The Kaiser's World: Speculating on a German victory in 1918

The "How" Germany could win

History Learner

Well-known member
In early 1918, the German Empire would launch its last series of offensives on the Western Front, although all are collectively referred to in the singular under the umbrella term of the "Spring Offensive". The German effort was the beneficiary of the collapse of the Russians, allowing the German Army to focus on a singular front for the first time in the war, as well as the refinement of tactics via four years of brutal wartime experimentation and learning. Driven by the very real calculation that the mass arrival of American troops would make victory impossible, the Germans would attempt their last ditch attacks starting in March and would not cease until June, by which point they were exhausted and the AEF was beginning to become increasingly noticeable along the front.

Although the Germans ultimately failed, they did come extremely close to victory. Amiens, one of the two critical railway hubs for the BEF's logistics, had the German Army come within three miles of seizing it while its aforementioned railway was subjected to harassment fire that did affect its operations. Indeed, as David T. Zabecki notes in his The German Offensives of 1918, considered one of the premier accounts of the eponymous attacks, the threat was very real and the BEF was in desperate straits:

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Indeed, as late as June 9th of 1918, as the last major German attack-directed at Paris-was developing, Lord Milner would write to Lloyd George that:

"We must be prepared for France and Italy both being beaten to their knees. In that case the German-Austro-Turks-Bulgar bloc will be master of all Europe and Northern and Central Asia up to the point at which Japan steps in to bar the way, if she does step in. In any case it is clear that, unless the remaining free peoples of the world, America, this country and the Dominions, are knit together in the closest conceivable alliance and prepared for the maximum of sacrifice, the Central Bloc will control not only Europe and most of Asia but the whole world."​

So how could the Germans come to win? Zabecki presents one such scenario on Pages 139-141, although there are many that could be inserted instead:

After 1916 submarines, mines, coastal artillery, and naval aviation were the German Navy's only effective weapons in the West. Had these assets been directed against the BEF's lines of communications (LOCs) in the Channel in coordination with a focused attack ground attack against the BEF's rail network, the British might well have been forced to withdraw from the Continent. The German submarine threat against their sea LOCs was a constant concern to the British, and one of the objectives behind the bloody battle of Passchendaele was to clear the Channel coast of the U-boat bases.

German mines in the Channel could have been delivered by air or by submarine. The Navy's Freidreichshafen bomber was capable of carrying and dropping 750-kilogram naval mines. One such mine, in fact, sank a Russian destroyer during the Baltic Islands operation. Submarines were the other way to lay mines, with the UC-class boats specifically designed as minelayers. Most of the UC-boats carried 18 mines. The U-class boats were fleet submarines that fired torpedoes; but in 1918 the Germans launched ten of the Project 45 fleet U-boats that could lay 42 mines through their torpedo tubes and carry an additional 32 mines in deck containers.

By the start of 1918, the Germans had 42 operational fleet U-boats; 66 operational coastal U-boats (UB-class); and 33 operational UC-class minelayers. During 1918 they built an additional 25 U-class (including the Project 45 boats); 47 UB-class; and 16 UC-class. The British, of course, had the Channel heavily mined, which increased the hazards of any U-boat operations. Mines caused 27 percent of the total German U-boat losses. Of the total of 53 UC type U-boats the Germans lost during the war, 19 were lost to mines. The Germans, nonetheless, had a capability to lay mines in the Channel and at least disrupt that leg of the BEF's LOCs. On 14 February 1918, the German Navy did launch one major and largely successful surface raid against British defenses between Dover and Calais. The Heinecke Torpedo Boat Flotilla sunk 28 British picket ships and other vessels, including an older cruiser. That raid, however, was never followed up. Nor had it been coordinated with OHL, rather it had been launched at the request of the Naval Corps in Flanders. Even after the failure of Operation MICHAEL in March 1918, General Ferdinand Foch still thought that increased submarine operations in the Channel posed a serious threat to cutting off the BEF.

Finally, German naval artillery could have been turned against the BEF's channel ports. The three so-called Paris Guns (Wilhelmgeschütze) were actually manned by naval crews. With a maximum range of 127 kilometers, they had the reach to hit the BEF's three primary northern Channel ports (Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk) and even Dover, if the guns had been positioned in the Fourth Army sector. But between 16 and 30 March 1918, during 140 Operation MICHAEL, they did not fire in support of the attacking Seventeenth, Second, or Eighteenth Armies. Rather, the guns were positioned in the Seventh Army sector, delivering pointless terrorizing fire against Paris.

At least two German coastal batteries in Flanders were capable of hitting Dunkirk and could have fired in support of ground forces during Operation GEORGETTE. But Batterie Deutschland (four 3 80mm guns) never fired against land targets, and Batterie Pommern (one 380mm gun) delivered only occasional fire against Dunkirk and the major British base at Poperinghe. A third battery, Batterie Tirpitz (four 280mm guns), had the range to hit targets in the northern quarter of the Ypres Salient, but it too never fired in support of ground operations.

So let's say the Germans do this, allowing them to close the remaining mileage to Amiens, eliminating 50% of the BEF's logistics immediately. Combined with the existing disruption to the Hazebrouck route, this allows Operation Georgette to take Hazebrouck; the BEF is thus compelled to destroy 90% of its equipment and retreat off the continent in a "1918 Dunkirk" that leaves the British out, at a minimum, for a year as it will take time to rebuild their equipment. Perhaps more pressing for the United Kingdom is that German control of the Channel ports will provide the Germans with the means of finally starving England into submission:

Submarine warfare that threatened the London approaches increased the pressure, and efforts to divert shipping to west coast ports were only partially successful. London was a lighterage port and could not be converted easily to massive rail use. Attempts to supersede a city infrastructure designed to live off of riverside supply lines with inland shipments by rail were likely to throw distribution networks into chaos. One effort to divert cargoes to Plymouth underscored the futility of feeding the entire London basin via rail deliveries from other ports. Out of 27,000 tons off-loaded, only 7,000 made their way to the capital, and there were railroad backups while they did so. It took approximately three weeks to unload the ships in Plymouth, whereas the job would have been done in seven in London.[15]

The situation will be disaster for the French as well, who will now have their right flank open with the evacuation of the British, and are also now greatly outnumbered; the French Army as a result will be compelled to surrender most, if not all, of Northern France and Paris will likely come under siege. Perhaps just as disastrous is the loss of the Bethune coal mines, which fed the Parisian war industries which constituted 70% of overall French output. In short, the Germans will have inflicted a one-two punch that forces the Entente to the table. What does the peace that comes after look like? We will review that in the next post...
 
The Ramifications of a German victory

History Learner

Well-known member
Adam Tooze in The Wages of Destruction gives us an idea of what an Imperial German win would come to look like in general terms:

In the twentieth century the future of the balance of power in Europe would be defined in large part by the relationship of the competing interests in Europe to the United States. Stresemann certainly did not underestimate either military force or the popular will as factors in power politics. In the dreadnought race, Stresemann was a consistent advocate of the Imperial fleet, in the hope that Germany might one day rival the British in backing its overseas trade with naval power. After 1914 he was amongst the Reichstag's most aggressive advocates of all-out U-boat war. But even in his most annexationist moment, Stresemann was above all motivated by an economic logic centred on the United States.12 The expansion of German territory to include Belgium, the French coastline to Calais, Morocco and extensive territory in the East was 'necessary' to secure for Germany an adequate platform for competition with America. No economy without a secure market of at least 150 million customers could hope to compete with the economies of scale that Stresemann had witnessed first hand in the industrial heartlands of the United States.​

John Keegan in his own The First World War also explains German claims in France in better detail:

Despite the near-desperate situation at the front, the Kaiser, government and high command all agreed, on 3 July, that, to complement the acquisition of territories in the east, the annexation of Luxembourg and the French iron and coal fields in Lorraine were the necessary and minimum terms for concluding the war in the west.​

The importance of this war goal cannot be overstated; the portion of Lorraine the Germans sought is called Briey Longwy. Of the 21.57 million tons of iron ore produced in 1913 by France, 90% was mined in Briey Longwy according to Abraham Berglund, "The Iron-Ore Problem of Lorraine," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 3 (May, 1919), pp. 531-554. Germany had occupied this area as early as August 4, 1914 and thus would have a pretty firm claim on the area. Likewise, as noted by Tooze, the portion of Calais the Germans sought to strip from France would also remove the aforementioned Bethune coal mines from the control of Paris. In short, France would be rendered incapable of being a peer competitor of Germany and, indeed, barely fit to hold the title of regional power.

As a side note, outside of their acquisitions on the continent, Britain and France would both be compelled to return occupied German colonies in Africa. Belgium would be forced to cede the Congo to Germany, but would in exchange receive the area around Calais which is also known as French Flanders. France would be forced to cede Dahomey, French Congo, Ubangi-Shari, and perhaps Madgascar as well as portions of French Chad. Britain would not lose anything and it is possible that Germany might cede German Southwest Afrika, in an effort to court the Dominion of South Africa.

Moving to the East, in which the Germans were seeking to model in their own image via the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, we again turn to Adam Tooze. This time we cite from The Deluge, his coverage of 1916 to roughly 1931:

If the British had been able to see inside Ludendorff’s staff offices in the summer of 1918, they would have found ample fuel to feed their fears. Up to the end of June, Chancellor Hertling was able to hold the line established in mid-May, blocking military advances in the East. This position was communicated to the Bolsheviks, enabling them to concentrate their trusty Latvian regiments, fighting as they believed for their independence, against the Czechs, who were fighting for theirs.13 But the equilibrium in Germany was precarious. In late June a memo prepared by Ludendorff’s staff, on ‘The Aims of German Policy’ (Ziele der deutschen Politik), made clear the extent to which German military policy had radicalized since Brest. Ludendorff’s aim was no longer merely to exercise hegemony over the periphery of the former Tsarist Empire, leaving the Bolsheviks in the rump of Russia to their own ruinous devices. In a mirror image of Lloyd George’s vision of a democratic bastion in Russia, Ludendorff aimed to reconstruct an integral Russian state that thanks to its conservative political make-up could be counted on as a ‘reliable friend and ally . . . that not only poses no danger for Germany’s political future, but which, as far as possible, is politically, militarily and economically dependent on Germany, and provides Germany with a source of economic strength’.14 The peripheral states of Finland, the Baltic, Poland and Georgia would remain under German protection. The return of Ukraine to Moscow would be bartered against German economic control over Russia as a whole. Harnessed to the Reich, Russia would provide the means for Germany to exert its domination throughout Eurasia. It would provide the hinterland for an economically self-sufficient, politically authoritarian ‘world state structure’ (Weltstaatengebilde), capable of competing head on with the ‘Pan-American bloc’ (panamerikanischen Block) and the British Empire.15
On the whole, we can thus conclude the 20th Century would be one dominated by Imperial Germany as the chief superpower. As for the United States, they will be a close second, as indicated by Tooze and the expectations of contemporary Germans.

In particular for the United States, German victory could have some unexpected ramifications. In 1919, there was a major war scare with Mexico over attacks on American diplomats and a threat to nationalize the oil industry (largely owned by Americans). This came at the worst possible point as America was already in the throes of the First Red Scare and was compounded by Congress, which at this time also produced documentation of Pro-German and Pro-Bolshevik actions within Mexico, inflaming the crisis. In a situation where Imperial Germany has won, these fears would likely be heightened, as would fears of Bolshevism (more on this later!). This could have serious effects, best exemplified by this statement before Congress by Congressman J.W. Taylor of Tennessee:
"If I had my way about it, Uncle Sam would immediately send a company of civil engineers into Mexico, backed by sufficient military forces, with instructions to draw a parallel line to and about 100 miles south of the Rio Grande, and we would...annex this territory as indemnity for past depredations . . and if this reminder should not have the desired effect I would continue to move the line southward until the Mexican government was crowded off [the] North America."
Taylor was not alone in his sentiments, as these feelings were the culmination of a decade of frustration and anger with Mexico, stretching back into the height of that country's Revolution. To quote from "An Enemy Closer to Us than Any European Power": The Impact of Mexico on Texan Public Opinion before World War I by Patrick L. Cox, The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, Jul., 2001, Vol. 105, No. 1 (Jul., 2001), pp. 40-80:
The Wilson administration and the military again blamed the conflict on Villa. Governor Ferguson expressed the feelings of many when he advocated United States intervention in Mexico to "assume control of that unfortunate country."J. S. M. McKamey, a banker in the South Texas community of Gregory concluded, "we ought to take the country over and keep it." As an alternative, McKamey told Congressman McLemore that the United States should "buy a few of the northern states of Mexico" because it would be "cheap- er than going to war." The San Antonio Express urged the Mexican government to cooperate with Pershing's force to pursue those who participated in "organized murder, plundering and property destruction."
Arizona's Senate delegation also at this time advocated for the annexation of Baja California, at the least. For more information, see:

Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Interventionist Movement of 1919
1919: William Jenkins, Robert Lansing, and the Mexican Interlude
Tempest in a Teapot? The Mexican-United States Intervention Crisis of 1919

Moving back to Europe once again and explaining my earlier statement of why Anti-Bolshevism being worse here, we must recall that even in victory, the Red Tide threatened to consume much of Europe. Italy had the Biennio Rosso, two years of unrest and violence rising to near Civil War levels; can one not envision at least a serious Bolshevik attempt to completely take over following a disastrous defeat after years of massive bloodshed? How about France, which had already seen massive unrest in 1917 and in 1920 had far left elements show a strong showing in the elections; they too could be radicalized via the defeat of France the same way German Bolsheviks were.

It may perhaps be surprising, but even Britain was not immune to this Red threat, herself very nearly succumbing to an attempted Revolution. To quote from The Russian Revolution and the British working class:

At the beginning of 1919 there was a huge wave of troop mutinies across Britain. Soldiers opposed attempts to send them to fight against the Bolshevik government, demanding to be demobilised. Most impressively there were a number of mutinies by British troops in Russia which helped to end the British attempts to crush the revolution.

The revolution gave direction to the disparate British revolutionary forces in their sometimes faltering attempts to intervene in events and to come together as a single revolutionary party. It led to the formation of the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1920 which included most of the best revolutionary activists.

This article explores the interplay between the revolutionary events in Russia and the deepening political crisis in Britain. Critically this was not simply about the motivating effect of Russia on British workers; equally the successful efforts of British workers to prevent intervention in Russia in 1919 and 1920 played a crucial role in holding back British imperial goals.
As the article goes on to note, 1919 was the worst year in that critical time period for Britain, with over 2.59 million workers involved in 1,352 work stoppages and over 34,000 working days lost as a result. The article is also backed up by 1919: Britain on the Brink of Revolution:

In several parts, especially in camps in and around London, mutineers commandeered lorries and drove to Whitehall to deliver their protests directly. On 9 January, 1,500 soldiers based at Park Royal in west London marched on Downing Street to confront Lloyd George and the Cabinet. Cunning Lloyd George was prepared to meet the men, but Lord Milner advised against as “similar processions would march on London from all over the country.” General Sir Henry Wilson declared that “the Prime Minister should not confer with soldiers who had disregarded their officers. The solders’ delegation bore a dangerous resemblance to a Soviet. If such a practice were to spread, the consequences would be disastrous.”

Instead, General Sir William Robertson was sent out to meet a delegation and agreed to their demands for better conditions and an end to the draft for Russia. The troops then returned to barracks.

British troops were also affected in Calais. Soldiers were proving equally unwilling to fight and to obey orders. Towards the end of January 1919, the men of the Army Ordnance and Mechanical Transport sections at the Val de Lievre camp organised a mass meeting which took the decision to mutiny. The mutiny broke out after agitation for demobilisation as the arrest of Private John Pantling, of the Royal Army Ordnance Corps, who had had a speech described by the authorities as a “seditious speech to an assembly of soldiers.”

Rebel soldiers broke into the prison and released Pantling. Military police were brought in to restore order, but the growing anger forced the Commanding Officer to relent and offer concessions. Word spread and Soldiers’ Councils were organised in other camps. When the authorities attempted again to arrest Pantling, the Soldiers’ Councils called a strike, which was completely solid. The guards were replaced by pickets

At another camp in nearby Vendreux, over 2,000 men struck in solidarity. Then they marched to the Calais camp. Following a mass meeting the combined forces marched behind brass bands towards army headquarters. The headquarters were rapidly surrounded by 4,000 mutineers, who demanded the release of Private Pantling, which was acceded to.

The next day, some 20,000 men had joined the mutiny. French troops fraternised as a total embargo was placed upon the movement of British military traffic by train. This stoppage led to 5,000 infantrymen due to return home, joining the demand for immediate demobilisation.

General Julian Byng attempted to call for reinforcements, but they proved equally unreliable in face of the growing mutiny.

The strike, coordinated by the strike committee, was solid. The committee took the title of “The Calais Soldiers' and Sailors' Association.” It was organised on democratic lines, where each group elected a delegate to the Camp Committee, which in turn sent delegates to the Central Area Committee. They ran everything and issued daily orders from the occupied Headquarters.

Soldiers at Dunkirk were also ready to come out. Even the women of the Queen Mary's Army Auxiliary came out in solidarity with the Calais strike. The Calais Area Soldiers' and Sailors' Association continued to meet and applied for representation on the newly formed Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmen's Union. The union continued to grow for five months, claiming 49 branches, including Calais and Boulogne, by the beginning of April. The Calais mutiny, which had clearly have developed a revolutionary character.

On January 30 1919, General Byng finally surrounded Calais with troops equipped with armoured cars and machine guns. However, fraternisation continued between the forces. General Haig wanted the leaders of the Calais mutiny shot. However, the government feared provoking an explosion. There was no soldier punished for the incident despite the fact that mutiny was punishable by death.

The only reprisals were in the navy, where one sailor was sentenced to two years’ hard labour, three to one year and three to ninety days’ detention for refusing to go to sea, taking over the patrol vessel HMS Kilbride at Milford Haven, hauling down the white ensign and hoisting the red flag instead.

The nerves of the General Staff were clearly affected by the revolts. “We are sitting on top of a mine which may go up at any moment”, stated General Wilson to Churchill. Churchill himself feared that the unrest would spread and that “widespread disobedience would encourage Bolshevism in Britain.”

So concerned, Lloyd George rushed back from Paris on 8 February. As he arrived, some 3,000 soldiers from different camps were marching from Victoria Station to Whitehall in protest at food and sleeping arrangements. They were stopped at Horse Guard Parade by a battalion of Grenadier Guards with fixed bayonets, who shepherded them to as far as near Wellington barracks.
On the whole, there is a serious risk that many of the now defeated Entente powers could slip into Bolshevik control or, at the very least, civil war initiated by the same. German bayonets would probably allow Anti-Communist forces to prevail in France and Italy, but Britain, given its position as an island, holds a very real risk indeed. Thus, it is entirely possible that as Germany and America reach for their Imperial goals, the British Empire could collapse as the Home Island falls to Revolution. That this would open up opportunities for other players, such as the United States, Germany, the Ottomans, etc cannot be ignored. Although his comments are on a different scenario (America staying neutral in 1917), H.L. Mencken provides some insights in this regard that I feel could prove useful in our speculations:

Baltimore Evening Sun, Nov. 11, 1931, "A Bad Guess" by H. L. Mencken:
The United States made a similar mistake in 1917. Our real interests at the time were on the side of the Germans, whose general attitude of mind is far more American than that of any other people. If we had gone in on their side, England would be moribund today, and the dreadful job of pulling her down, which will now take us forty or filthy years, would be over. We'd have a free hand in the Pacific, and Germany would be running the whole [European] Continent like a house of correction. In return for our connivance there she'd be glad to give us whatever we wanted elsewhere. There would be no Bolshevism [communism] in Russia and no Fascism in Italy. Our debtors would all be able to pay us. The Japs would be docile, and we'd be reorganizing Canada and probably also Australia. But we succumbed to a college professor [Wilson] who read Matthew Arnold, just as the English succumbed to a gay old dog who couldn't bear to think of Prussian MP's shutting down the Paris night-clubs.
On a final note, with the Red Scare being so much worse in 1919 and likely large numbers of IOTL Fascist Italians running about given the disorder in Italy, I wouldn't be surprised if the United States ended up becoming Fascist in this ATL. Henry Ford came close to winning a Senate seat in 1918 for Michigan and could serve as the Salazar or Hindenburg for such a regime later on, with men like Father Coughlin as the Goebbels of the regime, Huey Long as the Hitler, and Ezra Pound as the Bormann, etc.
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
So let's say the Germans do this, allowing them to close the remaining mileage to Amiens, eliminating 50% of the BEF's logistics immediately. Combined with the existing disruption to the Hazebrouck route, this allows Operation Georgette to take Hazebrouck; the BEF is thus compelled to destroy 90% of its equipment and retreat off the continent in a "1918 Dunkirk" that leaves the British out, at a minimum, for a year as it will take time to rebuild their equipment. Perhaps more pressing for the United Kingdom is that German control of the Channel ports will provide the Germans with the means of finally starving England into submission:

The situation will be disaster for the French as well, who will now have their right flank open with the evacuation of the British, and are also now greatly outnumbered; the French Army as a result will be compelled to surrender most, if not all, of Northern France and Paris will likely come under siege. Perhaps just as disastrous is the loss of the Bethune coal mines, which fed the Parisian war industries which constituted 70% of overall French output. In short, the Germans will have inflicted a one-two punch that forces the Entente to the table.
I think this is the key question here. Did the Germans have the manpower, resources, and ability to push their advantage like that? Zabecki seems to think "no".

On the strategic level Ludendorff ’s grand scheme was doomed from the start. An absolute military victory was impossible for the Germans to achieve in 1918...

If the 1918 offensives had been better designed operationally (as discussed below), the Germans more than likely could have split the British from the French. They probably could have pushed the BEF off the Continent. The Germans might even have been able to put enough pressure on the French to collapse their government. But then what? If Britain had been defeated on the Continent it almost certainly would have continued the fight so long as the Germans controlled the Belgian coast. The British still held an overwhelming superiority at sea, and the blockade had already come close to bringing Germany to its knees at home. The American forces streaming toward France could have been redirected to Britain to form a large military base for an eventual counterattack. This essentially is the scenario that played out in World War II, and in 1940 the Germans were relatively far stronger than they were in 1918.
Pp 311-312.
Strategically the Germans probably reached culmination in World War I with the failure of the unrestricted U-boat campaign and the entry of America into the war
P. 318.

In other words, Zabecki believes that only a negotiated settlement was possible for the Germans in 1918 and their operational strategy should have been tailored to this.
 

ATP

Well-known member
They could made it earlier.
In Poland many see Piłsudzki as saint,becouse he ,with few companies,tried to start Uprising against Russia in 1914/backed by A-H/ nothing come from that,but if he succed,2 russian armies send in OTL to Prussia would go there to massacre us.
German would not widraw dyvisions from West,and Paris would fall in 1914.
In 1915 lonely Russia would sue for peace,and we would have german Europe.Maybe they would even succesfully invade England....
 

DarthOne

☦️
I'm skeptical Imperial Germany could have 'won' in 1918, especially with the Americans on the way or arriving. At best, I think we might have gotten a more balanced Armistice where the Central Powers were not gutted like in the OTL.

Now, if America stayed neutral? Then I think a Central Powers victory would be more likely along the lines of the ones you described.

Of course, history is filled with weird domino effects and changes of fortune that no one could see coming at the time, but are taken for granted after the fact. I think World War 1 is rather bad in this regard. Not only have we to deal with a Century's worth of history written by the victors, but it's often overshadowed by its more infamous sequel, which thoroughly emasculated Germany as a nation and villanized it further then WW1 British propaganda in the eyes of the generations that followed.

Not to mention the effects of the War erasing plenty of historical records on the German side in particular thanks to the Allied firebombing, the murder of Prussia and the Soviet takeover.
 
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Buba

A total creep
1 - I think that German designs could easily be tempered down by their allies.
It is my belief that had the Entente made peace ouvertures to A-H it would had jumped at the opportunity to bail out. As a result Germany would had been forced to chose between pushing its aims on its own, or accepting not-so-good terms.

2 - Brie-Longwy - IMO those mines' relevance is blown out of proportion. These are low grade ores, i.e. 20-35% iron content, propped up by subsidies/hindered development of e.g. Algerian mines. The world is full of providers of high grade ores. France would not be worse off by not having those mines, it would simply ship in ores from abroad. And from inside its empire too!
The mines were more relevant for Germany as in a war overseas supplies are certain to be cut, hence their next door quality matters. Still, both World Wars have shown that Swedish ore will come by way of the Baltic, and in a "Germany wins 1918" scenario supply from Kriviy Rih would be assured as well. So, why bother with those Lorrainian mines at all?
I can understand that smelters designed to work with high grade ores may have problems working with inferior supplies, but would German iron works - designed to work with the low quality stuff from Lorrain - struggle with 50-60% iron content ores from elsewhere?
I really don't understand this fixation with Longwy-Brie ...

3 - In 1918 Germany was in a bad way. And its allies as bad or worse. Any peace negotiations would be a delicate dance between asking for too much and thus having to fight on on one hand and offering realistic terms on the other.
IMO internal talk-talk about desirable terms has a major element of wishful thinking (We demand - the moon!) and would run into the reality of actual peace negotiations.
 
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ATP

Well-known member
Another way for germans to win till 1916 - when Russia attacked Prussia,do not send anything.Even if they capture it,so what?
Take Paris with unchanged Schielfien plan in 1914,defeat Russia in 1915,England invaded if they do not made peace in 1916.
German victory without any miracle.
All they need was do not change anything in their good plan,but noo,they must try do that better.They could blame only themselves for lost war,but since it was germans,they must blame others and lost other war.
 

Buba

A total creep
LOL!
The so-called Schlieffen Plan working is ASB-ish, IMO.
However, for a non-miraculous German victory - no Verdun in 1916 but continued Russia-bashing, a repeat of 1915.
This leaves A-H in better condition and knocks Russia out a year earlier.
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
Another way for germans to win till 1916 - when Russia attacked Prussia,do not send anything.Even if they capture it,so what?
Take Paris with unchanged Schielfien plan in 1914,defeat Russia in 1915,England invaded if they do not made peace in 1916.
German victory without any miracle.
All they need was do not change anything in their good plan,but noo,they must try do that better.They could blame only themselves for lost war,but since it was germans,they must blame others and lost other war.
Abandoning East Prussia without a fight was not really an option in 1914. It was the ancestral home of the Hohenzollern and a core area of Germany.
LOL!
The so-called Schlieffen Plan working is ASB-ish, IMO.
However, for a non-miraculous German victory - no Verdun in 1916 but continued Russia-bashing, a repeat of 1915.
This leaves A-H in better condition and knocks Russia out a year earlier.
There is nothing ASB about the Germans beating the French in 1914. There are many errors on the German side that could have been reversed and near-misses. Some that immediately come to mind:

Frontiers (Charleoi)
Mons
Verdun
Marne (Oise)
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
There is nothing ASB about the Germans beating the French in 1914. There are many errors on the German side that could have been reversed and near-misses. Some that immediately come to mind:

Frontiers (Charleoi)
Mons
Verdun
Marne (Oise)
A ton of PoDs there. The Marne alone is full of them.
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
A ton of PoDs there. The Marne alone is full of them.
Not to mention that all these are within the same overall historical strategy which itself is open to lots of PODs, such as Terence Zuber's proposal which he asserts is the "true" Schlieffen Plan: draw the French into Alsace Lorraine and come down hard on their flank.

One of my favorite scenarios is that the commander of the French Third Army obeys Joffre's orders to retreat, and in the confusion of the withdrawal, the German 5th Army is able to take Verdun and inflict heavy losses on the French. By taking Verdun, the German armies would be able to remain at the Marne, allowing for Reims, Amiens, and Arras to be held throughout the war instead of given up. Even if the war drags on for years longer, this alone would put the Entente in a horrible position.
 
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History Learner

Well-known member
I think this is the key question here. Did the Germans have the manpower, resources, and ability to push their advantage like that? Zabecki seems to think "no".


Pp 311-312.

P. 318.

In other words, Zabecki believes that only a negotiated settlement was possible for the Germans in 1918 and their operational strategy should have been tailored to this.

While I highly respect his expertise in terms of the military side of the equation, I do think he has allowed his focus on the German end to obscure the political and military conditions that would effect the Entente in this case. In particular, the comparison to WWII falls flat because, unlike that conflict, there is no Eastern Front consuming millions of German soldiers nor is the technology there for a sustained strategic bombing campaign like that the Anglo-Americans wielded historically to bring German industry to her knees. Further, unlike 1940, by 1918 the British have taken millions of casualties and the war weariness is biting in even with the Americans in; Lord Milner's note to Lloyd George is from June of 1918.

If the French are knocked out and the BEF forced off the conflict, it will take a least a year to rebuild said BEF while without French industry the Americans won't be ready until 1920. In that time, Germany will have had two years to settle the situation in the East to her benefit, granting the immense resources the Germans sought in two world wars while also granting two years of time during which Berlin could work to conserve its manpower and more effectively transfer forces from the East in a way the Germans didn't manage to in 1918. Thereafter, the Anglo-Americans would be faced with the daunting issue of how to even get at the Germans. Attacking Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands is right out the window, as is landing on the German coast directly. That leaves only the Italy/Balkans options with all that entails or effectively declaring war upon the (now neutral) French to do a landing there. Given how seriously the French reacted to Mers-el-Kebir, I don't imagine they would react well to this either...

All of this is also assuming, of course, that Anglo-American political willpower holds out for this long and manpower in general for the British. The Irish issue, for all that entails in Anglo-American relations, would also be quickly becoming an unavoidable problem.
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
While I highly respect his expertise in terms of the military side of the equation, I do think he has allowed his focus on the German end to obscure the political and military conditions that would effect the Entente in this case. In particular, the comparison to WWII falls flat because, unlike that conflict, there is no Eastern Front consuming millions of German soldiers nor is the technology there for a sustained strategic bombing campaign like that the Anglo-Americans wielded historically to bring German industry to her knees. Further, unlike 1940, by 1918 the British have taken millions of casualties and the war weariness is biting in even with the Americans in; Lord Milner's note to Lloyd George is from June of 1918.

If the French are knocked out and the BEF forced off the conflict, it will take a least a year to rebuild said BEF while without French industry the Americans won't be ready until 1920. In that time, Germany will have had two years to settle the situation in the East to her benefit, granting the immense resources the Germans sought in two world wars while also granting two years of time during which Berlin could work to conserve its manpower and more effectively transfer forces from the East in a way the Germans didn't manage to in 1918. Thereafter, the Anglo-Americans would be faced with the daunting issue of how to even get at the Germans. Attacking Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands is right out the window, as is landing on the German coast directly. That leaves only the Italy/Balkans options with all that entails or effectively declaring war upon the (now neutral) French to do a landing there. Given how seriously the French reacted to Mers-el-Kebir, I don't imagine they would react well to this either...

All of this is also assuming, of course, that Anglo-American political willpower holds out for this long and manpower in general for the British. The Irish issue, for all that entails in Anglo-American relations, would also be quickly becoming an unavoidable problem.
I definitely agree with you about the political effects and it being nothing like 1940, but my question is more focused on the military side of things: say the Germans take Amiens and push the British back to the channel ports, what then? How do the Germans push their advantage into a victory? The Germans already had a pretty severe manpower deficit by March, 1918. Could they really afford another offensive in the summer to knock France out, say at Paris, Roen, La Havre, or god forbid, Verdun? What if this second offensive fails? What's preventing the BEF from retreating through Abbeville, or being evacuated from Calais to Dover and then La Havre, to reinforce the French again?
 

Emperor Tippy

Merchant of Death
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If the US is able to secure a decent beachhead in France then any German victory requires outlasting both the US and the British Empire's will to throw blood and treasure at the continent.

If the US decides to sit the war out or Germany can secure France before substantial US reinforcements have arrived then a German victory becomes much more possible.

The biggest problem that Germany faced in both WW1 and WW2 is the combined threat of the US and British Empire. The US Navy and Royal Navy combined are simply a force that Germany (of any stripe) is never able to contend with. Without the ability to credibly contest the allied fleets on the high seas, US and BE trade remains materially untouched while Continental Europe remains confined to land based trade routes and maybe Mediterranean shipping.

Germany's historical problem is that they have never been able to either 1) convince the British that a power in control of a unified continental Europe is not a major threat or 2) convince the US that Europe unified under Germany is a more useful ally to the US than the British are. (1) means that the British are always going to oppose and (2) means that the US isn't going to let the British lose.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
I definitely agree with you about the political effects and it being nothing like 1940, but my question is more focused on the military side of things: say the Germans take Amiens and push the British back to the channel ports, what then? How do the Germans push their advantage into a victory? The Germans already had a pretty severe manpower deficit by March, 1918. Could they really afford another offensive in the summer to knock France out, say at Paris, Roen, La Havre, or god forbid, Verdun? What if this second offensive fails? What's preventing the BEF from retreating through Abbeville, or being evacuated from Calais to Dover and then La Havre, to reinforce the French again?
The logistics of the BEF collapse without Amiens. Zabecki mentions that and I cross checked his references from the British official history. He is right, without Amiens the BEF is crippled because they lose 40% of their supplies (came from ports south of Amiens, which is the only major rail line running over the river Somme) and if Hazebrouck also falls then they have to fall back on the Channel ports immediately or face collapsing entirely due to lack of supplies. They'd have to leave a ton of their equipment and any stocks of ammo behind due to lack of ability to move them, which means the BEF is effectively nullified for months if not over a year.

With the BEF effectively out of the war, the US not in it, and the French now isolated and falling back on Paris (what they were going to do if ever separated from the BEF), then politically the French are out of the war. They were already dealing with riots to force a peace negotiation all over the country before the German offensives which required divisions to be pulled out of the front lines to break them, so a massive defeat like that would be like 1940 for the French public. Got to get out before terms get worse. They didn't know how strong the Germans were, as a defeat on that scale was already beyond what they thought the Germans could do. Psychologically the European Allies would have been broken and this is not WW2 with the desire to fight it out for years more.
 
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SpicyJuan

Active member
Not to mention that all these are within the same overall historical strategy which itself is open to lots of PODs, such as Terence Zuber's proposal which he asserts is the "true" Schlieffen Plan: draw the French into Alsace Lorraine and come down hard on their flank.

One of my favorite scenarios is that the commander of the French Third Army obeys Joffre's orders to retreat, and in the confusion of the withdrawal, the German 5th Army is able to take Verdun and inflict heavy losses on the French. By taking Verdun, the German armies would be able to remain at the Marne, allowing for Reims, Amiens, and Arras to be held throughout the war instead of given up. Even if the war drags on for years longer, this alone would put the Entente in a horrible position.
This map isn't entirely accurate, but it's clear enough that it demonstrates my point. Notice the rail line that runs west from Metz (German Lorraine) through Verdun and the front by the Marne. Then look at how the rail lines get there without Verdun. A world of difference.
a3678ef51782f5bda071e06e9e88423f.gif
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
If the US is able to secure a decent beachhead in France then any German victory requires outlasting both the US and the British Empire's will to throw blood and treasure at the continent.
The problem with that is the French provided the US with most their heavy equipment: MGs, tanks, aircraft, etc. The US provided the French with components like engines or steel, but the US entered the war so lack they didn't have weapons manufacturing ready, since per neutrality agreements they were only selling the Entente shell cases, explosives, steel, food, oil, etc. rather than equipment. So no way the US fights on by itself and a broke Britain while the US builds up an entire war industry from scratch over years. This is not the 1940s.
 

Emperor Tippy

Merchant of Death
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Staff Member
Founder
The problem with that is the French provided the US with most their heavy equipment: MGs, tanks, aircraft, etc. The US provided the French with components like engines or steel, but the US entered the war so lack they didn't have weapons manufacturing ready, since per neutrality agreements they were only selling the Entente shell cases, explosives, steel, food, oil, etc. rather than equipment. So no way the US fights on by itself and a broke Britain while the US builds up an entire war industry from scratch over years. This is not the 1940s.
Except the US doesn't actually have to hold the beachhead all that long before its industrial power is brought fully into the war. So long as, by the time US industry is brought up to speed, the US doesn't have to force a landing then the only real question is if the US will to fight outlasts Germanies ability to prosecute the war.

Compared to Europe (especially a Europe just conquered and after years of war), the US has basically limitless manpower and industrial power to throw into the fight. If continental Europe can't stop a substantial US landing then the war is over.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Except the US doesn't actually have to hold the beachhead all that long before its industrial power is brought fully into the war. So long as, by the time US industry is brought up to speed, the US doesn't have to force a landing then the only real question is if the US will to fight outlasts Germanies ability to prosecute the war.

Compared to Europe (especially a Europe just conquered and after years of war), the US has basically limitless manpower and industrial power to throw into the fight. If continental Europe can't stop a substantial US landing then the war is over.
It's power was brought to bear already, but as I said it's complex technical industries were not what they would become after the war. They specialized production during the period they were servicing British and French needs, which saw both countries develop more complex production like making artillery, aircraft, trucks, and tanks, while the US didn't and largely stayed with their consumer industries. I'm not saying that they couldn't but it would take years and vast expense that the US could not tolerate or wait for for morale reasons and in the meantime the European Allies would drop out from exhaustion. No way the US stays in then. Occupied France though would yield what Germany needed to continue the war given all the riches built up in that country to continue the war.

US manpower and whatnot is considerable...but it is on the other side of the Atlantic and not backed up by the necessary war industry, hence the heavy artillery, MGs, tanks, and aircraft they used historically being French:
The AEF used French and British equipment. Particularly appreciated were the French canon de 75 modèle 1897, the canon de 155 C modèle 1917 Schneider, and the canon de 155mm GPF. American aviation units received the SPAD XIII and Nieuport 28 fighters, and the U.S. Army tank corps used French Renault FT light tanks. Pershing established facilities in France to train new arrivals with their new weapons.[4]
With the US just having a bridgehead, but no French equipment it would get slaughtered by German artillery, aircraft, and captured Entente tanks.
 

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