Quite natural, as after all the interesting revelations about the company they are not likely to get a better deal evah.
Can they sue and/or fire the board for fucking up the deal? For mismanagement?
I'm not any kind of expert on corporate law so take this with a grain of salt. Shareholders can sue if they can establish that the board acted recklessly or foolishly and inflicted damage on shareholder value. That said there are some pretty significant barriers to them accomplishing anything there, CEOs have plenty of regulatory capture going on and they've made the road to the
peasants shareholders doing anything a rocky one.
F'rex Universal Demand laws are a PITA.
The problem is that in theory, the board has the responsibility of suing the Managers. Shareholders can only sue if the Managers caused them personal injury or loss, but if it's just the value of their
stocks, the Managers are protected by corporate personhood, the person the Managers hurt is the corporation and the
corporation has to file the lawsuit, ie. the board. In practice, the board is nigh-always cronies with the Managerial class and they work together against shareholders. Enter the
Derivative Lawsuit, which allows shareholders to sue directly on behalf of the company on the grounds that the company is failing to defend its own, and by derivation the stockholder's, interests.
Well of course executives don't like those uppity peasants getting to do that, so they've produced Universal Demand laws, which basically force the shareholders to instead present their demands back to the board, who can then give shareholders the finger. It moves rights away from shareholders and over to the managerial class with highly predictable results.
Shareholder derivative actions pose unique pleading challenges designed by statute to preserve management's role in deciding the company's business affairs. This week's New York Business Divorce highlights a pair of recent appellate rulings dismissing derivative actions for failure to plead...
www.nybusinessdivorce.com
While prior research holds the consensus that accounting conservatism can serve as an effective monitoring device, it is not clear whether shareholders can successfully enforce managers’ adherence to accounting conservatism when directors fail to fulfill their fiduciary duties. We attempt to...
www.semanticscholar.org