raharris1973
Well-known member
What if Austria occupied, and annexed, Bosnia earlier in the 19th century?
Would doing so, before Russia and Serbia became as powerful and confident states as they later became, have saved the trouble that Austria-Hungary got into by ultimately occupying Bosnia in 1878, and then finally annexing it in 1908? Or would an earlier 19th century annexation fait accompli simply have accelerated Austria's (and a later Austria-Hungary's) involvement in Balkan conflicts that likely would be ruinous.
Here are a few pre-1870s opportunities that could both motivate Austrian intervention and annexation, and provide an opportunity for it, by loosening Ottoman control in the area:
A. The Bosnian uprising of Gradascevic in 1831-32
B. The Hercegovinian uprising of Vukalovic in1852-53
Herzegovina uprising (1852–1862) - Wikipedia
C. The northwest Bosnian revolt of Pecija, coincident with the last parts of Vukalovic's revolt, in 1858
For A. the 1831-1833, the pros and cons of Austria moving to intervene are:
Pro:
-The local Muslim military elite, and landowning elite, succeeded for much of the revolt in driving the Ottoman forces out of the great bulk of the province. They were actually rebelling against more liberal (for Christians) and centralizing Ottoman reforms, but nevertheless, were still able to recruit many Christian soldiers. It should be manageable for Austria of the 1830s, a European great power, to offer, or pretend to offer Gradascevic and his rebels 'help' they cannot refuse. Or offer similar 'help' to the Turks in 'restoring order' that positions Austrian military units across Bosnia, or for Vienna to represent itself two-facedly to both sides, then use occupation to take over economically and politically, casting aside opponents once strong enough on the ground, being able to leverage against Muslim defiance Christian peasant outrage against them over high taxes, rents, and religious pecking order issues.
-The other great powers should not be in a really great position to interfere in 1831-1832. Ottoman Turkey had just fought, and lost, a long struggle against Greek independence by 1829. That struggle was capped off by the annihilation of its fleet at Navarino, and a two-year long Russo-Ottoman War (1828-29) that saw Russian advances through the 'Danubian provinces' (aka Romania) and Bulgaria to the edge of Constantinople and down the Caucasus to the northeastern gates of Turkish Anatolia. It is doubtful the Turkish army and economy recovered much by 1831 or 1832. Especially because the Ottoman Egyptian War was going on in 1831-1833 and denying the Ottomans the revenues of all Egypt and the Levant.
-The Russians should not be in a really fantastic position to oppose Austrian gains in Bosnian, or gain additional counter-valing gains immediately. They just finished up wars with the Ottomans and Persia by 1829, and those probably were a hit to the national budget, and war in the field probably turned out to be more challlenging, and certainly more expense, than war on the parade ground. Besides, Austria would only be grabbing a compensatory 'fair share' from a 'balance of great powers' point of view, after Russian direct gains of Ottoman territory in the Caucasus, gains of occupation over the now autonomous Danubian principalities and river mouth, an indemnity, influence over now autonomous Serbia, the independence of Greece, to be expected to be somewhat favorable to Russia, and a few years down the road, a deal over the straits.
-Also at this time, Austria is not beset or heavily challenged in its dominant position in Italy, nor in the German Confederation.
Con:
- Metternich, though he did not hesitate to intervene militarily to crush revolutions - examples include sending Austrian troops to crush rebels in Naples, and rebels in German states, and helped other powers like the British and Ottomans throw back Egyptian usurper Muhammad Ali, was a 'goody two-shoes' and stickler for the status quo of international borders, not wanting to allow them to be changed by revolts or uprisings. He would need to modify this viewpoint, or turn hypocritical on it, to allow Austria to aggrandize itself with Ottoman territory during his time in power. His goody two-shoes nature on upholding the status quo of international borders probably is something that accounts for why Austria, and other German states, never joined up with Russia, France, and Britain in fighting the Turks and actively supporting the Greek rebels. But hypocrisy in the name of Austrian national self-interest really should not be that much of a stretch.The argument for a need to secure Austria's thin border, protect its skinny Dalmatian lands with a robust hinterland, and halt refugee flows from repeated disorders wouldn't have been a bad one, all things considered. And Europe's other 'policeman', Russian Tsar Nicholas I, who offered to send troops across the continent to crush the Belgian revolt in 1830, and help suppress the Neapolitans that year, and earlier support intervention in favor of the Spanish old regime in Spain *and* its colonies, still managed to be hypocrite enough to ultimately support the Greek rebels in gaining independence, and fighting the Ottoman Sultan to gain land. Stealing from a *Muslim* ruler wasn't so bad to him after all.
-Any military operation would cost money, and the Austrian Habsburg monarchy was chronically short of money.
For B. 1852-1853, the pros and cons of Austria moving to intervene are:
Pro:
-This time it is a revolt of generally the Christian population against Muslim landlord misrule, so it doesn't have any of the bad look of siding with Muslim tyrants.
-Helping these rebels, but then taking over from them, would be fitting payback against the Ottoman Empire, which defiantly refused to extradite Hungarian rebels from 1848-49 who had fled across the border. Also, acquiring the Croatian/Catholic lands would be a fitting reward for the Croatians who stood loyally by the monarchy during the crises of 1848-49.
-Austria had weathered the storm of 1848-49 and restored its position successfully everywhere, in Germany, Italy, and Hungary, putting down the rebels (separatists, liberals, socialists) and upstarts (Prussia), whoever they were.
-Metternich was no longer in power, so Austria was no longer tied down by any scruples he may have had.
Con:
-At the very beginning of this, Russia has its hands free and is pretty self-confident and may be unsupportive or try to make excessive parallel Balkan gains
-Since this is a Christian revolt, more on the edges of Bosnia-Hercegovina, with the local Muslim powers that be remaining loyal to the Sultan, the military lift should be heavier than it would have been in the 1830s to invade and occupy the province.
-The Orthodox rebels, led by Vukalovic, were more oriented to Montenegro and Serbia, and desired connections with them more than Serbia. I still think after an Austrian occupation, they are hardly in a position to rebel successfully and the Ottomans are not in a position to retake though.
-Any operation really should finish before October 1853 and the outbreak of the Crimean War and the resulting alliance of the British-French and Ottomans, because it makes Austria a co-belligerent of Russia, and the Ottomans a co-belligerent of France and Britain, which is a whole new ball of wax and set of complications. OTL, Austria decidedly was *not* on Russia's side, and disliked Russian gains. It paid a diplomatic price its anti-Russian, but still non-belligerent, officialiy neutral stance. Some have argued that Austria *should* have sided with Russia (Austria would have remained on good terms with a vital neighbor, and with Russia would have been unbeatable in the Balkans), while others have argued siding with Russia could only have been a disaster for Austria, a lose-lose (Austria would 'win' a western naval blockade in the Mediterranean, western support for its enemies in Italy, western encouragement for its other rebellious nationalities, and even if it nevertheless 'won' in the Balkans and on land with Russia, Russia would get the bulk of more valuable territorial gains while Austria suffered relatively more blows for less valuable gains.
-RE: above, in any case, If Austria wishes to do an invade, grab, and exit type of move, without revising its overall strategy of self-interest and neutrality, it has to get it all done before the Crimean War starts. There is time to do it, but only with a sufficiently early start as soon as the mountain passes clear by spring 1853.
For B. 1858, the pros and cons of Austria moving to intervene are:
Pro:
- Russia is way too beat and tired to interfere
- Turkey is too beat and tired to resist for any lengthy period
- Britain, and likely even France, are too tired to militarily interfere with an Austrian intervention and occupation All the above is consequences from the bloody Crimean War, which only ended in 1856.
- Like the previous, it would be to assist Christian rebels, and occupation could earn popular acquiescence/pacification by improving material/social conditions for Christians
- Austria is not yet involved in any fighting in Italy, nor have the Prussian army reforms kicked in.
Con:
-Austria's own mobilizations, early and late during the Crimean war, and its noncombat, administrative occupation of the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, were fairly expensive for the Austrian budget, and combat operations would add more.
-While tired and financially depleted, the Turks have gotten superior recent tactical experience and decently modern weapons.
-While really, really, really unlikely to make an attack on Turkish Bosnia, a place of no strategic or sentimental value to the western powers, not on the road to India, no Holy Places, France and Britain would still be diplomatically pissed at an attack on their recent ally and recent loan recipient, and Austria's diplomatic reputation would be hurt. The Piedmontese, as we know now, were spoiling for a fight, which they started in 1859, and the French would be even more enthusiastic about helping them in this ATL. The Piedmontese might even start a little bit earlier, if physically able. Still, if the Austrians lock down Bosnia in 1858, only to lose their wars as historical in Italy 1859-60. and Germany 1866, they are not likely to lose Bosnia in those later wars. The British and French will eventually get over their anger with the Austrians.
Would doing so, before Russia and Serbia became as powerful and confident states as they later became, have saved the trouble that Austria-Hungary got into by ultimately occupying Bosnia in 1878, and then finally annexing it in 1908? Or would an earlier 19th century annexation fait accompli simply have accelerated Austria's (and a later Austria-Hungary's) involvement in Balkan conflicts that likely would be ruinous.
Here are a few pre-1870s opportunities that could both motivate Austrian intervention and annexation, and provide an opportunity for it, by loosening Ottoman control in the area:
A. The Bosnian uprising of Gradascevic in 1831-32
Bosnian uprising (1831–1832) - Wikipedia
B. The Hercegovinian uprising of Vukalovic in1852-53
Herzegovina uprising (1852–1862) - Wikipedia
C. The northwest Bosnian revolt of Pecija, coincident with the last parts of Vukalovic's revolt, in 1858
Pecija's First Revolt - Wikipedia
For A. the 1831-1833, the pros and cons of Austria moving to intervene are:
Pro:
-The local Muslim military elite, and landowning elite, succeeded for much of the revolt in driving the Ottoman forces out of the great bulk of the province. They were actually rebelling against more liberal (for Christians) and centralizing Ottoman reforms, but nevertheless, were still able to recruit many Christian soldiers. It should be manageable for Austria of the 1830s, a European great power, to offer, or pretend to offer Gradascevic and his rebels 'help' they cannot refuse. Or offer similar 'help' to the Turks in 'restoring order' that positions Austrian military units across Bosnia, or for Vienna to represent itself two-facedly to both sides, then use occupation to take over economically and politically, casting aside opponents once strong enough on the ground, being able to leverage against Muslim defiance Christian peasant outrage against them over high taxes, rents, and religious pecking order issues.
-The other great powers should not be in a really great position to interfere in 1831-1832. Ottoman Turkey had just fought, and lost, a long struggle against Greek independence by 1829. That struggle was capped off by the annihilation of its fleet at Navarino, and a two-year long Russo-Ottoman War (1828-29) that saw Russian advances through the 'Danubian provinces' (aka Romania) and Bulgaria to the edge of Constantinople and down the Caucasus to the northeastern gates of Turkish Anatolia. It is doubtful the Turkish army and economy recovered much by 1831 or 1832. Especially because the Ottoman Egyptian War was going on in 1831-1833 and denying the Ottomans the revenues of all Egypt and the Levant.
-The Russians should not be in a really fantastic position to oppose Austrian gains in Bosnian, or gain additional counter-valing gains immediately. They just finished up wars with the Ottomans and Persia by 1829, and those probably were a hit to the national budget, and war in the field probably turned out to be more challlenging, and certainly more expense, than war on the parade ground. Besides, Austria would only be grabbing a compensatory 'fair share' from a 'balance of great powers' point of view, after Russian direct gains of Ottoman territory in the Caucasus, gains of occupation over the now autonomous Danubian principalities and river mouth, an indemnity, influence over now autonomous Serbia, the independence of Greece, to be expected to be somewhat favorable to Russia, and a few years down the road, a deal over the straits.
-Also at this time, Austria is not beset or heavily challenged in its dominant position in Italy, nor in the German Confederation.
Con:
- Metternich, though he did not hesitate to intervene militarily to crush revolutions - examples include sending Austrian troops to crush rebels in Naples, and rebels in German states, and helped other powers like the British and Ottomans throw back Egyptian usurper Muhammad Ali, was a 'goody two-shoes' and stickler for the status quo of international borders, not wanting to allow them to be changed by revolts or uprisings. He would need to modify this viewpoint, or turn hypocritical on it, to allow Austria to aggrandize itself with Ottoman territory during his time in power. His goody two-shoes nature on upholding the status quo of international borders probably is something that accounts for why Austria, and other German states, never joined up with Russia, France, and Britain in fighting the Turks and actively supporting the Greek rebels. But hypocrisy in the name of Austrian national self-interest really should not be that much of a stretch.The argument for a need to secure Austria's thin border, protect its skinny Dalmatian lands with a robust hinterland, and halt refugee flows from repeated disorders wouldn't have been a bad one, all things considered. And Europe's other 'policeman', Russian Tsar Nicholas I, who offered to send troops across the continent to crush the Belgian revolt in 1830, and help suppress the Neapolitans that year, and earlier support intervention in favor of the Spanish old regime in Spain *and* its colonies, still managed to be hypocrite enough to ultimately support the Greek rebels in gaining independence, and fighting the Ottoman Sultan to gain land. Stealing from a *Muslim* ruler wasn't so bad to him after all.
-Any military operation would cost money, and the Austrian Habsburg monarchy was chronically short of money.
For B. 1852-1853, the pros and cons of Austria moving to intervene are:
Pro:
-This time it is a revolt of generally the Christian population against Muslim landlord misrule, so it doesn't have any of the bad look of siding with Muslim tyrants.
-Helping these rebels, but then taking over from them, would be fitting payback against the Ottoman Empire, which defiantly refused to extradite Hungarian rebels from 1848-49 who had fled across the border. Also, acquiring the Croatian/Catholic lands would be a fitting reward for the Croatians who stood loyally by the monarchy during the crises of 1848-49.
-Austria had weathered the storm of 1848-49 and restored its position successfully everywhere, in Germany, Italy, and Hungary, putting down the rebels (separatists, liberals, socialists) and upstarts (Prussia), whoever they were.
-Metternich was no longer in power, so Austria was no longer tied down by any scruples he may have had.
Con:
-At the very beginning of this, Russia has its hands free and is pretty self-confident and may be unsupportive or try to make excessive parallel Balkan gains
-Since this is a Christian revolt, more on the edges of Bosnia-Hercegovina, with the local Muslim powers that be remaining loyal to the Sultan, the military lift should be heavier than it would have been in the 1830s to invade and occupy the province.
-The Orthodox rebels, led by Vukalovic, were more oriented to Montenegro and Serbia, and desired connections with them more than Serbia. I still think after an Austrian occupation, they are hardly in a position to rebel successfully and the Ottomans are not in a position to retake though.
-Any operation really should finish before October 1853 and the outbreak of the Crimean War and the resulting alliance of the British-French and Ottomans, because it makes Austria a co-belligerent of Russia, and the Ottomans a co-belligerent of France and Britain, which is a whole new ball of wax and set of complications. OTL, Austria decidedly was *not* on Russia's side, and disliked Russian gains. It paid a diplomatic price its anti-Russian, but still non-belligerent, officialiy neutral stance. Some have argued that Austria *should* have sided with Russia (Austria would have remained on good terms with a vital neighbor, and with Russia would have been unbeatable in the Balkans), while others have argued siding with Russia could only have been a disaster for Austria, a lose-lose (Austria would 'win' a western naval blockade in the Mediterranean, western support for its enemies in Italy, western encouragement for its other rebellious nationalities, and even if it nevertheless 'won' in the Balkans and on land with Russia, Russia would get the bulk of more valuable territorial gains while Austria suffered relatively more blows for less valuable gains.
-RE: above, in any case, If Austria wishes to do an invade, grab, and exit type of move, without revising its overall strategy of self-interest and neutrality, it has to get it all done before the Crimean War starts. There is time to do it, but only with a sufficiently early start as soon as the mountain passes clear by spring 1853.
For B. 1858, the pros and cons of Austria moving to intervene are:
Pro:
- Russia is way too beat and tired to interfere
- Turkey is too beat and tired to resist for any lengthy period
- Britain, and likely even France, are too tired to militarily interfere with an Austrian intervention and occupation All the above is consequences from the bloody Crimean War, which only ended in 1856.
- Like the previous, it would be to assist Christian rebels, and occupation could earn popular acquiescence/pacification by improving material/social conditions for Christians
- Austria is not yet involved in any fighting in Italy, nor have the Prussian army reforms kicked in.
Con:
-Austria's own mobilizations, early and late during the Crimean war, and its noncombat, administrative occupation of the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, were fairly expensive for the Austrian budget, and combat operations would add more.
-While tired and financially depleted, the Turks have gotten superior recent tactical experience and decently modern weapons.
-While really, really, really unlikely to make an attack on Turkish Bosnia, a place of no strategic or sentimental value to the western powers, not on the road to India, no Holy Places, France and Britain would still be diplomatically pissed at an attack on their recent ally and recent loan recipient, and Austria's diplomatic reputation would be hurt. The Piedmontese, as we know now, were spoiling for a fight, which they started in 1859, and the French would be even more enthusiastic about helping them in this ATL. The Piedmontese might even start a little bit earlier, if physically able. Still, if the Austrians lock down Bosnia in 1858, only to lose their wars as historical in Italy 1859-60. and Germany 1866, they are not likely to lose Bosnia in those later wars. The British and French will eventually get over their anger with the Austrians.
