What did PM Salisbury want to do to the Ottomans over the Armenian massacres circa 1895-96?

[raharris1973]

What did PM Salisbury want to do to the Ottomans over the Armenian massacres circa 1895-96?

Here's one way to think of the question: If he could have used three wishes from a genie he let out of a bottle, one to change parliamentary/domestic opinion on what to spend/risk, another to make one or more non-Ottoman great powers decide to go along with a solution he liked, and a third to change Ottoman policy, what would he have wished for specifically?

Was his goal merely to 'be seen' as 'very concerned' about the Armenians?
Was it pro-Armenian relief and reform in the Ottoman Empire?
Was it regime-change in the OE, getting rid of Abdulhamid, in punishment and rage for the massacres, with the expectation of that leading to pro-Armenian relief and reform?
Was it a full partition of the OE, including establishment of a territorially contiguous Armenian state?
In a partition scenario, was he willing to see the straits and Armenia fall under Russia?

What did he want other countries to do, especially in the third scenario, partition? What roles did he see for Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, France? Did he have any fixed ideas on who could and could not be allowed to pick up which pieces?

What did all the other powers of Europe want to have happen relative to the Armenian massacres and how much punitive action and sovereign impairment were they willing to have imposed on the Ottomans over this question at the time? Talking about Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, and France here. Did they want any particular pieces in a partition scenario and like the idea of an immediate partition? Even in collaboration with Britain?

I ask all this in hope of finding more knowledge and informed perspectives. I've read a few different diplomatic history accounts by Norman Rich and others and wikipedia pages that paint part of a picture, and Rich seems credible in his sourcing. But there's an even more vivid picture filled in by AH.com user or former user that I haven't seen directly contradicted, but I have not seen directly backed up by other sources.

The 'vivid' picture painted by the AH.commer is thus:

Spoiler: Vivid Picture

1. Salisbury was so worked up over the crisis he wanted to break up the Ottoman Empire, including breaking off Armenia.
2. But despite UK massive naval and financial power, he felt UK couldn't break it up alone and sought to encourage a European coalition to do it with the UK.
3. Russia, despite its history of using Ottoman Christian oppression as an excuse to expand, and interest in the straits, did *not* want to break up the OE at this time, and found Salisbury's suggestions alarming and threatening rather than enticing for several reasons, including: a. Not trusting the Armenians, b. Not trusting a partition could be managed without great power war, c. seeing other powers, notably Britain, gaining more from a partitioned, broken OE than Russia, d. Britain's screwed us so long, if they say it's their idea, it *must* be bad for us, or a trick, or a trap. (even though similar to something Nicholas I suggested in 1850 something)
4. Germany thought this was a crazy, harebrained, reckless British scheme that would unleash war on Europe, maybe designed to set Germany and Russia at war with each other somehow.
5. No definite word ever heard from France or Austria-Hungary. I would suppose silence is objection for France, which held most of the Ottoman public debt, and had the greatest cultural influence. For Austria-Hungary, I would think the same- some Austrians wanted to advance to Salonika and ultimately Austria annexed Bosnia, but the empire moved lethargically, and its schizophrenia was such the Hungarian half never wanted to move or expand at all. Yet at the same time, it was often ready to take whatever stance would screw over the Russians.
6. Italy, in a phase of kissing the UK's butt at the time, was all ready to sign up with Britain for an anti-Ottoman crusade, with an eye on Libya and other marginal Ottoman territories.
7. The Belgian King said his Congolese Force Publique was all ready to go in with British support and clean up the Armenian situation and stop the Turkish massacres. He said it. That is all. Nothing more, nothing less.
8. As a result of all this British Ottoman relations were pretty crappy for the next decade or so, and Ottoman relations with the Russians were better than usual for about the next decade, roughly the dozen years through 1908 in which Abdulhamid was still in power. German-Ottoman relations also did well. British diplomatic isolation from Europe increased due to this 'bad idea' of intervention, not really starting to recover until the 1904 Entente Cordiale with France.

 

[ATP]

So,Brits had once good idea.Interesting.

 

[49ersfootball]

What did PM Salisbury want to do to the Ottomans over the Armenian massacres circa 1895-96?

Here's one way to think of the question: If he could have used three wishes from a genie he let out of a bottle, one to change parliamentary/domestic opinion on what to spend/risk, another to make one or more non-Ottoman great powers decide to go along with a solution he liked, and a third to change Ottoman policy, what would he have wished for specifically?

Was his goal merely to 'be seen' as 'very concerned' about the Armenians?
Was it pro-Armenian relief and reform in the Ottoman Empire?
Was it regime-change in the OE, getting rid of Abdulhamid, in punishment and rage for the massacres, with the expectation of that leading to pro-Armenian relief and reform?
Was it a full partition of the OE, including establishment of a territorially contiguous Armenian state?
In a partition scenario, was he willing to see the straits and Armenia fall under Russia?

What did he want other countries to do, especially in the third scenario, partition? What roles did he see for Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, France? Did he have any fixed ideas on who could and could not be allowed to pick up which pieces?

What did all the other powers of Europe want to have happen relative to the Armenian massacres and how much punitive action and sovereign impairment were they willing to have imposed on the Ottomans over this question at the time? Talking about Russia, Germany, Italy, Austria, and France here. Did they want any particular pieces in a partition scenario and like the idea of an immediate partition? Even in collaboration with Britain?

I ask all this in hope of finding more knowledge and informed perspectives. I've read a few different diplomatic history accounts by Norman Rich and others and wikipedia pages that paint part of a picture, and Rich seems credible in his sourcing. But there's an even more vivid picture filled in by AH.com user or former user that I haven't seen directly contradicted, but I have not seen directly backed up by other sources.

The 'vivid' picture painted by the AH.commer is thus:

Spoiler: Vivid Picture

1. Salisbury was so worked up over the crisis he wanted to break up the Ottoman Empire, including breaking off Armenia.
2. But despite UK massive naval and financial power, he felt UK couldn't break it up alone and sought to encourage a European coalition to do it with the UK.
3. Russia, despite its history of using Ottoman Christian oppression as an excuse to expand, and interest in the straits, did *not* want to break up the OE at this time, and found Salisbury's suggestions alarming and threatening rather than enticing for several reasons, including: a. Not trusting the Armenians, b. Not trusting a partition could be managed without great power war, c. seeing other powers, notably Britain, gaining more from a partitioned, broken OE than Russia, d. Britain's screwed us so long, if they say it's their idea, it *must* be bad for us, or a trick, or a trap. (even though similar to something Nicholas I suggested in 1850 something)
4. Germany thought this was a crazy, harebrained, reckless British scheme that would unleash war on Europe, maybe designed to set Germany and Russia at war with each other somehow.
5. No definite word ever heard from France or Austria-Hungary. I would suppose silence is objection for France, which held most of the Ottoman public debt, and had the greatest cultural influence. For Austria-Hungary, I would think the same- some Austrians wanted to advance to Salonika and ultimately Austria annexed Bosnia, but the empire moved lethargically, and its schizophrenia was such the Hungarian half never wanted to move or expand at all. Yet at the same time, it was often ready to take whatever stance would screw over the Russians.
6. Italy, in a phase of kissing the UK's butt at the time, was all ready to sign up with Britain for an anti-Ottoman crusade, with an eye on Libya and other marginal Ottoman territories.
7. The Belgian King said his Congolese Force Publique was all ready to go in with British support and clean up the Armenian situation and stop the Turkish massacres. He said it. That is all. Nothing more, nothing less.
8. As a result of all this British Ottoman relations were pretty crappy for the next decade or so, and Ottoman relations with the Russians were better than usual for about the next decade, roughly the dozen years through 1908 in which Abdulhamid was still in power. German-Ottoman relations also did well. British diplomatic isolation from Europe increased due to this 'bad idea' of intervention, not really starting to recover until the 1904 Entente Cordiale with France.

Definitely following this TL.

 

[Skallagrim]

Davide Rodogno, in Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914, gives us an insight into Salisbury's position at the time:

---------------------

Salisbury returned to power in Britain in June 1895 when he assumed the portfolio of prime minister as well as of the Foreign Office. He had twice failed to introduce reforms in the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, first in 1878–80 and again in the early 1890s. For the next five and half months, the course he followed made it clear that to protect the Armenians he was determined to do more than his predecessors had attempted and more than public opinion required. About his motives he said little, but enough to indicate that they were religious and humanitarian. In his first dispatch to Currie, Salisbury instructed him to study the feasibility of deploying the British Mediterranean Fleet, lying at Beirut some 200 to 300 miles from "Armenia," against the Ottoman Empire to force the government to carry out reforms. For the first time since the massacre of Sasun, a European prime minister took into consideration the possibility of undertaking a unilateral humanitarian intervention. In response, Ambassador Currie forwarded to the Foreign Office a letter from the president of the British Board of Trade in Constantinople, who noted the impossibility of any such military intervention.

Other military operations Salisbury had to discard were the occupation of Jeddah on the Red Sea and the occupation of Alexandretta in Asia Minor. Once landed, the small, possibly inadequate British troops contingent would encounter many difficulties because of the scarcity of supplies in the region. Salisbury conceived of yet another plan, showing his determination to do something about the Armenian Question. The self-described clever proposal was to transport British troops to provinces inhabited by the Armenians via the river Tigris. Ambassador Currie replied that the proposed expedition would be impossible to undertake owing to the many shallow points in the river, which would irremediably damage the warships. In late 1895 the Armenian Question was 1876 turned upside down. France, Germany, and Russia now sustained the sultan, and the British government, supported by public opinion, was in favor of an intervention. In such circumstances, Gladstone admitted, Britain could do little. Public opinion had to uphold the government's position and provide national and moral support for its action. The mighty British Empire appeared isolated and unable to force the barbarous Ottoman Empire to fulfill its treaty obligations. By the end of the summer of 1895, it was clear that the Ottoman government was unwilling to cooperate, that another massacre would occur, and that European powers would not reach a consensus on a coercive action to protect Ottoman Armenian civilian populations.

(...)

The Russian government [in early January 1986] was not ready to go any further to protect Ottoman Armenians. Foreign Minister Aleksei Lobanov-Rostovski noted that contrary to the case of the French expedition in Syria, where disturbances had taken place in a single area, in this case massacres were occurring in various and remote places, and the force of the intervention had to be very significant. Therefore, the sultan should be given more time to restore peace and public order in the country without damage to his authority. The British cabinet rejected Salisbury's idea of forcing the Straits, on the grounds that the French fleet would have been free to sail out of Toulon and attack the British from the rear. It was at this point that the United States chose to quarrel with Britain over Venezuela and the situation in South Africa also worsened. The moment when intervention might have been practicable had passed. Salisbury gave up.

In his letter to Queen Victoria dated January 15, 1896, Salisbury noted that "words were not enough to describe the horrors" concerning the Armenian Question. However, he admitted that Britain would be unable to act alone against the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain needed active Russian military cooperation if it really wanted to undertake a humanitarian intervention. Salisbury reiterated these views in a speech addressed to the Nonconformist Union Association on January 31. He ruled out any current or future British intervention in favor of the Armenians (...) Salisbury said that it was impossible to relieve the suffering of the Armenian population through a military intervention. Britain could defeat five or six sultans on the open seas, but British "ships could not get over the mountains of Taurus."

(...)

The European powers continued to disagree on the Armenian Question. In June 1896 the French ambassador at London, De Courcel, sent a report back to Paris on Salisbury's dislike of the "detestable Ottoman regime." The British prime minister was horrified by Abdul Hamid's policies. He made it clear that the purpose of British policy with respect to the Armenians was not to "ruin" the Ottoman Empire to protect the self-interest of Great Britain. What Salisbury wanted was a "cleansing operation," an operation of "reparation for all those populations unjustly administrated" by the Ottomans. The French government continued to turn a deaf ear to London, being aware that its Russian ally was extremely reluctant to become militarily involved in the Eastern Question.

(...)

On October 20, 1896, in the wake of the massacres at Constantinople, Salisbury sent a long memorandum to the other powers in a final attempt to revive the European Concert and seek collective agreement. (...) Salisbury claimed that the time had come to resolutely confront the Ottoman Empire, "a dominion which by its own vices is crumbling into ruin." He reiterated the need to preserve the Concert of Europe and to intervene unanimously and in the form of a coalition. The prime minister wrote that, in the interest of general peace, the European powers earnestly desired to maintain the fabric of the Ottoman Empire, at least in that extensive portion of it in which the mixed character of the population made an autonomous Christian government impossible. He made it clear that Great Britain had no self-interest in the matter and did not wish to create an autonomous Armenian province. He reminded his European counterparts that Europe had "to secure due protection in these regions to the Christian subjects of the Porte."

(...)

His central point was that once the powers reached a unanimous solution, it should be put into operation, regardless of Ottoman sovereignty. Salisbury claimed that a collective intervention was fully justified. The intervention on grounds of humanity would have assured peace in Europe and the territorial status quo of the Turkish Empire and prevented the occurrence of further massacre and atrocity. While Austria-Hungary and Italy promptly agreed, the French and Russian governments opposed the use of force. Thus nothing was done.

---------------------

...All of this makes the situation quite clear. Salisbury was in favour of intervention, and in fact willing to carry out unilateral intervention; but it was made clear to him that the latter was by no means a practical option. So he sought to build a coalition, with the primary aim of securing the safety of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. He didn't want to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, at least not the Islamic and religiously mixed territories-- but he was open to the notion of lopping off Christian-majority regions. On the other hand, he stressed that this was not a goal Britain actively sought (merely one that he'd happily support if the other powers desired it).

"Pro-Armenian relief and reform in the Ottoman Empire" comes cloest to describing his overall goal (with "the complete separation of Christian-majority regions into independent nations" as an optional corollary).

 

[raharris1973]

While Austria-Hungary and Italy promptly agreed, the French and Russian governments opposed the use of force.

It is interesting that Austria Hungary and Italy were so agreeable to the idea from London. Makes me wonder why Germany didn’t follow its triple alliance Allie’s and what would have happened if Berlin did.

I thought Italy was resentful at Britain at this time over perceived non support in Abyssinia m, but apparently not enough to be disagreeable to this proposal. Perhaps the Austrians were courting London unconditionally, trying to keep the Mediterranean agreements alive.

 

[raharris1973]

The Russian objections on the basis of logistical/geographical infeasibility of either the Sultan or outside powers, ending the violence quickly, may have been sincerely meant. I will demonstrate why: The Tsar signed right up with Britain, France, and Italy for a protective blockade and occupation of Crete and prevention of Ottoman reinvasion and reprisals after the Cretan revolt of 1897, just a year later. The main difference was Crete was finite, controllable geography, as an island.

Another probable relevant difference is that the Tsar ruled directly more Armenians than Greeks. Maybe, unlike Greeks and other Balkan orthodox nationalities, he saw them not as targets for liberation and proxy status, but as an Asian version of the Poles, requiring shared suppression by neighboring empires?

 

[ATP]

The Russian objections on the basis of logistical/geographical infeasibility of either the Sultan or outside powers, ending the violence quickly, may have been sincerely meant. I will demonstrate why: The Tsar signed right up with Britain, France, and Italy for a protective blockade and occupation of Crete and prevention of Ottoman reinvasion and reprisals after the Cretan revolt of 1897, just a year later. The main difference was Crete was finite, controllable geography, as an island.

Another probable relevant difference is that the Tsar ruled directly more Armenians than Greeks. Maybe, unlike Greeks and other Balkan orthodox nationalities, he saw them not as targets for liberation and proxy status, but as an Asian version of the Poles, requiring shared suppression by neighboring empires?

Possible,but unlikely.Armenians saw russians as liberators,not occupant.
Maybe simply tsar once in blue moon thought about logistic?

Usually that was sometching which tsars liked to fuck/logistic/

 

[raharris1973]

Davide Rodogno, in Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914, gives us an insight into Salisbury's position at the time:

---------------------
.........snip researched, reasoned, and thorough response....

"Pro-Armenian relief and reform in the Ottoman Empire" comes cloest to describing his overall goal (with "the complete separation of Christian-majority regions into independent nations" as an optional corollary).

------How might British policy and offers have developed had the Liberals and Roseberry stayed in power these years right after June 1895 rather than losing the election and returning Salisbury to power?

 

[raharris1973]

Davide Rodogno, in Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914, gives us an insight into Salisbury's position at the time:

---------------------

Salisbury returned to power in Britain in June 1895 when he assumed the portfolio of prime minister as well as of the Foreign Office. He had twice failed to introduce reforms in the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire, first in 1878–80 and again in the early 1890s. For the next five and half months, the course he followed made it clear that to protect the Armenians he was determined to do more than his predecessors had attempted and more than public opinion required. About his motives he said little, but enough to indicate that they were religious and humanitarian. In his first dispatch to Currie, Salisbury instructed him to study the feasibility of deploying the British Mediterranean Fleet, lying at Beirut some 200 to 300 miles from "Armenia," against the Ottoman Empire to force the government to carry out reforms. For the first time since the massacre of Sasun, a European prime minister took into consideration the possibility of undertaking a unilateral humanitarian intervention. In response, Ambassador Currie forwarded to the Foreign Office a letter from the president of the British Board of Trade in Constantinople, who noted the impossibility of any such military intervention.

Other military operations Salisbury had to discard were the occupation of Jeddah on the Red Sea and the occupation of Alexandretta in Asia Minor. Once landed, the small, possibly inadequate British troops contingent would encounter many difficulties because of the scarcity of supplies in the region. Salisbury conceived of yet another plan, showing his determination to do something about the Armenian Question. The self-described clever proposal was to transport British troops to provinces inhabited by the Armenians via the river Tigris. Ambassador Currie replied that the proposed expedition would be impossible to undertake owing to the many shallow points in the river, which would irremediably damage the warships. In late 1895 the Armenian Question was 1876 turned upside down. France, Germany, and Russia now sustained the sultan, and the British government, supported by public opinion, was in favor of an intervention. In such circumstances, Gladstone admitted, Britain could do little. Public opinion had to uphold the government's position and provide national and moral support for its action. The mighty British Empire appeared isolated and unable to force the barbarous Ottoman Empire to fulfill its treaty obligations. By the end of the summer of 1895, it was clear that the Ottoman government was unwilling to cooperate, that another massacre would occur, and that European powers would not reach a consensus on a coercive action to protect Ottoman Armenian civilian populations.

(...)

The Russian government [in early January 1986] was not ready to go any further to protect Ottoman Armenians. Foreign Minister Aleksei Lobanov-Rostovski noted that contrary to the case of the French expedition in Syria, where disturbances had taken place in a single area, in this case massacres were occurring in various and remote places, and the force of the intervention had to be very significant. Therefore, the sultan should be given more time to restore peace and public order in the country without damage to his authority. The British cabinet rejected Salisbury's idea of forcing the Straits, on the grounds that the French fleet would have been free to sail out of Toulon and attack the British from the rear. It was at this point that the United States chose to quarrel with Britain over Venezuela and the situation in South Africa also worsened. The moment when intervention might have been practicable had passed. Salisbury gave up.

In his letter to Queen Victoria dated January 15, 1896, Salisbury noted that "words were not enough to describe the horrors" concerning the Armenian Question. However, he admitted that Britain would be unable to act alone against the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain needed active Russian military cooperation if it really wanted to undertake a humanitarian intervention. Salisbury reiterated these views in a speech addressed to the Nonconformist Union Association on January 31. He ruled out any current or future British intervention in favor of the Armenians (...) Salisbury said that it was impossible to relieve the suffering of the Armenian population through a military intervention. Britain could defeat five or six sultans on the open seas, but British "ships could not get over the mountains of Taurus."

(...)

The European powers continued to disagree on the Armenian Question. In June 1896 the French ambassador at London, De Courcel, sent a report back to Paris on Salisbury's dislike of the "detestable Ottoman regime." The British prime minister was horrified by Abdul Hamid's policies. He made it clear that the purpose of British policy with respect to the Armenians was not to "ruin" the Ottoman Empire to protect the self-interest of Great Britain. What Salisbury wanted was a "cleansing operation," an operation of "reparation for all those populations unjustly administrated" by the Ottomans. The French government continued to turn a deaf ear to London, being aware that its Russian ally was extremely reluctant to become militarily involved in the Eastern Question.

(...)

On October 20, 1896, in the wake of the massacres at Constantinople, Salisbury sent a long memorandum to the other powers in a final attempt to revive the European Concert and seek collective agreement. (...) Salisbury claimed that the time had come to resolutely confront the Ottoman Empire, "a dominion which by its own vices is crumbling into ruin." He reiterated the need to preserve the Concert of Europe and to intervene unanimously and in the form of a coalition. The prime minister wrote that, in the interest of general peace, the European powers earnestly desired to maintain the fabric of the Ottoman Empire, at least in that extensive portion of it in which the mixed character of the population made an autonomous Christian government impossible. He made it clear that Great Britain had no self-interest in the matter and did not wish to create an autonomous Armenian province. He reminded his European counterparts that Europe had "to secure due protection in these regions to the Christian subjects of the Porte."

(...)

His central point was that once the powers reached a unanimous solution, it should be put into operation, regardless of Ottoman sovereignty. Salisbury claimed that a collective intervention was fully justified. The intervention on grounds of humanity would have assured peace in Europe and the territorial status quo of the Turkish Empire and prevented the occurrence of further massacre and atrocity. While Austria-Hungary and Italy promptly agreed, the French and Russian governments opposed the use of force. Thus nothing was done.

---------------------

...All of this makes the situation quite clear. Salisbury was in favour of intervention, and in fact willing to carry out unilateral intervention; but it was made clear to him that the latter was by no means a practical option. So he sought to build a coalition, with the primary aim of securing the safety of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. He didn't want to dismantle the Ottoman Empire, at least not the Islamic and religiously mixed territories-- but he was open to the notion of lopping off Christian-majority regions. On the other hand, he stressed that this was not a goal Britain actively sought (merely one that he'd happily support if the other powers desired it).

"Pro-Armenian relief and reform in the Ottoman Empire" comes cloest to describing his overall goal (with "the complete separation of Christian-majority regions into independent nations" as an optional corollary).

Thanks for the detailed outline of all the intervention ideas that Salisbury came up with and that got shot down.

I could imagine Salisbury coming up with one more unilateral military option to present the Ottomans, and importantly, the powers, with a fait accompli, he would hope could jolt the Ottomans into adjusting their behavior, or the powers into getting serious about multilateral actions lest things get out of control. It might in the end push things in a direction Salisbury desired, but it could just as easily backfire.

This option would be to send a strong military expedition against the eastern side of the Ottoman empire, from the British Empire's main area of comparative strength and main source of troops, especially expendable ones that can be risked on campaign, India. They could be sent from India to invade the Ottoman Empire from the British dominated Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, where SLOCs are secure, attacking the Ottomans via landing at Basra, like in the third plan outlined above, but with the understanding the Indian troops would be employed in a medium-long term ground expedition up the length of Mesopotamia through and past Baghdad and Mosul to the Armenian highlands, without counting on the absurdly 'clever' idea of having the force transported and fire-supported on their way upriver by the battleship of the Royal Navy. This would be a land-based advance, prepared for land marching and mule and camel train and horse logistics cross-country, augmented with assistance of whatever shallow-draft river-suitable watercraft of whatever protection, cargo, and armament capacity as can be helpful for the mission.

Salisbury's idea is to begin exerting unilateral British imperial pressure on the Ottoman Empire and its Sultan soonest to stop the anti-Armenian massacres, and to put competitive or shaming pressure on the other powers, particularly the Russians, to intervene. If the Russians intervene from across their Caucasus border with their substantial forces, they should be capable of arriving on the scene of Armenian majority and plurality east Anatolian provinces much more quickly than the British. Salisbury reckons the Russians could likely feel compelled to intervene because they would see the British intervention in Mesopotamia as building unwelcome British leverage on Persia, and they Russians would need to intervene on their own to counter British leverage on Persia and the Ottomans, and once the Russians intervene, they would stop the massacres. And even in the worst case, if the Russians are immovable and sit absolutely still, Eventually, the more modern British Indian forces would advance step by step up through Mesopotamia, into the Armenia highlands of eastern Anatolia, until *they* reach the Russian border, and provide protection for the Armenians themselves. The entire operation never puts the Royal Navy at risk in tight Mediterranean or straits quarters.

.....Of course, in suggesting this Salisbury would have to wave off the *real* worst case, which would actually be Russia, or other powers *actively aiding* the Ottoman Turks against British advance. Or the risk that an advance up Mesopotamia could be a long-grind that could take so long that by the time significant Armenia population centers are reached, all the Armenians are dead.

An additional complication could come from the employment of Indian troops. Most of the military manpower used in this arduous rescue mission of a Christian minority people, involves first a lengthy campaign through a mainly Islamic land, using troops who are mainly Muslim and Hindu.

But what if he starts doing it, the big British force debarks in Basra, while Salisbury keeps after his demands, explicitly for stopping the anti-Armenian massacres and reforming administration where they live, and implicitly but likely not definitively, calling for Sultan Abdulhamid's head?

And the Sultan, Tsar, German and Austrian Kaisers, and French President wake up, see the morning papers, and think to themselves, 'OMG, Salisbury that magnifient bastard, he is actually doing this. Never thought he'd be that insane.'