History Western Civilization, Rome and Cyclical History

ATP

Well-known member
One thing I do wonder is why there wasn’t the cycle of unification, division, reunification as happened in Imperial China.

Was it European ethnic diversity? Or it’s geography? Was it because Europe had competing poles of political power?

India, the Islamic World and China all went through periods of prolonged strife and division. But reunited, or at least attempts were made.

(You could argue the past century of the Middle East has been at attempt find some basis on which to reunite it after the collapse of the Ottomans).

China used to be more multipolar. But it grew and grew despite civil wars, barbarian invasions and anarchy.

What makes the west and China different?

Catholic Church.It created nations ,which could not reunite in Empire becouse french were french,and germans germans.
In China warring states never become independent nations,so next empire could reunite them.
In India you have caste system which made all indian states prone to unite in one indian state.
In muslim world all was important is faith,so they could unite,too.
But Catholics church created nations,and as long as german,french,hungarian etc would keep their nationality,we would not have european empire.
And thank God for that.
 

Cherico

Well-known member
One thing I do wonder is why there wasn’t the cycle of unification, division, reunification as happened in Imperial China.

Was it European ethnic diversity? Or it’s geography? Was it because Europe had competing poles of political power?

India, the Islamic World and China all went through periods of prolonged strife and division. But reunited, or at least attempts were made.

(You could argue the past century of the Middle East has been at attempt find some basis on which to reunite it after the collapse of the Ottomans).

China used to be more multipolar. But it grew and grew despite civil wars, barbarian invasions and anarchy.

What makes the west and China different?

geography, china's center is basically a flat bowl surrounded by natural barriers.
 
D

Deleted member 88

Guest
Yes but China pushed outside those natural barriers. By the 17th century they were exterminating central Asians, had met the Russians in central Siberia, and had authority over south East Asia(at least in a tributary sense).

Europe never unified and pushed outwards as one entity. European empires went expanded in different directions, perpendicular to other European states.

This is a complex subject though and I’m glad we can have this discussion :)
 

Navarro

Well-known member
Yes but China pushed outside those natural barriers. By the 17th century they were exterminating central Asians, had met the Russians in central Siberia, and had authority over south East Asia(at least in a tributary sense).

Europe never unified and pushed outwards as one entity. European empires went expanded in different directions, perpendicular to other European states.

This is a complex subject though and I’m glad we can have this discussion :)

Rome was reforming in the form of the Carolingian Empire during the early Middle Ages, but Germanic succession law short-circuited that process.
 
D

Deleted member 88

Guest
I'm not too sure that was guaranteed? Given the logistical and administrative limits at the time.

At most they might have held what would be France, Western Germany, the low countries, Dennmark and maybe northern Spain.

But given the fragmentation already inherent in Charlemagne's kingdom, I find some sort of Frankish Empire in the 9th century implausible.
 

stevep

Well-known member
I'm not too sure that was guaranteed? Given the logistical and administrative limits at the time.

At most they might have held what would be France, Western Germany, the low countries, Dennmark and maybe northern Spain.

But given the fragmentation already inherent in Charlemagne's kingdom, I find some sort of Frankish Empire in the 9th century implausible.

Would agree. Too much cultural diversity as well and Christianity also acted as a serious divisive factor. Plus to a degree the Frankish empire Charlemagne sought to establish was too distant from the core of the classical world, i.e. the Med, which by relative ease of sea transport made the Roman empire possible.

Some interesting discussions here. Remember reading Toynbee's a Study of History - the 1 vol abridged version, I didn't have that much free time, in my late teens and it covered a similar area of discussion, However I found his attempt to fit every culture into a very tight set of rules unsatisfactory. For instance the founder of his 'universal state' for modern western culture was Napoleon who ruled the core of the modern west - as it was then - but only for about a decade before it was shattered by opposing forces and the following period was one of the most inventive in world history. [Plus possibly as an idealistic youth I didn't like the excessive determinism and assumption that cultures which had lasted X years couldn't revitalise themselves.

Steve
 

Aldarion

Neoreactionary Monarchist
I do agree with your overall sentiment. Empires are wealth pumps and when that runs out the system collapses, and the longer they go on the greater likelihood of collapse. Although I would ponder the question of "what happens if the diminished Empire can transition to nation state or even super state?" Nations, not quite so dependent on funneling wealth in from the exterior, should prove a little more stable in the long run.

That is what happened to the Byzantine Empire, to an extent. It was conquered eventually, too, but it proved extremely stable and capable of withstanding reverses which caused collapse of most other empires.
 
D

Deleted member 88

Guest
Byzantium is interesting in that like a bouncing ball, it had periods of decline and revival, but each revival was lesser or closer to the ground than the first.

From Justinian's reconquest to fallback, to the success at the height of Byzantine triumph of the Persians to the Islamic conquest, in which Byzantium was fighting for its life, to a period of revival in the 9th-10th centuries. Then the ball went down again with the Seljuk invasion, then bounced up with the Kommenian dynasty, then collapsed with the Angeloi and the 4th crusade. the ball sputtered and managed to bounce up a little more with the retaking of Constantinople by the Niceans, in which they gained a brief respite and consolidated parts of Greece, and Anatolia, then there were the civil wars of the 14th century and then the ball finally dropped on the floor, never to bounce again.
 

Aldarion

Neoreactionary Monarchist
Byzantium is interesting in that like a bouncing ball, it had periods of decline and revival, but each revival was lesser or closer to the ground than the first.

From Justinian's reconquest to fallback, to the success at the height of Byzantine triumph of the Persians to the Islamic conquest, in which Byzantium was fighting for its life, to a period of revival in the 9th-10th centuries. Then the ball went down again with the Seljuk invasion, then bounced up with the Kommenian dynasty, then collapsed with the Angeloi and the 4th crusade. the ball sputtered and managed to bounce up a little more with the retaking of Constantinople by the Niceans, in which they gained a brief respite and consolidated parts of Greece, and Anatolia, then there were the civil wars of the 14th century and then the ball finally dropped on the floor, never to bounce again.

I think Byzantium was doomed in part by being, well, too Christian. They saw "just war" as being either defensive, or to reconquer territories which had been Byzantine in the living memory. Bulgaria, for example, was conquered in1018. entirely by accident. In the east likewise Byzantines could have expanded further than they did, but they stopped at border of areas where Christians were majority. But if the territory had been lost to the Empire for a long time, Byzantines simply didn't want it. This helped cause the "bouncing-ball effect" you had described, though it was not the only cause of such.
 
D

Deleted member 88

Guest
If I recall correctly, in the later 9th century there was a Byzantine Emperor-John something or another who had defeated an Arab Army in northern Mesopotamia, the road to Baghdad was open yet for some reason he didn't take it.
 
D

Deleted member 88

Guest
As I recall, historians aren’t sure why he didn’t press on. But your thesis does make some sense.

Baghdad was never a Christian city(even though Christians lived there under Islamic rule).

One other aspect, was that Byzantium saw itself as the continuation of the Roman Empire. Not a separate entity.

Thus-making a serious attempt to conquer say Sassanid Iran, or anywhere north of the Danube, or places that were never traditionally part of the Roman Empire-would have in some ways, broken the sense of continuity. Same would follow for Islamic Mesopotamia or Egypt, which were by the turn of the second millennium were well out of the Christian world.

As far as I know, Byzantium never bothered trying to conquer the Black Sea coast, or pushed north into Eastern Europe.

It had set frontiers-within the boundaries of the old Roman Empire and mostly stuck to them.

The byzantines under the best emperors could have pursued empire building beyond the limits of the old empire. But they never seemed to do so.

Hmm...maybe it was because Byzantium saw itself ideologically as defensive? Defending the Roman legacy, and the empire. Not tilling new pastures.

You could make the argument the ideological basis of Byzantium was a defense of Rome, and preservation of her legacy, with a restoration somewhere maybe in the distant future(they still considered themselves legally in control of the whole empire-France, Spain, etc...). So new conquests or conquering areas no longer Christian would be transgressing Byzantium’s ideological purpose.

@Aldarion thoughts on that?
 

Aldarion

Neoreactionary Monarchist
As I recall, historians aren’t sure why he didn’t press on. But your thesis does make some sense.

Baghdad was never a Christian city(even though Christians lived there under Islamic rule).

One other aspect, was that Byzantium saw itself as the continuation of the Roman Empire. Not a separate entity.

Thus-making a serious attempt to conquer say Sassanid Iran, or anywhere north of the Danube, or places that were never traditionally part of the Roman Empire-would have in some ways, broken the sense of continuity. Same would follow for Islamic Mesopotamia or Egypt, which were by the turn of the second millennium were well out of the Christian world.

As far as I know, Byzantium never bothered trying to conquer the Black Sea coast, or pushed north into Eastern Europe.

It had set frontiers-within the boundaries of the old Roman Empire and mostly stuck to them.

The byzantines under the best emperors could have pursued empire building beyond the limits of the old empire. But they never seemed to do so.

Hmm...maybe it was because Byzantium saw itself ideologically as defensive? Defending the Roman legacy, and the empire. Not tilling new pastures.

You could make the argument the ideological basis of Byzantium was a defense of Rome, and preservation of her legacy, with a restoration somewhere maybe in the distant future(they still considered themselves legally in control of the whole empire-France, Spain, etc...). So new conquests or conquering areas no longer Christian would be transgressing Byzantium’s ideological purpose.

@Aldarion thoughts on that?

I do not think it is that specific, as there were many areas of former Roman Empire which could have been liberated after 9th century recovery, yet Byzantines - beyond singular attempts of individual Emperors - never did so. But yes, seeing themselves as ideologically defensive and tasked with preservation of Roman legacy was likely the part of it.
 
D

Deleted member 88

Guest
The Byzantines never tried to conquer Eastern Europe. Or Iran. Or the Black Sea region.

Areas which were never part of the Roman Empire.

So I think the ideologically defensive thesis makes sense.
 

Lord Sovereign

Well-known member
@Skallagrim my good chap. What say you to the current state of America vaguely resembling the build up to the Social War of the Roman Republic? Because to my eyes it looks like the Optimates are, again, trying to dump Tiberius Gracchus in the river Tiber but he is struggling all the way.

Did I just compare Trump to Tiberius Gracchus, IE, one of the last chances of reform the Roman Republic might have had? I think I may have.
 

gral

Well-known member
Did I just compare Trump to Tiberius Gracchus, IE, one of the last chances of reform the Roman Republic might have had? I think I may have.

The comparison writes itself. I've mentioned this somewhere in this board, there's a Brazilian guy who's doing a podcast series on the end of the Roman Republic, starting with the Gracchi brothers. It's obvious he did it because he sees too many similarities to what's happening nowadays.
 

FriedCFour

PunishedCFour
Founder
Well,no.Romans morality was was only for romans - barbarians and slaves could be treated as bad as romans wonted.
And they considered killing their babies as good method of regulating number of people,too.
Moreover,they were big on Law - if law said that killing X is good, they killed X.

Catholics had one morality for everyone - and all people,including slaves,were sons/daughters of God.
And for us Law which is against God is no law.
You realize that the full name is the Roman Catholic Church right? That it was founded by Romans? That the legacy of the popes starts under Rome?
 

Skallagrim

Well-known member
@Skallagrim my good chap. What say you to the current state of America vaguely resembling the build up to the Social War of the Roman Republic? Because to my eyes it looks like the Optimates are, again, trying to dump Tiberius Gracchus in the river Tiber but he is struggling all the way.

Did I just compare Trump to Tiberius Gracchus, IE, one of the last chances of reform the Roman Republic might have had? I think I may have.
This comparison lines up pretty much exactly with what I think about the matter. It fits time-wise, too.

If I may be so bold as to suggest that if you wish to look for an American Cato Major (a man stubbornly representing and old, and doomed, ideal of the Republic-as-it-once-was), the man to look at is perhaps a Barry Goldwater. If 1998 (when Goldwater died) is roughly analogous to 149 BC (when Cato Major died), then the timeline goes roughly as follows:

Gracchii active: 133 BC - 121 BC. Equates to roughly 2014 - 2028. This indeed suggests that Trump may be seen as the Tiberius Gracchus of this day. And, of course, that Gaius Gracchus is yet to come. Observe that the reforms of T. Gracchus were screwed over by legal manipulations and obstructions. He was vilified as a demagogue and rough, uncouth figure unworthy of respect or even common dignity. Stop me if this sounds at all familiar. This period is not yet over. Depending on how things turn out, I expect a wave of (let us say) "neo-Trumpism" to roll over the country in 2024 or 2028. A more practical, results-oriented candidate sweeps to the fore. The first true leader of what may be termed the country party (basis of the Populares) against the urban party (basis of the Optimates). I don't expect it to end much better than it did back in Roman days. The man who fights the elite at this stage doesn't survive it.

Note that at this stage, presently existing party lines aren't very telling. Trump precedes the Populares. Mitt Romney, also a Republican, is a man of (what will become) the Optimates, through and through.

Social War: 91 BC - 87 BC. Equates to roughly 2056 - 2060. The ruthless suppression of the proto-Populares, and the subsequent legal gutting of their reforms, inevitably causes growing discontent. This can only be held at bay through political and legal trickery for so long. Eventually, something's gotta give. Note that modern Westerners really are less bloody in settling public disputes than the old Romans, so it may be a political war with attendant mob violence, rather than an outright civil war. But there is the key similarity of a struggle between the "common folk" (trending rural; socially more conservative; want a safe and normal country; seek cultural homogeneity within society) and the elite (trending urban; socially cosmopolitan; want profitable trade and a 'borderless world'; eagerly bring in heterogenous groups; speak of "diversity", but treat said minority groups as voting cattle).

The conflict ends when elite essentially buys off the trouble-makers with some obvious concessions, while remaining firmly in power. The emergence of an external conflict to re-focus public attention may well be engineered on purpose. (See below.)

Conflict between Marius and Sulla: 88 BC - 87 BC. Equates to roughly 2061 - 2062. Our time's equivalents to these may not have to be military leaders. Note that military promotion was the way to achieve meteoric ascendancy in Ancient Rome. What is the closest counterpart to that in the modern West? What is the fastest, surest route to social standing and political power? Answer that, and you'll be able to predict their nature quite well.

The major social conflict naturally brings Big Name Leaders to the front. On both sides. And they'll clash. The Popular leader (that's you, Marius!) has the advantage in public backing, but by this point, the elite has learned that the safe strategy of appointing non-entities to the front will not suffice anymore. So, at the risk of appointing men hey can't quite control, they select true leaders of their own. (That's you, Sulla!) The latter candidate has the intitutional advantage: his side can (still) outlast the Populares. They (still) have deep pockets.

On the other hand, this isn't about land reform, as it was back then. This will be about economic opportunity. The voting base of the Populares will be the people losing their jobs to globalisation and automatisation; the people who suffer because mass immigration is going too fast (and pulls in people too culturally removed from the West) to facilitate the kind of relatively fast assimilation that we saw with European immigrants in earlier ages. But at the same time, this is the period where the Populares cease to be a generally "white" faction. Currently, the Democrats still rope in most African-Americans and Hispanics. By the early 2060s, that will no longer be the case. A lot of people in those demographics will by then be unequivocally victimised by elite interests (much as the white working class, previously a left-wing voter base, was thus victimised and cast aside). They will side with the Populares. The Optimates will double down on importing new immigrants.

Meanwhile, the "solution" to poverty may include (promises of) a basic income. enough of the poor voters will be lured in by these kinds of promises to ensure that the Optimates get to coast on for a bit. But this promise of dramatic reform will either be reneged on, or it will turn into a fiasco. The economy will suffer immensely.

Sulla's (second) civil war: 83 BC - 81 BC. Equates to roughly 2066 - 2067. Things become way too dicey for the elite, as their promises prove either unfeasible, or are implemented and then fail. Their leading man (typically one who truly believes in elite rule) suppresses all opponents in a heavy-handed manner.

Sulla's dictatorship: 81 BC. Equates to roughly 2068. Said leader then uses legally dubious (or even outright extralegal) means to ensure elite control over the government. Imagine something like major court-packing, and dubious constitutional amendments. Forget about an Electoral College as we know it getting to survive this. Expect gerrymandering the likes of which even God has never seen. Possibly, there may be an outright "Second Constitutional Convention".

Instead of promises of social reform, elite rule becomes entrenched by law, and the commoners see their voting rights hollowed out. If any kind of soial security persists, it is a pittance. "Go die quietly, somewhere we can't see you" is the basic message to the poor. At this stage, the fate of the Optimates is essentially sealed. Their imposed order looks like it's won them control, but it's now built on a time bomb.

Note that the man doing this stuff in all likelihood genuinely believes that he's saving the Republic. He probably retires honourably afterwards, like a Cincinnatus, and his supporters call him a "second Washington". But he has set the precedent for ignoring the law and ruling by force. He has also made bloody revolution inevitable.

Mithridatic wars: 88 BC - 63 BC. Equates to roughly 2061 - 2086. That foreign war I was talking about. Was a way to point dangerous men elsewhere, and for men to gain standing, in Rome. Will be more of a way to distract the public (and maybe outright conscipt young trouble-makers) in the modern West. In this conflict (or series of conflicts), the Republic finds its limits. It is still the world's foremost military power, but there are enemies that it can only defeat with considerable difficulty. This is inherently worrying: the Republic is not up to the task of a Universal State! Nevertheless, this conflict "vents" some social pressure.

Caesar's civil war: 49 BC - 45 BC. Equates to roughly 2100 - 2104 By this time, power-politics have become unveiled for all to see. Someone is going to come out on top, and it becomes a knife-fight to the bitter end. In reality, it matters very little who wins. The point is that someone wins. One man rules the state at the end. Every single faction is embittered as can be. There are no more real compromises.

Caesar assassinated: 44 BC. Equates to roughly 2105. Said man either is or becomes so hated that he's killed, or he is so feared that he lives, but then his successor gets removed from power before you can say "coup d'état". Either way, we get...

The last bout of civil war(s): 43 BC - 30 BC. Equates to roughly 2106 - 2119. Those who would have the throne compete for it. This really tears whatever was left of the old political order to bloody tatters. There may be a faction who really wanted to restore the Republic now that the "tyrant" is dead, but they stand no chance at all. This fight is won by the most reactionary contender, for the simple reason that all public trust is now gone, and only the inherent legitimacy of tradition can bind the people together again. Thus, if anyone else wins, he doesn't get to rule for long, the wars continue... until the right man wins.

Principate founded: 27 BC. Equates to roughly 2122. The right man founds the Universal Empire. The endlesly messed-up cohorts of young men who lived through the preceding years get shipped off to conquer or re-conquer some stuff, so that they are well out of the country. I imagine that at some point in the following decade, an American soldier and a Polish soldier will shake hands on the Rhine, and praise Christ and the Emperor.


...Now, let me be clear: these years are mere indications. This is by no means precise. I can take events in Egypt or China, and we'll skew it all by a few decades. But the same trend persists. So what are a few decades, really? This is a mere impression of the future, not an accurate-to-life recording. Things never line up perfectly. For instance, does the War on Terror really line up all that well with the Third Punic War? Eh. (But then again, Bush jr. finishing off Saddam once and for all where Bush sr. let him stay in power does provide a parallel.) Does the fact that the "Trumpist" uprising broke through in 2016 rather than 2014 (as direct 1-on-1 analogy would suggest) make a meaningful difference? I don't think so.
 
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CarlManvers2019

Writers Blocked Douchebag
Say, did the Roman Empire get really insane in this sort of way

5ae.jpg


Yeah, I know they were full of pedarasts, but I think even they would sorta be ashamed of embracing this sort of stuff in public
 

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