powers could have changed significantly and some of them almost certainly would have.

Given the high rate of failure for attempts on Hitler's life and the strategic reasoning behind the failure of France to intervene in 1936 or stop the offensive in 1940*, I don't see that changing in my personal estimation. Given that, and for ease of comparison, I'm assuming that the overall same course of 1933 to 1941 is followed.

* To quote from Horne's To Lose a Battle:

Basically, the French would not be ready for war until 1942, which explains their failure to oppose the Rhineland Re-militarization in 1936 and was, arguably, the critical factor behind the German success in 1940; they were better prepared.

stevep · Oct 27, 2020

HL

Short of time because its late here. Will try and reply to other posts tomorrow.
a) Assuming everything else will stay the same despite big butterflies is a big assumption and doesn't seem at all likely. Some basic trends will be there but for most/all the small issues to repeat pretty much exactly is going way too far.

b) Yes FDR was just about to become President when killed here but that still means a sudden change in the new government with the need for the new President to decide his programme and probably some changes of office to fit his personal interests.

c) If your assuming a much larger moblisation earlier and Stalin not blocking any preparation then the Soviets are likely to put ip an even tougher fight. With higher losses for the Germans, especially the vital mobile spearheads before their attack runs out of steam. Especially since the logistical problems you mention mean that those additional forces will be spaced out more as it would be impractical to maintain them in the border regions.

As you say even with massive mistakes on the Soviet side the German logistical system was in serious problems by the end of September. It did manage to make further gains in October, such as the Donbass region but was increasingly running on empty.

Ditto with decisions related to France it could easily have decided to intervene in 1936 with a slightly different political path as it and Hitler knew France had overwhelming power at that point. Similarly the chances that lead to the OTL sicle attack which was the decisive factor in the rapid collapse of France could easily have gone differently.

What I'm saying, as I've said before, is that you can't assume that with big changes in one area then there won't be big ones on other areas.

Steve

History Learner · Oct 28, 2020

stevep said:
HL

Short of time because its late here. Will try and reply to other posts tomorrow.

No problem.

a) Assuming everything else will stay the same despite big butterflies is a big assumption and doesn't seem at all likely. Some basic trends will be there but for most/all the small issues to repeat pretty much exactly is going way too far.

Agreed that small matters and such will be different, but I think the overall trendlines would stay the same since those are very hard to change.

b) Yes FDR was just about to become President when killed here but that still means a sudden change in the new government with the need for the new President to decide his programme and probably some changes of office to fit his personal interests.

President Hoover was still in office and would be until March, at which time Garner would become President, so there is no sudden change but the already scheduled turnover in a month. Garner supported the First New Deal and actively worked to pass it, so I don't see any real differences there.

c) If your assuming a much larger moblisation earlier and Stalin not blocking any preparation then the Soviets are likely to put ip an even tougher fight. With higher losses for the Germans, especially the vital mobile spearheads before their attack runs out of steam. Especially since the logistical problems you mention mean that those additional forces will be spaced out more as it would be impractical to maintain them in the border regions.

As you say even with massive mistakes on the Soviet side the German logistical system was in serious problems by the end of September. It did manage to make further gains in October, such as the Donbass region but was increasingly running on empty.

l think there is some confusion here; I don't think Stalin would accurately differently as he was already attempting a partial mobilization and attempting to form another defensive line, but these efforts failed because of the German qualitatively superiority and inherent defects in the Red Army's structure and logistical system. As such, I don't see anyway Stalin and the Red Army could do better in 1941 overall, but especially so here.

As far as the German logistical situation goes, I agree that the August-September pause was needed. As you note, however, by October and November the German advance had overwhelmed vast areas of Soviet economic resources and this meant that, even if the Germans failed to land the killing blow in 1941, they would do so in 1942 or 1943 at the latest. As Stalin himself noted, American Lend Lease is what prevented the collapse of the USSR at that critical juncture by keeping the Red Army fed and equipped. Personally, however, I am convinced the killing blow would be landed in 1941:

If the Ostheer had a weakness, it was its logistical tail. Captured rail lines were handling only around half to two-thirds of their former capacity, while competing demands by garrison commanders in Poland squeezed supplies passing through to the front. To make matters worse, Typhoon’s six armies had only four major railheads from which to draw ammunition, fuel, and food, and the armies could not operate far from these railheads, given poor road networks and Germany’s chronic shortage of motor transport. Two-thirds of Germany’s artillery was still horse-drawn as Operation Typhoon began. Of the 13,000 tons of supplies per day needed to sustain Army Group Center’s 70 divisions, its motor pool was able to supply just 6,500 tons over decrepit Russian roads.

To re-quote Havlat:

Overall, the Western Allies were responsible only for a small fraction of the losses sustained by German infantry and armor between 1941 and 1943 (around 10 percent); however, their contribution in the destruction and occupation of the Luftwaffe was overwhelming. The same applies to their contribution in forcing the Germans to leave most heavy artillery in the Reich as anti-aircraft weapons, preventing them from being used as anti-tank weapons in the East. Without Allied military intervention, the Germans could have sent at least 2,000 additional tanks, some 5,000 additional 88 mm anti-aircraft guns, around 15,000 additional aircraft, tens of thousands of additional motor vehicles, and up to half a million additional soldiers to the Eastern Front in the years 1941–1943, which would have shifted the balance in their favor.

Without the Western Front, the Germans could-as noted by Havlat-divert tens of thousands of trucks to the Eastern Front and this would address Army Group Center's logistical issues. Theoretically, it's entirely possible that the advance on Moscow could thus even begin in early September instead of October 2nd.

Ditto with decisions related to France it could easily have decided to intervene in 1936 with a slightly different political path as it and Hitler knew France had overwhelming power at that point. Similarly the chances that lead to the OTL sicle attack which was the decisive factor in the rapid collapse of France could easily have gone differently.

What I'm saying, as I've said before, is that you can't assume that with big changes in one area then there won't be big ones on other areas.

Steve

I agree minor changes will happen, but I don't think the stated PoD is enough to divert the overall strategic structure. With regards to 1936 Rhineland Crisis, to quote from Sir Alistair Horne's To Lose a Battle: France 1940, Chapter Two:

In her turn, France looked towards Britain. But Britain was preoccupied with Italy and Abyssinia; besides, had not France declared impatiently, just two years previously, thereby killing the Disarmament Conference, that ‘France will henceforth guarantee her security by her own means’? 11 In any case, a large portion of Englishmen thoroughly agreed with Lord Lothian’s historic comment about the Germans ‘only going into their own back-garden’. So Britain told France that this was her problem.

The French Government called in General Gamelin, Weygand’s successor as Army Commander-inChief. Gamelin, already revealing himself a master of political if not military manoeuvre, temporized and equivocated in the style that was to prove so fatal to France four years later. Of course his Army was ready for instant action; but did the Government realize that the Germans had nearly a million men under arms, 300,000 of them already in the Rhineland? It was an absurd exaggeration (see below, p. 75), deliberately intended to avoid action and pass the responsibility on to the politicians. Without conceding that the Army might in any way be unfit for a swift offensive operation, Gamelin pointed out that it was numerically under strength owing to the reduction in military service (of course the fault of the politicians, he implied). Then he dropped the bombshell that, if it were to act over the Rhineland, the Government would have to face up to the prospect of general mobilization. 12

The French Ministers looked at each other in horror. Mobilization! And six weeks before an election? It was madness. The electorate would never stand for it. Parliamentary defeat would be certain – why their very jobs were at stake! It was impossible. Now both the military and the politicians had their excuses. It remained to blame Britain for their joint paralysis of will. This was, however, said Churchill, ‘an explanation, but no excuse’; and indeed, at least in the opinion of Paul Reynaud, had France acted alone, in defence of her vital interests, Britain would have been bound to back her up.

In short, Britain was refusing to back the French and the French Army was in no condition to conduct an action anyway. A general mobilization would have to be called and completed first, and with the upcoming elections there was no interest in doing so. The Left in France was ascendant at this time, and they held no interest in re-armament.

stevep · Oct 28, 2020

HL

Two basic points.
a) Yes with no L-L a victory for the Soviets will be a lot more costly and possibly impossible. However if the Germans suffer worse in late 41 because they get a more exposed position and seem much of AGC consumed in a murderous battle for Moscow, possibly followed by an encirclement then they would have needed that additional equipment and manpower available in 41/43 to make up their losses. A German victory after such losses would be still very difficult to achieve.

Plus as you quote the German logistics were faltering even before the weather went bad. The quote from Havlat covers extra resources over a three year period and I would suspect that the bulk of those resources weren't available in 41. Plus what additional forces that would be available would need transportation and support which is already lacking. Additional trucks simply weren't available in large numbers. Ditto that for instance, it takes a lot more to support a 88mm gun and its crew somewhere in the east than inside Germany itself.

Also, assuming your who I think you are you have argued that Germany would refuse to make peace with France and other occupied areas so it could continue looting them. This is going to have consequences including needing to garrison those regions.

b) Your assuming that everything happens pretty much exactly as OTL. You admit that France acting alone could prevent the reoccupation of the Rhineland, especially since Hitler had ordered the German units involved to withdraw if France reacted to the move. There are a lot of small things that could change matters for instance:
i) France might go for an allied approach rather than having made such a rash declaration earlier.
ii) Italy doesn't invade Ethiopia in this crisis period.
iii) Britain could decide either to sacrifice Ethiopia or to seriously oppose Italy, either of which would have important results.
iv) France could have a different government, not be due an election in a few months or get honest details from their military CinC, who simply may not be Gamelin.
v) Britain could have a different government or simply a few members who realise that Hitler is a serious threat and hence we need to nip him in the bud.

Steve

History Learner · Oct 28, 2020

stevep said:
HL

Two basic points.
a) Yes with no L-L a victory for the Soviets will be a lot more costly and possibly impossible. However if the Germans suffer worse in late 41 because they get a more exposed position and seem much of AGC consumed in a murderous battle for Moscow, possibly followed by an encirclement then they would have needed that additional equipment and manpower available in 41/43 to make up their losses. A German victory after such losses would be still very difficult to achieve.

How exactly do the Soviets achieve such a victory? If you're arguing their logistics prevent them from making a decisive advance on Moscow, how exactly do they expose themselves to such an event when it failed to occur under the exact same historical circumstances? With regards to a long war, German casualties from October, 1941 to January of 1942 amounted to 174,194 of all kinds. As Havlat notes, up to 500,000 soldiers without the Western Front would be available, making good any losses by Army Group Center.

Plus as you quote the German logistics were faltering even before the weather went bad. The quote from Havlat covers extra resources over a three year period and I would suspect that the bulk of those resources weren't available in 41. Plus what additional forces that would be available would need transportation and support which is already lacking. Additional trucks simply weren't available in large numbers. Ditto that for instance, it takes a lot more to support a 88mm gun and its crew somewhere in the east than inside Germany itself.

Indeed, German logistics were strained by September, which required the operational pause before beginning Operation Typhoon. The logistical issues that emerged during said operation, however, could be addressed by the introduction of resources that historically were used against the Western Allies, most of which were available in 1941. I do not presume the large scale introduction of forces in 1941, but that things like trucks and aircraft, which would not burden Army Group Center's supply lines but, in the case of the former, improve it.

Case in point, as noted, AGC's existing supply train could only support about 50% of their daily logistical needs. As Havlat notes in Part II:

The North African campaign had been a costly endeavor for the Axis. Total losses amounted to 620,000 killed or captured soldiers (one-third of them German), 7,600 aircraft, 2,550 tanks, 6,200 guns, and 70,000 trucks.57 German forces alone had lost 835 tanks in the two years from February 1941 to February 1943; aircraft losses had been even more severe.58 From November 1942 to May 1943 the Germans had lost 2,422 aircraft in the Mediterranean, including 1,005 fighters, 862 bombers, and 371 transport aircraft.59 British historian R. A. C. Parker concludes: ‘The western allies were keeping occupied a comparatively small number of German troops, but their fighting power made their removal from the eastern front an important help to the Red Army. North Africa was thus an authentic “second front”’. 60

The addition of just 6,000 trucks to Army Group Center in October of 1941 would've not only allowed them to meet their daily total of 13,500 tons of supplies but to actually establish a surplus.

Also, assuming your who I think you are you have argued that Germany would refuse to make peace with France and other occupied areas so it could continue looting them. This is going to have consequences including needing to garrison those regions.

To quote from Havlat, in Part II:

The most reliable method to calculate the military help provided to the USSR is to examine the amount of effort the German army had to expend in fighting the Western Allies. According to Norman Davies, British forces accounted for perhaps 5 to 10 percent of German casualties and American forces perhaps 15 percent, making the Western Allies responsible for 20 to 25 percent of German land warfare losses.137

Calculating the number of German divisions by the time these units were stationed at a certain front, John Ellis comes to the conclusion that out of a total of 9,032, the Eastern Front accounted for 7,146 (79 percent) of German military effort, while the North African Campaign, the battles in Italy, and the fighting in Western Europe accounted to 91,393 and 637 respectively.138 This conclusion is easily verifiable. The average number of German divisions fighting on the Eastern Front from June 1941 to May 1945 was 161.5.139 If one multiplies the amount of divisions with the duration they spent on this front, or 161.5 divisions times 46.5 months, one gets a military effort of 7,510 ‘division-months’. 140

Using the same method for the fronts where the Germans were fighting the Western Allies produces the following results:141

● North Africa: An average of 3.5 German divisions were fighting for 26.5 months = 93.

● Italy: An average of 22 German divisions were fighting for 22 months = 484.

● Western Europe: An average of 60 German divisions were fighting for 11 months = 660.

France, in 1942 and 1943 after Operation Anton was occupied by about 20 Divisions, and this had increased to 56 by June of 1944 in reaction to the looming threat of the Allied invasion. Occupying France without the Anglo Americans in the conflict would thus not present a serious burden on the Germans.

b) Your assuming that everything happens pretty much exactly as OTL. You admit that France acting alone could prevent the reoccupation of the Rhineland, especially since Hitler had ordered the German units involved to withdraw if France reacted to the move. There are a lot of small things that could change matters for instance:
i) France might go for an allied approach rather than having made such a rash declaration earlier.
ii) Italy doesn't invade Ethiopia in this crisis period.
iii) Britain could decide either to sacrifice Ethiopia or to seriously oppose Italy, either of which would have important results.
iv) France could have a different government, not be due an election in a few months or get honest details from their military CinC, who simply may not be Gamelin.
v) Britain could have a different government or simply a few members who realise that Hitler is a serious threat and hence we need to nip him in the bud.

Steve

I think you misunderstood, as that is not my belief with regards to France. The French did seek British support, but were rejected; left on their own, this was one of the reasons the French refused to act. As Horne notes, Gamelin lied because the Army, as a result of being underfunded during the 1930s, was not in a condition to actually oppose the Germans. The same is true for the timing of the Rhineland; it was chosen in part precisely because of the ongoing political difficulties in France. Given all of these were largely tied to the Great Depression and that pre-dates the PoD, I don't see anyway such could be changed. You might, in theory, have Gamelin replaced, but that does change the structural issues with the French Army as a whole, for example.

stevep · Oct 28, 2020

History Learner said:
How exactly do the Soviets achieve such a victory? If you're arguing their logistics prevent them from making a decisive advance on Moscow, how exactly do they expose themselves to such an event when it failed to occur under the exact same historical circumstances? With regards to a long war, German casualties from October, 1941 to January of 1942 amounted to 174,194 of all kinds. As Havlat notes, up to 500,000 soldiers without the Western Front would be available, making good any losses by Army Group Center.

Because reaching the outskirts of Moscow, as they did OTL is not the same as capturing it. You were assuming that the Germans were able to make a serious attack on the city. It follows that if this occurs and it doesn't succeed then a chunk of the German army is burnt up in urban fighting and even more on its outskirts, suffering from supply diffiuclties that will be greatly compounded by the climate and vulnerable to a counter attack by fresh Soviet forces as they become available.

Indeed, German logistics were strained by September, which required the operational pause before beginning Operation Typhoon. The logistical issues that emerged during said operation, however, could be addressed by the introduction of resources that historically were used against the Western Allies, most of which were available in 1941. I do not presume the large scale introduction of forces in 1941, but that things like trucks and aircraft, which would not burden Army Group Center's supply lines but, in the case of the former, improve it.

Case in point, as noted, AGC's existing supply train could only support about 50% of their daily logistical needs. As Havlat notes in Part II:

The North African campaign had been a costly endeavor for the Axis. Total losses amounted to 620,000 killed or captured soldiers (one-third of them German), 7,600 aircraft, 2,550 tanks, 6,200 guns, and 70,000 trucks.57 German forces alone had lost 835 tanks in the two years from February 1941 to February 1943; aircraft losses had been even more severe.58 From November 1942 to May 1943 the Germans had lost 2,422 aircraft in the Mediterranean, including 1,005 fighters, 862 bombers, and 371 transport aircraft.59 British historian R. A. C. Parker concludes: ‘The western allies were keeping occupied a comparatively small number of German troops, but their fighting power made their removal from the eastern front an important help to the Red Army. North Africa was thus an authentic “second front”’. 60

The addition of just 6,000 trucks to Army Group Center in October of 1941 would've not only allowed them to meet their daily total of 13,500 tons of supplies but to actually establish a surplus.

Those 70,000 trucks - which may include Italian ones and a large number of captured ones as Rommel stated he often relied on captured equipment - were lost over a 3 year period and most would have been lost from Nov 42 because as you say only limited German forces were in N Africa before then. As such very few of those are going to be available in 1941. Ditto with most of the other equipment. You will notice the bit you cite reported heavy Germany air losses from Nov 42.

An additional 6,000 trucks if available and if fuel can be found and supplied to them are going to be operating on muddy roads already clogged in many cases with broken or abandon vehicles. As such how much they would actually add, to get that much additional forces to the front and maintain them there is unclear.

France, in 1942 and 1943 after Operation Anton was occupied by about 20 Divisions, and this had increased to 56 by June of 1944 in reaction to the looming threat of the Allied invasion. Occupying France without the Anglo Americans in the conflict would thus not present a serious burden on the Germans.

I take it you are the same poster then. If this force was occupying France in 41-43 then how much extra would have been available in 41 for the east, along with the additional logistical support that would have been required for them? Especially since if technically continuing the war against France some occupation forces would be necessary, possibly also in the Vichy zone.

I think you misunderstood, as that is not my belief with regards to France. The French did seek British support, but were rejected; left on their own, this was one of the reasons the French refused to act. As Horne notes, Gamelin lied because the Army, as a result of being underfunded during the 1930s, was not in a condition to actually oppose the Germans. The same is true for the timing of the Rhineland; it was chosen in part precisely because of the ongoing political difficulties in France. Given all of these were largely tied to the Great Depression and that pre-dates the PoD, I don't see anyway such could be changed. You might, in theory, have Gamelin replaced, but that does change the structural issues with the French Army as a whole, for example.

I was relying on your quote:

had not France declared impatiently, just two years previously, thereby killing the Disarmament Conference, that ‘France will henceforth guarantee her security by her own means’?

No Gamelin lied about the size of the German forces, as well as their location. The French army was easily able to defeat any German incursion into the Rhineland, even if fighting alone. Apart from the fact the Germans had orders to withdraw if the French reacted as Hitler knew they were too weak.

3+ years are plenty of time for such relatively small but subtle butterflies to occur. The fact the Depression still occurs several years before the POD doesn't change that.

Steve

History Learner · Oct 28, 2020

stevep said:
Because reaching the outskirts of Moscow, as they did OTL is not the same as capturing it. You were assuming that the Germans were able to make a serious attack on the city. It follows that if this occurs and it doesn't succeed then a chunk of the German army is burnt up in urban fighting and even more on its outskirts, suffering from supply diffiuclties that will be greatly compounded by the climate and vulnerable to a counter attack by fresh Soviet forces as they become available.

Okay, so which way is it? You're arguing that logistical difficulties prevent a German capture of Moscow; how then do they get "burnt up in urban fighting" if they haven't been able to reach it in the first place? If such is your position, then how do the Soviets achieve such an envelopment since they failed to do such historically under the same conditions?

If you concede the Germans could reach it, then how do they not capture it? To quote Zhukov:

Western historians have been saying it for decades, but to hear it from Georgy Zhukov himself is something else entirely. In a shockingly candid interview that was finally broadcast in Russia for the first time this year,the commander of the Red Army during World War II readily admits just how close the Soviets came to being defeated by the Germans outside Moscow in 1941—and how poorly organized the Red Army’s defenses were at that critical point in the war.

“It was an extremely dangerous situation,” Zhukov says in the 1966 recording, responding to questions from the Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov. “In essence, all the approaches to Moscow were open.”

By October, only 90,000 troops were left before Moscow with no troops in the city itself. The Germans can't get burnt out in urban fighting if they don't have anybody to fight.

Those 70,000 trucks - which may include Italian ones and a large number of captured ones as Rommel stated he often relied on captured equipment - were lost over a 3 year period and most would have been lost from Nov 42 because as you say only limited German forces were in N Africa before then. As such very few of those are going to be available in 1941. Ditto with most of the other equipment. You will notice the bit you cite reported heavy Germany air losses from Nov 42.

An additional 6,000 trucks if available and if fuel can be found and supplied to them are going to be operating on muddy roads already clogged in many cases with broken or abandon vehicles. As such how much they would actually add, to get that much additional forces to the front and maintain them there is unclear.

The fuel for any additional trucks is easy to find; they wouldn't be using it in North Africa, so they could use it in the Eastern Front. As far as trucks themselves, Rommel in late 1941 had 8,000 in total, 20% more than the 6,000 I stated. Said figure (the 6,000) is also inclusive in terms of need, as Army Group Center needed another 3,000 to achieve supply sufficiency and anything over that would allow for a surplus capacity. I also say 6,000 as that allows for a loss rate of 30-40%, which was seen on the Eastern Front and in North Africa, while still keeping Army Group Center fully supplied.

I take it you are the same poster then. If this force was occupying France in 41-43 then how much extra would have been available in 41 for the east, along with the additional logistical support that would have been required for them? Especially since if technically continuing the war against France some occupation forces would be necessary, possibly also in the Vichy zone.

Everything Havlat listed would be available.

I was relying on your quote:

The quote is part of the citation from Horne's book, not my personal belief. As Horne notes, this was French bluster; as soon as the Rhineland Crisis began, they approached the UK for support.

No Gamelin lied about the size of the German forces, as well as their location. The French army was easily able to defeat any German incursion into the Rhineland, even if fighting alone. Apart from the fact the Germans had orders to withdraw if the French reacted as Hitler knew they were too weak.

According to Horne, this was not the case with regards to the French Army:

The French Government called in General Gamelin, Weygand’s successor as Army Commander-inChief. Gamelin, already revealing himself a master of political if not military manoeuvre, temporized and equivocated in the style that was to prove so fatal to France four years later. Of course his Army was ready for instant action; but did the Government realize that the Germans had nearly a million men under arms, 300,000 of them already in the Rhineland? It was an absurd exaggeration (see below, p. 75), deliberately intended to avoid action and pass the responsibility on to the politicians. Without conceding that the Army might in any way be unfit for a swift offensive operation, Gamelin pointed out that it was numerically under strength owing to the reduction in military service (of course the fault of the politicians, he implied). Then he dropped the bombshell that, if it were to act over the Rhineland, the Government would have to face up to the prospect of general mobilization. 12

If the French Army was fit, why would Gamelin lie after all?

3+ years are plenty of time for such relatively small but subtle butterflies to occur. The fact the Depression still occurs several years before the POD doesn't change that.

Steve

Given the French Army was underfunded because of the Great Depression and the rise of the French Left was also related to such, and thus behind the political issues of the French, any effort to confront the Rhineland Crisis would thus require an ability to mitigate the Great Depression. By 1933, however, such an opportunity had long since passed.

As far as the British go, in 1938 they had only two deployable divisions and did not deploy their first squadron of Hurricanes until October; they had nothing in 1936 to support the French with or oppose the Italians either. This, as well as the ongoing Depression, was why Britain did not move to intervene seriously in either crisis.

stevep · Oct 29, 2020

HL

a) Right, I'll say it again. Reaching Moscow, even with more forces and earlier than OTL is not necessarily taking it. As I've said before its like Stalingrad but earlier and on a much bigger scale. Urban fighting is bloody difficult for an attacker, especially one at the end of a long supply lane and worn down by several months of hard fighting. The Germans can get parts of the urban area but the Soviets can fed in forces as available and necessary to hold them and let them bled out while building up for a counter-offensive. Its not a binary situation that the 1st battalion of German forces reaching the outskirts mean the city is immediately captured.

b) You still need to get those trucks and the fuel to where they need to operate, especially since there's no capacity, unlike in N Africa, to move stuff by sea to save oil and wear and tear on vehicles as they advance to the front. Those 6,000-8,000 extra trucks may be available but they won't solve all the problems, especially since their likely to be spread over all the fronts not just AGC. - That is assuming they exist as skimming through the link I can see a reference to 7,000 trucks the Italians used to support their own forces and to 2,000 used by Rommel in support of his forces for the attack in spring 42 which lead to the capture of Tobruk. I may have missed a reference but numbers are generally fairly easy to pick up. Even if he had that many at some point how many would be captured from British forces, which wouldn't be available in the proposed scenario? I do notice that your not defending the idea that 70,000 additional trucks were available in 1941.

c) Your evading the issue. Its not that such equipment might be available in the timescale Havlat listed, i.e. 41-43 but that they wouldn't be available in summer/autumn 41.

d) The quote from Horne you mentioned shows that such a statement - that France would look after its own interests by its own efforts - existed. It might well have been French bluster but that doesn't change that it occurred.

e) As Horne mentions "It was an absurd exaggeration (see below, p. 75), " in terms of Gamelin's statement of German forces and that a sizeable proportion of them were already in the Rhineland. As you say he was a political soldier and no friend to the current government so that could be the reason he mislead them. Or possibly French intelligence was that bad, although that seems unlikely. In the latter case then a reasonably accurate report of German strength is a quite possible butterfly.

f) France still had a markedly more powerful army than Germany at this stage. Which is why the German army had been ordered to beat a hasty retreat if France had acted. Similarly while the British home army was small the Italian one wasn't that great and to defeat Italy in a crisis over Ethiopia needs a navy more than an army and I doubt you would claim that the RN was up to the task! Even ignoring British control of Gibraltar and Suez. Plus the RAF may have had no Hurricanes at that time but what did Italy have?

Steve

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