AHC – France sustains its post-Versailles security order for 44 years

[raharris1973]

So the requirement for this challenge is for France to sustain the security order over western and central Europe it imposed at Versailles 1919, including multiple alliances and ententes it established in the few years after, without a collapse or fatal breach of the system until at least 1963.

Why 44 years? Because I’m making an analogy with another European country that was faced with a massive and terrifying German invasion, was forced to retreat so much the fate of its capital was in doubt, made enormous sacrifices and suffered great human losses, but rallied its own people and own industrial powers, and with significant support from its allies, turned the tide and beat back the Germans, until the Germans couldn’t take it anymore. Subsequently that European power occupied part of Germany, charged it reparations, and made a set of alliances to contain the possibility of a resurgent German threat.

That country of course was the Soviet Union, it’s security system, practically in existence from 1945, but only formally codified in 1955, was the Warsaw Pact, and its system did the containment job without irreparable breach for 44 years, until 1989.

It was a finite amount of time, but it was more than a generation, and more than twice as long as the French-backed post-Versailles alliance system which lasted, generously 19 years (Versailles to Munich), or less generously 17 (Versailles to Rhineland).

Oh, and one more requirement -like the USSR, the France of this challenge needs to be the leader of its own block, unable to appeal to greater or richer powers like Britain or America, who remain aloof at best, for back-up or subsidization.

I submit – A devastated USSR found a way. France could have found a way too.

 

[Buba]

Easy - Paris has to react strongly to the remilitarisation of the Rheinland, not caring for what London thinks (which secretly was happy that it finally was getting a counterweight to French domination of the Continent). Hitler falls. Or the next time he suggests such a wild ride the generals revolt.
This probably requires not shortening military service to 12 months in the late '20s.
Also - a clearly anti USSR stance instead of treating Poland, Czechia, Romania etc. as surrogate mini-Russia's.

Probably also a more bully boy attitude - called being pro-active in polite company/for public consumption - towards its satellites.
E.g. when Piłsudski and his bunch siezed power in Poland in 1926 it ushered in a group of self deluded cretins who believed in Poland being an independent player on the international stage, a regional Power. France could/should had meddled to keep/bring a more realistic i.e. pro-French bunch in power.

 

[stevep]

So the requirement for this challenge is for France to sustain the security order over western and central Europe it imposed at Versailles 1919, including multiple alliances and ententes it established in the few years after, without a collapse or fatal breach of the system until at least 1963.

Why 44 years? Because I’m making an analogy with another European country that was faced with a massive and terrifying German invasion, was forced to retreat so much the fate of its capital was in doubt, made enormous sacrifices and suffered great human losses, but rallied its own people and own industrial powers, and with significant support from its allies, turn the tide and beat back the Germans, until the Germans couldn’t take it anymore. Subsequently that European power occupied part of Germany, charged it reparations, and made a set of alliances to contain the possibility of a resurgent German threat.

That country of course was the Soviet Union, it’s security system, practically in existence from 1945, but only formally codified in 1955, was the Warsaw Pact, and its system did the containment job without irreparable breach for 44 years, until 1989.

It was a finite amount of time, but it was more than a generation, , and more than twice as long as the French-backed post-Versailles alliance system which lasted, generously 19 years (Versailles to Munich), or less generously 17 (Versailles to Rhineland

Oh, and one more requirement -like the USSR, the France of this challenge needs to be the leader of its own block, unable to appeal to greater or richer powers like Britain or America, who remain aloof at best, for back-up or subsidization.

I submit – A devastated USSR found a way. France could have found a way too.

I don't think France on its own has that ability and resources after 1914 and especially not after 1919. Especially since other powers including both the US and UK will intervene if it looks like France is getting that level of economic/political dominance. Even if it managed to include say Belgium, the Netherlands and possibly a Rhineland state in their sphere of influence I can't see them having the resources to do what you suggest.

As Buba says it could have done better by responding to Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland, which would probably have maintained some level of security for at least a decade or two but it followed the British lead in part because it felt too weak to stand alone.

Also of course the USSR was both a much large and more powerful state than France has been since at least ~1812-14 and a totalitarian dictatorship. The latter causing serious problems, which eventually brought the state down but in the shorter term can help considerably in maintain commitment for foreign 'adventures' and also suppressing internal dissent of the governments actions.

 

[ATP]

So the requirement for this challenge is for France to sustain the security order over western and central Europe it imposed at Versailles 1919, including multiple alliances and ententes it established in the few years after, without a collapse or fatal breach of the system until at least 1963.

Why 44 years? Because I’m making an analogy with another European country that was faced with a massive and terrifying German invasion, was forced to retreat so much the fate of its capital was in doubt, made enormous sacrifices and suffered great human losses, but rallied its own people and own industrial powers, and with significant support from its allies, turn the tide and beat back the Germans, until the Germans couldn’t take it anymore. Subsequently that European power occupied part of Germany, charged it reparations, and made a set of alliances to contain the possibility of a resurgent German threat.

That country of course was the Soviet Union, it’s security system, practically in existence from 1945, but only formally codified in 1955, was the Warsaw Pact, and its system did the containment job without irreparable breach for 44 years, until 1989.

It was a finite amount of time, but it was more than a generation, , and more than twice as long as the French-backed post-Versailles alliance system which lasted, generously 19 years (Versailles to Munich), or less generously 17 (Versailles to Rhineland

Oh, and one more requirement -like the USSR, the France of this challenge needs to be the leader of its own block, unable to appeal to greater or richer powers like Britain or America, who remain aloof at best, for back-up or subsidization.

I submit – A devastated USSR found a way. France could have found a way too.

As @Buba said - attack in 1936,but just after that made Bavaria and Saxony free again,made Rhineland independent state.And occupy only Prussia with african ,czech and polish soldiers till they pay all Germany debt.
Till 1963 they should be still occupied.

After that - made strong anti-soviet alliance with Poland,Romania and Japan.Sralin would not try anything,and without WW 2 gains soviets would fall before 1963 - it lasted only thanks to american help.

Then we would have Cold war USA vs England vs France.With Japan as ally against soviets,but not England.

 

[raharris1973]

I don't think France on its own has that ability and resources after 1914 and especially not after 1919. Especially since other powers including both the US and UK will intervene if it looks like France is getting that level of economic/political dominance. Even if it managed to include say Belgium, the Netherlands and possibly a Rhineland state in their sphere of influence I can't see them having the resources to do what you suggest.

As Buba says it could have done better by responding to Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland, which would probably have maintained some level of security for at least a decade or two but it followed the British lead in part because it felt too weak to stand alone.

Also of course the USSR was both a much large and more powerful state than France has been since at least ~1812-14 and a totalitarian dictatorship. The latter causing serious problems, which eventually brought the state down but in the shorter term can help considerably in maintain commitment for foreign 'adventures' and also suppressing internal dissent of the governments actions.

this brings up the question of France’s advantages and disadvantages compared to Soviet Russia:

disadvantage- smaller home territory and population

...but more skilled and educated home population, and a very large colonial territory and population

Disadvantage- internal partisan divisions and class divisions, ability of politicians to vote against tax and conscription burdens, intertwine meant of military doctrine debates with left-right debates....

but plans could be improved by discussion and debate, not stifled by fear.

disadvantage - debt, whereas Soviet Russia repudiated its debt
... on the other hand Russia had to respect new, post revolutionary debts and establish new creditworthiness. France had it.

advantage- a market economy

advantage- not a pariah state

advantage- a working, adequate, self-sufficient agricultural sector

advantage- world class designs for ground and air weapons and land tactics

advantage- natural allies with other territorial “gainers” and “successor states” of Versailles treaty.

 

[Buba]

No Locarno Treaty - or a DIFFERENT Locarno Treaty - would be a good foundation to assert itself versus Germany and to send good vibes to the French Attack Dog Block
In Poland Locrano was/is perceived as being sold down the river by France and UK. I'm talking about the different treatment given to Germany's western and eastern borders ...

 

[stevep]

this brings up the question of France’s advantages and disadvantages compared to Soviet Russia:

disadvantage- smaller home territory and population

...but more skilled and educated home population, and a very large colonial territory and population

Disadvantage- internal partisan divisions and class divisions, ability of politicians to vote against tax and conscription burdens, intertwine meant of military doctrine debates with left-right debates....

but plans could be improved by discussion and debate, not stifled by fear.

disadvantage - debt, whereas Soviet Russia repudiated its debt
... on the other hand Russia had to respect new, post revolutionary debts and establish new creditworthiness. France had it.

advantage- a market economy

advantage- not a pariah state

advantage- a working, adequate, self-sufficient agricultural sector

advantage- world class designs for ground and air weapons and land tactics

advantage- natural allies with other territorial “gainers” and “successor states” of Versailles treaty.

You raise some valid points but unless Germany can be divided internally in some way not too hostile to the bulk of the population I think by 1919 its too big and powerful to be kept subordinate to France while attempts to do such will incite opposition in London and Washington as well as Berlin.

There are possible allies in the east but the Poles and Romanians aren't really great or developed powers at this point and Poland especially had border clashes with too many neighbours as well as internal problems if it had anything like its OTL success in the war with the Soviets. Romania also has disputes with both Hungary and Bulgaria as 1940 showed. Belgium and the Czechs are probably more reliable allies but also fairly small if economically developed powers. Italy is also unlikely to be willing to pay 2nd fiddle to Paris so will be a rogue player while the Balkans are likely to be a chaotic mess.

Also large colonial empires have costs as well as benefits. You can get some bases and troops in wartime but their a burden to govern, especially in relatively poor and undeveloped regions which covers a hell of a lot of the French empire. Also, possibly especially with the French attitude to empire, seeking to make Frenchmen of all their colonial subjects, independence movements are going to develop. Which could come later or earlier if we avoid WWII.

Possibly if Britain bites the bullet after the failure to get a triple alliance and accepts that a deal with France is better than seeking what turned out to be the chimerical of one with the US? The two come to clear agreements on common interests and on supporting each other. As such France and possibly a strong-armed Italy doesn't oppose British support for the Greeks in their war with the Turks and Britain supports French moves to ensure Germany keeps more to the terms of the Versialles treaty. Although this is likely to lead to the London-Paris bloc coming into political and probably economic conflict with the US and they can't really afford this in the 1920's.

 

[sillygoose]

So the requirement for this challenge is for France to sustain the security order over western and central Europe it imposed at Versailles 1919, including multiple alliances and ententes it established in the few years after, without a collapse or fatal breach of the system until at least 1963.

Impossible given the French population and foreign policy being at odds with Britain and the US. The only way to make it work is if they instigate the EU before Stresseman dies:

Aristide Briand - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

As foreign minister Briand formulated an original proposal for a new economic union of Europe.[36] Described as Briand's Locarno diplomacy and as an aspect of Franco-German rapprochement, it was his answer to Germany's quick economic recovery and future political power. Briand made his proposals in a speech in favor of a European Union in the League of Nations on 5 September 1929, and in 1930, in his "Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Federal Union" for the Government of France.[37]

The idea was to provide a framework to contain France's former enemy while preserving as much of the 1919 Versailles settlement as possible. The Briand plan entailed the economic collaboration of the great industrial areas of Europe and the provision of political security to Eastern Europe against Soviet threats. The basis was economic cooperation, but his fundamental concept was political, for it was political power that would determine economic choices. The plan, under the Memorandum on the Organization of a System of European Federal Union, was in the end presented as a French initiative to the League of Nations. With the death of his principal supporter, German foreign minister Gustav Stresemann, and the onset of the Great Depression in 1929, Briand's plan was never adopted but it suggested an economic framework for developments after World War II that eventually resulted in the European Union.[38]

In evaluating his internationalism, historian Douglas Houston concludes:
Briand's internationalism is easy to deride; nothing he achieved was durable, and his aim seemed no more than old-fashioned security fired by a personal ambition he made little effort to hide. Yet no one worked harder or more imaginatively to give the new international system life. His internationalism sprang from the realization that France could not be secure until everyone else was. He may have embraced principle for reasons of Realpolitik, but there is little doubt that he became convinced of the justice of his cause.[39]

The only framework for French security involved rapprochement with Germany that tied her and the rest of Europe to a unified political and economic system that ensured all their prosperity, which the modern EU is based on.

Easy - Paris has to react strongly to the remilitarisation of the Rheinland, not caring for what London thinks (which secretly was happy that it finally was getting a counterweight to French domination of the Continent). Hitler falls. Or the next time he suggests such a wild ride the generals revolt.

Economically the French couldn't, which Hitler had intel on and why he acted. They were fiscally insolvent and this directly led to them leaving the gold standard so they could liquidate their excessive stockpiles and fund rearmament.
In fact had they not hoarded gold in the interwar they'd have been in a much better economic situation and could have maintained decent military spending as well as helped avoid the Great Depression.

Remilitarization of the Rhineland - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

At the same time, in late 1935 to early 1936 France was gripped by a financial crisis, with the French Treasury informing the government that sufficient cash reserves to maintain the value of the franc as currently pegged by the gold standard in regard to the US dollar and the British pound no longer existed, and only a huge foreign loan on the money markets of London and New York could prevent the value of the franc from experiencing a disastrous downfall.[131] Because France was on the verge of elections scheduled for the spring of 1936, devaluation of the franc, which was viewed as abhorrent by large sections of French public opinion, was rejected by the caretaker government of Prime Minister Albert Sarraut as politically unacceptable.[131] Investors' fears of a war with Germany were not conducive to raising the necessary loans to stabilize the franc, and the German remilitarization of the Rhineland, by sparking fears of war, worsened the French economic crisis by causing a massive cash flow out of France, with worried investors shifting their savings towards what were felt to be safer foreign markets.[132] The fact that France had defaulted on its World War I debts in 1932 understandably led most investors to conclude that the same would occur if France was involved in another war with Germany,. On March 18, 1936, Wilfrid Baumgartner, the director of the Mouvement général des fonds (the French equivalent of a permanent under-secretary) reported to the government that France, for all intents and purposes, was bankrupt.[133] Only by desperate arm-twisting from the major French financial institutions could Baumgartner manage to obtain enough in the way of short-term loans to prevent France from defaulting on its debts and to keeping the value of the franc from sliding too far, in March 1936.[133] Given the financial crisis, the French government feared that there were insufficient funds to cover the costs of mobilization and that a full-blown war scare caused by mobilization would only exacerbate the financial crisis.[133] The American historian Zach Shore wrote, "It was not lack of French will to fight in 1936 which permitted Hitler's coup, but rather France's lack of funds, military might, and therefore operational plans to counter German remilitarization".[134]

Arguably they could have simply accepted inflation and printed money to finance everything, but as the above pointed out that was political suicide before an election. Especially without Britain helping and France having to go it alone against Germany.

 

[ATP]

You raise some valid points but unless Germany can be divided internally in some way not too hostile to the bulk of the population I think by 1919 its too big and powerful to be kept subordinate to France while attempts to do such will incite opposition in London and Washington as well as Berlin.

There are possible allies in the east but the Poles and Romanians aren't really great or developed powers at this point and Poland especially had border clashes with too many neighbours as well as internal problems if it had anything like its OTL success in the war with the Soviets. Romania also has disputes with both Hungary and Bulgaria as 1940 showed. Belgium and the Czechs are probably more reliable allies but also fairly small if economically developed powers. Italy is also unlikely to be willing to pay 2nd fiddle to Paris so will be a rogue player while the Balkans are likely to be a chaotic mess.

Also large colonial empires have costs as well as benefits. You can get some bases and troops in wartime but their a burden to govern, especially in relatively poor and undeveloped regions which covers a hell of a lot of the French empire. Also, possibly especially with the French attitude to empire, seeking to make Frenchmen of all their colonial subjects, independence movements are going to develop. Which could come later or earlier if we avoid WWII.

Possibly if Britain bites the bullet after the failure to get a triple alliance and accepts that a deal with France is better than seeking what turned out to be the chimerical of one with the US? The two come to clear agreements on common interests and on supporting each other. As such France and possibly a strong-armed Italy doesn't oppose British support for the Greeks in their war with the Turks and Britain supports French moves to ensure Germany keeps more to the terms of the Versialles treaty. Although this is likely to lead to the London-Paris bloc coming into political and probably economic conflict with the US and they can't really afford this in the 1920's.

1.Bavarians wonted independence,and other german countries would follow.So,strong germany are no longer a factor.
2.Allies - Poland till 1926 putch was good ally,but after Piłsudzki death in 1935 ruling junta behaved as if we were superpower.No help there.But Romania,Czech,Yugoslavia - all would be good client states.
3.Then France,Italy and England need Japan as ally.Together they could block USA.Problem is - it would be no french Europe.

 

[sillygoose]

1.Bavarians wonted independence,and other german countries would follow.So,strong germany are no longer a factor.
2.Allies - Poland till 1926 putch was good ally,but after Liłsudzki death in 1935 ruling junta behaved as if we were superpower.No help there.But Romania,Czech,Yugoslavia - all would be good client states.
3.Then France,Italy and England need Japan as ally.Together they could block USA.Problem is - it would be no french Europe.

The Bavarians did not. The Communists in Bavaria wanted independence, since it would solidify their power, and Allied recognition, but the Allies had no interest in dealing with Communists.

 

[ATP]

The Bavarians did not. The Communists in Bavaria wanted independence, since it would solidify their power, and Allied recognition, but the Allies had no interest in dealing with Communists.

Other Bavarians wonted it,too.Unfortunatelly,England wonted united Germany to counter France.Which they get.

 

[sillygoose]

Other Bavarians wonted it,too.

Nowhere near a majority. Even the Austrians wanted to join Germany at the end of the war, but were denied by the Allies.

 

[ATP]

Nowhere near a majority. Even the Austrians wanted to join Germany at the end of the war, but were denied by the Allies.

Which would change after Hitler would lost in 1936.His plans for french intervention was commit suicide and let generals think what next.
When France would ask Bavarians - and other germans from formely independent states - what they prefer,occupation like prussia till they pay for WW1,and independent state allied with France,what would they choose ?
From their perspective,it would be second time prussian lead them to lost war.

 

[raharris1973]

No Locarno Treaty - or a DIFFERENT Locarno Treaty - would be a good foundation to assert itself versus Germany and to send good vibes to the French Attack Dog Block
In Poland Locrano was/is perceived as being sold down the river by France and UK. I'm talking about the different treatment given to Germany's western and eastern borders ...

This is a really good point. To keep its security structure intact, France can't sign a pact like OTL Locarno that guarantees the borders of Western Europe but leaves Germany's eastern borders open-ended. France needs to stay firm that the security of Europe is indivisible, east and west.

Also - a clearly anti USSR stance instead of treating Poland, Czechia, Romania etc. as surrogate mini-Russia's.

How does a clearly anti-USSR stance help. And how does it differ from treating the others like "surrogate mini-Russia's. I mean it's not that nice (to the Russians) to find substitutes for them, but that's what Paris did.

After that - made strong anti-soviet alliance with Poland,Romania and Japan.

How is that especially helping France, when Germany turned out to be its big problem, indeed its big conqueror

Probably also a more bully boy attitude - called being pro-active in polite company/for public consumption - towards its satellites.
E.g. when Piłsudski and his bunch siezed power in Poland in 1926 it ushered in a group of self deluded cretins who believed in Poland being an independent player on the international stage, a regional Power. France could/should had meddled to keep/bring a more realistic i.e. pro-French bunch in power.

Ah, so you're suggesting it would have been more healthy for Paris to give Warsaw more reminders, like "Without us, you are nothing but breakfast lunch and dinner for the Germans and Soviets, or maybe even just one all-day feast! Get with our program dammit, stop farting around with the Czechs and Lithuanians"

Did the French really have the finesse/influence to bring more pro-French people into power? Who would they have been? Dmowski? And would they have really been more realistic or successful?

3.Then France,Italy and England need Japan as ally.Together they could block USA.

Why is all this blocking of the USA necessary? What is the USA in its pre-WWII form and pre-WWII habits, trying to do around the world that is such a threat to everybody?

Sralin would not try anything,and without WW 2 gains soviets would fall before 1963 - it lasted only thanks to american help.

Sounds like a pretty unique perspective. Getting more territory to the west after WWII just about replaced the population lost in WWII, and the Soviets got wider influence in Europe. But I've never heard it suggested they'd be anything other than better off without all the losses from getting invaded in WWII.

 

[raharris1973]

Possibly if Britain bites the bullet after the failure to get a triple alliance [you mean the proposed Anglo-Franco-US pact/guarantee] and accepts that a deal with France is better than seeking what turned out to be the chimerical of one with the US? The two come to clear agreements on common interests and on supporting each other. As such France and possibly a strong-armed Italy doesn't oppose British support for the Greeks in their war with the Turks and Britain supports French moves to ensure Germany keeps more to the terms of the Versialles treaty.

This does not sound like the French have to give up much. Was their OTL policy (and Italy's) so much obstructionist/opposition to Loyd George's pro-Greek moves as it was, "we didn't sign up for this, we're not involved".

If the French just need to say the right things to the Brits and Greeks and not have meetings with Kemal, an in return they get support on German issues, I'm sure the French would go for it.

But would the British be up for making such a Machiavellian trade? (If the British wanted to be really Machiavellian, maybe they should have told the French, hey, we'll support you on German and European issues if we get your Syrian mandate). Or were the British just going to do their, inactive and dovish thing on Germany for their domestic and strategic reasons of not wanting to exert the effort and not wanting to ruin Germany economically?

Since we're bringing things back to almost Versailles itself, and I personally suspect that France was always going to find the Anglo powers unreliable because of their domestic mood swings, was their anything the French could have done at Versailles to butter up the Italians to satisfy them and keep them a reliable ally, partnered with France's continental security system for the interwar?

After all, it seems gratuitous that France ever supported any Yugoslav claims against Italian claims, at least on realpolitik grounds. Seems to make more sense to give Italy whatever it wants for friendship, and if the Yugoslavs complain, say, "Dude, shut up, you started the war, you were occupied a year ago, and you just got a country more than double it's original size"

Although this is likely to lead to the London-Paris bloc coming into political and probably economic conflict with the US and they can't really afford this in the 1920's.

But is the US showing any sign of politicizing or militarizing any disagreements? I don't see what their motivation would be. The Americans couldn't/wouldn't rouse themselves to keep their own boot on Germany in OTL, but would they be any more ready to energetically kick Anglo-French boots *off* of Germany?

I

 

[Buba]

How does a clearly anti-USSR stance help. And how does it differ from treating the others like "surrogate mini-Russia's. I mean it's not that nice (to the Russians) to find substitutes for them, but that's what Paris did.

The clearly anti-Soviet stance helps in similar way as no Locarno. Sends a message of unwavering support.
True that the newly emerged Central European countries are surrogate mini-Russias, but they need to be reassured that Paris will not drop them for the Soviet monsters at first opportunity.

Around Munich - Soviets offering to come to Czechosloviakia's aid, through Poland (the shortest route is through Romania, BTW), and France not telling Staling to fuck off, but sounding out Warsaw what does it think about such an idea. Really?

Yes, some more banging of heads of Central Europeans is called for.

Did the French really have the finesse/influence to bring more pro-French people into power? Who would they have been? Dmowski? And would they have really been more realistic or successful?

The bunch overthrown by Piłsudski were the pro-French gang. Throwing in the towel to the putschits so quickly does cast doubts on their competence. Sikorski, for instance, was an incompetent twit writ large ...
Keeping the pre-1926 ruling group in power is not likely to improve competence in the short term, here the gain for France being their reliably pro-French stance.

 

[stevep]

This does not sound like the French have to give up much. Was their OTL policy (and Italy's) so much obstructionist/opposition to Loyd George's pro-Greek moves as it was, "we didn't sign up for this, we're not involved".

If the French just need to say the right things to the Brits and Greeks and not have meetings with Kemal, an in return they get support on German issues, I'm sure the French would go for it.

But would the British be up for making such a Machiavellian trade? (If the British wanted to be really Machiavellian, maybe they should have told the French, hey, we'll support you on German and European issues if we get your Syrian mandate). Or were the British just going to do their, inactive and dovish thing on Germany for their domestic and strategic reasons of not wanting to exert the effort and not wanting to ruin Germany economically?

Since we're bringing things back to almost Versailles itself, and I personally suspect that France was always going to find the Anglo powers unreliable because of their domestic mood swings, was their anything the French could have done at Versailles to butter up the Italians to satisfy them and keep them a reliable ally, partnered with France's continental security system for the interwar?

After all, it seems gratuitous that France ever supported any Yugoslav claims against Italian claims, at least on realpolitik grounds. Seems to make more sense to give Italy whatever it wants for friendship, and if the Yugoslavs complain, say, "Dude, shut up, you started the war, you were occupied a year ago, and you just got a country more than double it's original size"

As I understood it France not only had meetings with the Turks but supplied them with arms for their fight against the Greeks. Not as much as the Soviets did but there was stupid acts of mistrust on all sides in this period. It wasn't that they simply refused political, let alone military support for the final stages of trying to keep the straits out of Turkish hands.

With Italy in part their demands were rather extreme but also they clashed with Greek as well as Yugoslav territories agreed at Versailles, which may would not have been easy to change. Especially with Wilson's commitment to borders matching national identities.

But is the US showing any sign of politicizing or militarizing any disagreements? I don't see what their motivation would be. The Americans couldn't/wouldn't rouse themselves to keep their own boot on Germany in OTL, but would they be any more ready to energetically kick Anglo-French boots *off* of Germany?

They did a lot OTL to try and prevent reparations from Germany to the allies while continuing to demand debt payments themselves. This included according to Tooze in his "The Deluge" a number of cases where they sought to block agreements, including between France and Germany because it might give the powers involved a better chance of managing their own debt issues.

True I have found a number of factual errors in the book, like early on he mentions Bulgaria joining WWI in 1914 [Oct 1915 actually] and a couple of times where he makes statements which sounded odd and with no references or notes for those statements. There's one right near the end when he criticises FDR for ignoring warnings from the New York Stock Exchange on the day he came to power. Checking that date was the day before he was actually inaugurated and the leader of the stock exchange took action that night - according to Tooze - so Rooseverlt had no chance to actually influence this.

 

[ATP]

This is a really good point. To keep its security structure intact, France can't sign a pact like OTL Locarno that guarantees the borders of Western Europe but leaves Germany's eastern borders open-ended. France needs to stay firm that the security of Europe is indivisible, east and west.



How does a clearly anti-USSR stance help. And how does it differ from treating the others like "surrogate mini-Russia's. I mean it's not that nice (to the Russians) to find substitutes for them, but that's what Paris did.



How is that especially helping France, when Germany turned out to be its big problem, indeed its big conqueror



Ah, so you're suggesting it would have been more healthy for Paris to give Warsaw more reminders, like "Without us, you are nothing but breakfast lunch and dinner for the Germans and Soviets, or maybe even just one all-day feast! Get with our program dammit, stop farting around with the Czechs and Lithuanians"

Did the French really have the finesse/influence to bring more pro-French people into power? Who would they have been? Dmowski? And would they have really been more realistic or successful?



Why is all this blocking of the USA necessary? What is the USA in its pre-WWII form and pre-WWII habits, trying to do around the world that is such a threat to everybody?



Sounds like a pretty unique perspective. Getting more territory to the west after WWII just about replaced the population lost in WWII, and the Soviets got wider influence in Europe. But I've never heard it suggested they'd be anything other than better off without all the losses from getting invaded in WWII.

1.Made anti-soviet block after destroing Germany in 1936.Without that,sralin would attack.Soviets always attacked those who they perceived as weak or divided.So,to be sfe,France need to be superpower with lots of cannon fodder allies.

2.Like @Buba said,after 1926 we were ruled bu idiots beliving that they are superpower.So,after crushing Germany just made putch in Poland.In 1936 Piłsudzki was dead,and without successor.Instead 3 dudes fought for power.Use that to made putch and gave power to Dmowski.He considered putch in 1938 to help Czech,but decided against it becouse both soviets and Germany would attack,and France was pussyboys.
Now,with strong France crushing Germany,it would be easy.
Till 1926 Poland backed by his party usually did what France wonted,so it would be again.

3.In 1936 USA was arleady lead by FDR - who need war to help economy.Becouse USA economy was saved by succesful war,no New Deal.But with perspective of facing England,Japan and France,he would not start anything.

4.Soviets never cared about human losses,otherwise they would not kill millions of their own.And Sralin would get entire Europe,if France in OTL actually fought and keep Hitler busy till 1942.
But Sralin was cautious,so if France do not need war with him they need destroyed Germany,strong France and many allies.

 

[sillygoose]

3.In 1936 USA was arleady lead by FDR - who need war to help economy.Becouse USA economy was saved by succesful war,no New Deal.But with perspective of facing England,Japan and France,he would not start anything.

FDR only transitioned to confrontation in 1938 after the collapse of the economy after trying to balance the budget; only then did it become clear that the New Deal had failed to restart the economy and that is when he turned to military build up and confrontation to prop up the economy. Of course coupled with that was German trade competition, which was getting pretty serious by 1938; they had cut their imports from the US by 50% and dramatically increased their exports to areas the US considered their backyard in Latin America. On top of that China was being cut off from trade by Japan, so US exporters were freaking out.

So the New Deal would be attempted, but by 1938 he'd turn toward military buildup when it was clear that politically it was not possible to spend enough to really help the economy; plus prior to 1938 and the advance of the Axis powers politically war mongering was not popular in the US and even after 1938 it took a massive effort to get the US out of isolationism, including years of illegal efforts.

 

[raharris1973]

No Locarno Treaty - or a DIFFERENT Locarno Treaty - would be a good foundation to assert itself versus Germany and to send good vibes to the French Attack Dog Block
In Poland Locrano was/is perceived as being sold down the river by France and UK. I'm talking about the different treatment given to Germany's western and eastern borders ...

If France wasn't going to do this and hold firm to it's 'contain Germany on all sides approach' and go ahead with Locarno....

...it needed to go all in on the alternative Briand-esque approach of the proto-EU that sillygoose mentioned:

The only framework for French security involved rapprochement with Germany that tied her and the rest of Europe to a unified political and economic system that ensured all their prosperity, which the modern EU is based on.

....and if counting on rapprochement with Germany, not eastern alliances, then the French financial intervention to thwart the Austro-German customs union of 1929 made no sense.

Possibly, had the French left well enough alone, Europe's slide into the Depression wouldn't have been as fast and as bad, and if Austro-Germans customs union led to early political union, this might have strengthened the vote and political weight Catholic Centrists (and Bruning) in Germany against far right groups like Hindenburg and the Nazis.

But that's all a digression from the topic.