The Iranian military had a number of serious problems. Foremost was the fact that the revolution caused deep fractures within Iranian society—fractures that represented contending political and religious factions, as well as the divided nature of opposition to the Shah’s regime. Iran’s military already had been purged of those loyal to the Shah or those whom the new regime did not trust. Even after the purges, the Iranian military had little standing with those in the political realm. Military professionalism was simply not in the vocabulary of Khomeini’s regime. The alternative to the professional military in Iran was a number of revolutionary militias. None of these militias had any serious military training, nor, as Hamdani would describe, did they possess leaders with even the slightest understanding of tactics.
The militias—in some cases no more than small groups swearing fealty to a local imam or ayatollah with political ambitions—often acted independently, obeying no instructions and initiating combat actions without orders to do so. Local Iranian commanders appeared to have had almost complete freedom of action, whatever the strategic or operational consequences might be. This may well explain the fact that some Iranian units began shelling Iraqi towns and military positions in a rampageous fashion before the Iraqi invasion began and before the initiation of large-scale military operations. Thus, one can hardly speak of coherent Iranian military operations, much less a strategic conception, throughout the first 4 years of the conflict.
While the militias were important in the dangerous game of politics swirling around Tehran, they had no military training and remained disjointed, answering to different clerics and factions among Khomeini’s supporters and exhibiting little interest in repairing their military deficiencies. Not surprisingly, their attitudes reflected those of their leaders, and they showed little or no willingness to learn from, much less cooperate in military operations with, the regular army. All of this derived from their belief that religious fervor was the key to victory on the battlefield. Thus, Iranian tactics remained unimaginative and militarily incompetent throughout the war. More often than not, human wave attacks were all the Iranian militias could launch. The result was a catastrophic casualty tally reminiscent of the fighting in World War I. Unlike in Baghdad, where Saddam attempted to control everything, the exact opposite military command model was in effect in Tehran. Various factional leaders, imams, and others launched attacks or raids in an effort to curry favor with the religious and political leaders, who were in turn jockeying for position around Khomeini. Early in the war, few if any of Iran’s attacks appeared to have coherence or clear objectives, nor did they fit into a larger strategic conception of the war. Most battles thus contributed to the growing casualties while achieving little of tactical, much less operational, value. This situation reflected the general lack of military understanding among the religious and political leaders in Tehran, who were supposedly running the show.