raharris1973
Well-known member
Britain's course of action towards a continental war that starts in 1914 over the Sarajevo incident and July Crisis where Germany instead starts the war striking east instead of striking west is a perennial and constantly debated topic on this forum. Will Britain declare war on Germany anyway or not- we've all heard it and discussed it.
By contrast, France's course of action is far less discussed or debated. It's generally assumed the French declare war, attack into Alsace-Lorraine and keep at it. If any debate comes up, it's typically about whether the French will at some point try an end run through Belgium into Germany.
But I think it's worth discussing. If Germany declares war on and attacks Russia only, making no threats or demands on France and simply making defensive precautions on its own side of the border, will France immediately declare war?
If the the Poincare-Viviani government does declare war and initiate hostilities without the Germans invading or telegraphing hostilities first, will they have the wide-backing of socialist deputies and no problems with labor strikes?
Does it make a difference to this question if one of the butterfly effects is Jean Jaures surviving or avoiding his assassination right before the war?
Of course that's an interesting timeline if a general strike breaks out or if there's a broad socialist opposition to going to war on behalf of the Russian alliance, possibly led by a living Jaures.
A Viviani-Poincare crackdown and arrest/suppression of of Jaures and other Socialist deputies and strike leaders while pushing the war declaration through would be an interesting (in the Chinese sense) mess.
However, left opposition to going to war could just as likely turn out to be bluff, even in the absence of a German invasion of la patrie, and Socialists could basically fall in line behind a Union Sacree in support of the war, with either a living Jaures or a dead one. There could still be a French consensus, including even Socialists, that the moment is right to get back Alsace-Lorraine, and the Russian alliance must be honored for the sake of France's security in Europe.
However, supposing that is the case, would the wartime Union Sacree be as strong and persist as long as OTL's when the French had not only Alsace-Lorraine to recover, but chunks of northern France freshly occupied by the German enemy?
The French Army, charging into Alsace-Lorraine in bright red pants, is likely to initially suffer monstrously high casualties for little gain. So that won't be good for morale. On the other hand, for as long as the French hold the initiative, they can modulate how many men they choose to throw away in subsequent offensives.
Also, there should some material benefits, leading to morale benefits, from having French national territorial under control and less damaged- a better economy, fewer refugees, a wider recruiting base, a couple months ago somebody had a thread going on munitions production advantages.
If the French hang in there, would they keep focusing all their military energies on Alsace-Lorraine in 1914, 1915, and 1916 even if that stalls? Or would they have an "easterner" faction emerge, supporting employment of colonial and expeditionary forces on a another front like the Balkans to put pressure on a Central Powers flank?
Or could the French have grueling, hard-win territorial victories in Alsace-Lorraine that turn out to be fatal for France's commitment to the overall war effort and Russian alliance. As in, over the course of slow-moving and sometimes reversing see-saw battles, the French gain back pretty much the entirety of Alsace-Lorraine bite-by-bite over the course of 1914 and 1915 and 1916, and then, rather than press for the Rhineland or Berlin, they signal they are ready to peace out based on the battlefield status quo?
By contrast, France's course of action is far less discussed or debated. It's generally assumed the French declare war, attack into Alsace-Lorraine and keep at it. If any debate comes up, it's typically about whether the French will at some point try an end run through Belgium into Germany.
But I think it's worth discussing. If Germany declares war on and attacks Russia only, making no threats or demands on France and simply making defensive precautions on its own side of the border, will France immediately declare war?
If the the Poincare-Viviani government does declare war and initiate hostilities without the Germans invading or telegraphing hostilities first, will they have the wide-backing of socialist deputies and no problems with labor strikes?
Does it make a difference to this question if one of the butterfly effects is Jean Jaures surviving or avoiding his assassination right before the war?
Of course that's an interesting timeline if a general strike breaks out or if there's a broad socialist opposition to going to war on behalf of the Russian alliance, possibly led by a living Jaures.
A Viviani-Poincare crackdown and arrest/suppression of of Jaures and other Socialist deputies and strike leaders while pushing the war declaration through would be an interesting (in the Chinese sense) mess.
However, left opposition to going to war could just as likely turn out to be bluff, even in the absence of a German invasion of la patrie, and Socialists could basically fall in line behind a Union Sacree in support of the war, with either a living Jaures or a dead one. There could still be a French consensus, including even Socialists, that the moment is right to get back Alsace-Lorraine, and the Russian alliance must be honored for the sake of France's security in Europe.
However, supposing that is the case, would the wartime Union Sacree be as strong and persist as long as OTL's when the French had not only Alsace-Lorraine to recover, but chunks of northern France freshly occupied by the German enemy?
The French Army, charging into Alsace-Lorraine in bright red pants, is likely to initially suffer monstrously high casualties for little gain. So that won't be good for morale. On the other hand, for as long as the French hold the initiative, they can modulate how many men they choose to throw away in subsequent offensives.
Also, there should some material benefits, leading to morale benefits, from having French national territorial under control and less damaged- a better economy, fewer refugees, a wider recruiting base, a couple months ago somebody had a thread going on munitions production advantages.
If the French hang in there, would they keep focusing all their military energies on Alsace-Lorraine in 1914, 1915, and 1916 even if that stalls? Or would they have an "easterner" faction emerge, supporting employment of colonial and expeditionary forces on a another front like the Balkans to put pressure on a Central Powers flank?
Or could the French have grueling, hard-win territorial victories in Alsace-Lorraine that turn out to be fatal for France's commitment to the overall war effort and Russian alliance. As in, over the course of slow-moving and sometimes reversing see-saw battles, the French gain back pretty much the entirety of Alsace-Lorraine bite-by-bite over the course of 1914 and 1915 and 1916, and then, rather than press for the Rhineland or Berlin, they signal they are ready to peace out based on the battlefield status quo?