A few what-ifs about the campaigns of 1914

raharris1973

Well-known member
1) What if the German armies on the left-wing in Alsace-Lorraine are weaker by multiple Divisions or Corps, forcing them to give ground in the face of French attack at the beginning of the war, and lengthening the western front lines even more? Which side is hurt worse and more likely to have its line snapped by being stretched out like this, Germany or France? Will either side, France or Germany, gain an opportunity, with wider gaps between formations, to cut off and destroy one, two, or more enemy armies in the late summer or fall 1914 campaign? Which one and why so?

2) What if the initial Russian advance into East Prussia does not panic Molke into sending two reserve Corps to East from the western front. What use are those forces put to in the west, and to what effect? In the east, these forces did not arrive in time to effect the battle of Tannenburg.
In the west, their departure probably did not change the outcome of the battle of the Marne, but might it alter the "race for the sea" or where the final trench line for the year falls? West of Calais would be significantly different from east of Calais, for example.

3. What if the Austro-Hungarians did a competent, Serbian-focused offensive deployment in 1914?

In the real world, Conrad fumbled the Austro-Hungarian deployment plans in 1914 and sent Austro-Hungarian armies strewn across the country shuttling between Serbia and the Russian front, and had both the Galician and Serbian offensives happened with insufficient troops in either place, with the Russian counter-attack subsequently annihilating the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia. What if Conrad had not come up with his complicated deployment plan and stuck to the initial operation of 2 armies rather than 1 against Serbia, giving decisive numerical superiority, while the troops in Galicia remain on the defensive in all of those forts that the Austrians spent so much money on.

Would the results be a great short-term success?


4. What if the Austro-Hungarians to the opposite (and what I think the Germans were hoping they would do), just keep minimal screening forces on the Serbian border and concentrate as much as possible against Russia, doing an offensive north into Russian Poland?

5. What if the French reverted from Joffre's offensive deployment and plan to Michel's defensive deployment and plan once it became clear that a) the Germans were invading through the Belgium, b) the British had declared war, and c) the Russians were attacking in the east. Could the French significantly reduce their losses by switching to the defensive early and deliberately? What would be the effects on the war longer term?
 
Will reply more verbosely later, but top of mind:
3 - The forts were in Kraków, Przemyśl and maybe somewhere else - blocking RR routes/passes to Hungary. Even if the westernmost 1/4th of the line may be screened by the Vistula/sparce RR left bank of Congress Kingdom, while the rightmost end is behind the Dnestr (which runs in a deep gorge) the rest is open country. Hence "defensive stance" means fallback to the Carpathians and Dnestr line, ceding almost all of transcarpathia to the Russians.
Politically difficult, even if Galicia does not hold anything of importance. Let us not go overboard with that c.0,5M tons of oil a year - not that relevant in 1914 ...
 
1) What if the German armies on the left-wing in Alsace-Lorraine are weaker by multiple Divisions or Corps, forcing them to give ground in the face of French attack at the beginning of the war, and lengthening the western front lines even more? Which side is hurt worse and more likely to have its line snapped by being stretched out like this, Germany or France? Will either side, France or Germany, gain an opportunity, with wider gaps between formations, to cut off and destroy one, two, or more enemy armies in the late summer or fall 1914 campaign? Which one and why so?

Could go either way. Do the French obcession with the offensive - which matched that of the Germans - mean they tie up too many forces that can't be switched north to help defend Paris? In which case despite the exhaustion of the German forces they might take Paris. Which isn't necessarily a war winner as its a coalition war but would be bad for them. Or the Germans possibly panic and switch a lot of forces from somewhere else to bolster the faltering A-L front.

2) What if the initial Russian advance into East Prussia does not panic Molke into sending two reserve Corps to East from the western front. What use are those forces put to in the west, and to what effect? In the east, these forces did not arrive in time to effect the battle of Tannenburg.
In the west, their departure probably did not change the outcome of the battle of the Marne, but might it alter the "race for the sea" or where the final trench line for the year falls? West of Calais would be significantly different from east of Calais, for example.

That could be nasty for the allies as it opens up the Channel to potential naval threat - albeit that could be risky for German forces involved. It would effectively knock Belgium out of the war, at least in Europe and be a further morale blow for the French while making more difficult allied supplies in the northern part of the front.

3. What if the Austro-Hungarians did a competent, Serbian-focused offensive deployment in 1914?

In the real world, Conrad fumbled the Austro-Hungarian deployment plans in 1914 and sent Austro-Hungarian armies strewn across the country shuttling between Serbia and the Russian front, and had both the Galician and Serbian offensives happened with insufficient troops in either place, with the Russian counter-attack subsequently annihilating the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia. What if Conrad had not come up with his complicated deployment plan and stuck to the initial operation of 2 armies rather than 1 against Serbia, giving decisive numerical superiority, while the troops in Galicia remain on the defensive in all of those forts that the Austrians spent so much money on.

Would the results be a great short-term success?

Suspect Buba is right here that that would be politically very difficult. Plus even with more forces committed to the north the Russians were able to besiege and take Przemyśl at least so might do it more quickly here.


4. What if the Austro-Hungarians to the opposite (and what I think the Germans were hoping they would do), just keep minimal screening forces on the Serbian border and concentrate as much as possible against Russia, doing an offensive north into Russian Poland?

Then they have the issue of Serbia unoccupied and possibly able to attack themselves while in the Carpathians I would still expect the Russians to win although its likely to be more costly for both sides.

5. What if the French reverted from Joffre's offensive deployment and plan to Michel's defensive deployment and plan once it became clear that a) the Germans were invading through the Belgium, b) the British had declared war, and c) the Russians were attacking in the east. Could the French significantly reduce their losses by switching to the defensive early and deliberately? What would be the effects on the war longer term?

IF they were able to do this and responded quickly that could check the Germans markedly further north-east and probably also increase their losses. Whether this would result in a total collapse of the Germans into a rout would probably be unlikely but they might be pushed further back, possibly resulting in the liberation of the Lille region and much more of Belgium. There is a chance here that such a shock could prompt the CPs to look for a peaceful settlement, which would actually be in every-bodies interests of course. At the very least it might well make Constantinople think again about joining the fray and is likely to make Italy more eager to join the allies.
 
Russians were able to besiege and take Przemyśl
Besiege - yes.
As to take ... Przemyśl capitulated for lack of food. Such shortage resulting from stocks being used to feed the field armies.

ADDED LATER:
When the siege was lifted in October, an attempt was made to rebuild those food stocks. But four weeks proved not to be enough.
 
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3. What if the Austro-Hungarians did a competent, Serbian-focused offensive deployment in 1914?

In the real world, Conrad fumbled the Austro-Hungarian deployment plans in 1914 and sent Austro-Hungarian armies strewn across the country shuttling between Serbia and the Russian front, and had both the Galician and Serbian offensives happened with insufficient troops in either place, with the Russian counter-attack subsequently annihilating the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia. What if Conrad had not come up with his complicated deployment plan and stuck to the initial operation of 2 armies rather than 1 against Serbia, giving decisive numerical superiority, while the troops in Galicia remain on the defensive in all of those forts that the Austrians spent so much money on.

Would the results be a great short-term success?
Germany would freak out that the Austrians aren't attacking. Unfortunately I think Conrad was insane enough to attack anyway.
However assuming the scenario laid out above is ultimately the plan then yes the Austrians would likely have stomped the Serbs and their armies in Galicia would have done much better given that the logistical situation was so bad for Russia in trying to invade Galicia up to the Austrian fortress system along the San river. Przemysl supported by the Austrian armies well rested and dug in would be a very tough nut to crack, as I recall in 1914 the Russians lacked rail artillery and had to hastily convert some naval guns and fortress artillery to bring to Galicia in 1915 to finally deal with the fort.

IMHO even with the artillery advantage the Russians would gore themselves on Austrian defenses if Conrad stuck to the defensive variant plans they had worked out, including the fortified bridgeheads over the San river. Add in field armies with probably 6 weeks to dig in and prepare for a Russian offensive and the logistical mess the Russians would have due to the lack of infrastructure to support their advance and they'd have their own 'western front' level of trench systems ready to go. Though the Russians would benefit from all the time to concentrate their armies that would make them reckless in their use of manpower to try and force the issue, as they'd have 6 armies to the 3.5 the Austro-German armies in Southern Poland+Galicia.

Assuming the rest of the war plays out the same in the west and Prussia then we probably see a Russian flanking maneuver through Poland probably by October at the latest. The German 9th army would be available by then, as would the Austrian 2nd and probably 6th armies (the 5th would stay behind to occupy Serbia), so they could counter the move.
I'd imagine the 2nd army ends up in East Galicia per OTL, just later once Serbia is dealt with (September at the earliest), while the 6th army moves to southern Poland and takes over command of the Austrian Kummer Group while the German 9th army takes over their Woyrsch Corps.

6th army would be under Oskar Potiorek, who ITTL wouldn't lose his reputation by the botched Serbian operation. His army was quite decently powerful and would be somewhat moreso with the Kummer Group addition:
  • 6th Army, commanded by Oskar Potiorek
    • 1. infantry division
    • 48. infantry division
    • 18. infantry division
    • 47. infantry division
    • 40. honved infantry division
    • 109. landsturm infantry brigade
  • Banat Rayon and garrisons
    • 107. landsturm infantry brigade
    • sundry units of infantry, cavalry and artillery
I'd imagine the Banat group would see the useful 'sundry' infantry, cavalry, and artillery sent with 6th army, but the Landsturm brigades left behind with 5th army for occupation. 5th army in turn would probably transfer its regular army divisions (2 of them) to 6th army since Serbia shouldn't be that difficult to occupy and wouldn't need the best quality divisions for that role. 2nd army would probably leave its cavalry division behind too, as that isn't much help in the defensive fighting that the army would see in Galicia.

  • Army group Kummer
    • 7. Cavalry Division
    • Landsturm forces


Effectively that should secure the CP positions in Poland and would probably ensure any sort of analogue Lodz offensive by the Russians actually turns out worse given the extra Austrian army available while Galicia becomes a sinkhole of Russian forces that bleeds them worse than the Austrians. I doubt we'd see a Carpathian campaign ITTL, but the San river line becomes a western front style bloodbath insofar as logistics lets the Russians keep attacking.

Long term the Austrian armies are much tougher due to lower casualties and loss of equipment as well as experience gained in favorable conditions, while the Russian armies have their own 'vicious circle' of attrition instead.

Also a major implication here is that Italy probably stays neutral without the Serb diversion of Austrian resources plus the humiliations that make them look like easy pickings and the Entente doesn't move into Salonika to help Serbia, which is crushed early on and the Greeks not being as favorable to the Entente, which means a substantial saving in resources for them. Bulgarian probably stays neutral and favorable to the CPs, so a major trade partner. Then the Romanians might actually consider joining the CPs if Serbia is crushed that quickly and the Ottomans join the war on time since they still had a German born monarch favorable to the CPs in 1914. His Entente favorable son wouldn't rise to power until later on when his father died.

All in all much better for Austria ITTL.
 
Scenario #6 added-

What the Germans and Austro-Hungarians from December 1912 though July 1914, did an amount of collaborative peacetime operational planning matching in detail the amount of Russian-French, Anglo-French, and Anglo-Russian planning? What if they challenged the Italians to take part?

Assuming the Sarajevo assasimation still happens on time in 1914, and Austria-Hungary wants to fight Serbia over it, what plans to the Triple Alliance powers have on the shelf and how are they different from OTL?

Will the Germans still like the Schlieffen-Moltke plan after they find the Austrians will send a lot of their forces against Serbia instead of Russia, or decide Germany need to devote more force against Russia?

Will Austrian arguments and Italian evasiveness about making plans convince the Germans that counting on Italian reinforcements in Alsace is ‘bad planning*?

For the Austrians, seeing that the German plan is France-first, will they be less excited to rely on Germany for protection against Russia?
 
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Scenario #6 added-

What the Germans and Austro-Hungarians from December 1912 though July 1914, did an amount of collaborative peacetime operational planning matching in detail the amount of Russian-French, Anglo-French, and Anglo-Russian planning? What if they challenged the Italians to take part?
They kind of did and the Germans basically reneged on all the arrangements. It also didn't help that the Russians blackmailed the head of Austrian intelligence and got the entire Austrian war plan...
The Italians were included to some extent about moving to Alsace, but otherwise they really only could do their plan against the French, so no need to really involve them.
 
4. What if the Austro-Hungarians to the opposite (and what I think the Germans were hoping they would do), just keep minimal screening forces on the Serbian border and concentrate as much as possible against Russia, doing an offensive north into Russian Poland?

Would Franz Joseph I allow that, his nephew Franz Ferdinand was killed by a Yugoslav nationalist of Serbian ethnicity.
 
Would Franz Joseph I allow that, his nephew Franz Ferdinand was killed by a Yugoslav nationalist of Serbian ethnicity.
When FF was murdered FJ did a happy dance (well, as much as his age allows). The two did not get along.
Holding off Serbia while "knocking Russia out of the war" is a sound strategy :)

Imagine OTL but with the Serbian front held by Landsturm while an additional six or more 1st line Common and Landwehr/Honved Divisions are on the Ginla Lipa River line.
 
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When FF was murdered FJ did a happy dance (well, as much as his age allows). The two did not get along.
Holding off Serbia while "knocking Russia out of the war" is a sound strategy :)

Imagine OTL but with the Serbian front held by Landsturm while an additional six or more 1st line Common and Landwehr/Honved Divisions are on the Ginla Lipa River line.
But will Serbia be content of going on the defensive ore will it, seeing AH not attacking, decide the best way to survive is to go on the atack.
 
One thing I remember from The Story of the Great War was accounts of German infantry doing 40-mile forced marches in 1914.

I know someone who did a 22-mile walk around a lake when he was twelve. He said it took seven hours and did it because he was annoyed with his aunts and uncles and needed to be elsewhere while he calmed down.

What if the Armies of 1914 were much smaller and couldn't cover the entire frontier?
 
But that does not mean they cannot try.
They can try, but they probably won't get far.

The 1862 Battle of Fredericksburg saw a Union Army attempt a river crossing against entrenched Confederates. It was a bloodbath the Union did not win.

Fast forward to 1914 and the Serbians would get slaughtered by the Austro-Hungarians so badly that the generals who ok'd that bit of stupidity would deserve to be court-martialed and shot.

In 1862 Burnside had an excuse. He knew he wasn't qualified to lead an army, said as much, but took the job anyways because there wasn't anyone better under consideration.
 
One thing I remember from The Story of the Great War was accounts of German infantry doing 40-mile forced marches in 1914.
Polish granny* stronk.
Pilgrimage from Hel to Częstochowa make 640 km in 19 days. About 33 km a day.

As to the Serbs charging across the Danube - there is a perfectly fine 200km "no big river" border with Bosnia :)

* actually identifying as Kaszubian
 
Polish granny* stronk.
Pilgrimage from Hel to Częstochowa make 640 km in 19 days. About 33 km a day.

As to the Serbs charging across the Danube - there is a perfectly fine 200km "no big river" border with Bosnia :)

* actually identifying as Kaszubian
33km ~= 20.5 miles.

8 hours of casual walking when unencumbered is 24-32 miles (39.6-51.5km).
 
1) What if the German armies on the left-wing in Alsace-Lorraine are weaker by multiple Divisions or Corps, forcing them to give ground in the face of French attack at the beginning of the war, and lengthening the western front lines even more? Which side is hurt worse and more likely to have its line snapped by being stretched out like this, Germany or France? Will either side, France or Germany, gain an opportunity, with wider gaps between formations, to cut off and destroy one, two, or more enemy armies in the late summer or fall 1914 campaign? Which one and why so?

2) What if the initial Russian advance into East Prussia does not panic Molke into sending two reserve Corps to East from the western front. What use are those forces put to in the west, and to what effect? In the east, these forces did not arrive in time to effect the battle of Tannenburg.
In the west, their departure probably did not change the outcome of the battle of the Marne, but might it alter the "race for the sea" or where the final trench line for the year falls? West of Calais would be significantly different from east of Calais, for example.

3. What if the Austro-Hungarians did a competent, Serbian-focused offensive deployment in 1914?

In the real world, Conrad fumbled the Austro-Hungarian deployment plans in 1914 and sent Austro-Hungarian armies strewn across the country shuttling between Serbia and the Russian front, and had both the Galician and Serbian offensives happened with insufficient troops in either place, with the Russian counter-attack subsequently annihilating the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia. What if Conrad had not come up with his complicated deployment plan and stuck to the initial operation of 2 armies rather than 1 against Serbia, giving decisive numerical superiority, while the troops in Galicia remain on the defensive in all of those forts that the Austrians spent so much money on.

Would the results be a great short-term success?


4. What if the Austro-Hungarians to the opposite (and what I think the Germans were hoping they would do), just keep minimal screening forces on the Serbian border and concentrate as much as possible against Russia, doing an offensive north into Russian Poland?

5. What if the French reverted from Joffre's offensive deployment and plan to Michel's defensive deployment and plan once it became clear that a) the Germans were invading through the Belgium, b) the British had declared war, and c) the Russians were attacking in the east. Could the French significantly reduce their losses by switching to the defensive early and deliberately? What would be the effects on the war longer term?
1.Depend on how fast german attack through Belgium would be.If they let french take part of Alsace,but attacked fast enough to take Paris in 40 days,like they planned,it mean winning.
2.They would take Paris,and end France in 1914.End of war in 1915,german Europe without need for Putin help.

3.Like @Buba said - politically too risky.Althought they should do so.

4.They would meet russian offensive .Many corpses,nothing change.

5.France should do so.Just like they should use modern uniforms,not red pants.But,being french,it would be politically impossible for them.
P.S somebody should create TL where red pants made french faster,like orks in WH40,and let them win WW1.Unless everybody start using red uniforms....
 
Not-red pants were being fiercely debated in France - and I believe the pantalon rouge were to be phased out starting in ... 1915.
 
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Scenario # 7:

What if China's Beiyang Republic under Yuan Shikai declared war on Germany and attacked Qingdao a week or two before Japan made the same move? Could the Chinese mass the number and firepower to besiege the Germans from the whole landward side and compel German capitulation sooner or later, in a manner that offers no excuse for Japanese or British boots on the ground in the erstwhile German leased territory?

---
Scenario # 8:

What if Serbia quit the war in December 1914? General Typhus attacks Serbia a few weeks early, in November 1914 instead of December 1914. Serbian Field Marshal Radomir Putnik favored a separate peace in OTL November 1914, fearing Serbia could not withstand the impending third Austro-Hungarian invasion. The King, Regent, and Prime Minister all opposed him at that time, and insisted on holding on.

In this TL, the King, Regent, Prime Minister and other generals still think Putnik is being too pessimistic, but especially, with worsening rainy, muddy weather making movement more difficult, and rising reports of typhus from multiple encampments, they have some additional doubts and worries.

As in OTL the Austro-Hungarians force some Serbian retreats and occupy Belgrade, but unlike OTL, the spread of typhus in key units slows their movement and fatally weakens the counterattack at Kolubara that OTL drove the Austro-Hungarians back out of Belgrade and got Potierek fired and revived Serbian morale for the season.

Facing mounting losses in futile counter-attacks, Serbian government morale slips.

The Austrians pursue and damage Serbian forces but don't advance much further than Belgrade, which turns out better for them, as the more villages they occupy would only increase their own soon to increase typhus caseload.

The Serbs sue for peace, trying to exit the war with a white peace, status quo ante bellum. The Austrians insist on their own occupation of Belgrade, a northern border strip of Serbia, coastal Montenegro, and Serbian territorial cessions to Bulgaria and Albania.

The Germans, eager to have Austrians forces back north reinforcing Galicia against the Russians, press for milder terms, and offer to let the Serbians "compensate" themselves by annexing Montenegro and northern Albania, and limiting territorial cessions in the south to Bulgaria, and territorial cessions in the north to Austrian occupation of Belgrade's fortifications 'for the duration'.

Serbia signs and drops out of the war in December 1914, and territory changes hands. Austria-Hungary, while sore at not quite sufficiently punishing Serbia, has cleaned up its southern front and can focus on Russia as it moves into the new year. Italian opportunists looking for signs of Austrian crumbling and opportunities to jump an overwhelmed Austria are discouraged for the moment. So are Romanian opportunists. Meanwhile, Italy is pissed off with Serbia's move into northern Albania, and moves to counter it by sending troops of its own to occupy southern Albania, where the situation may get tense along the border with Greek troops.

The Russians, although driven back in the summer with heavy losses from East Prussia, can still feel they are mastering the Austrians in Galicia having seized much terrain, many fortresses, and besieging Przemysl. Nevertheless, the Russian Tsar, Ministers, diplomats, officer corps and elites are quite outraged that little Serbia, who they risked all to champion, has quit the common cause, and indeed betrayed Montenegro. And those Bulgarians, who took Macedonia in the devil's bargain are no better. So the Russians are left feeling quite cynical about the Balkans in general and "Slavism".

How do things go in the war from 1915 on, without a Serbia front, with a fat, happy Bulgaria that is neutral, but with a pro-CP leaning, thus leading to no Salonika front, and an Italy that will take more convincing to fight Austria and in a bit of a stand-off with Greece and Serbia over Albania?

Is Gallipolli as likely to be attempted in this environment?
 
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Not-red pants were being fiercely debated in France - and I believe the pantalon rouge were to be phased out starting in ... 1915.
The French leadership knew that bright red pants on a modern battlefield was a very bad combination and were working to change things. They didn't have enough time and Germany was where the dye for the preferred not-red pants colour they wanted was produced.

The British had already figured out that dressing officers in scarlet uniforms was dumb on a battlefield where rifles used smokeless gunpowder. And switched to khaki.

Why khaki when their own exercises had shown that the dingy maroon the grunts red uniforms faded to over time actually provided better camouflage?

That's the colour everyone's uniform partway through a campaign in India where you don't have time to wash clothes will eventually wind up being so they effectively said "that'll do" and called it a day.
 

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