What If Barbarossa Launches from the Original Molotov-Ribbentrop Position?

SpicyJuan

Active member
On September 28th, 1939, the German-Soviet Frontier Treaty was signed which greatly changed the different spheres of influence of the East: the Soviets ceded the Lublin area in Poland and in return obtained Lithuania. But what if there was no border change? How would the original borders have shaped Barbarossa? Would it have helped or hurt it?

Looking at the map it becomes apparent that Germany would be much closer to taking Riga, Pskov, and Leningrad, but the central axis to Moscow would be greatly delayed. However with the Vilnius salient, this could offer an opportunity for a great encirclement, although the lack of encirclements wasn't really the problem for Barbarossa, either. What does everyone think?
1024px-Ribbentrop-Molotov_no_legend.svg.png
 

ATP

Well-known member
Germany still gets it's teeth kicked in because just changing the starting point does nothing to solve the massive oil and logistical problems the Third Reich had.
And fact that they attacked enemy with 6:1 tank and 3:1 planes advantage.If soviets do not start mass surrender,entire war should end in 1942 by soviet victory.
And since soviet would still surrender till germans start genocide them,and then fight again - nothing would change.Maybe they take few houses in Moscov in 1941,but it would be only difference.They would reatreat after that anyway.
Unless...they take part of Moscov,soviet counter attack,Hitler refuse to widraw...and german would lost Central army group in 1942.Then,soviet could take Europe till end of 1944.
 
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sillygoose

Well-known member
The issue is more likely that the Soviets are deploying further back and closer to the Stalin Line, which will be more intact ITTL if not entirely so if the Germans can start that far forward. Makes it tougher to break through beyond Pskov, but will enable a quicker conquest of Estonia and perhaps the Narwa route becomes and option. Yes there is the chance for a bigger encirclement, but cramming AG-North and Center into Lithuania isn't going to be all the workable logistically, same with AG-South and elements of AG-Center in southern Poland. IMHO this creates more problems than it solves. Methinks there was a good reason that the Germans traded Lithuania for more of Central Poland IOTL, especially given the Moscow was the key to winning the 1941 campaign.

Germany still gets it's teeth kicked in because just changing the starting point does nothing to solve the massive oil and logistical problems the Third Reich had.
Oil wasn't an issue in 1941 and really wasn't a serious until 1944 when the Wallies bombed the hell out of the production facilities and rail ways. Logistical problems in Barbarossa are largely based on cherrypicked data and was not the problem it has been made out to be. There were of course very real issues, but that wasn't the problem that cause Barbarossa to fail.
 

Typhonis

Well-known member
Wrong, oil WAS an issue. Germany needed 20,000,000 barrels of oil a year and was getting less than 10,000,000 barrels. If they had a second Romania they might have broken the 15 million barrel mark but not by much. In late 1940 early 1941 the German army removed motor vehicles and used horse-drawn carts the oil situation was that bad. They had 2 months' worth of combat oil at the start of Barbarossa and had massive troubles throughout.

They also had logistical problems due to the trains not being prioritized, and the bottleneck of converting from European gauge railroads to Russian Gauge.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Wrong, oil WAS an issue. Germany needed 20,000,000 barrels of oil a year and was getting less than 10,000,000 barrels. If they had a second Romania they might have broken the 15 million barrel mark but not by much. In late 1940 early 1941 the German army removed motor vehicles and used horse-drawn carts the oil situation was that bad. They had 2 months' worth of combat oil at the start of Barbarossa and had massive troubles throughout.

They also had logistical problems due to the trains not being prioritized, and the bottleneck of converting from European gauge railroads to Russian Gauge.
Again, numbers out of context and saying flat out incorrect things. Pulling a Trump and just saying wrong doesn't make you right.

You're flat out incorrect about your numbers in 1940-41 as they had the largest fleet of vehicles ever assembled in the world to that point for Barbarossa and were able to fuel them from stockpiles throughout 1941 while fighting an air war in the west, fighting on the ground and air in Africa, and fighting a global naval war. Any issues during Barbarossa was rail related in terms of getting things to the front given the differences in Soviet and German rail systems and even that was exaggerated in modern 'histories'.
 

BlackDragon98

Freikorps Kommandant
Banned - Politics
Again, numbers out of context and saying flat out incorrect things. Pulling a Trump and just saying wrong doesn't make you right.

You're flat out incorrect about your numbers in 1940-41 as they had the largest fleet of vehicles ever assembled in the world to that point for Barbarossa and were able to fuel them from stockpiles throughout 1941 while fighting an air war in the west, fighting on the ground and air in Africa, and fighting a global naval war. Any issues during Barbarossa was rail related in terms of getting things to the front given the differences in Soviet and German rail systems and even that was exaggerated in modern 'histories'.
I agree.
Barbarossa was mostly a problem of supply line length (it took too long for supplies to get to the front) and the limited number of trucks available, not that there weren't supplies to be transported.
The rail issue wasn't changing gauges but rather, the lack of rolling stock (Soviets destroyed their own, Germans didn't have enough).
Also, the lack of good roads, limited number of railways, and the rasputitsa season.

Also, the Germans prioritized new vehicles and planes at the expense of spare parts, which caused problems as new vehicles and planes only added to the number of spare parts needed.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
I agree.
Barbarossa was mostly a problem of supply line length (it took too long for supplies to get to the front) and the limited number of trucks available, not that there weren't supplies to be transported.
The rail issue wasn't changing gauges but rather, the lack of rolling stock (Soviets destroyed their own, Germans didn't have enough).
Also, the lack of good roads, limited number of railways, and the rasputitsa season.

Also, the Germans prioritized new vehicles and planes at the expense of spare parts, which caused problems as new vehicles and planes only added to the number of spare parts needed.
It wasn't about the rail line length, supplies were pretty timely and it wasn't that far from Germany to Russia, it was the capacity of the lines to get trains through. Change the gauge didn't increase the ground pressure carrying capacity of the trains and wider trains have lower ground pressure, so the change to narrow European gauge changed that calculation. Then Russian trains were larger, so coaling and other stations were further apart, which meant for European trains to work they'd have to change everything about the infrastructure in Russia, which just took a long time.
Otherwise yeah, mostly agree. Though as far as the spare parts issue went a lot of that was because Hitler prioritized standing up new divisions ver keeping existing ones up to strength, as his philosophy was to rotate and rebuild divisions rather than keeping them fed and healthy in the field for extended periods of time.
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
It wasn't about the rail line length, supplies were pretty timely and it wasn't that far from Germany to Russia, it was the capacity of the lines to get trains through. Change the gauge didn't increase the ground pressure carrying capacity of the trains and wider trains have lower ground pressure, so the change to narrow European gauge changed that calculation. Then Russian trains were larger, so coaling and other stations were further apart, which meant for European trains to work they'd have to change everything about the infrastructure in Russia, which just took a long time.
Wow, an ambitious undertaking! Due to this, what do you think was the ceiling was for German advancement during Barbarossa in 1941 (eg, how far could the logistics take them)? Was it one of the primary reasons why Germany could only ever pull off a single Army Group offensive at a time?
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Wow, an ambitious undertaking! Due to this, what do you think was the ceiling was for German advancement during Barbarossa in 1941 (eg, how far could the logistics take them)? Was it one of the primary reasons why Germany could only ever pull off a single Army Group offensive at a time?
I think Stolfi was basically correct that the Moscow-Gorki space was obtainable if they attacked Moscow in August. For one thing they'd seize a huge chunk of the Soviet rail system much earlier and likely a huge amount of rolling stock that wouldn't be evacuated in time in Russia's main rail hub.

Single army group offensive at a time in 1941? That was not the case.
 

History Learner

Well-known member
Honestly, I'm going to say this goes better for the Germans because the logistics situation is even worse for the Soviets and they are further forward deployed. I don't foresee a grand encirclement out of Lithuania occurring, but rather a quicker occupation of the Baltics and then drive on Leningrad.
 

Buba

A total creep
Soviets [...] are further forward deployed.
Now, that is a good question - is the Red Army deployed in similar manner as in OTL? At least to the north of the Pripet Marshes it could be arranged differently, not as far west as in OTL.
Would Stalin really cram armies up to the Vistula River?

I don't foresee a grand encirclement out of Lithuania occurring
Still possible - attack east and then around Polotsk veer south along the Berezina/Upper Dnepr towards Mohyliv - that cuts almost all the longitudinal RR between Russia and troops to the west of the Dnepr (and north of the marshes).
 

ATP

Well-known member
Now, that is a good question - is the Red Army deployed in similar manner as in OTL? At least to the north of the Pripet Marshes it could be arranged differently, not as far west as in OTL.
Would Stalin really cram armies up to the Vistula River?


Still possible - attack east and then around Polotsk veer south along the Berezina/Upper Dnepr towards Mohyliv - that cuts almost all the longitudinal RR between Russia and troops to the west of the Dnepr (and north of the marshes).

Of course Stalin would send his armies to the border.He planned attack Germany in 1941,only Hitler was 1-2 week faster.
So,in this scenario soviets would lost their armies even quicker then in OTL - as a result germans would advance faster.
But so what? Hitler lost,when he decide to keep kolchoz system and started genociding average soviet people.If he gave land to peasants,and massacred only party members,he would win.
 

stevep

Well-known member
Of course Stalin would send his armies to the border.He planned attack Germany in 1941,only Hitler was 1-2 week faster.
So,in this scenario soviets would lost their armies even quicker then in OTL - as a result germans would advance faster.
But so what? Hitler lost,when he decide to keep kolchoz system and started genociding average soviet people.If he gave land to peasants,and massacred only party members,he would win.

There's no actual evidence of that at all. Stalin was desperate to avoid a conflict because he knew after the terrible peformances in Poland and Finland the Red Army was nowhere near ready for a war, let alone a massive offensive. It was also in the middle of a massive re-equipment programme as well as expansion in numbers. That was why the military were ordered not to respond to German 'provocations' and all warnings of an impending German attack, from whatever source were dismissed. Stalin had decided that Hitler would never attack him while he still had a war with Britain and refused to consider he could have misjudged his fellow dictator.
 

ATP

Well-known member
There's no actual evidence of that at all. Stalin was desperate to avoid a conflict because he knew after the terrible peformances in Poland and Finland the Red Army was nowhere near ready for a war, let alone a massive offensive. It was also in the middle of a massive re-equipment programme as well as expansion in numbers. That was why the military were ordered not to respond to German 'provocations' and all warnings of an impending German attack, from whatever source were dismissed. Stalin had decided that Hitler would never attack him while he still had a war with Britain and refused to consider he could have misjudged his fellow dictator.

Wiktor Suworow proved it long ago in his "Icebreaker" - for example,soviet started removing barbed wire from frontier and replacing NKWD border unit with army before 22.06.41.
According to their manuals,it would be done ONLY if soviets planned attacking in few days.
 

sillygoose

Well-known member
Wiktor Suworow proved it long ago in his "Icebreaker" - for example,soviet started removing barbed wire from frontier and replacing NKWD border unit with army before 22.06.41.
According to their manuals,it would be done ONLY if soviets planned attacking in few days.
Does anyone take Suvorov seriously anymore? Glantz pretty decisively debunked him with Soviet archival material.
Though a new book is coming out that does indicate Stalin did intend to fight Hitler when he was ready, but not in 1941:
 

ATP

Well-known member
Does anyone take Suvorov seriously anymore? Glantz pretty decisively debunked him with Soviet archival material.
Though a new book is coming out that does indicate Stalin did intend to fight Hitler when he was ready, but not in 1941:

Suworow delivered facts.Soviets really start removbing barbed wire,really do not have maps of their own and occupied by them territories but only those occupied by germans, and really gave to their soldiers millions of small soviet-german dictionaries with question like "is there any SA officers here"
And SA operated ONLY on german territory,not on occupied ones.
Not mention,that they have 16 brigades of paratroopers with gliders,for which they do not build - and do not plan to build later - any hangars.Which mean,that they MUST be used before 1941 winter.
 

stevep

Well-known member
Suworow delivered facts.Soviets really start removbing barbed wire,really do not have maps of their own and occupied by them territories but only those occupied by germans, and really gave to their soldiers millions of small soviet-german dictionaries with question like "is there any SA officers here"
And SA operated ONLY on german territory,not on occupied ones.
Not mention,that they have 16 brigades of paratroopers with gliders,for which they do not build - and do not plan to build later - any hangars.Which mean,that they MUST be used before 1941 winter.


Survov made claims, just as other people do. [IIRC I have one of his books from the 1980's somewhere, although haven't read it for years but as sillygoose has said he's been discredited by many sources]. I know of no significant evidence that would support your assertions. However the behaviour of both Stalin and the Red army in the 1st days of the war in the east strongly suggest that they had no intention of attacking at that time. Quite possibly in 1-2 years time when the Red army had reequipped and possibly the German position was more vulnerable. I have no doubt that Stalin's morals were as strong [i.e. non-existent] as Hitler's but he wasn't in any position to try an invasion of German controlled Europe and he seems to have been very aware of that.

However the Germans were fully prepared for an invasion of the Soviet empire and there is no evidence I have seen that it was at all motivated by the idea that the Soviets were going to attack them in the near future. Going here by what the Germans themselves said. Gobbles and his propaganda people probably made claims in the immediate aftermath of the invasion but then they also claimed that the invasion of Poland was in response to a Polish attack on Germany and I don't think anyone believes that either. ;)

Steve
 

ATP

Well-known member
Survov made claims, just as other people do. [IIRC I have one of his books from the 1980's somewhere, although haven't read it for years but as sillygoose has said he's been discredited by many sources]. I know of no significant evidence that would support your assertions. However the behaviour of both Stalin and the Red army in the 1st days of the war in the east strongly suggest that they had no intention of attacking at that time. Quite possibly in 1-2 years time when the Red army had reequipped and possibly the German position was more vulnerable. I have no doubt that Stalin's morals were as strong [i.e. non-existent] as Hitler's but he wasn't in any position to try an invasion of German controlled Europe and he seems to have been very aware of that.

However the Germans were fully prepared for an invasion of the Soviet empire and there is no evidence I have seen that it was at all motivated by the idea that the Soviets were going to attack them in the near future. Going here by what the Germans themselves said. Gobbles and his propaganda people probably made claims in the immediate aftermath of the invasion but then they also claimed that the invasion of Poland was in response to a Polish attack on Germany and I don't think anyone believes that either. ;)

Steve

Suworow have facts taken from soviet,not german sources.

Poland have no 6:1 advantage in tanks and 3:1 in planes over Germany,soviets had it.And lost 11.000 tanks during first 3 weeks,when german made 400-500km and lost 2KIA for each soviet tank destroyed.Becouse they were slaves,and slaves fight well only if they are elite force or have no other choice.Here they could surrender,so they surrender.
Only after Hitler killed most of soviet 4 millions prisoners,they started fight to death.

P.S another prove,that soviet planned attack in 1942 - they have many regiments of 152mm howitzers on border,but they do not build or planned to do so schelter for ammo.And when troops could survive winter in tents,ammo could not.It need specialized schelter.
So,they plan to use that ammo in 1942,and attacking germans.Becouse regiments of heavy artillery are gathered on border only if you wont to attack.If enemy attack,you would lost it.Just like soviets lost all that guns in 1941.
 

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