So your saying that producing thousands more trucks would consume no cash, industrial manpower, engines, steel, rubber or other materials?? The petrol shortage was a factor that caused the Germans to consider reducing their level of motorisation but it doesn't mean other constrains don't exist. Germany was always operating on close margins, a point you continue to ignore. Especially ironic in terms of quoting Tooze as that's one of the core arguments of his book.
No I am saying exactly what is cited, in that the only constraint on production in late 1941 was oil; the resources you cite for the Germans were already earmarked for them and if they weren't, Tooze would cite that as a factor in why truck production was halted. Likewise, I welcome you to make a relevant argument on the latter statement.
That is your assumption. Possibly correct but possibly note. Your putting another army on the same line of advance, putting further strain on the limited road system and its a lot further away than Rostov. It also leaves Rostov and adjacent areas unoccupied so the forces there would need to be neutralised and the area occupied later.
No, it's literally the history of the campaign; to be honest, you sound very uninformed on Case Blau. Up until late July, 4th Panzer Army was attached to Army Group B so there is no extra forces on their supply lines but even if there was, we've already established much higher logistical amounts for the Germans going into the campaign. Specifically as it concerns Rostov, again, you need to read up on the campaign because that was already being handled by Army Group A as part of its movement into the Caucasus. The diversion of 4th Panzer Army did nothing but congest the roads, something noted by the German commanders on the scene who did not ask for it nor request it as reinforcements. It was solely an action of Hitler.
On the Soviet end, in late July about the only Soviet forces in Stalingrad itself were a handful of AA troops, with 62nd and 64th Armies that would later defend it not present at all and Stalingrad Front having yet to form; if you feel the City is defended or can be, please name the forces available and where they are at.
In which case there is further time for the western powers to deny it - or its ruins - to the Germans.
Probably, but as already pointed out, Maikop, Grozny, the fields listed in the OP and Romania are more than enough to meet German needs, present and future.
So there is zero population, industrial or agricultural resources etc east of the A-A line. I repeat, the Soviets would be vastly weakened but they would still be a potential threat. Especially since in this scenario while the Germans are driving south in 42 they still have to deal with Moscow and the bulk of the Volga area. Or are you now assuming that this has all fallen in 41?
You can repeat it, but you have yet to demonstrate it, which is how a debate works. If you feel the Soviets can still be a threat with no food, energy for their factories or inputs for their factories, please explain how they can fight with no weapons or soldiers? Moving beyond that, with what soldiers are they to fight the Germans with? As for the Moscow-Gorky axis, I am assuming that is in 1943 or 1944. How exactly can the Soviets defend it with no soldiers, equipment or oil to man their equipment?
Yes OTL L-L is supplying a lot of people and there would be great suffering and death. However it doesn't cease to exist, neither does agricultural resources elsewhere. Plus once Germany advances to the A-A line as your proposing it has far, far less people to support. The Germans planned to starve tens of millions in the Russian heartland but once their in control of that areas feeding them is not an issue for L-L.
Yes, it does cease to exist and I am asking you to prove otherwise, as I've already cited this to you:
1943: 4,794,545t of which 1,606,979 Persian Gulf, 2,388,577 Soviet Far East, North Russia, 117,946 Soviet Artic.
The A-A Line would see the Persian Gulf and North Russia imports removed, which is 2,288,022 tons or 47% of all Lend Lease imports. Further, Hunger and War directly states that without Lend Lease, the Red Army would've starved; can you cite anything to the contrary of this? Also, what agricultural resources are you referring to east of the Line? I think anybody familiar with basic Russian/Soviet geography would know very little grows in arid Central Asia or the permafrost of Siberia. Again, as has already been cited to you before:
By November of 1941, 47% of Soviet cropland was in German hands. The Germans had 38% of the grain farmland, 84% of the sugar land, 38% of the area devoted to beef and dairy cattle, and 60% of the land used to produce hogs. The Russians turned to the east and brought more land into cultivation. In the fall of 1941, the autumn and winter crops increased sharply in the eastern area. But despite all efforts, farm yields dropped from 95.5 million tons of grain in 1940 to 29.7 million tons in 1942. Production of cattle and horses dropped to less than half of prewar levels and hogs to one fifth. By 1942, meat and dairy production shrank to half the 1940 total and sugar to only 5%. Farm production in 1942 and 1943 dropped to 38% and 37% of 1940 totals.
Interesting that the primary concern here was an attack through Turkey as from what I recall the concern was the collapse of the Soviet union allowing limited threat via the Caucasus region.
The primary concern is that the Axis can attack all throughout the Middle East now with nothing to stop them.
Two errors here. I specifically said that the allies don't waste considerable resources building up a huge US army in Britain, which did very little for two years other than training for when they eventually went into action. Some of this sent to the ME could boost the position defending there without affecting the Torch Operation at all.
Then name those forces and, even better, name where they are getting the naval shipping to do such.
Given what happened historically there is bugger all chance of Rommel reaching Suez. The El Alemen position is too strong and his logistics are too weak, even if somehow the Axis take Malta.
Except this situation is nothing like what happened historically and the 8th Army will have to deal with the Germans in Syria, Iraq and Iran very shortly, which will force the transfer of forces from Egypt to there lest the Germans overrun the entirety of the region. Despite what you assert, the El Alemain position can and nearly was breached in 1942 and definitely can be in this situation, where Rommel has much, much better logistics and a thrust coming into the British rear.
Its fairly easy to loot rich farmlands but the northern areas with much less food production. That is part of the reason why the Germans designed the Hunger Plan, because they couldn't feed the Russian heartland without using up the surplus from the Ukraine which they wanted for themselves. Going to be a lot more difficult getting that much food from the north.
Okay, but that literally doesn't mean anything since they aren't trying to feed the north and getting all the food they need from the South?
Yes Germany got some resources out of the occupied lands, and had occupied a fair number of the richest ore regions already, at least those west of the A-A line. They did manage to use this to get dramatic increases in some areas of production in 42/43. The British bombing camapign against the Rhur didn't affect that at all. What it did was reduce coal and steel production so if it still occurs - or as Tooze suggested continued - no amount of specialised ores from the east would help significantly.
You haven't read Tooze then if you are going to make such an obliviously baseless claim that is directly contradicted by Tooze. I have cited this to you at least three times I can recall, so you have no excuse on this. See
Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze, starting Page 596:
In the spring of 1943, however, the German war economy itself was sucked directly into the fighting. As we have seen, the threat of Anglo-American bombing had bulked large in German strategic thinking at least since 1940. But until early 1943 it proved remarkably easy to counter. The Royal Air Force simply did not have enough heavy bombers to do sustained damage to the German home front, nor did it have the technology necessary to guide them to their targets. The heavy air raids on Luebeck (28/29 March 1942), Rostock (23/24 April 1942) and the 'thousand-bomber raids' on Cologne (30/31 May 1942) and Essen (1 June 1942) gave some indication of what was in store, but they did not develop into a sustained campaign of aerial destruction.26 It was not until March 1943 that RAF Bomber Command had the planes with which to mount a prolonged attack on the heart of German heavy industry, or the technology with which to guide them to their targets.
The 'Battle of the Ruhr' began on 5 March with an attack on the industrial city of Essen, the home of Krupp.27 Between 8.58 p.m. and 9.36 p.m., following the invisible beam of the OBOE electronic guidance system, 362 bombers hit the main target with a combination of incendiaries and high explosives leaving a trail of blazing destruction.28 This time the RAF not only attacked in force but returned repeatedly over a period of five months, dropping a total of 34,000 tons of bombs. The sequence of heavy attacks was relentless and interspersed by daily harassing raids by small forces of light Mosquito bombers. Heavy attacks were delivered against every major node of the Ruhr conurbation: Essen (5 March, 12/13 March, 3/4 April, 30 April, 27 May, 25 July), Duisburg (26/27 March, 8/9 April, 26/27 April, 12/13 May), Bochum (13/14 May, 12 June), Krefeld (21 June), Duesseldorf (25 May, 11 June) and Dortmund (4 May, 23 May), Barmen-Wuppertal (29 May), Muelheim (22 June), Elberfeld-Wuppertal (24 June), Gelsenkirchen (25 June, 9 July), Cologne (16 June, 28 June, 3 July, 8 July). To increase the misery, on 16 May specially adapted bombs destroyed the dams on the Moehne and Eder rivers, inundating the surrounding countryside and cutting off the water supply. The bombers killed thousands of people and did heavy damage to the urban fabric. Above all, however, they struck against the most vital node in the German industrial economy, precisely at the moment that Hitler, Speer and the RVE were hoping to energize armaments production with a fresh surge in steel production.
Reading contemporary sources, there can be no doubt that the Battle of the Ruhr marked a turning point in the history of the German war economy, which has been grossly underestimated by post-war accounts.29 As Speer himself acknowledged, the RAF was hitting the right target.30 The Ruhr was not only Europe's most important producer of coking coal and steel, it was also a crucial source of intermediate components of all kinds. Disrupting production in the Ruhr had the capacity to halt assembly lines across Germany. When the first of the heavy raids struck Krupp in Essen, Speer immediately travelled to the Ruhr with a view to learning general lessons in disaster management.51 He was forced to return in May, June and July to energize the emergency response and to rally the workforce with well-advertised displays of personal bravery.32 The Ruhr was raised from the status of the home front to that of a war zone. Speer established a special emergency staff with absolute authority over the local economy and made plans for the total evacuation of the non-essential population. The remaining workforce was to be organized along para-military lines, uniformed and housed in camp accommodation so that they could be redeployed at a moment's notice to whichever plants were still operational.33
But all Speer could do was to limit the damage. He could not stop the bombers or prevent them from seriously disrupting the German war effort. Following the onset of heavy air raids in the first quarter of 1943, steel production fell by 200,000 tons. Having anticipated an increase in total steel production to more than 2.8 million tons per month and allocated steel accordingly, the Zentrale Planung now faced a shortfall of almost 400,000 tons. All the painstaking effort that had gone into reorganizing the rationing system was negated by the ability of the British to disrupt production more or less at will. In light of the steel shortage, Hitler and Speer had no option but to implement an immediate cut to the ammunition programme.34 After more than doubling in 1942, ammunition production in 1943 increased by only 20 per cent.35 And it was not just ammunition that was hit.
In the summer of 1943, the disruption in the Ruhr manifested itself across the German economy in a so-called 'Zulieferungskrise' (sub-components crisis). All manner of parts, castings and forgings were suddenly in short supply.56 And this affected not only heavy industry directly, but the entire armaments complex. Most significantly, the shortage of key components brought the rapid increase in Luftwaffe production to an abrupt halt. Between July 1943 and March 1944 there was no further increase in the monthly output of aircraft. For the armaments effort as a whole, the period of stagnation lasted throughout the second half of 1943. As Speer himself acknowledged, Allied bombing had negated all plans for a further increase in production.37 Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks.
By 45 Britain had largely exhausted its manpower reserves yes. The US still had vast resources available if they were willing to use them. The 1918 situation is irrelevant as Germany isn't offering to surrender, which was what 1918 basically way and is still undefeated and aggressive. I have read there was a significant drop in morale in the US Army in Europe after the surrender of Germany so there is an issue here if that happened but that's a long way yet. [More likely in TTL things will be resolved by the nuclear option but that won't be known by people at this point]. Biden himself has recently pointed out that the death toll in the US exceeds that from both world wars plus I think at least one other conflict so yes the US had potential for a long more military activity if it so decides.
Britain was out of manpower by 1943, and began to have to breakdown existing units to keep their existing ones up to strength. Take in note,
this was before even landing on the continent in 1944:
Indeed, in the summer of 1943 it became apparent that Great Britain had reached the limits of mobilisation; during the rest of the year recruitment from the non-industrial population would not be sufficient to offset the normal wastage from industry. Before long the labour force would decline. In any case, supplies of labour in the last nine months of 1943 would be less than had been expected. The demands of the Services and industry for the last nine months of 1943 added up to 912,000 men and women; the prospective supply was 429,000. once more ruthless cuts would have to be imposed. The Service demands could not possibly be met in full; Even without battle casualties, the total occupied population of the United Kingdom would fall by about 150,000 in 1944. The manpower was no longer one of closing a gap between demand and supply by subtracting at the demand end and adding at the supply end. Nothing was left to add. The country was fully mobilised and all that remained was to change the distribution of manpower as the strategy of war demanded.
Likewise, the Americans had exhausted their own supplies for the most part by 1945 and could not further expand their forces without cutting their own industrial production.
Case in point of this crisis:
Late in January the theater estimated that the shortage of infantrymen within the armies alone totaled 82,000, of which nearly 50,000 were in riflemen.105 The outlook for the future was hardly encouraging despite the special efforts now being made. Earlier in the month the War Department had again relented somewhat, revising its capabilities upward to 44,000 men for May and 46,000 in June. To achieve these figures, however, it noted that it would have to call upon the Army Air Forces for an additional 15,000 men. These would consist largely of students in training for air crews and of highly trained technicians, and the Army Air Forces warned that their transfer would seriously affect air operations in the European theater. The War Department preferred not to make these withdrawals. ETOUSA manpower officials insisted on the additional replacements, however, pointing out that the theater's conversion capabilities would begin to diminish after June.
Since the alternative to not fighting on is leaving much of the globe and its resources under the control of two insanely militaristic and expansionist dictatorships that have made clear their hostility towards the US to gather up resources for another war in the future how many people in the US would be rash enough to insist on peace at any terms?
Everyone, including the Military Political establishment which was more familiar with the strategic balance of power than the man on the street, again, as I have pointed out to you before. See Mark Stoler's
Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II. From Page 72:
Eisenhower and his subordinates were far from alone or original in perceiving the overriding importance of continued Soviet participation in the war. As previously noted, in the summer and fall of 1941 Roosevelt and army planners had begun to recognize that victory over Germany might not be possible unless the Red Army continued to tie down the bulk of the Wehrmacht, and they consequently had made assistance to Russia a focal point of their global strategy. The JB had forcefully reiterated this conclusion by informing Roosevelt on December 21 that ‘‘Russia alone possesses the manpower potentially able to defeat Germany in Europe.’’ 26 The Soviets’ late 1941 success in stopping the German advance on Moscow and launching a counteroffensive, occurring at a time when Axis forces were everywhere else successful, further reinforced this belief. As a result virtually all Allied planning papers in late 1941– early 1942 stressed the critical importance of aiding the Russians so that they could survive a renewed German onslaught. Roosevelt agreed. ‘‘Nothing would be worse than to have the Russians collapse,’’ he told Treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau on March 11. ‘‘I would rather lose New Zealand, Australia, or anything else than have the Russians collapse.’’ Five days earlier the JUSSC had bluntly stated that ‘‘Russia must be supported now by every possible means’’ because the absence of a Russian front would postpone ‘‘indefinitely’’ the end of the war.27 And as army planners realized, such postponement would only increase public and naval pressure to turn away completely from the indecisive European theater in favor of the Pacific.
Page 80:
Marshall’s reasoning was based not only on Eisenhower’s February–March presentations but also on military and political events since then which had heavily reinforced the OPD’s original conclusions. Once again the focal point was the Soviet Union. ‘‘The retention of Russia in the war as an active participant is vital to Allied victory,’’ now acting chief of staff McNarney had emphasized on April 12; if German armies were allowed to turn west, ‘‘any opportunity for a successful offensive against the European Axis would be virtually eliminated.’’ 56 In mid June the staff again warned that Russian collapse would necessitate a strategic reassessment, ‘‘possibly with the result of directing our main effort to the Pacific rather than the Atlantic.’’ 57
Page 93:
As early as April–May, OPD, g-2, and the joint committees had begun to explore the appropriate response should this ‘‘desperate situation’’ result in a Soviet collapse, and in early August the JUSSC completed and forwarded to the JPS a massive study of such a contingency. This study indicated that Russian collapse would be a ‘‘catastrophe’’ of such magnitude as to put the United States in a ‘‘desperate’’ situation too, one in which it ‘‘would be forced to consider courses of action which would primarily benefit the United States rather than the United Nations.’’
Indeed, it might be the only remaining major member of the United Nations, because the British Commonwealth might collapse and the British public react to Soviet defeat by overthrowing Churchill and agreeing to a negotiated peace that would leave Hitler in control of Eurasia. A revival of isolationism and an ‘‘increase in defeatism’’ within the country were also possible in this scenario. Even without British withdrawal, however, the only sound U.S. response to a Soviet collapse would be to ‘‘adopt the strategic defensive in the European Theater of War and to conduct the strategic offensive in the Japanese theater.’’ On August 19 the JPS the great strategic debate 93 approved this report, forwarded it to the Joint Chiefs as JCS 85, and ordered the preparation of a strategic plan for the defeat of Japan.40
Concurrent to these concerns, the following documents were prepared:
"Conditions under Which an Armistice Might Be Negotiated between the United Nations and the European Powers", on June 11, 1942 by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong (S Document 22)
Col. Nevins, ‘‘Courses of Action Open to the United States in the Event the Prospective 1942 German Offensive Forces Russia to Capitulate,’’ memo, Apr. 1942, and unsigned memo to Nevins, Apr. 25, 1942, Wedemeyer Papers, box 76, folder 2, HI
With the removal of the Russian Front, the conclusion by American planners was the need to shift from the Europe First to Pacific First strategy at the minimum, drawing down forces in the Atlantic purely to those sufficient to safe guard the United Kingdom from a German invasion. With the benefit of hindsight we know this wasn't a realistic concern in terms of invasion, but the JCS was concerned with such given they didn't have access to German documents like we do. In the first document, written by Maj. Gen. Strong, it was recommended negotiations be opened to convene an armistice, as it was not thought possible to defeat the Germans without the Red Army tying down large elements of it.
It may not have been clear to most at the time but Japan was largely spent as an offensive force at this point. Relatively limited actions could have tightened the grip as OTL and forced the collapse of its empire. If nothing else continued supplies to China, rather than trying to establish a logistically very demanding USAAF bomber force in the country would have continued to wear it down as would a commerce war on its limited merchant shipping. As I said huge saving could be made by only attacking on one line, either in SE Asia or the central Pacific, rather than allowing the army and navy to have their owm separate operations. It wouldn't be any quicker than OTL and may take a bit longer but its possible with far less forces.
It's not clear to anyone, then or now. In 1943, the Japanese Islands were not under any bombing campaign, the submarine campaign had yet to be undertaken and the IJN had yet to be defeated as an effective force. Most of Southeast Asia and China are under Japanese occupation, so even if the submarine campaign starts the Japanese can just do Operation Ichi Go and now the Americans have no ability to harm them economically, allowing the Japanese to build up their military and industrial might undisturbed.
You have said there would be huge savings, but you have not demonstrated that at all, which is how a debate works. Further, you are contradicting yourself further; somehow the Americans can build up a massive army at the expense of the Navy and Army Air Force, but then somehow still be able to tighten the noose against Japan with much fewer resources.
You must know how stupid that statement is. Even ignoring for replacements there are issues of ground crew and other support staff that would be vastly higher. Not to mention the even more important one of the huge industrial effort to develop and manufacture teh B-29's.
Steve, you're the one claiming one airplane was the sole reason the U.S. didn't have a larger Army in WWII with no citations, so perhaps you shouldn't be casting stones when your argument is made of glass? Let's go wild and say the support services for the B-29 was five times the amount of crew needed for them, which then equates to a combined total of 262,020 or about....
14 divisions lol. Given the manpower that was slated to build them was needed to, you know, build them, then you are now saying the U.S. has no B-29s which means a strategic air campaign against Japan is out of the question entirely.
Of course the above analysis is no longer relevant. Russia has already been reduce to a 2nd rate power so you can't rely on it to do the majority of the fighting. Therefore you have to either do it yourself, which as you say the US was unwilling to do or rely on "indirect campaigns in the Mediterranean against Germany’s satellites, combined with blockade, bombing, and guerrilla operations, to force a German collapse". Or more to the point to continue waging the war and weakening the enemy until other options are available. As the quote says the southern Balkans especially are remote from the centres of German power so they are logistically difficult to get to. The terrain and many natives deeply hostile to the Axis also makes the sort of German armoured thrusts far less effective.
Given the different circumstances and that as you argue the US was unwilling to take on the German army head to head then peripheral operations are the only option for land warfare.
The idiotic Anglo-phobia shows how ignorant of the circumstances the people making those suggestions were. Britain is clearly spent as a great power able to pose a serious economic challenge to the US post-war and that's well known by now.
To focus in on the Russian angle is to deliberately ignore the majority, as well as the very first sentence, which notes such a strategy was rejected because in the view of the U.S. they could never defeat the Germans with such a strategy, it's stated plain and simple. Quite frankly, your own argument shows that; if the Balkans are distant and logistically difficult, how exactly are you supposed to defeat the Germans there since it is not economically vital? Further, the Balkans are only a few hundred miles by train from Germany but literally thousands-if not tens of thousands given the Med is closed with Malta lost-by ship from America or Britain. As the U.S. JCS said, there was no way they could beat the Germans given those logistical constraints alone and to talk about how the Allies could grind down the Germans there is to ignore the very obvious counter to that historically: Italy.
Again your playing fast and loose with the facts. I clearly mentioned not wasting a lot of resources in building up a sizeable army sitting around in Britain when a relatively small proportion of that could make a big difference where the fighting could well be. So again there's no impact on Torch. Ditto I'm talking about using naval power more efficiently and the primary difference might be one hugely expensive research project gets cut.
No, you keep moving goalposts to suit your argument. What forces are you referring to and can you name them? You suggested reducing Naval production, so how exactly is the shipping there to do all of that then? If the U.S. and UK are sending forces to do TORCH, there is nothing for the Middle East when the Germans come knocking. If you are pulling things out of the Pacific in 1942, congratulations, the Republicans win the midterms on a Pacific First strategy. Even worse, the Japanese are free to build up in peace and establish air and naval bases in the Southwest Pacific that isolate Australia, a political disaster for Britain and further pressure on Roosevelt to cut losses in Europe in order to focus on Japan, who the American public see as their main enemy anyway.
You can't have it both ways and as I have asked you repeatedly now, you need to clearly and concisely state what you are arguing. If you think I am misunderstanding you, then that is because you have not adequately defined what you are saying and the onerous to do such is on you.
Apart from the fact its not unlimited oil as I have pointed out above and as you would know from any book on WWII, possibly most especially Tooze's oil was far from the only limitation on the German war machine. Interesting that your suggesting that the US war economy will stumble with any change to match the new situation but that the German one, with less population, less resources and industry and far inferior leadership will manage to magic up unlimited production of a/c without any restraint. Especially since:
a) Your already admitted the occupied zone in the east will require considerable German forces - and supplies and equipment for them - even without clashes with rump Soviet/Russia forces in the Urals and further east or fighting allied forces in area such as the Caucasus Mts. Remembering we're talking about Hitler and the Nazis here so both of those are likely.
b) An equal comparison would be that Britain, a small island under partial blockade and from 1944 also under renewed bombardment, with markedly less population and industrial base than greater Germany managed to pretty much match the latter in a/c production. Especially remembering that the British were expanding huge resources on stratgic bombers, which takes a lot more than fighters and that its designs were markedly superior than those being produced in Germany.
It is unlimited oil because, as pointed out by
@sillygoose, Maikop and Grozny with Romania vastly exceeds German requirements, meaning there would be a surplus. You can make the trivial argument that there is no such thing as unlimited oil given the finite supplies on Earth, but that is, as stated, a trivial argument that is throughly semantics rather than substance. Further, if you can think of other constraints, by all means, cite them for us. Let us see what they are and then we can look at what is available to Germany in this scenario and then look at their effectiveness in extracting resources historically. I don't think you will do this however because your arguments rely on their undefined nature to cast aspersions on to what I say or cite, without offering any real substance on your part.
We can also do without making deliberately false arguments on your part, such as the claim I said the U.S. economy would stumble. If I said that, I challenge to cite me where I did. Since we both know you are lying, you can apologize instead. Now then, to address your points:
A) I said the Germans would probably maintain a 100 Division occupation force. That automatically frees up 50 Divisions for duty elsewhere and, given the lack of the level of losses in the East from 1942 onward, you've also avoided roughly another 50 Divisions in losses. That means 100 Divisions of manpower able to be converted into industrial labor, for use in combat actions against the Western Allies (For the record, this is more divisions than the U.S. raised in WWII for the Army), or converted to other tasks; combing through for pilots, for example. As I said earlier, you can continue to pretend to claim the Soviets will be fighting on but there is no proof for that and this is why you have failed categorically to offer it yet.
B) What your analysis ignores is that Britain raised only about 50 Divisions in WWII, Germany raised over 300. Britain had access to the industrial might and resources of the United States and its Empire, which is an economic advantage Germany didn't achieve IOTL and was seeking to do so with the conquest of Russia. That Germany still, by 1944, managed to outproduce the UK or match it in everything but naval production says a lot. Don't believe me? Look at AFVs, Aircraft and munitions output for that time. Now tell me how, exactly, with a greatly expanded resource base and vast amounts of manpower for industrial work freed the Germans can't achieve higher production? I never claimed it would be unlimited, that is you engaging in malicious lies again. If you feel otherwise, again, please quote me where I made that claim.
Again I'm quoting from Tooze, see pages 582-584, where he talks about the outdated German designs and the burdens that placed on the Luftwaffe. Especially the comment from a US ace about the extreme vulnerability of the 109G. Germany boosted numbers by failing to upgrade quality. As he mentions in the preceding pages developing newer designs would have been a slow and costly process and if 2-3 years down the line would then cause a disruption to production while all those assembly lines had to retool. It might help if Germany was still fighting in 46-47 but isn't going to produce better a/c in substantial numbers in the shorter term.
I also notice your raising the old chimera of massively increasing Me 262 production. Those required large quantities of specials materials the Germans don't have access to. Plus even then the a/c was distinctly unstable and its weight and landing speed meant it really needed specialised concrete runways rather than grass tracks and even then tended to suffer damage due to inferior artificial rubber and its stats meaning a lot of punchers.
Sillygoose already addressed this for me but to claim higher Me 262 production is a chimera is baseless. Said special materials come from Yugoslavia, Ukraine and Turkey, all of which German owns or has economic ties with. Good thing too the Germans have high production of quality rubber, as already stated in the OP, and vast amounts of resources and space for runways without needing to expand synthetic oil production facilities. Even further, I suggest you actually look at the stats of the plan itself rather than an uncited claim; in all relevant metrics, it was superior to anything the Allies were fielding in 1945. If you take it a step further and look at its shoot down rates, which was one every eight sorties, then compare it to the sortie rates of the Luftwaffe in OTL 1944, you begin to realize the issues for the Allies. Had the Germans achieved a fleet of about 1,500 or so Me-262s active at any one time, with no other aircraft, while achieving the same sortie rate they did IOTL 1944 with fuel shortages, you find the Germans would shoot down more American bombers than American bombers were produced in 1944.
