In any Russian 19th century war (post-Napoleon) which extreme outcome is more plausible - ravaging Berlin/Vienna, or a Brest-Litovsk?

raharris1973

Well-known member
In any hypothetical Russian 19th century war (post-Napoleon), that includes a Central European front, which extreme outcome if more plausible - an ending like May 1945 with the Russians ravaging Berlin/Vienna, or a Brest-Litovsk with Russia losing all its ethnically diverse western borderlands? Even if neither scenario that likely at all, which extreme is *least implausible* compared to the other?

Let me know if you think it varies significantly by period or decade within 1816-1900, but since I'm keeping the poll binary, provide the answer to the poll that applies to the greatest balance of the period.

Russian 19th and 20th century wars featured multiple types of endgames, I could classify them thusly:

1) Russian steamrolls - WWII is a classic example of this, in its classic, 'come from behind' form, where Russia starts as the attacked, disadvantaged party, but recovers, defeats the enemy armies, and steamrolls on to occupy the enemy's capital city, ie Berlin by May 1945, a little under four years after the Nazi invasion of June 1941. The other classic example is the Russian (and allied) steamroll and occupation of Paris by (whatever month it was) in 1815, in the third year after Napoleon's French-led invasion of Russia in 1812. Russian participation against Japan at the end of WWII was a rapid steamroll (runaway train or truck) from beginning to end without any harrowing defensive struggle up front.

2) Brest-Litovskian mutilation - The stripping away of Russians ethnically diverse western and Caucasian territories after grueling military defeats, military underperformance, and societal collapse amid revolution. A process taking place in tandem with revolution. One where the succeeding Soviet state, with much sacrifice and a bloody civil war, grabbed back about half the yardage.

3) The 'mutilated' victory - The Russo-Turkish War of the 1870s. Russia won, defeated the Turkish armies and gained territories for itself in Europe (southern Bessarabia) and Asia (Kars), and reshaped the Balkans into new states. But the war was blemished by underperformance at the start, and Russia felt butthurt being denied some ambitious territorial goals (San Stefano Bulgaria) at the end, even though those were an overreach beyond what they promised they were looking for in the begining. All in all, fairly parallel to the Italian mutilated victory in WWI - she unmistakably won in territorial terms, but sulked about not getting some additional questionable objective.

4) Humiliating, but only flesh-wounding, defeats - The Crimean War and Russo-Japanese War meet this criteria. Russia has to sue for peace in the first, concede influence over the Danubian principalities, then having a navy on the Black Sea, but territorially, just a smalll slice of southern Bessarabia. No indemnity. In the R-J War, Russia has to sue for peace, loses two fleets in battle, concedes recently acquired influence and property in Korea and southern Manchuria (but not all property in all Manchuria), but of home territory, only southern Sakhalin island. No indemnity or demilitarization clauses. Defeat in Russo-Polish War of 1921 (but mixed case, because Polish maximal goals defeated too)

5) Successful police actions - Hungary 1848, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, suppression of 1830 and 1860 Polish revolts

6) Crumbled police actions/counter-insurgencies - Afghanistan, 1980s

7) Frontier victories - 19th century wars of expansion and conquest against small states or polities of Caucasus, Central Asia and the Ottomans and Persians in the 1820s and the Ottomans and Swedes circa 1810.

8) Bloodless victories - Acquisition of Outer Manchuria and Primorye from China, 1858-1860, ending of restricting Black Sea clauses, 1871.
 
In any hypothetical Russian 19th century war (post-Napoleon), that includes a Central European front, which extreme outcome if more plausible - an ending like May 1945 with the Russians ravaging Berlin/Vienna, or a Brest-Litovsk with Russia losing all its ethnically diverse western borderlands? Even if neither scenario that likely at all, which extreme is *least implausible* compared to the other?

Let me know if you think it varies significantly by period or decade within 1816-1900, but since I'm keeping the poll binary, provide the answer to the poll that applies to the greatest balance of the period.

Russian 19th and 20th century wars featured multiple types of endgames, I could classify them thusly:

1) Russian steamrolls - WWII is a classic example of this, in its classic, 'come from behind' form, where Russia starts as the attacked, disadvantaged party, but recovers, defeats the enemy armies, and steamrolls on to occupy the enemy's capital city, ie Berlin by May 1945, a little under four years after the Nazi invasion of June 1941. The other classic example is the Russian (and allied) steamroll and occupation of Paris by (whatever month it was) in 1815, in the third year after Napoleon's French-led invasion of Russia in 1812. Russian participation against Japan at the end of WWII was a rapid steamroll (runaway train or truck) from beginning to end without any harrowing defensive struggle up front.

2) Brest-Litovskian mutilation - The stripping away of Russians ethnically diverse western and Caucasian territories after grueling military defeats, military underperformance, and societal collapse amid revolution. A process taking place in tandem with revolution. One where the succeeding Soviet state, with much sacrifice and a bloody civil war, grabbed back about half the yardage.

3) The 'mutilated' victory - The Russo-Turkish War of the 1870s. Russia won, defeated the Turkish armies and gained territories for itself in Europe (southern Bessarabia) and Asia (Kars), and reshaped the Balkans into new states. But the war was blemished by underperformance at the start, and Russia felt butthurt being denied some ambitious territorial goals (San Stefano Bulgaria) at the end, even though those were an overreach beyond what they promised they were looking for in the begining. All in all, fairly parallel to the Italian mutilated victory in WWI - she unmistakably won in territorial terms, but sulked about not getting some additional questionable objective.

4) Humiliating, but only flesh-wounding, defeats - The Crimean War and Russo-Japanese War meet this criteria. Russia has to sue for peace in the first, concede influence over the Danubian principalities, then having a navy on the Black Sea, but territorially, just a smalll slice of southern Bessarabia. No indemnity. In the R-J War, Russia has to sue for peace, loses two fleets in battle, concedes recently acquired influence and property in Korea and southern Manchuria (but not all property in all Manchuria), but of home territory, only southern Sakhalin island. No indemnity or demilitarization clauses. Defeat in Russo-Polish War of 1921 (but mixed case, because Polish maximal goals defeated too)

5) Successful police actions - Hungary 1848, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, suppression of 1830 and 1860 Polish revolts

6) Crumbled police actions/counter-insurgencies - Afghanistan, 1980s

7) Frontier victories - 19th century wars of expansion and conquest against small states or polities of Caucasus, Central Asia and the Ottomans and Persians in the 1820s and the Ottomans and Swedes circa 1810.

8) Bloodless victories - Acquisition of Outer Manchuria and Primorye from China, 1858-1860, ending of restricting Black Sea clauses, 1871.
Till 1861 - Brest-Litovsk. Russia was rural state runnung on slave labour,they must lost to any modern nation.
But,after,let say,1870,it changed,they have free farmers and factories in bigger numbers.


So,after that,i would toss a coin.Tjhey could either face total victory,or total defeat.
 
Post 1815 European Wars were closer to the Gabinet Wars of the XVIIIth century and the idea of Balance of Power than the total wars of the French Revolutionary Period and the XXth century.
So I'd say "neither".
But as Russia was weak and most of the time had bad rulers - e.g. industrious idiot Nicholai I, I'd say that getting dogpiled and losing its western territories is more likely than 1945.
Best opportunity - Crimean War, but with Prussia and/or Austria interested in a landgrab or setting up buffer states to keep Russia away.
Also, we must remember than OTL 1945 was only possible by Russia being part of a coalition. On its own it would had been raped in 1942. Same applies to Russians in Paris in 1814 - on its own the Russian army would not have crossed the Oder.
 
Also, we must remember than OTL 1945 was only possible by Russia being part of a coalition. Same applies to Russians in Paris in 1814 - on its own the Russian army would not have crossed the Oder.
Excellent point.

So '4's (flesh-wounding defeats) and '3's (mutilated victories) are more likely than Brest-Litovsks or 1945 or 1814-15s?

But between the last two, defeats are more imaginable.

But what you say about having a coalition suggests that maybe, with the right coalition, Russia can score 1945, 1814-15 level victory. But WWI suggests it has to be a really overwhelming coalition, because in WWI, being in a coalition on the same side as traditional coalition leaders and patrons, Britain and France (and little Italy) wasn't enough to prevent Russia's Brest-Litovsk level defeat.

To score a 1945-ish victory in a 19th century war Russia would maybe need London, Paris, and Vienna on its side against Berlin somehow; Or London and Berlin on its side against Vienna and Paris.
 
Excellent point.

So '4's (flesh-wounding defeats) and '3's (mutilated victories) are more likely than Brest-Litovsks or 1945 or 1814-15s?

But between the last two, defeats are more imaginable.

But what you say about having a coalition suggests that maybe, with the right coalition, Russia can score 1945, 1814-15 level victory. But WWI suggests it has to be a really overwhelming coalition, because in WWI, being in a coalition on the same side as traditional coalition leaders and patrons, Britain and France (and little Italy) wasn't enough to prevent Russia's Brest-Litovsk level defeat.

To score a 1945-ish victory in a 19th century war Russia would maybe need London, Paris, and Vienna on its side against Berlin somehow; Or London and Berlin on its side against Vienna and Paris.
In 1878 we almost had England +Berlin + Turkey vs Russia +France + Austria war.
If Russians win,you would get that kind of victory.
 
Everything I've ever read about the Eastern Crisis suggests that if the Russo-Turkish war widened, Austria would be one of the powers coming in against Russia, not on Russia's side. Germany might have been an ally for Russia, given Bismarck's prior policies and Wilhelm's. France might have been an ally for Russia, if Germany chose not to be. But Austria was never going to be an ally of Russia's against other European powers. The reason it scavenged Ottoman Bosnia while the Russians fought the Ottomans in OTL was only because no anti-Russian coalition was forming. But there's no world where Germany is against Russia and for the Ottomans where the Austrians are for the Russians and against the Ottomans. Even the French would have to be boldly acting against their prior investments and interests to take Russia's side against the Ottomans in a broadened war over the Eastern Crisis. Russia, by trying to impose San Stefano, faced a real danger of war with almost everyone else in Europe - Austria, Britain, Germany, and France.
 
Russia, by trying to impose San Stefano, faced a real danger of war with almost everyone else in Europe - Austria, Britain, Germany, and France.
This.
Even without Germany - which might enjoy the popcorn - three GP against it means that Russia is curbstomped.
 
Everything I've ever read about the Eastern Crisis suggests that if the Russo-Turkish war widened, Austria would be one of the powers coming in against Russia, not on Russia's side. Germany might have been an ally for Russia, given Bismarck's prior policies and Wilhelm's. France might have been an ally for Russia, if Germany chose not to be. But Austria was never going to be an ally of Russia's against other European powers. The reason it scavenged Ottoman Bosnia while the Russians fought the Ottomans in OTL was only because no anti-Russian coalition was forming. But there's no world where Germany is against Russia and for the Ottomans where the Austrians are for the Russians and against the Ottomans. Even the French would have to be boldly acting against their prior investments and interests to take Russia's side against the Ottomans in a broadened war over the Eastern Crisis. Russia, by trying to impose San Stefano, faced a real danger of war with almost everyone else in Europe - Austria, Britain, Germany, and France.
Well,let agree that we do not agree,then.
Pity,that i forget my source.....

But,assuming that you are right,Russia would be cumberstomped like in 1918.
So,you would get your Brest-Litowsk scenario !.

Without Lenin,becouse there was no possibility in 1878 for revolutionists taking powere there.
But...maybe some russian Hitler?
considering,that jews supported germans even in 1914,it could mean russian Holocaust.
If we were stupid enough to made another uprising,then poles would be genocided,too.
 
Well,let agree that we do not agree,then.
Pity,that i forget my source.....

But,assuming that you are right,Russia would be cumberstomped like in 1918.
So,you would get your Brest-Litowsk scenario !.

Without Lenin,becouse there was no possibility in 1878 for revolutionists taking powere there.
But...maybe some russian Hitler?
considering,that jews supported germans even in 1914,it could mean russian Holocaust.
If we were stupid enough to made another uprising,then poles would be genocided,too.

Only problem with this, is that Russia may be so amputated of western territories, that any Russian Hitler cannot get his hands on very many Jews or Poles, because the PLC lands and the Jewish Pale of Settlement, almost the same land, could be partitioned or puppetized by great powers from west of Russia, like Germany, Austria, Sweden. Only the unfortunate Poles and Jews that Russian Hitler can round up living in Moscow, St. Petersburg, maybe Smolensk, (possibly illegally) or in Siberian exile are in his reach for harm.

You are correct, there is no Lenin and I see no success for a Marxist so-called Workers Revolution. Georgi Plekhanov of the Russian Social Democrats is not one to pull off a successful revolution.

But maybe something besides a right-wing Black Hundreds or Russian could happen, maybe something that is still 'left-ish', just in the style of earlier generations. Perhaps a peasant-glorifying Anarchist/Nihilist/Narodnik radical movement. Odds would favor such groups simply spreading all over, doing uprisings, jacqueries, burning the countryside and estates, and eventually getting cleaned up by a disciplined military establishing order and probably monarchy, but if the revolutionaries have leaders who make up an organized and ruthless enough clique, maybe they can hold power by terror, intimidation, and distributing loot. In the worst case, maybe they could wreck the towns and drive people into the country, Khmer Rouge style.
 
  • Like
Reactions: ATP

Users who are viewing this thread

Back
Top