Historian uses what-if analysis to argue WWI was inevitable, and the mid-July crisis lull was misinterpreted

[raharris1973]

I am referring to the argument of the late Paul Schroeder, and will cite some key passages from his argument.

He argues that under the conditions as they developed by around 1914, WWI was pretty much inevitable fairly soon. Heroic, creative, self-sacrificial diplomatic action on somebody's part would have been required to avert it, and since that wasn't part of how anybody was playing the game anymore, it was just a matter of the next crisis.

Interestingly, this is contrary to the argument of political scientist Richard Ned Lebow, who see WWI as *not* overdetermined, and highly contingent, sees Europe as passing through. a relatively brief "danger zone" that would have closed no later than 1917, after which a great power war would have become very unlikely.

I begin, citing Schroeder's argument about the pause in July, and his view that two common counterfactual what-if ideas a) if the Austrians had gone in right away in a heat without the pause and b) the fact there was a pause proves the war wasn't inevitable, are both BS in his view:

Every account of the July Crisis discusses the delay between July 5, when Austria-Hungary received Germany's support for its ultimatum to Serbia, and July 23 when the ultimatum was actually delivered. Some have speculated that the delay was fateful in allowing the initial shock of the assassination to wear off (which is doubtful-the Serbian and Russian reactions, the decisive ones, would have been the same earlier). Another delay, more fateful and inexplicable, is hardly mentioned or discussed in the vast literature. For a full month after the assassination, the powers did absolutely nothing in concert to prepare for or deal with the possible or likely consequences of this sensational incident. Everyone knew that Austria-Hungary and Serbia were mortal enemies, that they had gone to the brink of war at least four times in the past five years, three of them in the past year, and that Russia was Serbia's ally and protector and Austria-Hungary's main enemy. Yet when something occurred that anyone could see might set off this long-envisioned war, the Entente powers averted their eyes, went about their other business, waited for whatever Austria-Hungary and Germany might do, and hoped for the best. And of course Austria-Hungary and Germany took the very action that did set off the war.


This argument seems paradoxically to prove the precise opposite of what was promised and intended: that the war was avoidable. If the means for a serious attempt at avoiding it were known and available, then the root cause of the war was contingent, a collective failure to apply them.

He goes on to argue that fundamentally nobody on either side, Central or Entente, was willing to say "no" to an ally anymore or even to risk displeasing an ally by offering to help a member of the opposite coalition with its problems:

But of course that collective inaction was neither inexplicable nor really contingent.


I contend only that the pressure of events did not make war objectively so, by making peaceful choices impossible in the face of hard realities like security threats, alliance commitments, and arms races, but subjectively so, by fatally constricting what all the actors would entertain as a conceivable, rational course of action in the face of this crisis or any like it.


Austria-Hungary and Germany were determined to reverse the existing trend considered fatal to them, and saw in this crisis a good, possibly final, chance to do so. The Entente power equally saw in this crisis a danger to the existing trend and were equally determined not to allow it to be reversed. Russian policy, seen by Russians as a defense against German and Austro- Hungarian aggression, was resolutely determined to maintain and extend Russia's control over the Balkans. French policy was rigidly fixed on maintaining the existing alliances and therefore doing nothing to weaken the Franco-Russian one.(33) Britain's was fixed on maintaining its ententes, both in order to check Germany in Europe and avoid threats to the British Empire-the latter aim, the primary one, requiring maintaining the entente with Russia at all cost.(34)

He argues that was a crucial difference, from earlier eras, when Europe still had Congresses:

But behind these familiar positive reasons for failure to act collectively, there was a still more fundamental negative one. No one believed that a sane, rational policy allowed any longer for this kind of collective response. Anyone who tried to suspend the rules of power politics, of "every man and every alliance for himself, and the devil take the hindmost," was a fool and would earn the fool's reward. Hence to ask any British, French, Russian, Italian, or even German leader to sacrifice or subordinate particular interests and opportunities of theirs for the sake of some sort of collective action to stabilize the international position of Austria-Hungary so as to lessen the chances of a general war was to ask the impossible and absurd-to ask them to commit political suicide at home and to be laughed at and swindled abroad. Stabilizing Austria- Hungary's position was really not anyone's business except that of Austrians and Hungarians, or perhaps Germans if they wished to do so for their own power-political reasons. This profound practical indifference to the survival of a vital actor such as the Habsburg Monarchy was, to repeat, a break with tradition-not normal Realpolitik, but a different concrete definition of it, a different collective attitude toward international politics.(35) The power whose final break with the Concert principle proved decisive, Austria-Hungary, was also the last and most reluctant to abandon it, because it was the one most dependent it and on collective international support and restraint to survive.

So essentially his idea is that expecting war not happen is like expecting car crashes not to happen when you have drivers moving at high speed, and let all the signs and painted lane lines fade and concrete barriers fall.

Your thoughts?

 

[Bear Ribs]

This is pretty much what I was taught. The web of alliances guaranteed that if any two nations starting something everybody else was going to get pulled in, and the possibility of Europe managing to go for years without anybody deciding to pick a fight was simply remote.

 

[Buba]

I agree with the view that WWI was not inevitable.

 

[ATP]

In my opinion two factors made WW1 inevitable:
1.England politic to smash any country which could dominate Europe -
2.All generals beliving in "short,victorious war" bullshit - german belived that they could take Paris in 40 days/if they do not change Schiefen plan,it was possible/,and Russia that they win in 4 months./not possible/

 

[stevep]

This is pretty much what I was taught. The web of alliances guaranteed that if any two nations starting something everybody else was going to get pulled in, and the possibility of Europe managing to go for years without anybody deciding to pick a fight was simply remote.

That is definitely a factor but then it also assumes that the nation deciding to jump into something - or underestimating the determination of an opposing nation not to accept some decision - is also certain its 'allies' are committed to supporting their actions.

OTL the CPs were OK between Germany and Austria because Germany fully backed Austria before the latter committed to war. However they lost Italy.

Similarly while was very likely to support Russia in a war it was literally forced into it by German action the informal military talks they had had with some British officers caused something of a panic in Paris when they were reminded that no formal political agreement had been made and it was only the invasion of Belgium that moblised enough opinion in the British government to ensure it joined the conflict despite there being clear strategic interests for doing so.

I think the best answer for when wars occur is when you get two events happening.
i) Nation A says "I'm doing X"
ii) Nation B replies "No you not".

Regardless of whether either or both nations think the other is bluffing and will back down or simply is overconfident about their ability to win.

 

[WolfBear]

I am referring to the argument of the late Paul Schroeder, and will cite some key passages from his argument.

He argues that under the conditions as they developed by around 1914, WWI was pretty much inevitable fairly soon. Heroic, creative, self-sacrificial diplomatic action on somebody's part would have been required to avert it, and since that wasn't part of how anybody was playing the game anymore, it was just a matter of the next crisis.

Interestingly, this is contrary to the argument of political scientist Richard Ned Lebow, who see WWI as *not* overdetermined, and highly contingent, sees Europe as passing through. a relatively brief "danger zone" that would have closed no later than 1917, after which a great power war would have become very unlikely.

I begin, citing Schroeder's argument about the pause in July, and his view that two common counterfactual what-if ideas a) if the Austrians had gone in right away in a heat without the pause and b) the fact there was a pause proves the war wasn't inevitable, are both BS in his view:



He goes on to argue that fundamentally nobody on either side, Central or Entente, was willing to say "no" to an ally anymore or even to risk displeasing an ally by offering to help a member of the opposite coalition with its problems:



He argues that was a crucial difference, from earlier eras, when Europe still had Congresses:



So essentially his idea is that expecting war not happen is like expecting car crashes not to happen when you have drivers moving at high speed, and let all the signs and painted lane lines fade and concrete barriers fall.

Your thoughts?

FWIW, I have actually corresponded a bit with Professor Lebow about this topic via e-mail. I think that the crucial factors in any future crisis (assuming that FF and his wife both survive Sarajevo) would be whether there would be sufficient room for compromise. I could imagine these two future crises, for instance:

-Austro-Hungarian civil war in 1917. If Italy, Serbia, and/or Romania attempt to support separatists in A-H during this time, actually succeed in doing this (similar to Donbass 2014 as opposed to Kharkiv 2014), and actually get Franco-Russian backing in the event of a war crisis, then I would presume that the Great Powers would try to settle this issue through arbitration, perhaps by holding plebiscites in the disputed territories or something like that. However, if one or both of the parties will refuse to agree to an arbitrated compromise solution of this problem, then war can still result over this.

-Unrest in Ottoman Armenia: If there will be violence involving Ottoman Armenians, Ottoman Kurds, or both of these groups, with or without the involvement of the Ottoman government, then I could see Russia aiming to intervene here, in which case Russia could either be allowed to annex Ottoman Armenia, have this occur but also see a general partition of the Ottoman Empire, or have Germany and A-H risk war over the question of a Russian annexation of Ottoman Armenia for fear that this will serve as a springboard for a future Russian conquest of Constantinople and the Straits. I would presume that a possible compromise settlement that Germany and A-H (and perhaps Britain as well) could propose would be an independent (Ottoman) Greater Armenia with some neutral or relatively neutral European prince as its King. This would protect the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire from the Ottoman government without also strengthening Russia. Whether war would subsequently result would depend on whether or not Russia would actually be willing to accept this compromise, and it looks like it would indeed be pressured to accept this compromise if it genuinely merely cares about the well-being of the Ottoman Armenians as it claims rather than aiming to use them as pawns in a geopolitical game.

 

[WolfBear]

That is definitely a factor but then it also assumes that the nation deciding to jump into something - or underestimating the determination of an opposing nation not to accept some decision - is also certain its 'allies' are committed to supporting their actions.

OTL the CPs were OK between Germany and Austria because Germany fully backed Austria before the latter committed to war. However they lost Italy.

Similarly while was very likely to support Russia in a war it was literally forced into it by German action the informal military talks they had had with some British officers caused something of a panic in Paris when they were reminded that no formal political agreement had been made and it was only the invasion of Belgium that moblised enough opinion in the British government to ensure it joined the conflict despite there being clear strategic interests for doing so.

I think the best answer for when wars occur is when you get two events happening.
i) Nation A says "I'm doing X"
ii) Nation B replies "No you not".

Regardless of whether either or both nations think the other is bluffing and will back down or simply is overconfident about their ability to win.

I think that it's more akin to this:

1. Is everyone willing to compromise?
2. If someone is not willing to compromise, are their allies nevertheless prepared to back them up?
3. If the answer to #2 is Yes, then what do one's enemies/the opposing side do in response to this? Back down or fight?

 

[raharris1973]

@WolfBear - Very interesting that you've corresponded in detail with Professor Lebow.

I enjoyed his book on the subject, 'Franz Ferdinand Lives'. My one critique on the realism of his "No WWI" scenarios, both his deliberately optimistic and deliberately pessimistic ones,
is that when he examines alternate lives, he acts like any and every interesting individual of European origin (Einstein, Isaac Asimov, Martin Scorsese) will not emigrate to the United States but for the world wars happening.

But as we've discussed many times on the board, the First World War in particular was really important in putting American business on an immigrant labor diet and convincing it that it could still prosper with little or no immigration and by tapping internal migration, and also heightened nativism and Red Scares that fed into each other. So the wars had a chilling effect on raw numbers of immigrants by tying up shipping, employing people in different ways, tapping alternative labor sources, and bolstering support for restrictive laws.

So sure, war and war-related political problems incentivized emigration, maybe disproportionately of interesting and talented scientists and artists and writers and so on. But also probably the much more mundane ability to earn a higher standard of pay and living off your talent in America than in Europe had the most to do with the emigration of these folks to America from Europe.

 

[WolfBear]

@WolfBear - Very interesting that you've corresponded in detail with Professor Lebow.

I enjoyed his book on the subject, 'Franz Ferdinand Lives'. My one critique on the realism of his "No WWI" scenarios, both his deliberately optimistic and deliberately pessimistic ones,
is that when he examines alternate lives, he acts like any and every interesting individual of European origin (Einstein, Isaac Asimov, Martin Scorsese) will not emigrate to the United States but for the world wars happening.

But as we've discussed many times on the board, the First World War in particular was really important in putting American business on an immigrant labor diet and convincing it that it could still prosper with little or no immigration and by tapping internal migration, and also heightened nativism and Red Scares that fed into each other. So the wars had a chilling effect on raw numbers of immigrants by tying up shipping, employing people in different ways, tapping alternative labor sources, and bolstering support for restrictive laws.

So sure, war and war-related political problems incentivized emigration, maybe disproportionately of interesting and talented scientists and artists and writers and so on. But also probably the much more mundane ability to earn a higher standard of pay and living off your talent in America than in Europe had the most to do with the emigration of these folks to America from Europe.

Rob, you are very much correct in your analysis here. That said, though, significant support for some immigration restriction was already building up in the US even before the 1920s. The US Congress very narrowly failed (by several votes both times) to override US presidential vetoes of literacy tests for immigrants in 1913 and 1915 and actually did successfully override such a veto in 1917:

Immigration Act of 1917 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

This academic article from 1917 speculated that it was only a matter of time before further, more severe immigration restrictions will be implemented in the US:

Accept Terms and Conditions on JSTOR

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary sources.

www.jstor.org

You could say that 1915 and 1917 was after the start of WWI, but they were only continuing the pattern from 1913, which was right before WWI.

 

[Buba]

the much more mundane ability to earn a higher standard of pay and living off your talent in America than in Europe had the most to do with the emigration of these folks to America from Europe.

This.
No WWI = richer Europe.
No WWI = USA less rich and more backwaterish.
Hence lesser/no braindrain.

 

[WolfBear]

This.
No WWI = richer Europe.
No WWI = USA less rich and more backwaterish.
Hence lesser/no braindrain.

Some countries already have a brain drain to the US even before WWI; for instance, Russia with its Jews.

@raharris1973 If you're curious, you can contact professor Lebow through the e-mails on the links here:

https://www.kcl.ac.uk/people/richard-ned-lebow

Richard Ned Lebow

govt.dartmouth.edu

Professor Richard Ned Lebow | Pembroke

Richard Ned Lebow is Professor Emeritus of International Political Theory in the War Studies Department of King’s College London and the James O. Freedman Presidential Professor Emeritus of Government at Dartmouth College. He is a Fellow of the British Academy and recipient of numerous honorary...

www.pem.cam.ac.uk