What if different US leader besides LBJ was POTUS during May 1967 Mideast Crisis, potential June 6-Day War & that era?

[raharris1973]

What if a different US leader besides LBJ was POTUS during the May 1967 Mideast Crisis, the potential June 6-Day War & that general era from 1965?

How would the presence of different politician than the overall quite pro-Israel Lyndon Johnson, in the West Wing and in the resolute desk, shape American handling of the possible 6-Day War and its aftermath, or the various crises beforehand leading up to it, regarding the Straits of Tiran, removal UN peacekeepers, Israeli-Syrian frontier escalation, the emergence of the PLO and Fatah and cross-border Fedayeen attacks, and clandestine but suspected developments within the Israeli nuclear program, all of which may affect whether an Arab-Israeli war happens at all, or who is involved?

Here are some potential alternate leaders to Johnson to consider:

a) A surviving JFK
b) A Nixon elected in 1960 and reelected in 1964
c) A JFK, assassinated as in OTL, but who had been elected in 60 with another Veep on the ticket, reelected in 1964 - Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri
d) Similar set up of an LBJ's slot with JFK taken - but by Senator Albert Gore Sr. of Tennessee - this scenario was developed 25 years ago on SHWI by poster President Chester A. Arthur, who is still a member here under a different name, and abbreviated as PAGS (President Al Gore Senior)
e) Similar, but Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson of Washington State is the LBJ substitute and POTUS after JFK's assassination
f) Nixon as a comeback kid, elected in 1964, after JFK has to make a public trade of missiles in Turkey for Cuba, that makes the electorate think he is weak.
g) Barry Goldwater somehow elected against a surviving Kennedy.
h) A non-divorced Rockefeller somehow winning against a surviving Kennedy
g) Henry Cabot Lodge jr. as POTUS, having succeeded Nixon (elected in 1960) after Nixon's 1963 assassination

LBJ's Israel policy - did not actually intervene in the 1967 crisis. His prior pro-Israel moves however were, 1st face to face summit with an Israeli PM, Levi Eshkol, in 1964 or 1965. And first approval of a sale of US offensive systems, fighter aircraft, and I think tanks, in 1966 or 1967. Ordered, but not delivered to Israel, by the time of the June 1967 fighting.

 

[raharris1973]

a) A surviving JFK

JFK would be reasonably well-disposed towards Israel, and would tend to be supported by many of the American citizens who supported Israel. So he would be seen as pro-Israel.
This would actually leave him freer and more confident to be less pro-Israel, in all particulars, because American Jewish liberals were gaga over this guy who represented the hope of American opportunity for all non-Protestants in a way that LBJ could not.

In OTL, he in fact moved beyond the Eisenhower and Truman era US arms embargo on Israel and authorized the sale of Hawk air defense missiles. He also called BS on Saudi Arabia's policy of banning ARAMCO from having Jewish employees present with its operations and facilities in Saudi Arabia, getting Saudi compliance.

He might or might not have taken some of the same steps LBJ took, the first person to person chief executive meeting - Eshkol and LBJ met in OTL 1964. And authorization of the sale F-16s in late 1966, for delivery in the second half of 1967.

Regardless of whether or not Kennedy was escalating Vietnam as much as LBJ was in OTL, a separate question we shouldn't debate here, he was a foreign policy President, even though he also had domestic reform interests. He should be better able to juggle multiple foreign policy issues and 'walk and chew gum at the same time' compared with Johnson.

This could mean that he maintains a positive line of communications with Nasser for longer. And while opposing Nasser's objectives in puppetizing Yemen, Kennedy may seek a formula allowing him to exit with more grace rather than pure defeat.

Kennedy may also be observing Israeli-Syrian border conflict dynamics more closely, and put more pressure or linkage (for example, to UN votes, or impending jet sales) on Israel to no develop agricultural fields in the Syrian-Israeli DMZ [In OTL, Syria would shell and shoot at the Israeli tractors operating in the DMZ, which the Israelis would answer with airstrikes, and so on]. And he may also watch Israeli nuclear developments more closely, which could force the Israelis to work even more quietly, and consequently slowly.

Any or all of these factors, separately, or in combination, might result in forestalling the May 1967 crisis that escalated first between Israel and Syria, and then Israel and Egypt, that culminated in the 6-Day War. Nasser may simply end up unmotivated in alternate circumstances to demand that UNEF leave Sinai and to blockade the straits of Tiran.

This may not delay an Arab-Israeli war forever, but it could delay it beyond the time scope of Kennedy's second full term, and one might happen under a less deft or more distracted, or less lucky successor.

Alternatively, if Nasser makes himself the problem with the straits of Tiran blockade, Kennedy might order US naval action, possibly backed by the UK, to challenge the Egyptian blockade and preempt any Israeli pretext for war.

And finally if there is an Arab-Israeli war, either in June 1967, or later, despite probable efforts by Kennedy to discourage it, Kennedy may be engaged enough to try to limit some Israeli actions taken during the war.

Among the possible limitations Kennedy might try to press could be:

1) No attacking, taking Jordanian territory, even if they are shelling you first. Rationale - Jordan, unlike Egypt and Syria, is more of a pro-western country fundamentally, Jerusalem is an internationally sensitive point, and military advances in the West Bank risk a big refugee crisis.
2) Pressure in the aftermath of Israeli victory, to permit Palestinian refugees, at least from the current war, and possibly the '48 war, to return to at least the recently occupied territories (but not green line Israel proper)
3) Pressure for Israeli withdrawal on all-fronts, and deployment of UN peacekeepers in their place on all fronts. This one I think really is a bridge too far, not just in terms of Israeli acceptance [based on their Sinai-UNEF experience] but also US domestic politics.

b) A Nixon elected in 1960 and reelected in 1964

Nixon I also think would have more foreign policy sophistication and devote more strategic thought to the Middle East, even if Nixon administration policy was taxed with wars potentially in Indochina and/or Cuba.

Nixon would see Cold War competition against the USSR as paramount in the Middle East, and US relationships with oil producers, Arab and Iranian, as key. So Saudi Arabia and Iran would be his favorites. But he would have little patience for Nasser's Egypt, friendly with the Soviets, critical of the USA, socialist, not an oil exporter, all take and no give.

He would have a policy parallel to LBJ's of working with the Saudis to help Nasser get defeated in the Yemen guerrilla war.

And he would not mind Nasser getting knocked around.

He could caution the Israelis a bit on their Syrian border activities, and keep escalation slowed down, but another part of his, would kind of enjoy seeing Israeli pilots humiliating Syrian pilots flying Soviet jets.

So I see him less concerned with pure deescalation and peace preservation as an end in itself.

But, I see Nixon, if war breaks out, as being quite determined, and detail oriented, about making sure, "friends of America" don't get hurt.

And I think that means extra effort to keep Jordan out of the war, and if Jordan does feel it has to participate for domestic reasons, it means minimizing or negating Jordanian losses.

c) A JFK, assassinated as in OTL, but who had been elected in 60 with another Veep on the ticket, reelected in 1964 - Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri
d) Similar set up of an LBJ's slot with JFK taken - but by Senator Albert Gore Sr. of Tennessee - this scenario was developed 25 years ago on SHWI by poster President Chester A. Arthur, who is still a member here under a different name, and abbreviated as PAGS (President Al Gore Senior)
e) Similar, but Senator Henry 'Scoop' Jackson of Washington State is the LBJ substitute and POTUS after JFK's assassination

Stu Symington, Al Gore Sr., or Scoop Jackson?

Hard to say. I guess they could fall anywhere on the spectrum between LBJ's OTL behavior and my projected possible Kennedy behaviors.

I suspect all three would be less confident standing up to pro-Israeli constituent pressure. Depending how much Vietnam has escalated under them, and how much strategic bandwidth that has left them, that leaves them with more or less ability to at least try to head off the crisis, or try preemptive naval posturing or to try to shield Jordan from the war.

g) Barry Goldwater somehow elected against a surviving Kennedy.

If the world has not blown up by June 1967, Barry is substantively likely to most likely matched LBJ's policy. And cheered when the Israelis won.

h) A non-divorced Rockefeller somehow winning against a surviving Kennedy
g) Henry Cabot Lodge jr. as POTUS, having succeeded Nixon (elected in 1960) after Nixon's 1963 assassination

Moderate Republicans like Rocky and Lodge, in the 1960s, and Charles Percy, if he was ever a contender - but I don't think he was, are the ones most likely to try to repeat the Eisenhower moves of 1956 and force Israeli concessions and withdrawal from occupied territorial, even without peace treaties.

They are the ones most likely, on the Republican side, to mirror some of the restraint moves, before, during and after the crisis, that I imagine might come from JFK,and they do it feeling its realpolitik, with less worry about constituent pressure. They might go a little further and get into public arguments by pushing that withdraw and replace with peacekeepers angle, which the Israelis will resist as long as they can and will forego aid over.