What If? What if (most of) Syria were teleported out into the Med on Dec 5th, 1994?

[raharris1973]

What if on December 5th, 1994, the last night of Hanukah, Syria was teleported to the central Mediterranean?

This is 6 to 8 weeks after the signature of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, and over a year after the Oslo Accords.

The ASB responsible leaves the Golan Heights attached with Israel, but the UN buffer strip and most of Mount Hermon go with Syria.

The ASB also does not want to torpedo Iraq's agriculture or ecosystem, so she leaves behind that portion of Syria in the northeast that is part of the Euphrates drainage basin. The Yarmouk river drainage basin is messed up, rendering that river useless for Syria, Jordan and Israel, but those countries are much less dependent on that shallow river for freshwater supplies than Iraq is on the Tigris-Euphrates.

What happens to Syria as a large new island, bigger than Sicily, now located in the Mediterranean, in between Libya and Italy?

What happens to rump northeast Syria that remains in the Levant/Fertile Crescent area? And its neighbors, and all the places neighboring this new eastern alcove of the Mediterranean Sea, like Lebanon, Israel, and new improved Jordan - now with a Mediterranean coast?

Here is what it all looks like in maps, at a regional, and local, scale:

 

[WolfBear]

I expect Rojava to be created much earlier in this TL and for it to get northeastern Syria while Sunni Islamists get Idlib in northwestern Syria. Assad gets to keep his Syrian island.

 

[raharris1973]

How is the history of Lebanon, the South Lebanon war, and the Hezbollah struggle against Israel altered by the absence of an Iran-Syria-Bekaa Valley supply line, if at all?

Note also that all of the middle and late 1990s diplomatic effort and speculation on Syrian-Israeli peace becomes an irrelevance, and importantly, is not an attention-sucker for the Clinton administration or its State Department.

 

[Buba]

Interesting.

I'd expect the Lebanese factions dependent on Syrian backing to dial back their efforts and to see their influence diminish. Israel might intervene to crush those who do not like it.

I expect Israeli Navy to attack shipping to Lebanon it suspects of bringing arms to Hezbollah, with motions of censure of Israel for piracy being vetoed by the Usual Suspects in the UN.

Iraq can into space. Well, not space, but IMO Saddam overruns rump Syria-on-the-Euphrates. Iraqi oil will be exported through it. Who needs the Strait of Ormuz if you have the Lebanese Narrows to go through?
Alternatively Syria-on-the-Euphrates is backed by Iraq and/or Turkey to strike out on its own.

Jordan aquires a booming tourism industry, attracting beach-goers like Egypt does.

Syria-the-island becomes wetter and spends less on the army.

 

[raharris1973]

Iraq can into space. Well, not space, but IMO Saddam overruns rump Syria-on-the-Euphrates. Iraqi oil will be exported through it. Who needs the Strait of Ormuz if you have the Lebanese Narrows to go through?

No it can't. - 1994 Iraq was on sanctions, oil embargo, oil-for-food, UN inspections, and no-fly-zone lockdown. A land grab would get airstrikes minimum, if not an early OIF.

I'd expect the Lebanese factions dependent on Syrian backing to dial back their efforts and to see their influence diminish. Israel might intervene to crush those who do not like it.

I expect Israeli Navy to attack shipping to Lebanon it suspects of bringing arms to Hezbollah, with motions of censure of Israel for piracy being vetoed by the Usual Suspects in the UN.

So is Israel not losing the war in Lebanon or unilaterally withdrawing in the face of Hizballah. Is it taking its usual approach of only withdrawing from a place, maybe, if they get a peace treaty and diplomatic relations, like with Egypt? Or is it preferring to occupy South Lebanon forever? Maybe shoving a peace treaty down Beirut's throat all the same? Or does Hezbollah wear the Israelis out and convince them to quit the country like OTL, maybe just later?

Any knock-ons from Syria alterations and Lebanon alterations for later Israel-PA & Palestinian interactions?

Knock-ons for Iran-US relations and Iran-Israel relevance to each other?

 

[Buba]

1994 Iraq was on sanctions

I somehow forgot that this is post 1st Gulf War ...

As to Lebanon - maybe an Israeli attack to destroy the rest of Syrian military, weaken Hezbollah and leave the remaments to a coalition of local factions? The way I see things Syria, while not enamoured with Shia's, would not allow their elimination as a faction because reasons.

 

[Atarlost]

Jordan aquires a booming tourism industry, attracting beach-goers like Egypt does.

Might want to look at the topography. The only bits of the Syrian border low enough to maybe have sea access is the place where the Euphrates crosses, which is specifically excluded, and the bits that are already at the coast where Lebanon and Turkey already have sea access. And if the sea floor is swapped from the central Mediterranean there's no shelf. Any erosion is going to plummet into the depths instead of forming a beach. The new coasts are all going to be useless.

 

[WolfBear]

How is the history of Lebanon, the South Lebanon war, and the Hezbollah struggle against Israel altered by the absence of an Iran-Syria-Bekaa Valley supply line, if at all?

Note also that all of the middle and late 1990s diplomatic effort and speculation on Syrian-Israeli peace becomes an irrelevance, and importantly, is not an attention-sucker for the Clinton administration or its State Department.

The Cedar Revolution occurs a decade earlier in Lebanon? :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cedar_Revolution

 

[WolfBear]

@raharris1973 Another interesting effect in this TL is that this might make an independent Sunni Arab state in western Iraq in the event that the Shi'a will ever seize power in the rest of Iraq much more viable due to such a state actually having sea access in this TL, though of course there will still be the issue of this state having insufficient natural resources, unlike the oil-rich Shi'a-majority parts of Iraq.

 

[Buba]

Syria-on-the Euphrates has some gas and oil - should suffice.

 

[WolfBear]

Syria-on-the Euphrates has some gas and oil - should suffice.

But whatever independent Sunni Arab state might emerge in western Iraq would first need to conquer northeastern Syria!

 

[raharris1973]

As to Lebanon - maybe an Israeli attack to destroy the rest of Syrian military, weaken Hezbollah and leave the remaments to a coalition of local factions? The way I see things Syria, while not enamoured with Shia's, would not allow their elimination as a faction because reasons.

I assume you only mean the Syrian military leftover in Lebanon. The Syrians *were* enamored/allied with the Shia's in Lebanon by the 1990s. The "leftover" Syrians would indeed have no reliable support connections from either mainland Syria.

I'd expect the Lebanese factions dependent on Syrian backing to dial back their efforts and to see their influence diminish. Israel might intervene to crush those who do not like it.

I expect Israeli Navy to attack shipping to Lebanon it suspects of bringing arms to Hezbollah,

The Cedar Revolution occurs a decade earlier in Lebanon? :

This all sounds like it is adding up to the foundations of Hizballah's secure bases shifting under its feet - the protection of the Syrian Army (which dominates Lebanon), disappearing, the secure ground supply lines from Iran through Syria, disappearing, replaced with far less secure sea and air supply lines, other, non-Syria and non-hizballah friendly Lebanese political actors being emboldened, the Israelis not yet despairing and driven to unilateral withdrawal.

Hizballah still has its ideology, ideological connection, organization, and popular support going for it, and admiration for its guts taking on the Israelis.

But the geopolitical shift likely means that Israel cannot be forced into a unilateral withdrawal, and it makes a defeat or marginalization of Hizballah, and a possible Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty, more likely.

Hizballah does not emerge with comparable international prestige. Iran gets less prestige in militant circles for successful opposition to Israel. It doesn't mean it won't support similar Shia militant groups where there is a potential constituency like in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and the Arabian Peninsula, like the group who did Khobar Towers, but Iran will have less confidence about it. In turn, Israel may be a little less Iran obsessed. (after all, in the 1980s war, they tilted more anti-Iraq than anti-Iran, and supplied Iran)

This lack of Hizbollah's 1999-2000 victory over Israel (in forcing unilateral withdrawal without any concessions) may mean that Palestinians go into that year without envying the Hizballah experience so much and elevating their expectations so unrealistically, so that final status offers which led to the second intifadeh are not so shocking and enraging.

Terrorists in general are a little less cocky about their ability to make a difference.

Assad gets to keep his Syrian island.

Syria-the-island becomes wetter and spends less on the army.

Agreed. Left over Syria is now proportionately populated by demographics more loyal to the Assad. On the other hand, with no hope of recovering Golan Heights, and no role as a 'front-line' state against Israel, the regime loses a lot of its raison d'être. Since it cannot be the final peace partner for Israel, nor spoiler, it loses all its value to Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran. If they get along, the Assad and Qaddafi regimes can help each other out in the case of Arab Spring style unrest emerging later on.

 

[WolfBear]

Agreed. Left over Syria is now proportionately populated by demographics more loyal to the Assad. On the other hand, with no hope of recovering Golan Heights, and no role as a 'front-line' state against Israel, the regime loses a lot of its raison d'être. Since it cannot be the final peace partner for Israel, nor spoiler, it loses all its value to Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran. If they get along, the Assad and Qaddafi regimes can help each other out in the case of Arab Spring style unrest emerging later on.

Any chance of Assad and Gaddafi attempting a political union between their two countries? Two black sheep and pariahs attempting to band together?

 

[Buba]

Any political union would be just talk. And Assad knows that Kaddafi is too crazy to be given a kebab stand to run, let alone a country.

 

[raharris1973]

Any chance of Assad and Gaddafi attempting a political union between their two countries? Two black sheep and pariahs attempting to band together?

That goes too far, in that it requires sharing. Dictators are bad at sharing.

 

[Atarlost]

@raharris1973 Another interesting effect in this TL is that this might make an independent Sunni Arab state in western Iraq in the event that the Shi'a will ever seize power in the rest of Iraq much more viable due to such a state actually having sea access in this TL, though of course there will still be the issue of this state having insufficient natural resources, unlike the oil-rich Shi'a-majority parts of Iraq.

Syria on the Euphrates doesn't have sea access without more earth moving than they can afford. By leaving the Euphrates watershed you by definition put your new coastline on the continental divide so it's massive sea cliffs too. They can only trade in quantity through Iraq or Turkey and only easily through Iraq.

Any chance of Assad and Gaddafi attempting a political union between their two countries? Two black sheep and pariahs attempting to band together?

Does one of them have at least one daughter but no sons and the other at least one son? If so the answer is not in either Assad or Gaddafi's lifetime. If no the answer is not ever.

 

[Buba]

Syria-the-island - how did the demographics change? The Allevites and Druze double their shares? Increased by 50%?
Besides there being no Kurds left - who else lost share? Sunni Arabs? Shia? Christians?

 

[raharris1973]

The Allevites and Druze double their shares?

At least

Sunni Arabs?

Definitely reduced

Shia? Christians?

Definitely increased

 

[WolfBear]

At least



Definitely reduced



Definitely increased

You might be interested in this, though this is obviously OTL:

Shia crescent - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[raharris1973]

Is there consensus here that Hizballah cannot "win" the South Lebanon war against Israel here? Or most likely will not?

What about knock-on consequences for the Palestinian issue I speculated upon, and knock-on effects for Iranian proxy warfare region wide and its impact on relations with the US, Israel and others?