raharris1973
Well-known member
In OTL during WWI, the Greek King Constantine, influenced by his Hohenzollern family relations, and possibly a natural caution, and possibly war-fatigue from the two Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and territorial satiation from the absorption of former Ottoman lands in Epirus and Macedonia, was quite opposed to entering WWI on the Entente side. He likely also realized it was impractical for Greece, with its long coastline and dependence on foreign trade, to side with the Central Powers.
Constantine's strident anti-Entente/anti-war stance was not a consensus view among Greek politicians, although the King had a pretty strong support base in "old Greece" - the territories of the Greek mainland as they existed before the Balkan Wars. The "liberal" Eleftherios Venezelos supported the Entente and the idea of getting into the war and had in mind further national expansion into more Greek-speaking areas, the so-called 'Megali or Greater Greece idea. His popular support base was strongest in Crete, absorbed since the late 1890s, and in "new Greece" in the northern part of the mainland, gained by conquest in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 with the Ottomans and then Bulgaria. Such was the "national schism" linking splits in Greek domestic and foreign policy positions.
The Greeks seeking entry into the war had ideas for invading the Gallipoli peninsula in force, which would have worked to help a larger effort to open the straits to Allied shipping, and which the Greeks hoped would lead to the Greeks taking the Ottoman capital of Constantinople. The Russians had discomfort with the idea of any Greek campaign of this sort at least. Some also hoped to make territorial gains at Turkish expense in western Anatolia in the Smyrna/Ionian Coast area. By entering the war in 1914 or early 1915, Greece also would have provided an automatic backstop and strategically deep rear area and system of supply ports for Serbia and the Serbian forces.
It was probably for this last reason that the western Entente members, Britain and France, avidly supported Greek entry into the war on the Entente side from late 1914 and early 1915 onward, and Britain even offered to cede her Crown Colony of Cyprus to the Greek Kingdom in exchange for Greece joining the war against the Central Powers. King Constantine still firmly refused.
In their own way, the western Allies, as Serbia was nearing defeat later in 1915, refused to take "no" for an answer, and occupied the port of Salonika in northern Greece in a last ditch effort to save Serbia, or at least rescue its evacuating army. In that area, it sponsored a rogue Venezelist opposition administration, that succeeded by some point in 1917 in overridin the King politically and getting a Greek DoW on the CP and getting the Greek army mobilized and fighting.
But what if Constantine was more pragmatic and was simply able to get over his German Hohenzollern self. And when the British dangle Cyprus, of all things, in front of him, he accepts this is an alliance offer he as Greek King simply cannot refuse. He engages with the British, focused on this part of the offer, counter-offering that he promises alliance, mobilizing and taking part in the war, including supporting the Serbs, but demanding the administrative handover of Cyprus to Greece begin immediately upon Greece's DoW on Germany, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary, and demanding up front military supply and cash support and some direct colonial troop support.
With this all being arranged, before there is even a start to the Gallipoli campaign or landing that started on April 25th, 1915, and before Bulgaria declared for the Central Powers on Oct 14, 1915. the Kingdom of Greece declares war on Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. The British Empire cedes Cyprus to the Kingdom of Greece and begins to transfer administration forthwith, with a proviso that Britain is permitted to maintain a lease on a large property on the island around Akrotiri for 30 years for naval facilities.
How do things go for the rest of the war, its campaigns, its diplomacy, and the politics of the Greek 'national schism' after this, with the Pro-Entente, Pro-getting Cyprus, and pro-getting territory at Ottoman expense positions no longer being a point of disagreement between the King and Venizelos?
With Greece starting to coordinate with Serbia by no later than early spring 1915, while Serbian resistance to Austria-Hungary is still going strong, does the time ever seem ripe to Bulgaria to join the war on the CP side by attacking Serbia in the rear? Or might Greek entry *accelerate* Bulgarian entry into the war against Serbia and Greece, because its two most bitter and recent enemies are now on the other side?
Do the western Allies and Russia allow the Greeks to get in on Gallipoli, or do they veto it? If they allow it, does the weight of their participation and topographical/operational knowledge make any positive difference?
Assuming the Serbs are eventually pushed beyond endurance by Austria-Hungary, and forced south, or attacked form the north, and by Bulgaria from the east as historical, is the retreat/escape of the Serbs any different with an allied connection to Greece? Possibly the main body of Serbs is able to hold on in Macedonia, or retreat through it, instead of over the Kosovo and Albanian mountains?
Does early Greek entry into the war on the Entente side in any way discourage, or otherwise mess with Italy's entry into the Entente side?
Post-war, should we assume there will still be some continued Greco-Turkish warfare like OTL? In this wouldn't Greece be favored to continue controlling all Cyprus, and as part of any population exchanges, shouldn't we expect it to compel Turkey to take the Muslim/Turkish Cypriot population of the island as part of population swaps for what would most likely be Greece's acceptance of much larger numbers of Greek refugees/expellees from Anatolia?
Constantine's strident anti-Entente/anti-war stance was not a consensus view among Greek politicians, although the King had a pretty strong support base in "old Greece" - the territories of the Greek mainland as they existed before the Balkan Wars. The "liberal" Eleftherios Venezelos supported the Entente and the idea of getting into the war and had in mind further national expansion into more Greek-speaking areas, the so-called 'Megali or Greater Greece idea. His popular support base was strongest in Crete, absorbed since the late 1890s, and in "new Greece" in the northern part of the mainland, gained by conquest in the Balkan wars of 1912-13 with the Ottomans and then Bulgaria. Such was the "national schism" linking splits in Greek domestic and foreign policy positions.
The Greeks seeking entry into the war had ideas for invading the Gallipoli peninsula in force, which would have worked to help a larger effort to open the straits to Allied shipping, and which the Greeks hoped would lead to the Greeks taking the Ottoman capital of Constantinople. The Russians had discomfort with the idea of any Greek campaign of this sort at least. Some also hoped to make territorial gains at Turkish expense in western Anatolia in the Smyrna/Ionian Coast area. By entering the war in 1914 or early 1915, Greece also would have provided an automatic backstop and strategically deep rear area and system of supply ports for Serbia and the Serbian forces.
It was probably for this last reason that the western Entente members, Britain and France, avidly supported Greek entry into the war on the Entente side from late 1914 and early 1915 onward, and Britain even offered to cede her Crown Colony of Cyprus to the Greek Kingdom in exchange for Greece joining the war against the Central Powers. King Constantine still firmly refused.
In their own way, the western Allies, as Serbia was nearing defeat later in 1915, refused to take "no" for an answer, and occupied the port of Salonika in northern Greece in a last ditch effort to save Serbia, or at least rescue its evacuating army. In that area, it sponsored a rogue Venezelist opposition administration, that succeeded by some point in 1917 in overridin the King politically and getting a Greek DoW on the CP and getting the Greek army mobilized and fighting.
But what if Constantine was more pragmatic and was simply able to get over his German Hohenzollern self. And when the British dangle Cyprus, of all things, in front of him, he accepts this is an alliance offer he as Greek King simply cannot refuse. He engages with the British, focused on this part of the offer, counter-offering that he promises alliance, mobilizing and taking part in the war, including supporting the Serbs, but demanding the administrative handover of Cyprus to Greece begin immediately upon Greece's DoW on Germany, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary, and demanding up front military supply and cash support and some direct colonial troop support.
With this all being arranged, before there is even a start to the Gallipoli campaign or landing that started on April 25th, 1915, and before Bulgaria declared for the Central Powers on Oct 14, 1915. the Kingdom of Greece declares war on Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. The British Empire cedes Cyprus to the Kingdom of Greece and begins to transfer administration forthwith, with a proviso that Britain is permitted to maintain a lease on a large property on the island around Akrotiri for 30 years for naval facilities.
How do things go for the rest of the war, its campaigns, its diplomacy, and the politics of the Greek 'national schism' after this, with the Pro-Entente, Pro-getting Cyprus, and pro-getting territory at Ottoman expense positions no longer being a point of disagreement between the King and Venizelos?
With Greece starting to coordinate with Serbia by no later than early spring 1915, while Serbian resistance to Austria-Hungary is still going strong, does the time ever seem ripe to Bulgaria to join the war on the CP side by attacking Serbia in the rear? Or might Greek entry *accelerate* Bulgarian entry into the war against Serbia and Greece, because its two most bitter and recent enemies are now on the other side?
Do the western Allies and Russia allow the Greeks to get in on Gallipoli, or do they veto it? If they allow it, does the weight of their participation and topographical/operational knowledge make any positive difference?
Assuming the Serbs are eventually pushed beyond endurance by Austria-Hungary, and forced south, or attacked form the north, and by Bulgaria from the east as historical, is the retreat/escape of the Serbs any different with an allied connection to Greece? Possibly the main body of Serbs is able to hold on in Macedonia, or retreat through it, instead of over the Kosovo and Albanian mountains?
Does early Greek entry into the war on the Entente side in any way discourage, or otherwise mess with Italy's entry into the Entente side?
Post-war, should we assume there will still be some continued Greco-Turkish warfare like OTL? In this wouldn't Greece be favored to continue controlling all Cyprus, and as part of any population exchanges, shouldn't we expect it to compel Turkey to take the Muslim/Turkish Cypriot population of the island as part of population swaps for what would most likely be Greece's acceptance of much larger numbers of Greek refugees/expellees from Anatolia?
