General military questions thread

Do you think that Italy could have won the war against Austria much earlier had it had someone of Diaz's caliber in charge much earlier? Or had A-H had someone less competent than Boroevic in charge?

Italy could not have won the war against Austria-Hungary by itself. Now, had somebody less competent than Boroević been in charge, then pressure from Italy combined with the Carpathian front might well have led to collapse. But so long as somebody with a working brain (so literally anyone other than Conrad von Hotzendorf) was in charge, Italians could not have hoped to achieve anything of strategic significance by themselves. I mean, first, there is nothing strategically important anywhere close to Isonzo front: OK, there is Trieste, but main naval base was in Pola, and in any case A-H navy was strategically insignificant. Second:
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Yeah, not much advance happening there...

Main change re: somebody less competent on Austrian side / more competent on Italian side would bring would be, I feel, in regards to the 1917 Caporetto offensive.
 
Main change re: somebody less competent on Austrian side / more competent on Italian side would bring would be, I feel, in regards to the 1917 Caporetto offensive.

An Italian victory? Or less of an Austrian defeat?

BTW, off-topic, but here is a map of the Hero Cities for the Soviet Union in World War II:

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An Italian victory? Or less of an Austrian defeat?

Basically, Italy will not have been so badly mauled as it was. German-Austrian advance may or may not have been as significant as it historically was, but it certainly wouldn't have been as devastating. One of major factors in impact of the advance was Cadorna ordering his units to hold to the last, while he himself fled to beyond Venice (of course he did). These "not an inch back" orders caused unnecessary losses in terms of manpower and material, and required intervention by UK and France to keep Italy in war.
 
Basically, Italy will not have been so badly mauled as it was. German-Austrian advance may or may not have been as significant as it historically was, but it certainly wouldn't have been as devastating. One of major factors in impact of the advance was Cadorna ordering his units to hold to the last, while he himself fled to beyond Venice (of course he did). These "not an inch back" orders caused unnecessary losses in terms of manpower and material, and required intervention by UK and France to keep Italy in war.

Similar to Hitler's no-retreat orders during WWII?
 
Yes. Although comparing Hitler to Cadorna is rather insulting to the former, I'd say.

Cadorna wasn't a brutal sociopath, was he?

Also, off-topic, but why did the Western Front of World War I descend into trench warfare but not the Eastern Front of World War I?
 
1 - yes he was
2 - length

Because he didn't care about his men's lives?

A longer front = less chances of trench warfare? That makes sense, I suppose. This also helps explain why the Italian Front in WWI was also relatively static for the first two years. But of course the Russo-Ukrainian War as well as the Iran-Iraq War both had very long fronts and yet also descended into trench-like warfare pretty quickly.
 
The first stage of the Russo-Ukrainian War near Kiev strikes me as being similar to the run-up to the First Battle of the Marne in 1914, with Russia = Germany, Ukraine = France, and Kiev = Paris:

2022_Russian_Invasion_of_Ukraine_animated.gif
 
I do not know enough about the war next door to comment on operational choices there.

Fair enough.

Anyway, which large-scale wars do you think could have realistically occurred in recent decades but didn't? I mean specific hypothetical examples.
 
Cadorna wasn't a brutal sociopath, was he?

Also, off-topic, but why did the Western Front of World War I descend into trench warfare but not the Eastern Front of World War I?

1) Yes, he was. He sacrificed soldiers for literally no military gain, against basically unassailable positions, merely in order to advance his own political career. He is literally the same personality type as Hitler, it is just that he never came to rule the country (and never actually fought personally, as far as I know - Hitler meanwhile was awarded a medal, though tbf his work - courier - was lot less dangerous than that of a soldier on the front). The main difference between them is that Hitler did have occasional bouts of military competence, which is what my comment was referring to. Cadorna meanwhile was just one disastrous decision after another.

2) Firstly, there were episodes of trench warfare on the eastern front as well. But there are two main factors: terrain and lines of communications. In terms of terrain, Eastern Front was much more open than the Western Front: far larger area, with fewer obstacles - more plains and so on. Perhaps more important difference was in terms of lines of communication: Western front had a very dense railroad network, which in the East was nearly nonexistent:




Railway-maps-of-Europe-1850-1890-and-1890-1930.ppm


A longer front = less chances of trench warfare? That makes sense, I suppose. This also helps explain why the Italian Front in WWI was also relatively static for the first two years. But of course the Russo-Ukrainian War as well as the Iran-Iraq War both had very long fronts and yet also descended into trench-like warfare pretty quickly.

Iran-Iraq war descended into static warfare for two reasons. Firstly, Iraqis were pathetically incompetent at mobile warfare while Iranians were fundamentally a light infantry army - they didn't have the hardware necessary for mobile warfare. Second, active front was actually quite short, and terrain was not conductive to mobile warfare.

For Russo-Ukrainian war, reason for relatively static nature of warfare is simple: reconnaissance and weapons. Guided munitions mean that concealment is the only way to survive for long, even for heavily armored vehicles. This also means that cost of the attack is very, very high - essentially, offense/defense balance is closer to World War I than it is to World War II. Yet presence of satellite and UAV reconnaissance means that achieving concealment on the offense is exceedingly difficult. What this means is that rather than deep operational penetrations in the vein of Blitzkrieg, Soviet Deep Battle, or recent operations such as Desert Storm or Storm 1995, we get purely tactical penetrations that are quickly closed off.
 
1) Yes, he was. He sacrificed soldiers for literally no military gain, against basically unassailable positions, merely in order to advance his own political career. He is literally the same personality type as Hitler, it is just that he never came to rule the country (and never actually fought personally, as far as I know - Hitler meanwhile was awarded a medal, though tbf his work - courier - was lot less dangerous than that of a soldier on the front). The main difference between them is that Hitler did have occasional bouts of military competence, which is what my comment was referring to. Cadorna meanwhile was just one disastrous decision after another.

2) Firstly, there were episodes of trench warfare on the eastern front as well. But there are two main factors: terrain and lines of communications. In terms of terrain, Eastern Front was much more open than the Western Front: far larger area, with fewer obstacles - more plains and so on. Perhaps more important difference was in terms of lines of communication: Western front had a very dense railroad network, which in the East was nearly nonexistent:




Railway-maps-of-Europe-1850-1890-and-1890-1930.ppm




Iran-Iraq war descended into static warfare for two reasons. Firstly, Iraqis were pathetically incompetent at mobile warfare while Iranians were fundamentally a light infantry army - they didn't have the hardware necessary for mobile warfare. Second, active front was actually quite short, and terrain was not conductive to mobile warfare.

For Russo-Ukrainian war, reason for relatively static nature of warfare is simple: reconnaissance and weapons. Guided munitions mean that concealment is the only way to survive for long, even for heavily armored vehicles. This also means that cost of the attack is very, very high - essentially, offense/defense balance is closer to World War I than it is to World War II. Yet presence of satellite and UAV reconnaissance means that achieving concealment on the offense is exceedingly difficult. What this means is that rather than deep operational penetrations in the vein of Blitzkrieg, Soviet Deep Battle, or recent operations such as Desert Storm or Storm 1995, we get purely tactical penetrations that are quickly closed off.

Excellent analysis! Thank you very much!

By the way, do you believe that had World War I been delayed by a decade or two or three, then it would have been (much) more mobile than it was in real life, especially in the West?

Also, do you believe that a Russo-Ukrainian War that broke out in 2014 rather than in 2022 would have been (much) more mobile? I mean a full-out war between Russia and Ukraine, not the "mere" skirmishes that were seen in the Donbass back then.
 
By the way, do you believe that had World War I been delayed by a decade or two or three, then it would have been (much) more mobile than it was in real life, especially in the West?

In that case, it would have been basically World War II... maybe. Thing is, while World War II mobile warfare doctrine was in large part a response to World War I, World War I itself began as a mobile war. So yes, it would certainly be far more mobile, but it probably would still differ significantly from World War II.

Also, do you believe that a Russo-Ukrainian War that broke out in 2014 rather than in 2022 would have been (much) more mobile? I mean a full-out war between Russia and Ukraine, not the "mere" skirmishes that were seen in the Donbass back then.

Probably not. Most of the factors were already in place by then. If you had wanted a mobile war, it probably would have had to come in 1990s at latest. Maybe.
 
In that case, it would have been basically World War II... maybe. Thing is, while World War II mobile warfare doctrine was in large part a response to World War I, World War I itself began as a mobile war. So yes, it would certainly be far more mobile, but it probably would still differ significantly from World War II.



Probably not. Most of the factors were already in place by then. If you had wanted a mobile war, it probably would have had to come in 1990s at latest. Maybe.

World War I began as a mobile war in the West, but this stopped pretty rapidly after the Germans lost at the Marne and failed to conquer Paris in September 1914. There's even an argument that the 1914 German advance in the West was doomed from the start due to logistics in any case. What do you think, @sillygoose?

Interesting. What about a hypothetical Russian invasion of Kazakhstan?
 
World War I began as a mobile war in the West, but this stopped pretty rapidly after the Germans lost at the Marne and failed to conquer Paris in September 1914. There's even an argument that the 1914 German advance in the West was doomed from the start due to logistics in any case. What do you think, @sillygoose?

It was doomed because railways meant that defender would always have advantage in speed / response time / logistics over the attacker.
 
It was doomed because railways meant that defender would always have advantage in speed / response time / logistics over the attacker.

Was the same also the case back in 1870-1871? Because in that war, the Germans did manage to conquer Paris, albeit without them also simultaneously having to fight on a second front.
 
Had Germany encircled both the BEF and Charles Lanrezac's Fifth Army in late August 1914 and subsequently managed to conquer Verdun due to France diverting the troops from there to the Marne in order to save Paris, could the fortress of Toul have become this TL's version of Verdun in 1916?

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