I have provided the citation with page number; if you feel I am misquoting or misrepresenting the work, you have all the power at the fingertips to prove such. If you feel the source is wrong, then the onus is on you to provide a competing source. Your personal disagreement is not a valid argument in of itself.
So all the statements by German leaders are to be ignored.
Given you have not defined or cited any, yes.
So Germany can produce miracles without any external support but France and Britain, with access to the rest of the world, multiple allies and large empires are doomed to collapse as soon as the US decides to stop trading with them.
Yes, according to the British and French Governments. To re-quote what I have shown you elsewhere,
The Command of Gold Reversed: American Loans to Britain, 1915-1917 by John Milton Cooper, Jr.,
Pacific Historical Review, May, 1976, Vol. 45, No. 2 (May, 1976), pp. 209-230:
The American retaliatory legislation also prompted the British government in September and October 1916 to initiate its first comprehensive inquiry into dependence upon American trade. Up to that time, the Treasury, War Trade Advisory Council, and Ministry of Munitions had separately studied the situation. The suggestion for a broad review of British dependence first came on September 5, 1916, from Richard Sperling, a clerk in the American Section of the Foreign Office. Sperling proposed the review as a preliminary step toward counterretaliatory measures. The suggestion found favor with his superiors, and on September 13, the Foreign Secretary asked for representatives of other ministries to meet with members of his department in order to "ascertain definitely how far this country is dependent financially and commercially on the United States... ." Delays ensued, and not until October 3 did an interdepartmental committee from the Foreign Office, Treasury, Board of Trade, Admiralty, Board of Agriculture, Ministry of Munitions, War Office, and Colonial Office meet to review the American situation.'3
The interdepartmental committee made a shocking discovery. The chairman, Lord Eustace Percy of the Foreign Office, reported, ". .. it developed at once at the conference that there was really nothing to deliberate about because our dependence was so vital and complete in every respect that it was folly even to consider reprisals." The committee had found that in food, raw materials, and particularly steel, "American supplies are so necessary to us that reprisals, while they would produce tremendous distress in America, would also practically stop the war." Even worse, in order to finance the war orders, the Treasury had to "find something over ?2,000,000 sterling a day in New York." By March 1917, British reserves of gold and securities would be gone. "Now, in these circumstances," wrote Percy, "our job is not merely to maintain decently friendly relations with the United States, but to keep sentiment in America so sweet that it will lend us practically unlimited money." No record was kept of the discussion that produced those conclusions, but it is not hard to guess what happened at the meeting. The Treasury representative to the committee was Keynes, and Percy's comments on finance recapitulated views that Keynes had often expressed. Not only was Keynes the best in-formed person about the American situation on the committee, but throughout his adult life the economist's quick mind and ready turn of phrase made him excel in swaying small groups of experts. The interdepartmental committee, it would seem, furnished an ideal forum for the Treasury's brilliant Cassandra.'4
At the end of October 1916, the Foreign Office circulated three sets of documents from the committee to the Cabinet. These included a resolution against reprisals, a memorandum by Percy urging conciliation toward the United States, and papers on British dependence by different departments. The most incisive arguments came in the Treasury paper prepared by Keynes. Dwindling stocks of gold and securities could meet less and less of the financial requirements, he noted. More and more money would therefore have to come from loans. But loans carried great dangers. "A statement," Keynes warned, "from the United States executive deprecating or disapproving of such loans would render their flotation in sufficient volume a practical impossibility." Even official approval, he further warned, might not be enough. "The sums which this country will require to borrow in the United States of America in the next six to nine months are so enormous, amounting to several times the national debt of that country, that it will be necessary to appeal to every class and section of the investing public." Keynes's conclusion was chilling: "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that In a few months time the American executive and the American public will be in a position to dictate to this country on matters that affect us more dearly than them.""5
Again untrue as its the Germans who have forced the issue by their demands. However if the US is that misguided they have themselves to blame for the mess their helped create.
The demands were not considered unreasonable by the United States, which is all that is relevant. If the Anglo-French refused to accept them, then the U.S. was clear it would wipe its hands of the situation and the Germans could enforce harsher demands later. Whether you like it or not on a personal level, welcome to Geopolitics.
Again that is contradicted by all the plans made by Germany for after the war.
You've stated this, yes, but that alone does not constitute evidence. Indeed, you have yet to define what these are; I brought up the September Program because that is what I assumed you were talking about, but once again those were not the definitive German plan and there's doubt on if they even constituted a cohesive plan rather than a packet of options.