OK, let's try to take this question, without leaping ahead too far, too fast, with conclusions.
It is 1895 and Japan has imposed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on China, the world powers are curious about its terms, which the Japanese are keeping secret until the last minute. The Chinese, trying to get foreign help, are leaking out the most extreme version of Japanese demands.
The Japanese demands include annexation of the whole Liaotung peninsula from the outlet of the Yalu river at the western end of Korea, to the Great Wall to the west. This offers a commanding position adjacent to Korea and Beijing. It gets in the way of developing Russian interests in particular.
In OTL Russia protested with the enthusiastic support of Germany, and then France (which would have preferred to keep out) felt compelled as Russia's ally to join in protest. Britain was invited to join the protest but refused. The powers advised Japan to give up Liaotung, which she did, but she was compensated with a greater indemnity. Russia then loaned the Chinese the money to pay the higher indemnity and since they didn't have their own finances, got the French to provide the financing for them.
The difference in the ATL is that the Germans, like the British, don't speak up. Berlin takes the attitude, "why should we do you any favors when you signed an alliance with France behind out back? It would be different if you hadn't quit the Three Emperors League, but you dropped out, so pound sand."
Given that the idea expressed so far that everybody in Europe, Russians, Germans, thought the Japanese were barbaric weaklings they could beat on their own, and they may not have been wrong about the military/naval balance at that time, then the Russians would have sent a note all by themselves telling the Japanese to back off of Liaotung at that time, right?
Looking at the military and naval situation, I think logistically, without any Trans-Siberian railroad yet, and with the Japanese forces already in place in Korea and Liaotung, the Russians and any other western ground force would have had difficulty getting to the Far East in the near term with any substantial strength to dislodge the Japanese. But the naval situation was different. The Russians and westerners had larger fleets, even in the Far East or deployable there, and could credibly defeat the Japanese fleet and cut off the Japanese Army on the Asian mainland from supply from the Home Islands and threaten vital Japanese trade.
So, faced with just the Russians, instead of the Triple Intervention of Russia-France-Germany, would Japan back down, or decide to fight it out with Russia right there and then?
If Japan backs down, as it might because it was aware of its financial strain and saw firsthand heightened levels of readiness on Russian warships making frequent use of Japanese ports, then the immediate Russo-Japanese situation proceeds similarly to OTL. Japan leaves Liaotung, takes the money (and Taiwan and the Pescadores) and runs. Russia is able to press its imperial agenda in Manchuria and Korea in the ensuing years, and Japan builds up it strength, concerned about containing the Russian threat, eventually looking to an anti-Russian alliance and a war of revenge.
So, overall, this should probably leave Russian expansionism as Far East focused as it was in the OTL 1895-1904 period, and seeking quiet on the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian frontiers. Thus, even while remaining perfectly cool and unsupportive to Russia, unlike OTL, Germany, and her allies in Europe, should benefit just as much as in OTL, from Russia's preoccupations elsewhere and desires to keep the Near East and Balkans 'on ice'.
If Japan calculates that with only Russia opposing it, unaided by others, it must stand its ground and fight, we may have the Russo-Japanese War in 1895 or 1896.
Most who have voiced an opinion on the outcome of an early R-J war, on this thread (ATP), or elsewhere, have said or hinted the Russians would win. If the Russians won against the Japanese in 1895-96, the Japanese Army on the mainland would be cut-off, Japan would have to surrender its influence over Korea and Manchuria, and Russia would probably charge Japan an indemnity to ransom Japan's cut-off Army and suspend naval harassment. Perhaps another power could choose to join in on Russia's side, like France, and grab Taiwan from Japan for itself. Or China could be a nominal ally of Russia and Russia could force Japan to retrocede Taiwan and the Pescadores to China. Those latter ideas are rather 'iffy' but could happen.
This situation would leave Japan poorer and less stable with a longer road to revival and regional power.
Russia would have plenty of imperial development activities to keep itself busy in the Far East (especially railroad development). It's forward posture in Korea and northern China would not only be something Japan would hope to see reversed someday, but that Britain would find quite disturbing. Britain could draw closer to the Triple Alliance in European, Mediterranean, and Near Eastern affairs as a consequence. If that happened, it would only be good for Germany.
On the other hand, with Japan being beaten for the near and medium term, and quite possibly not in any shape for a comeback war in the 1904 timeframe (maybe 1910 or 1915 would be a period where it could be plausibly strong enough to try) Russia could feel confident enough to *both* develop its Far East position, and start adventuring again in the Balkans and Near East in the late 1890s/early 1900s. That possibility would be a *worse* turn of event for those years for Austria-Hungary, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire than happened in OTL.
Now if Japan surprised everyone, and won a victory in 1895 or 1896 against Russia, that would have its own effects. Russia would secure all its Shimonoseki gains. It could not extract an indemnity from Russia, and may, or may not, gain South Sakhalin.
It would be a great international humiliation for Russia, but I don't know if Russia's internal situation was 'ripe' for there to be a revolutionary outbreak at the same time.
Russia would become interested in military reforms and in finishing the Trans-Siberian. As far as its goals after defeat, it might, like OTL, adjust to the new status quo in the Far East, and renew its expansionist interest in the Balkans, which spells trouble for Austria-Hungary and Germany. Or it might in contrast be looking for a war of revenge on Japan, after its railroad is complete. Another factor is Russia's view of the French alliance. If it lost the war, it might consider its alliance disappointing.
---This also brings us back to how Germany staying aloof in 1895 shapes the French response to the crisis. If Germany stays uninvolved, maybe France feels free to follow its own preferences to stay uninvolved, and maybe France and Russia don't evolve as close cooperation in their alliance. Maybe the French decline to financially support Russian Far Eastern projects, and that might mean the Russians aren't so helpful diplomatically during things like the Morocco disputes. Or, maybe because of the alliance already arranged in the earlier 1890s, France feels obliged to fully support Russia all the time, either in a dual intervention to get Japan to back off in 1895, or in a Russo-Japanese War that year. Either example of Franco-Russian muscle flexing might cause Britain to reach out to Germany for support, which could put Germany in a better diplomatic position.
