The Blair Plan enacted, 1865

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From Mexican Projects of the Confederacy by J. Fred Rippy, The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Apr., 1919), pp. 291-317

On December 28, 1864, Francis P. Blair of Maryland received from President Lincoln a pass through the lines of the Union army to go South and return. On January 12, he arrived at Richmond where he had a conference with Jefferson Davis. Lincoln had permitted him to go in order to learn the attitude of the Confederacy towards proposals of peace, but his mission was said to be unofficial. His main proposition was the cessation of hostilities and the union of military forces for the purpose of maintaining the Monroe Doctrine. Blair urged that slavery, so productive of woe, was "admitted on all sides to be doomed" and that, since Napoleon clearly intended to conquer this continent, any further hostilities toward the Union became a war in support of monarchy for which the French ruler stood. The present suicidal war was most pleasing to the Emperor and, if continued, would enable him to realize his designs.​
Davis the only person whose "fiat could deliver his country from the bloody agony now covering it in mourning." What if an armistice could be entered into--an armistice the secret preliminaries of which might enable Davis to "transfer such portions of his army as he deemed proper to the banks of the Rio Grande ?" Here they could form a junction with the Liberalists under Juirez, who no doubt would devolve all the power he could on Davis, a dictatorship if necessary. If they were needed, Northern forces could join the enterprise and Davis, having driven out the Bonaparte-Hapsburg dynasty and allied his name with those of "Washington and Jackson as defender of the liberty of the country," could mould the Mexican States so that subsequently they could be admitted into the Union.
Thus the peace proposals of Blair amounted to a joint filibustering undertaking by which the United States' possessions were to be extended to the Isthmus of Darien. Davis, moved by feelings of regard resulting from former kindnesses on the part of the Blair family, by a knowledge that alliance with Napoleon was now hopeless, and by a feeling of patriotism, gave close attention to the proposal and displayed a certain amount of sympathy with it. "But," in the words of Nicolay and Hay, "the government councils at Washington were not ruled by the spirit of political ad- venture . . . Lincoln had a loftier conception of patriotic duty and a higher ideal of national ethics" and the affair was dropped."17​

No Peace without Victory, 1861-1865 by James M. McPherson, The American Historical Review , Vol. 109, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 1-18

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Jefferson Davis and the Hampton Roads Peace Conference: "To secure Peace to the two countries" by Charles W. Sanders Jr., The Journal of Southern History, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Nov., 1997), pp. 803-826:

On January 12, Blair met with Davis and began the meeting by emphasizing that he was acting in an unofficial capacity and had no authority to commit the Lincoln government to any program or agreement. His sole purpose in seeking the interview, he told Davis, was the termination of the war. Then, remaining true to his journalistic heritage, the former editor asked permission to read aloud to Davis a document ("much like an editorial," he confessed) outlining his plan for ending the conflict.33​
Blair's document contained a proposal that the two warring sides conclude a cease-fire in order to undertake a common military mission-the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. This joint effort, the details of which would be concluded in a secret agreement, would be directed toward ousting the French-supported government of the Emperor Maximilian in Mexico.34 Blair was certain that such a venture, undertaken after the establishment of a temporary truce that would allow passions on both sides to cool, would restore fraternal relations between the two warring sections and provide the foundation for a lasting peace.35​
Davis listened in silence until Blair finished reading his proposal. He then questioned the old gentleman as to the specifics of how the negotiations might proceed, given the inability of the two sides to join in productive talks in the past. Blair replied that he was certain that Lincoln was now disposed to receive peace commissioners. He pro- posed that he return to Washington, report that the Confederate president was prepared to enter into negotiations based on the Mexican plan, and determine if Lincoln was willing to proceed. Davis agreed and provided Blair with a letter, dated January 12, "of remarks made by me to be repeated by you to President Lincoln ...." In the letter Davis wrote:​
"I have no disposition to find obstacles in forms, and am willing now, as hereto- fore, to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace, am ready to send a commission whenever I have reason to suppose it will be received, or to receive a commission if the United States Government shall choose to send one. That, notwithstanding the rejection of our former offers, I would, if you could promise- that a commissioner, minister, or other agent would be received, appoint one immediately, and renew the effort to enter into conference with a view to secure peace to the two countries.36"​
Those who contend that Jefferson Davis authorized participation in the Hampton Roads conference only to discredit the southern peace movement maintain that the Confederate president, from the start, had no faith in the success of the Blair mission and that he pretended to go along only because he recognized in the proposal a singular opportunity to undercut Stephens and his supporters.37 This argument is flawed because it assumes that Davis knew at this very early stage that the very tentative talks with Blair would culminate, almost a month later, in direct negotiations between Confederate commissioners and the president of the United States and that those negotiations would fail to produce peace. Of course he knew no such thing.
What did he know? He knew that he was dealing with an important and powerful emissary who had come south with Lincoln's express permission. While Blair professed to hold no "official" credentials, Davis believed throughout the process that the old man truly repre- sented the views and aspirations of Lincoln.38 In this opinion, Davis was not alone. The New York Herald, always closely read in the South, proclaimed Blair "the representative of the conservative republicans," and Alexander H. Stephens himself characterized Blair as "unquestionably, the master spirit-the real Warwick-of the Party then in power at Washington ...."39​
How could Davis have been certain that the proposal brought by Blair did not have Lincoln's support? He could not. If Davis's motive, therefore, was to discredit the "croakers," he was running the enormous political risk that the negotiations might actually succeed. Had Davis sought only to discredit the peace movement, a much safer and wiser strategy would have been to make the Blair proposal public immediately, casting it as yet another example of the impractical schemes of those who advocated negotiations with the Lincoln government.​

It would thus seem that in January-February of 1865, leading up to the Hampton Road Conference, there was a genuine opening for a negotiated peace between the Union and Confederacy. Blair's plan was for the two to establish an armistice, and for them to then transfer forces to the Rio Grande in order to force the French out of Mexico. Following the completion of that, it was hoped [by Blair] that the passions on both sides would've been sufficiently mollified that the wayward Confederate States would peacefully rejoin the Union under fairly conservative terms, which Lincoln and Seward IOTL seemed to dangle at the Conference; the prospect that, if they rejoined the Union, they could defeat the 13th Amendment or at least get it to be delayed, and that they would immediately resume their previous privileges, with liberality in terms of having their goods (Sans Slaves) returned and pardons for essentially everyone.

As noted in these passages, it appears the desire for this was real on the part of the Confederates and did have some support in general in the North; beyond the cited passages, news of the OTL Conference added a jolt to the 13th Amendment ratification process, as Congress did not wish to prejudice any negotiations. The obstacle, therefore, would seem to be on the part of Lincoln, who dismissed the Mexico Plan as unfeasible. Is there anyway he could be made amendable to such and, if so, what would the ramifications of such be? It's worth noting Seward, his Secretary of State, was an ardent expansionist and both Nicolay and Hay, whom Rippy cites in the last paragraph of that citation, were his [Lincoln's] Secretaries; they both appeared in favor of the plan, so there was some influencers around Lincoln.
 

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This scenario brings up some interesting possibilities. For a tl;dr version of such:

1) It seems Davis was actually interested in a ceasefire and genuinely willing to consider peace talks that would lead to reunion.
2) Lincoln and Seward both seemed to dangle the prospect of the South being able to avert the passage of the 13th Amendment, as well the limited nature of the Emancipation Proclamation.
3) Annexing Mexico in one go seems unlikely, but the rather deteriorated state of the Mexican Liberals leaves open, in my mind, the ability to establish a protectorate that could eventually be incorporated. Puerto Rico seems a good comparison, in this regard.
 

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"On December 28, 1864" the Confederacy is almost dead. There is practically nothing intetesting for the Union in this proposal. If the Union would like Mexico conquered, then that could be done as well after victory over last Confederate forces four months later.

It ends the war months ahead of schedule, averts the need for Reconstruction and thus reduces the possibility of insurgency by the defeated Confederates and quite literally avoids tens of thousands of casualties on both sides in the final months; at the time, it was not apparent how long the war would continue on. It also, finally, deals with the major geopolitical strategic threat of the French Empire in Mexico in the process. Multiple wins here all around for the Lincoln Administration.
 

History Learner

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So, the Blair Plan works and in February of 1865 the American Civil War comes to a close via agreement in an alternate Hampton Roads Conference. Over the course of March of 1865, Confederate armies lay down their arms and the Confederate States are quickly re-admitted which, when combined with some Northern Democrats is enough to prevent the passage of the 13th Amendment. Still, the damage of the war and the already installed Reconstruction-governments in places like Louisiana or Tennessee means Slavery is definitely on the decline but it will end on terms more amendable to Southern Whites, for better or worse.

Specifically for Mexico, I'd imagine you'd get a combined Army with one Corps of ex-Confederate volunteers, led by James Longstreet since he would be the Confederate commander most amicable to working with the Federals.
 

Abhorsen

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It ends the war months ahead of schedule, averts the need for Reconstruction and thus reduces the possibility of insurgency by the defeated Confederates and quite literally avoids tens of thousands of casualties on both sides in the final months; at the time, it was not apparent how long the war would continue on. It also, finally, deals with the major geopolitical strategic threat of the French Empire in Mexico in the process. Multiple wins here all around for the Lincoln Administration.
The Union wanted reconstruction at the time. Only Lincoln has any real desire to avoid it. They hate the South at this point for both good and bad reasons, and want to crush it. The 13th amendment is getting passed no matter what happens, and it really has no effect on the Confederacy either, as the Emancipation Proclamation already went out, freeing all of their slaves. All the 13th did was free the rest of the slaves in Union territory.
 

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The Union wanted reconstruction at the time. Only Lincoln has any real desire to avoid it. They hate the South at this point for both good and bad reasons, and want to crush it. The 13th amendment is getting passed no matter what happens, and it really has no effect on the Confederacy either, as the Emancipation Proclamation already went out, freeing all of their slaves. All the 13th did was free the rest of the slaves in Union territory.

I think that is to over-state the case:

Lincoln instructed Secretary of State William H. Seward, Representative John B. Alley and others to procure votes by any means necessary, and they promised government posts and campaign contributions to outgoing Democrats willing to switch sides.[49][50] Seward had a large fund for direct bribes. Ashley, who reintroduced the measure into the House, also lobbied several Democrats to vote in favor of the measure.[51] Representative Thaddeus Stevens later commented that "the greatest measure of the nineteenth century was passed by corruption aided and abetted by the purest man in America"; however, Lincoln's precise role in making deals for votes remains unknown.[52]
Republicans in Congress claimed a mandate for abolition, having gained in the elections for Senate and House.[53] The 1864 Democratic vice-presidential nominee, Representative George H. Pendleton, led opposition to the measure.[54] Republicans toned down their language of radical equality in order to broaden the amendment's coalition of supporters.[55] In order to reassure critics worried that the amendment would tear apart the social fabric, some Republicans explicitly promised the amendment would leave patriarchy intact.[56]
In mid-January 1865, Speaker of the House Schuyler Colfax estimated the amendment to be five votes short of passage. Ashley postponed the vote.[57] At this point, Lincoln intensified his push for the amendment, making direct emotional appeals to particular members of Congress.[58] On January 31, 1865, the House called another vote on the amendment, with neither side being certain of the outcome. With 183 House members present, 122 would have to vote "aye" to secure passage of the resolution; however, eight Democrats abstained, reducing the number to 117. Every Republican (84), Independent Republican (2), and Unconditional Unionist (16) supported the measure, as well as fourteen Democrats, almost all of them lame ducks, and three Unionists. The amendment finally passed by a vote of 119 to 56,[59] narrowly reaching the required two-thirds majority.[60] The House exploded into celebration, with some members openly weeping.[61] Black onlookers, who had only been allowed to attend Congressional sessions since the previous year, cheered from the galleries.[62]

If the Southern states are immediately re-admitted, there is no chance of the vote passing. As Lincoln noted in early 1865, the Emancipation Proclamation only applied to the slaves currently under the Union control and the EP as a whole was on shaky ground, given its status as a war time measure.
 

Abhorsen

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Hmm?
I thought it was the other way around - that it only applied to areas under CSA control, with Border States and areas under Union occupation exempt ...
Am I more confused than usual? What did I mix up?
This is correct.

If the Southern states are immediately re-admitted, there is no chance of the vote passing. As Lincoln noted in early 1865, the Emancipation Proclamation only applied to the slaves currently under the Union control and the EP as a whole was on shaky ground, given its status as a war time measure.
As a condition of rejoining, they almost certainly would have had to agree to keeping the slaves free under the emancipation proclamation, which would be a no go, and also mean that slavery would quickly die out, as the only places left in the US that it would have been legal would have been Maryland, DC, and New Orleans (which was under control of the Union at the time). If they don't agree to the emancipation proclamation and the Blair plan is enacted, the whole civil war happens again in a decade or two.
 
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History Learner

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Hmm?
I thought it was the other way around - that it only applied to areas under CSA control, with Border States and areas under Union occupation exempt ...
Am I more confused than usual? What did I mix up?

Basically the EP was a threat to free the slaves by force, but even Lincoln conceded it was only legal under war-time provisions and even then was on shaky legal ground; basically, "What we've already freed would stay free, but those we haven't got to yet would remain in bondage because the war (and thus my power in the matter) would be over."

This is correct.

As a condition of rejoining, they almost certainly would have had to agree to keeping the slaves free under the emancipation proclamation, which would be a no go, and also mean that slavery would quickly die out, as the only places left in the US that it would have been legal would have been Maryland, DC, and New Orleans (which was under control of the Union at the time). If they don't agree to the emancipation proclamation and the Blair plan is enacted, the whole civil war happens again in a decade or two.

Except Lincoln nor Seward said this and, as I have cited, quite clearly stated that the 13th Amendment could be stopped if the South would rejoin the Union. Accepting those slaves already freed would stay such was definitely known and accepted by Jefferson Davis, who carried on the peace talks and as of December of 1864 was advocating a manumission in exchange for service bill in the C.S. Congress; in February of 1865 a last ditch Confederate diplomatic mission in Europe would even offer a general emancipation if the Anglo-French would intervention.
 

Abhorsen

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Except Lincoln nor Seward said this and, as I have cited, quite clearly stated that the 13th Amendment could be stopped if the South would rejoin the Union. Accepting those slaves already freed would stay such was definitely known and accepted by Jefferson Davis, who carried on the peace talks and as of December of 1864 was advocating a manumission in exchange for service bill in the C.S. Congress; in February of 1865 a last ditch Confederate diplomatic mission in Europe would even offer a general emancipation if the Anglo-French would intervention.
Stopping the 13th amendment has very little effect at this point. Almost all slaves have been declared free by the Emancipation Proclamation. The 13th amendment was the final piece of tidying. It almost certainly would have been passed eventually, as it would only have been legal in a few states.
 

Buba

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1 - I think there would be slaves in the four Border States and CSA areas occupied by the Union at the time the EP began to apply;
2 - without the 13th Amendment wouldn't there be the odd situation of States where slavery was legal but there were no/almost no slaves, due to them having been freed by the EP?

Text:
That on the first day of January in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom
 

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1 - I think there would be slaves in the four Border States and CSA areas occupied by the Union at the time the EP began to apply;
2 - without the 13th Amendment wouldn't there be the odd situation of States where slavery was legal but there were no/almost no slaves, due to them having been freed by the EP?

Text:
That on the first day of January in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom
Basically this. And what this leads to is the 13th amendment and also a court stacking on the supreme court because Tany is judge right now.
 

History Learner

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Stopping the 13th amendment has very little effect at this point. Almost all slaves have been declared free by the Emancipation Proclamation. The 13th amendment was the final piece of tidying. It almost certainly would have been passed eventually, as it would only have been legal in a few states.

Stopping the 13th Amendment would have a very large effect, as slavery has only been ended in a handful of areas; roughly 400-800,000 slaves have been emancipated, meaning roughly two million remained in bondage even at this late date. The EP would keep the former free but the latter would remain, although I don't deny slavery at this point is on borrowed time in the South given the situation. The difference is it won't be ended by a Federal amendment but on terms more amendable to the Southerners as a peace concession. As for the ability of the 13th to pass later, if it didn't have the votes without a massive bribery campaign with all of the Southern delegations not present in early 1865, with them seated again how exactly can it pass given this would extend the "no" vote substantially?
 

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Stopping the 13th Amendment would have a very large effect, as slavery has only been ended in a handful of areas; roughly 400-800,000 slaves have been emancipated, meaning roughly two million remained in bondage even at this late date. The EP would keep the former free but the latter would remain, although I don't deny slavery at this point is on borrowed time in the South given the situation.
You don't seem to understand what the EP said. All the slaves in the rebelling areas are free de jure, and if possible, de facto. Unless it is repealed, and there is no way in hell Lincoln agrees to this plan with a repeal, once the Union is in control of the south, all the slaves go de facto free, as the slaves now have the legal right to kill their masters and escape, whereas before they only had the moral right. Slavery in the south is over as of the EP + reunification. The 13th was just an added bit to deal with it everywhere else.
 

History Learner

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You don't seem to understand what the EP said. All the slaves in the rebelling areas are free de jure, and if possible, de facto. Unless it is repealed, and there is no way in hell Lincoln agrees to this plan with a repeal, once the Union is in control of the south, all the slaves go de facto free, as the slaves now have the legal right to kill their masters and escape, whereas before they only had the moral right. Slavery in the south is over as of the EP + reunification. The 13th was just an added bit to deal with it everywhere else.

And as I've cited, that's not what Lincoln himself was saying circa the Hampton Roads Conference and earlier. To quote other sources, starting with What Shall We Do With the Negro? by Paul Escott (2009)

"As a consequence of his view of the Constitution, he favored and repeatedly proposed a method of emancipation that would depend entirely upon state initiative and state choice, even if the federal government might help. For the same reason, he viewed his Emancipation Proclamation as a war measure, a step to be chosen only by the commander in chief, to be justified only by 'actual armed rebellion,' and to become inoperative as soon as the war itself ceased. Likewise, he told Confederate commissioners that in the judgement of the courts this war measure might apply only to 200,000 black Americans who had actually experienced its benefits."​
Further:

"Unlike some legal experts and many in his party, Lincoln held to a belief that the U.S. Constitution forbade interference by the federal government with slavery in the states. As a result, this man who decreed emancipation solely on his authority as a commander in chief was also far more of a state-rights president than many tend to remember."​
Finally:

"And, again, as a result of his ideas about the Constitution, he wanted the rebel states to be restored their rights swiftly, if not immediately, and to be able to vote on the Thirteenth Amendment. Lincoln could hold all of these views even though he was antislavery and believed that for one human being to enslave another was morally wrong."​
And from another citation, this being Lincoln by David Donald (1995)
"Stephens' record would be highly suspect were it not confirmed by other, more contemporary evidence that Lincoln did not now insist upon the end of slavery as a precondition for peace. He told Representative Singleton that his 'To Whom it May Concern' letter to the Confederate commissioners at Niagara Falls had 'put him in a false position—that he did not mean to make the abolition of slavery a condition' of peace and that 'he would be willing to grant peace with an amnesty, and restoration of the union, leaving slavery to abide the decisions of judicial tribunals.' On the day before Christmas, Lincoln repeated these views to Browning, who was advising Singleton; he declared 'that he had never entertained the purpose of making the abolition of slavery a condition precedent to the termination of the war, and the restoration of the Union.'"​
 

Abhorsen

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And as I've cited, that's not what Lincoln himself was saying circa the Hampton Roads Conference and earlier. To quote other sources, starting with What Shall We Do With the Negro? by Paul Escott (2009)

"As a consequence of his view of the Constitution, he favored and repeatedly proposed a method of emancipation that would depend entirely upon state initiative and state choice, even if the federal government might help. For the same reason, he viewed his Emancipation Proclamation as a war measure, a step to be chosen only by the commander in chief, to be justified only by 'actual armed rebellion,' and to become inoperative as soon as the war itself ceased. Likewise, he told Confederate commissioners that in the judgement of the courts this war measure might apply only to 200,000 black Americans who had actually experienced its benefits."Further:

"Unlike some legal experts and many in his party, Lincoln held to a belief that the U.S. Constitution forbade interference by the federal government with slavery in the states. As a result, this man who decreed emancipation solely on his authority as a commander in chief was also far more of a state-rights president than many tend to remember."Finally:

"And, again, as a result of his ideas about the Constitution, he wanted the rebel states to be restored their rights swiftly, if not immediately, and to be able to vote on the Thirteenth Amendment. Lincoln could hold all of these views even though he was antislavery and believed that for one human being to enslave another was morally wrong."And from another citation, this being Lincoln by David Donald (1995)
"Stephens' record would be highly suspect were it not confirmed by other, more contemporary evidence that Lincoln did not now insist upon the end of slavery as a precondition for peace. He told Representative Singleton that his 'To Whom it May Concern' letter to the Confederate commissioners at Niagara Falls had 'put him in a false position—that he did not mean to make the abolition of slavery a condition' of peace and that 'he would be willing to grant peace with an amnesty, and restoration of the union, leaving slavery to abide the decisions of judicial tribunals.' On the day before Christmas, Lincoln repeated these views to Browning, who was advising Singleton; he declared 'that he had never entertained the purpose of making the abolition of slavery a condition precedent to the termination of the war, and the restoration of the Union.'"
... Then he wrote the EP, which said exactly what I said it did? I mean, you say all this stuff about what Lincoln really meant, but then once the confederates were effectively beaten and the EP sent out, it's too late for take backsies. The slave's freedom isn't up for discussion, it already happened. Lincoln would not be fine reenslaving millions.
 

History Learner

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... Then he wrote the EP, which said exactly what I said it did? I mean, you say all this stuff about what Lincoln really meant, but then once the confederates were effectively beaten and the EP sent out, it's too late for take backsies. The slave's freedom isn't up for discussion, it already happened. Lincoln would not be fine reenslaving millions.

Actually, he wrote the EP long before any of this, given it was issued in late 1862 and the "To Whom It May Concern" letter is from July of 1864; indeed, all of these references are talking about what Lincoln was saying/thinking/doing in late 1864/early 1865. Overwhelmingly, they show he was prepared to concede the EP would only apply to those ex-slaves that had passed into Union control by that point while leaving alone the vast majority that remained in Confederate hands. Contrary to what you suggest, Lincoln remained up until the Hampton Roads Conference, at least, content with leaving millions in slavery if it meant the end of the war and restoration of the Union.
 

Abhorsen

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The To Whom it may concern letter in full:
Washington, July 18, 1864.

To Whom it may concern:

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States will be received and considered by the Executive government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points; and the bearer, or bearers thereof shall have safe-conduct both ways.

Abraham Lincoln
Yeah, no, slavery was dead and gone after the EP was issued.
 

History Learner

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The To Whom it may concern letter in full:

Yeah, no, slavery was dead and gone after the EP was issued.

Lincoln by David Donald (1995)
"Stephens' record would be highly suspect were it not confirmed by other, more contemporary evidence that Lincoln did not now insist upon the end of slavery as a precondition for peace. He told Representative Singleton that his 'To Whom it May Concern' letter to the Confederate commissioners at Niagara Falls had 'put him in a false position—that he did not mean to make the abolition of slavery a condition' of peace and that 'he would be willing to grant peace with an amnesty, and restoration of the union, leaving slavery to abide the decisions of judicial tribunals.' On the day before Christmas, Lincoln repeated these views to Browning, who was advising Singleton; he declared 'that he had never entertained the purpose of making the abolition of slavery a condition precedent to the termination of the war, and the restoration of the Union.'"​

No, the evidence says otherwise decisively.
 

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