raharris1973
Well-known member
Could the Triple Alliance have bailed out the Italian War effort in Abyssinia, post defeat of Adwa in 1896?
Italy's Triple Alliance powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, might be motivated by Italian calls for help, and more importantly, by the desire to keep Italy committed to the alliance rather than wobbling into the Franco-Russian alliance.
For this to happen, not only would the Italians need to decide differently and continue the war (which they did for fatigue and financial reasons, even though it was a long, unforgiven humiliation) instead of settling the war on simple terms by repudiating the protectorate Treaty of Wuchale with Emperor Menelik, but the alliance partners would have to figure out how much and how to help.
In terms of credits, money and some supplies for reinforcing Italian troops in Eritrea and Somalia, both Austria-Hungary and Germany should be able to provide this on loan or gratis. In terms of more direct assistance, merchant shipping support to Italian reinforcement, or support with colonial Askari troops, Austro-Hungary could do nothing, but Germany could contribute some colonial troop detachments from the Ostafrika/Tanganyika colony. Of course the Italians would need to redouble their commitment as well.
A trick to get this done would be to somehow make Prime Minister Rudini, who replaced Crispi right after the defeat at Adwa, think that the redoubling and winning the war, even with the further pride-swallowing of accepting allied help, is a superior move politically to just repudiating his predecessor and political enemy's war and abandoning it.
Or possibly, take the choice out of his hands.
Perhaps have the Abyssinians under Menelik not be so restrained after Adwa and pursue and attempt to destroy the Italian Army of Baratierie totally, and sweep into Eritrea. This could have a double-edged effect. While further damaging/eliminating veteran Italian forces (Italian and East African native) and damaging the Eritrean base, it could be too much for Italian public opinion to take, and force a public that wanted to quit to turn a bungled war into a national crusade, for revenge. Perhaps follow-on aggression could result in the unseating of Rudini and the installation of a PM determined to fight a war to the end.
What would be the knock-on consequences of Italy subduing Abyssinia over 1896-97, possibly into 1898, with some German direct help and indirect help?
Might Salisbury offer to help the Italians with supply for their anti-Abyssinian revenge campaign, and for the transfer of the Sudanese-Eritrean border district of Kassala (which Rudini's Italian government ceded to Britain for nothing in particular in exchange as far as I can tell)? Britain had not had a positive relationship with Abyssinia, having fought a war with it in prior decades, and was gearing up for its own war of vengeance on an African polity that had earlier embarrassed it, Mahdist Sudan - perhaps Britain would provide material-diplomatic support for the Italians with the understanding the Italians would be supportive of the soon-to-come British campaign to vanquish the Mahdists of Sudan. Additionally, Ethiopia was seen as somewhat of a client in Africa of France and Russia, Britain's main competitor at the time in Africa, and in the wider Asian/global "Great Game".
Italy's Triple Alliance powers, Germany and Austria-Hungary, might be motivated by Italian calls for help, and more importantly, by the desire to keep Italy committed to the alliance rather than wobbling into the Franco-Russian alliance.
For this to happen, not only would the Italians need to decide differently and continue the war (which they did for fatigue and financial reasons, even though it was a long, unforgiven humiliation) instead of settling the war on simple terms by repudiating the protectorate Treaty of Wuchale with Emperor Menelik, but the alliance partners would have to figure out how much and how to help.
In terms of credits, money and some supplies for reinforcing Italian troops in Eritrea and Somalia, both Austria-Hungary and Germany should be able to provide this on loan or gratis. In terms of more direct assistance, merchant shipping support to Italian reinforcement, or support with colonial Askari troops, Austro-Hungary could do nothing, but Germany could contribute some colonial troop detachments from the Ostafrika/Tanganyika colony. Of course the Italians would need to redouble their commitment as well.
A trick to get this done would be to somehow make Prime Minister Rudini, who replaced Crispi right after the defeat at Adwa, think that the redoubling and winning the war, even with the further pride-swallowing of accepting allied help, is a superior move politically to just repudiating his predecessor and political enemy's war and abandoning it.
Or possibly, take the choice out of his hands.
Perhaps have the Abyssinians under Menelik not be so restrained after Adwa and pursue and attempt to destroy the Italian Army of Baratierie totally, and sweep into Eritrea. This could have a double-edged effect. While further damaging/eliminating veteran Italian forces (Italian and East African native) and damaging the Eritrean base, it could be too much for Italian public opinion to take, and force a public that wanted to quit to turn a bungled war into a national crusade, for revenge. Perhaps follow-on aggression could result in the unseating of Rudini and the installation of a PM determined to fight a war to the end.
What would be the knock-on consequences of Italy subduing Abyssinia over 1896-97, possibly into 1898, with some German direct help and indirect help?
Might Salisbury offer to help the Italians with supply for their anti-Abyssinian revenge campaign, and for the transfer of the Sudanese-Eritrean border district of Kassala (which Rudini's Italian government ceded to Britain for nothing in particular in exchange as far as I can tell)? Britain had not had a positive relationship with Abyssinia, having fought a war with it in prior decades, and was gearing up for its own war of vengeance on an African polity that had earlier embarrassed it, Mahdist Sudan - perhaps Britain would provide material-diplomatic support for the Italians with the understanding the Italians would be supportive of the soon-to-come British campaign to vanquish the Mahdists of Sudan. Additionally, Ethiopia was seen as somewhat of a client in Africa of France and Russia, Britain's main competitor at the time in Africa, and in the wider Asian/global "Great Game".