raharris1973
Well-known member
Interpretation of Sean McMeekin’s Russian Origins of WWI
-Good points –
· This book, and the same author’s ‘July 1914’ provide good data points on how the Russians were playing with fire and following an aggressive policy with their secret mobilization.
· He brings home the interesting and original point also that the impending Ottoman dreadnought deliveries were projected to give the Ottomans a naval advantage on the Black Sea for two years, so that presented the Russians with a short-term ‘window of opportunity’ closing, similar to what the Germans perceived they had.
· He points out that Russia was in the most advantageous position to pursue the straits with the Triple Entente in place and Britain and France on side. I would concede this is true, but would argue that was not unique to 1914, but applied to multiple earlier years also.
· He astutely observes that the way intra-Entente military planning worked out, Russia was able to guarantee itself Entente support (first France, then Britain) over a matter which was a perceived Russian interest, Serbia’s fate in the Balkans. Furthermore, military plans were such, that the enemy first blows fell on Russia’s allies and neutrals: Serbia, France, and Belgium, instead of Russia herself, and Russia got to bring the war to its German and Austro-Hungarian enemy’s territories with its homeland untouched the first year.
· He observes correctly that once the war started, the dreadnought delivery to the Ottomans stopped.
· He observes correctly that once the Ottomans joined the war, Russia got specific agreements it had never gotten before from its alliance partners, about partitioning the Ottoman Empire, with the Straits and Ottoman Armenia falling into Russian hands.
· Additionally, despite Russia being the ultimate territorial beneficiary per intra-Entente agreements, the western Allies actually attempted the military labor of seizing the straits.
The first point noted is a useful balance or accompanying context to German-centric examinations of the origins of the war. The last four points, provide a novel counter to the idea that Russians expressed late in the war that they were dutifully and unrewardingly sacrificing themselves and their way of life (first the Tsarist regime, and then the Provisional Government) to continue the war on behalf of their western allies. Well, that might have been how it worked out, but when the war started, it was most definitely, the other way around, the western allies jumping in front the Central Powers bullet, on behalf of Russian agendas and Russian prestige.
· McMeekin also provides several interesting datapoints about the superior morale, and superior performance, or Russian ground troops on the Ottoman Caucasus front compared to the European fronts, although this better performance has been noted elsewhere, for example in David Fromkin’s “a peace to end all peace”
-Stretched points—
At the same time, historical reality, and Russian choices during the war, just often failed to line-up with the central emphasis McMeekin places on the straits as the be-all, end-all motivating Russian policy during the war.
· Russian failure to actually directly assault the straits during the three years Russia was at war is pretty notable. Sure there may have been hard tactical and operational obstacles, but if it was *the* primary goal, you’d think the Russians would find a way.
· Russia didn’t declare war on or attack the Ottomans at the outset of the war, it waited for the Ottomans to attack and declare war three months after general hostilities. It also didn’t have an anti-Ottoman offensive prepared along the common border along the common border, which you would expect if they were planning an imminent war of aggression.
· Russia’s passive support or tolerance for western allies Gallipolli operation can be read two ways. McMeekin chooses to read it as the Russians cleverly getting the west to do the Russians work for them. This would be true, if they keep their promises, but it also posed a risk to the very same straits for Russia agenda, by allowing western forces to get into a physical position to deny the straits to Russia.
· Obviously, since there was a war in Europe, and Russia depended on support from western allies, Russia needed to take prompt effort and always make a sufficient effort to keep Germany and Austria-Hungary tied down to avoid the defeat of France. But Russia still didn’t go as far as it might have to give its war a “southern accent” to put the straits in its reach by allocating more of its forces against the Ottomans and Bulgarians to blast a way to the straits, at the expense of some of their offensive efforts or forward defenses in the Poland/Belarus/Ukraine area.
· Despite the advantages in bringing down any of Germany’s southern allies, the Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, and most importantly the Ottomans, the Russians discouraged and ultimately delayed the entry into the war of allies who could help in their defeat, notably the Italians, Romanians, and Greeks. I think that foot-dragging weakens the case for the Russian straits-centric approach, and it certain should lower our estimation of the Russians’ strategic realism and judgment.
-Good points –
· This book, and the same author’s ‘July 1914’ provide good data points on how the Russians were playing with fire and following an aggressive policy with their secret mobilization.
· He brings home the interesting and original point also that the impending Ottoman dreadnought deliveries were projected to give the Ottomans a naval advantage on the Black Sea for two years, so that presented the Russians with a short-term ‘window of opportunity’ closing, similar to what the Germans perceived they had.
· He points out that Russia was in the most advantageous position to pursue the straits with the Triple Entente in place and Britain and France on side. I would concede this is true, but would argue that was not unique to 1914, but applied to multiple earlier years also.
· He astutely observes that the way intra-Entente military planning worked out, Russia was able to guarantee itself Entente support (first France, then Britain) over a matter which was a perceived Russian interest, Serbia’s fate in the Balkans. Furthermore, military plans were such, that the enemy first blows fell on Russia’s allies and neutrals: Serbia, France, and Belgium, instead of Russia herself, and Russia got to bring the war to its German and Austro-Hungarian enemy’s territories with its homeland untouched the first year.
· He observes correctly that once the war started, the dreadnought delivery to the Ottomans stopped.
· He observes correctly that once the Ottomans joined the war, Russia got specific agreements it had never gotten before from its alliance partners, about partitioning the Ottoman Empire, with the Straits and Ottoman Armenia falling into Russian hands.
· Additionally, despite Russia being the ultimate territorial beneficiary per intra-Entente agreements, the western Allies actually attempted the military labor of seizing the straits.
The first point noted is a useful balance or accompanying context to German-centric examinations of the origins of the war. The last four points, provide a novel counter to the idea that Russians expressed late in the war that they were dutifully and unrewardingly sacrificing themselves and their way of life (first the Tsarist regime, and then the Provisional Government) to continue the war on behalf of their western allies. Well, that might have been how it worked out, but when the war started, it was most definitely, the other way around, the western allies jumping in front the Central Powers bullet, on behalf of Russian agendas and Russian prestige.
· McMeekin also provides several interesting datapoints about the superior morale, and superior performance, or Russian ground troops on the Ottoman Caucasus front compared to the European fronts, although this better performance has been noted elsewhere, for example in David Fromkin’s “a peace to end all peace”
-Stretched points—
At the same time, historical reality, and Russian choices during the war, just often failed to line-up with the central emphasis McMeekin places on the straits as the be-all, end-all motivating Russian policy during the war.
· Russian failure to actually directly assault the straits during the three years Russia was at war is pretty notable. Sure there may have been hard tactical and operational obstacles, but if it was *the* primary goal, you’d think the Russians would find a way.
· Russia didn’t declare war on or attack the Ottomans at the outset of the war, it waited for the Ottomans to attack and declare war three months after general hostilities. It also didn’t have an anti-Ottoman offensive prepared along the common border along the common border, which you would expect if they were planning an imminent war of aggression.
· Russia’s passive support or tolerance for western allies Gallipolli operation can be read two ways. McMeekin chooses to read it as the Russians cleverly getting the west to do the Russians work for them. This would be true, if they keep their promises, but it also posed a risk to the very same straits for Russia agenda, by allowing western forces to get into a physical position to deny the straits to Russia.
· Obviously, since there was a war in Europe, and Russia depended on support from western allies, Russia needed to take prompt effort and always make a sufficient effort to keep Germany and Austria-Hungary tied down to avoid the defeat of France. But Russia still didn’t go as far as it might have to give its war a “southern accent” to put the straits in its reach by allocating more of its forces against the Ottomans and Bulgarians to blast a way to the straits, at the expense of some of their offensive efforts or forward defenses in the Poland/Belarus/Ukraine area.
· Despite the advantages in bringing down any of Germany’s southern allies, the Austro-Hungarians, Bulgarians, and most importantly the Ottomans, the Russians discouraged and ultimately delayed the entry into the war of allies who could help in their defeat, notably the Italians, Romanians, and Greeks. I think that foot-dragging weakens the case for the Russian straits-centric approach, and it certain should lower our estimation of the Russians’ strategic realism and judgment.
