raharris1973
Well-known member
Could Japan have had its carrier decks and carrier wings up to their Nov 1941 levels by Nov '40 or Nov '39 with earlier plausible investments?
How far back would Japan had to have performed the designed work, allocated the steel, allocated the workers and engineers for the decks, the raw materials for the aircraft, the training programs for the airmen, sailors, and officers, etc.? I anticipate the correct answer would be measured in years, not mere months.
In terms of affording this from a finite labor pool, financial and agricultural resource base, the spot market for iron, coal, and steel internationally, accelerating or advancing the Kido Butai carrier force build up could well have required trade-offs. I imagine Japan's flexibility to do invest in the fleet bigger and earlier would have been greater in Japan had somehow avoided the China Incident turning into full-scale war with China in 1937, with major ongoing operational costs.
On the other hand, did the IJN learn any important carrier tactics or operations or naval aircraft performance lessons from the China War, 1937-41? And the ongoing Sino-Japanese War did justify higher taxes and national mobilization. However, it most certainly did not *pay for itself* in terms of loot or resources extracted from China.
If Japan had not engaged in even the Manchuria incident at the beginning of the decade, Army requirements for defense of the Manchukuo puppet state's long borders with the USSR would have been much less than OTL (the Soviet borders with Japanese Korea and mutual order on Sakhalin are rather short), and theoretically the IJN could have commanded even more resources for a faster fleet build-up. At the same time, since Chinese contestation of Japan's occupation of Manchuria was so weak and unsuccessful and Japan developed it so fast, Manchukuo may have "paid in" to the Japanese Empire in resources useful for the Navy than it cost. In any case, the Japanese Army's political strength and agenda drew it into Manchuria.
I am aware there is a certain irony if that the very thing that permits Japan to have its carrier striking force in the Kido Butai at its Nov 1941 capability earlier, is staying out of a full war in China, that lack of a full war in China, will probably remove most realistic circumstances that would lead to Japan *using* that fleet against the western powers. For example, lack of a full war in China would remove aggravation accumulating into an American/western decision to impose sanctions on Japan.
How far back would Japan had to have performed the designed work, allocated the steel, allocated the workers and engineers for the decks, the raw materials for the aircraft, the training programs for the airmen, sailors, and officers, etc.? I anticipate the correct answer would be measured in years, not mere months.
In terms of affording this from a finite labor pool, financial and agricultural resource base, the spot market for iron, coal, and steel internationally, accelerating or advancing the Kido Butai carrier force build up could well have required trade-offs. I imagine Japan's flexibility to do invest in the fleet bigger and earlier would have been greater in Japan had somehow avoided the China Incident turning into full-scale war with China in 1937, with major ongoing operational costs.
On the other hand, did the IJN learn any important carrier tactics or operations or naval aircraft performance lessons from the China War, 1937-41? And the ongoing Sino-Japanese War did justify higher taxes and national mobilization. However, it most certainly did not *pay for itself* in terms of loot or resources extracted from China.
If Japan had not engaged in even the Manchuria incident at the beginning of the decade, Army requirements for defense of the Manchukuo puppet state's long borders with the USSR would have been much less than OTL (the Soviet borders with Japanese Korea and mutual order on Sakhalin are rather short), and theoretically the IJN could have commanded even more resources for a faster fleet build-up. At the same time, since Chinese contestation of Japan's occupation of Manchuria was so weak and unsuccessful and Japan developed it so fast, Manchukuo may have "paid in" to the Japanese Empire in resources useful for the Navy than it cost. In any case, the Japanese Army's political strength and agenda drew it into Manchuria.
I am aware there is a certain irony if that the very thing that permits Japan to have its carrier striking force in the Kido Butai at its Nov 1941 capability earlier, is staying out of a full war in China, that lack of a full war in China, will probably remove most realistic circumstances that would lead to Japan *using* that fleet against the western powers. For example, lack of a full war in China would remove aggravation accumulating into an American/western decision to impose sanctions on Japan.
