Second Mexican American War in 1919

[stevep]

We don't have to assume Congress would approve a military in 1920 because in 1919 said force already existed; total U.S. Armed Forces strength in 1919 was 1,172,602 of whom 851,624 were U.S. Army. They did do further demobilizations in 1920 but that was in the context of a peace time situation, which wouldn't hold here because of the obvious war situation. It's also worth noting this war wasn't "out of the blue" but had bipartisan support and was being aggressively pushed by the Republicans who were ascendant in Congress, with Senator Fall being a Republican. To quote from Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Interventionist Movement of 1919:

From mid-November until the reconvening of Congress in December, the related crises deepened. Jenkins, advised by Matthew Hanna of the state department, refused to pay the nominal bail set by the Puebla court and called upon the United States government to secure his freedom. Lansing responded by sending strong notes to the Carranza government urging it to release Jenkins immediately. When the Mexican Foreign Office reminded Lansing that in a federal republic the central government may not interfere with state jurisprudence, the secretary was angered.62 He held a stormy interview with Ambassador Bonillas on November 28 and threatened that, if Jenkins were not released immediately, a "tide of indignation" among the American people might prevent further diplomatic discussion and force a break in relations which would almost inevitably mean war 63 On the next day Lansing sent the Mexican Foreign Office a harsh, insolent note containing a peremptory demand that Jenkins be released immediately. Although he had not heeded Fletcher's advice of November 21 to give Carranza forty-eight hours to free Jenkins or have the United States sever diplomatic relations, Lansing had taken strong action. The sending of the peremptory demand to an apparently unyielding Carranza government had moved the two countries to the brink of war.​

​

The Republican controlled Senate responded favorably to Lansing's well-publicized initiatives. After conferring with Fletcher at the state department, Senator Brandegee wired Fall to postpone his subcommittee's investigations in the West and return to Washington, because no action could be taken without him. On December 1, state department officials met Fall at the train station and drove him to Lansing's home. Following a pattern set in mid-November, Lansing gave Fall copies of his diplomatic correspondence with Mexico; and the two men discussed the Mexican crises. Lansing explained that he was acting on his own initiative without the knowledge of President Wilson. Fall told Lansing that his subcommittee would make an official report to the Senate and that he would introduce a resolution upholding Lansing's hand.65​

As far as Leonard Wood goes, he was viewed as a conservative by 1920 as a result of his intense Anti-Bolshevism and Americanism stances.



It would be fatal, because how else can an insurgency survive without weapons and munitions? The Mexican Revolution was possible because of entities like the United States and German Empire funneling weapons into the region, while the Mexican factions themselves held the cities and thus means of producing their own equipment but neither possibility exists here. Numbers, motivation and experience are all well and good, but they don't produce effective results in the fields without the industrial capacity to back them up; see the German Army in 1945 for a good example. Likewise, the Zapatistas did find their support in the agrarian areas but they also lost said Mexican Revolution and ended up having to make peace with the Mexican government, so I fail to see why they would be more successful against a more powerful opponent.

As for the Banana War conflicts, yes, the U.S. had to fight an anti insurgency campaign for years; I see the same happening here with Mexico. That doesn't detract from the fact, however, that American willpower failed to break and in the end the U.S. was able to enforce its political desires. Just as you've pointed out Mexico had experience with both irregular and conventional warfare, so too did the United States but also a force size and industry many times over that than what Mexico possessed. The 400,000 troops the U.S. could use in the conventional phase of the conflict is nearly twice as large as what any side in the Mexican Revolution could deploy, for example.



I've touched on it earlier, in that this is why I think a long standing occupation is likely. There is no ready alternative to the existing order available for the U.S. to use, so they will have to build one from scratch the same way the United States had to in both Iraq and Afghanistan in modern times. The motivation is certainly there, because it would be obvious to Washington that a withdraw would result in a hostile government coming into power on the southern border, an intolerable national security threat.



Such ignores the specific political circumstances unique to 1919, however, namely that the First Red Scare was going on and still intense at the time before gradually declining in fervor over the course of the 1920s. There was also nothing comparable to the situation faced in 1919, in that isolated attacks on personal property did not threaten American economic interests the same way nationalizing the extremely large and profitable holdings held in oil did, nor did murder or kidnapping of Americans occur in such a way as the Jenkins Affair, which also broke international standards with regards to diplomats. An American citizen paying a fatal price after willingly taking personal risk is one thing, but attack an American official and than having the Mexican Government arrest him on allegations he planned his own kidnapping is quite another.



See what I said earlier about the changed politics, but also the situation of Garrido's rise and American investment in Mexico. The U.S. trusted the wider government by that point and didn't have a vested interest in their agricultural sector like they did in the energy sector.



Basically, and no disrespect intended, your argument boils down to Will to Power based on Nationalistic desires. It's understandable position, but it isn't reflected well in the real world; could one say the Filipinos, the Central Americans, Caribbean peoples, or even Native Americans were less motivated? How about the Germans and Japanese in World War II? Motivation to fight is an important factor, but it isn't, on its own, decisive in Insurgency contexts. Even the Iraq War, despite its unpopularity, saw the U.S. willpower last long enough to install a government that still to this day more or less stands in control of Iraq. Unlike said conflict, however, the U.S. would and did have a lot of motivation to fight a war in Mexico in the timeframe.

If we're assuming that a President Wood goes for an invasion of Mexico then the important date isn't 1920 but March 1921 as that's the 1st point he has any real power. Coupled with the impact of WWI and the pandemic as well as the paralysis and division resulting from Wilson's ill health and mismanagement I think its reasonable to ask whether the US would still have the deployed manpower and the will - both by the government, public opinion and probably also the conscripts being sent into this new war zone.

In terms of how long an insurgency last that depends on the level of motivation. If your talking about a prolonged occupation by a foreign invader who is probably behaving badly and also looting resources that could be quite a while. Mexico isn't a 1st rate power at this time but its not a pre-industrial one either. It doesn't take much to produce some basic guns, or for the matter steal/buy from the occupying forces. After a year or two with prolonged bloodshed and heavy occupation costs how attractive will this be to many Americans? The forces involved in assorted Caribbean or isthmus nations were quite small and a hell of a lot more will be required for occupying Mexico. Other when at war the US maintained only very small military forces in peacetime until 1945.

The Philippines have been the only time before 1945 when the US occupied a sizeable nation and while successful US actions there received a lot of criticism. This is likely to occur again here, especially since the operation is even larger and a lot closer so reporters and others can gain access to details.

You mention US successes in Iraq but isn't the current government largely dominated by the Shia groups, many of whom are close to Iran. In Afghanistan the US is pretty much giving up on opposing the Taliban. Although there's a chance that Biden may change this US will to continue with no clear end is sight is waning. That's despite this being a pretty low level operation and the US having substantial support from both allies and internal groups.

Its possible that the US can impose a new regime but how likely is that to last once they withdraw? Or are they going to return every time their strongman is deposed or threatened?

Steve

 

[Circle of Willis]

We don't have to assume Congress would approve a military in 1920 because in 1919 said force already existed; total U.S. Armed Forces strength in 1919 was 1,172,602 of whom 851,624 were U.S. Army. They did do further demobilizations in 1920 but that was in the context of a peace time situation, which wouldn't hold here because of the obvious war situation. It's also worth noting this war wasn't "out of the blue" but had bipartisan support and was being aggressively pushed by the Republicans who were ascendant in Congress, with Senator Fall being a Republican. To quote from Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Interventionist Movement of 1919:

From mid-November until the reconvening of Congress in December, the related crises deepened. Jenkins, advised by Matthew Hanna of the state department, refused to pay the nominal bail set by the Puebla court and called upon the United States government to secure his freedom. Lansing responded by sending strong notes to the Carranza government urging it to release Jenkins immediately. When the Mexican Foreign Office reminded Lansing that in a federal republic the central government may not interfere with state jurisprudence, the secretary was angered.62 He held a stormy interview with Ambassador Bonillas on November 28 and threatened that, if Jenkins were not released immediately, a "tide of indignation" among the American people might prevent further diplomatic discussion and force a break in relations which would almost inevitably mean war 63 On the next day Lansing sent the Mexican Foreign Office a harsh, insolent note containing a peremptory demand that Jenkins be released immediately. Although he had not heeded Fletcher's advice of November 21 to give Carranza forty-eight hours to free Jenkins or have the United States sever diplomatic relations, Lansing had taken strong action. The sending of the peremptory demand to an apparently unyielding Carranza government had moved the two countries to the brink of war.​

​

The Republican controlled Senate responded favorably to Lansing's well-publicized initiatives. After conferring with Fletcher at the state department, Senator Brandegee wired Fall to postpone his subcommittee's investigations in the West and return to Washington, because no action could be taken without him. On December 1, state department officials met Fall at the train station and drove him to Lansing's home. Following a pattern set in mid-November, Lansing gave Fall copies of his diplomatic correspondence with Mexico; and the two men discussed the Mexican crises. Lansing explained that he was acting on his own initiative without the knowledge of President Wilson. Fall told Lansing that his subcommittee would make an official report to the Senate and that he would introduce a resolution upholding Lansing's hand.65​

As far as Leonard Wood goes, he was viewed as a conservative by 1920 as a result of his intense Anti-Bolshevism and Americanism stances.



It would be fatal, because how else can an insurgency survive without weapons and munitions? The Mexican Revolution was possible because of entities like the United States and German Empire funneling weapons into the region, while the Mexican factions themselves held the cities and thus means of producing their own equipment but neither possibility exists here. Numbers, motivation and experience are all well and good, but they don't produce effective results in the fields without the industrial capacity to back them up; see the German Army in 1945 for a good example. Likewise, the Zapatistas did find their support in the agrarian areas but they also lost said Mexican Revolution and ended up having to make peace with the Mexican government, so I fail to see why they would be more successful against a more powerful opponent.

As for the Banana War conflicts, yes, the U.S. had to fight an anti insurgency campaign for years; I see the same happening here with Mexico. That doesn't detract from the fact, however, that American willpower failed to break and in the end the U.S. was able to enforce its political desires. Just as you've pointed out Mexico had experience with both irregular and conventional warfare, so too did the United States but also a force size and industry many times over that than what Mexico possessed. The 400,000 troops the U.S. could use in the conventional phase of the conflict is nearly twice as large as what any side in the Mexican Revolution could deploy, for example.



I've touched on it earlier, in that this is why I think a long standing occupation is likely. There is no ready alternative to the existing order available for the U.S. to use, so they will have to build one from scratch the same way the United States had to in both Iraq and Afghanistan in modern times. The motivation is certainly there, because it would be obvious to Washington that a withdraw would result in a hostile government coming into power on the southern border, an intolerable national security threat.



Such ignores the specific political circumstances unique to 1919, however, namely that the First Red Scare was going on and still intense at the time before gradually declining in fervor over the course of the 1920s. There was also nothing comparable to the situation faced in 1919, in that isolated attacks on personal property did not threaten American economic interests the same way nationalizing the extremely large and profitable holdings held in oil did, nor did murder or kidnapping of Americans occur in such a way as the Jenkins Affair, which also broke international standards with regards to diplomats. An American citizen paying a fatal price after willingly taking personal risk is one thing, but attack an American official and than having the Mexican Government arrest him on allegations he planned his own kidnapping is quite another.



See what I said earlier about the changed politics, but also the situation of Garrido's rise and American investment in Mexico. The U.S. trusted the wider government by that point and didn't have a vested interest in their agricultural sector like they did in the energy sector.



Basically, and no disrespect intended, your argument boils down to Will to Power based on Nationalistic desires. It's understandable position, but it isn't reflected well in the real world; could one say the Filipinos, the Central Americans, Caribbean peoples, or even Native Americans were less motivated? How about the Germans and Japanese in World War II? Motivation to fight is an important factor, but it isn't, on its own, decisive in Insurgency contexts. Even the Iraq War, despite its unpopularity, saw the U.S. willpower last long enough to install a government that still to this day more or less stands in control of Iraq. Unlike said conflict, however, the U.S. would and did have a lot of motivation to fight a war in Mexico in the timeframe.

Well, I suppose this is where I'll have to agree to disagree with you and bow out. I still don't see an extended occupation happening when the Americans already had the resources, motives and opportunity to try doing so historically, but didn't. The oil expropriations didn't really kick into high gear until the Calles and Cardenas administrations of the mid-20s to 30s, prior to that the revolutionaries focused on land reform and agrarian expropriation instead. And I mean, the Mexicans certainly gave them enough casus belli which I've listed several times and even engaged in large skirmishes after American entry into WW1 that left dozens dead or wounded, yet - no full-scale invasion, much less occupation afterward.

To summarize my position throughout this thread up till now:

1. I simply do not see a good reason as to why they'd take a chance by going all-in in 1919 when they never did before or after, often when the circumstances were more favorable and the case for war arguably stronger than it was with the Jenkins kidnapping. Violating diplomats' sanctity is bad and valid grounds for war, of course, as Genghis Khan would argue, but then surely actively raiding American towns, killing dozens of American citizens and troops, giving actual known Communists positions of power and forcibly nationalizing American property (from the US perspective, stealing) are as bad or worse, yet...they all happened IRL and they never led to all-out war, not even just to turf out the Mexican government, much less to occupy and nation-build.
2. The assumption that ~200,000 American soldiers, the baseline for a successful occupation as you said, would precisely be enough to sustain the occupation also seems to me extremely optimistic and reliant on absolutely nothing going wrong (and thus necessitating another troop surge) for the occupation at any stage. For comparison and since we've brought up the Banana Wars a couple times, Nicaragua had much less US involvement, pitted against weaker rebels who were even more isolated from foreign support, and yet Augusto Sandino kept up the fight for six years. Hell, he survived to see the US withdrawal, free as a bird and still under arms.
3. I still see even less reason as to why the average American citizenry would tolerate keeping a force literally 100 times the size of the one sent to Nicaragua in Mexico, taking casualties and eating up their tax dollars for at least as many years and probably more than a decade, in a time of growing isolationism where they demonstrably voted for the candidates of 'returning to normalcy' with the primary reasons for said occupation being 'I bet they're all commies' and 'if we pull out they'll surely attack us in revenge' (both of which I'd imagine would start wearing thin after the first two or three years - even the latter, as it should be clear quite quickly that Mexico is in no shape to storm the border).

That said, I will leave things at this: you've clearly put a great deal of thought & research into this POD, even if I don't necessarily agree with the conclusions you're drawing. So if you're going to write a timeline out of this discussion I'll almost certainly read & like it.

Edit: Actually, disregard what I said about 'bowing out'. This is a sufficiently interesting and too-little-discussed topic that I'd like to come back to when I can, just give me a month or so to settle some things on my end. What I said at the end still holds true though, if you start a timeline based around this POD in the meantime.

 

[History Learner]

Edit: Actually, disregard what I said about 'bowing out'. This is a sufficiently interesting and too-little-discussed topic that I'd like to come back to when I can, just give me a month or so to settle some things on my end. What I said at the end still holds true though, if you start a timeline based around this POD in the meantime.

Is about eight months sufficient lol? I've been thinking about this recently again too and seeing this edit I hadn't seen previously made me want to come back to talk about this again even more. Hope things got better on your end.

So, firstly, after discussing this elsewhere I have started leaning more towards the agreement that total annexation-at least directly-probably wasn't likely; annex the then still under-populated northern areas, I think, is far more likely but that's not what I'm going to focus on here. Rather, how about a Philippines/Cuba status, with local autonomy but heavy U.S. domination of the economy and control of foreign affairs/defense? Or, perhaps, a Puerto Rica-like Commonwealth status? After a few decades of inter-connections, it ends up resulting in annexation.

Also, I've been thinking of this in terms of its impacts on the Interwar and WWII especially as my main focus. Mexico's population in 1940 was around ~20 Million, so at 12.7% mobilization (the level of the U.S. for its armed forces), that would net about 2.5 million that could be used in the industrial labor force (and thus freeing up more American manpower) or it could be a mixture, in terms of most/some going into industry and the rest going into the U.S. Armed Forces directly, ala the Philippines Divisions model historically used in 1941-1942. Regardless of how this manpower source was used, this would probably allow the United States to raise up to 185 to 200 Divisions, closely matching what the Victory Plan had originally called for in 1941 OTL.

 

[Circle of Willis]

Is about eight months sufficient lol? I've been thinking about this recently again too and seeing this edit I hadn't seen previously made me want to come back to talk about this again even more. Hope things got better on your end.

So, firstly, after discussing this elsewhere I have started leaning more towards the agreement that total annexation-at least directly-probably wasn't likely; annex the then still under-populated northern areas, I think, is far more likely but that's not what I'm going to focus on here. Rather, how about a Philippines/Cuba status, with local autonomy but heavy U.S. domination of the economy and control of foreign affairs/defense? Or, perhaps, a Puerto Rica-like Commonwealth status? After a few decades of inter-connections, it ends up resulting in annexation.

Also, I've been thinking of this in terms of its impacts on the Interwar and WWII especially as my main focus. Mexico's population in 1940 was around ~20 Million, so at 12.7% mobilization (the level of the U.S. for its armed forces), that would net about 2.5 million that could be used in the industrial labor force (and thus freeing up more American manpower) or it could be a mixture, in terms of most/some going into industry and the rest going into the U.S. Armed Forces directly, ala the Philippines Divisions model historically used in 1941-1942. Regardless of how this manpower source was used, this would probably allow the United States to raise up to 185 to 200 Divisions, closely matching what the Victory Plan had originally called for in 1941 OTL.

Yes indeed, things have gotten much better on my end! Thanks for asking

Philippine/Cuba status with a referendum on whether or not to become a formal part of the US, like the ones Puerto Rico has every now and then, does seem like it'd be the easiest way to get Mexico to become part of the States. I'm not sure how long that'd take though (not just the annexation but also presumably making the jump from being US territories to proper states), could be 50 years or 100 or more considering Puerto Rico still isn't a state after ~120 years. Or even whether American politicians/the public at home would want to absorb Mexico - it could easily throw the Democrat/Republican balance of power out of whack, so whichever party thinks they have more to lose electorally from adding the Mexican states has a pretty powerful incentive to want to block or at least delay the process as much as possible.

I haven't had the time to give the domestic implications of Mexico joining the US too much thought, and certainly which Mexican states fall in line with which party probably depends greatly on the time period in which they join because the Dems/GOP of 1965 (for example) were pretty different from the two parties in 2015. The Mexicans also have their own traditional sociopolitical/ethnic divides, leftovers of the casta system, to try to fit into the American political arena. But in general, assuming both Dem and GOP voters & politicians approve of the annexation of Mexico after a while, my guess is that the new Mexican states would generally support initiatives to devolve power back to the states and roll back federal overreach, since I can't imagine they'd particularly want absolute rule from Washington DC (or anything close to it).

Other than that, there might be an earlier uptick in economic populism on the part of both big parties since Mexican voters tend to like that. I'd also guess the GOP (assuming they still end up on the conservative side of the culture war post-Reagan) would have an easy time picking up the most socially conservative states such as Guanajuato and other OTL-Cristero/PAN bastions while the Dems snap up the native-dominated states like Chiapas. I'm thinking the American feds, with their far greater power and higher anti-corruption standards, would never allow the cartels and groups like the Zapatistas to balloon to the level they're at today, so the drug war wouldn't be nearly as much of a society-crippling problem in the Mexican states (maybe Colombia's cartels will remain ascendant ITL?) nor would there likely be any Zapatista communes tolerated in the south.

 

[History Learner]

I got a copy of Charles Emmerson's 1913, which has a chapter specifically on Mexico which was very revealing:

Where exactly America ended and where Mexico began was hard to​

say. In principle, the boundary between the two countries was defined by​

a line on a map: gently east from California, then skirting the southern​

limits of Arizona and New Mexico, fully-fledged states for less than a​

year, and then following the twists and turns of the Rio Grande down to​

the Gulf of Mexico. But lines on maps do not always correspond to the​

realities on the ground. How different, really, was San Antonio, Texas,​

from Monterrey, Mexico?​

​

The line on the map was, in any case, perhaps temporary. In his novel​

Philip Dru, Woodrow Wilson’s Texan adviser Colonel House had​

fantasised about a future where Mexico was incorporated into the United​

States. This did not seem so far-fetched. To many Americans, it would be​

the natural continuation of manifest destiny which had gathered Texas​

and California into the American fold, and which had made America​

responsible for the fates of the former Spanish colonies of Cuba and the​

Philippines. But even if the line would not be redrawn, would it not fade​

away over time as Mexico and America were welded together in the​

common fires of economic development? If Mexico was California’s​

past, was California not Mexico’s future? Even in 1913, as Mexico was​

falling apart in the fires of civil conflict, Wilson’s personal​

representative, holed up in Veracruz because the capital was too​

dangerous, contemplated that American civilisation was percolating​

south over the border, unstoppably:​

​

... we must not overlook the contact of the Mexican peon with our civilization along​

the National boundary, in our schools, and along the lines of the National railways for​

upwards a quarter century. Many have tasted the sweets of personal independence and​

security and of a higher plane of living ... They are breathing the atmosphere of the​

twentieth century in rarefied form. A middle class is in the making. They have become​

democrats by contact with democracy and force of circumstance ... and in the degree​

that the Mexican of the North becomes a democrat his hatred grows against the social​

and economic conditions of the South and against the old 16th century regime ...1​

​

In the first years of the twentieth century, American companies were​

already the largest investors in Mexico, well ahead of the Mexicans​

themselves (and ahead of the British, French or Germans). American​

mines had American foremen, American engineers, American​

accountants and American doctors. Edward L. Doheny, the man who had​

first struck oil in Los Angeles, was also the first to produce oil in Mexico,​

at El Ebano, near Tampico on the Gulf of Mexico. His Mexican​

Petroleum Company, controlling 600,000 acres of Mexican land, was​

incorporated in Los Angeles.2 Although Mexico’s foreign-built railway​

system had now come under Mexican control its official language was​

still English, and its principal railway lines still ran north. A strike of​

workers at the American-owned Cananea Copper Company in 1906 was​

put down with the help of Arizona rangers from across the border in​

Bisbee, though the local Mexican governor softened the blow to national​

pride by insisting the Americans be temporarily sworn in as soldiers of​

the Mexican border state of Sonora.​

 

[WolfBear]

I got a copy of Charles Emmerson's 1913, which has a chapter specifically on Mexico which was very revealing:

Where exactly America ended and where Mexico began was hard to​

say. In principle, the boundary between the two countries was defined by​

a line on a map: gently east from California, then skirting the southern​

limits of Arizona and New Mexico, fully-fledged states for less than a​

year, and then following the twists and turns of the Rio Grande down to​

the Gulf of Mexico. But lines on maps do not always correspond to the​

realities on the ground. How different, really, was San Antonio, Texas,​

from Monterrey, Mexico?​

​

The line on the map was, in any case, perhaps temporary. In his novel​

Philip Dru, Woodrow Wilson’s Texan adviser Colonel House had​

fantasised about a future where Mexico was incorporated into the United​

States. This did not seem so far-fetched. To many Americans, it would be​

the natural continuation of manifest destiny which had gathered Texas​

and California into the American fold, and which had made America​

responsible for the fates of the former Spanish colonies of Cuba and the​

Philippines. But even if the line would not be redrawn, would it not fade​

away over time as Mexico and America were welded together in the​

common fires of economic development? If Mexico was California’s​

past, was California not Mexico’s future? Even in 1913, as Mexico was​

falling apart in the fires of civil conflict, Wilson’s personal​

representative, holed up in Veracruz because the capital was too​

dangerous, contemplated that American civilisation was percolating​

south over the border, unstoppably:​

​

... we must not overlook the contact of the Mexican peon with our civilization along​

the National boundary, in our schools, and along the lines of the National railways for​

upwards a quarter century. Many have tasted the sweets of personal independence and​

security and of a higher plane of living ... They are breathing the atmosphere of the​

twentieth century in rarefied form. A middle class is in the making. They have become​

democrats by contact with democracy and force of circumstance ... and in the degree​

that the Mexican of the North becomes a democrat his hatred grows against the social​

and economic conditions of the South and against the old 16th century regime ...1​

​

In the first years of the twentieth century, American companies were​

already the largest investors in Mexico, well ahead of the Mexicans​

themselves (and ahead of the British, French or Germans). American​

mines had American foremen, American engineers, American​

accountants and American doctors. Edward L. Doheny, the man who had​

first struck oil in Los Angeles, was also the first to produce oil in Mexico,​

at El Ebano, near Tampico on the Gulf of Mexico. His Mexican​

Petroleum Company, controlling 600,000 acres of Mexican land, was​

incorporated in Los Angeles.2 Although Mexico’s foreign-built railway​

system had now come under Mexican control its official language was​

still English, and its principal railway lines still ran north. A strike of​

workers at the American-owned Cananea Copper Company in 1906 was​

put down with the help of Arizona rangers from across the border in​

Bisbee, though the local Mexican governor softened the blow to national​

pride by insisting the Americans be temporarily sworn in as soldiers of​

the Mexican border state of Sonora.​

In such a scenario, Mexico would become to the US what Central Asia is to Russia. FWIW, I'm willing to support the creation of a North American Union (confederation) if Canada will also join it alongside Mexico. Would be nice if entry into such a union could make Mexico less corrupt and also significantly reduce its homicide rate. But it wouldn't be a full-on union but instead something similar to the EU.

 

[ATP]

In such a scenario, Mexico would become to the US what Central Asia is to Russia. FWIW, I'm willing to support the creation of a North American Union (confederation) if Canada will also join it alongside Mexico. Would be nice if entry into such a union could make Mexico less corrupt and also significantly reduce its homicide rate. But it wouldn't be a full-on union but instead something similar to the EU.

If USA let cristeros win,you would have it.They were against socialism.But,USA protestants must support mexican masons,who made corrupted dynasties,fucked economy,and created current Mexico.

 

[History Learner]

In such a scenario, Mexico would become to the US what Central Asia is to Russia.

That's an interesting statement because @SpicyJuan directed me to The Lost History of 1914 by Jack Beatty and I'm currently going through its chapter on Mexico and American relations with it. Of note is this passage concerning President Wilson's early policy efforts to deal with the turmoil:

In early 1914, Wilson asked his diplomats to canvass foreign opinion on the Mexican crisis.​

The chargé d’affaires in St. Petersburg reported that the tsar believed “the only satisfactory​

solution is [U.S.] annexation, and this action Russia would see with approval.” Nicholas’s​

imperial solution was shared by the American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO),​

one of whose directors openly called for the United States to absorb northern Mexico. The​

financier Otto Kahn would have settled for the north becoming a separate country. Robert​

Lansing, then counsel to the State Department, warned that with nonrecognition and the​

lifting of the arms embargo the United States was on a path to war with Huerta. Annexation​

—of California and the Southwest—had crowned victory over Mexico in the 1846–48 war,​

and history might repeat itself in 1913–14. Woodrow Wilson confessed his shame over the​

Mexican War and in a major speech on Latin America before the Southern Commercial​

Congress in Mobile pledged that the United States would “never again” seek “one additional​

foot of territory by conquest.” Yet his anti-imperialist policy, twisted back on itself by contact​

with the tenebrous reality of Mexico, seemed headed toward war and conquest.​

 

[WolfBear]

That's an interesting statement because @SpicyJuan directed me to The Lost History of 1914 by Jack Beatty and I'm currently going through its chapter on Mexico and American relations with it. Of note is this passage concerning President Wilson's early policy efforts to deal with the turmoil:

In early 1914, Wilson asked his diplomats to canvass foreign opinion on the Mexican crisis.​

The chargé d’affaires in St. Petersburg reported that the tsar believed “the only satisfactory​

solution is [U.S.] annexation, and this action Russia would see with approval.” Nicholas’s​

imperial solution was shared by the American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO),​

one of whose directors openly called for the United States to absorb northern Mexico. The​

financier Otto Kahn would have settled for the north becoming a separate country. Robert​

Lansing, then counsel to the State Department, warned that with nonrecognition and the​

lifting of the arms embargo the United States was on a path to war with Huerta. Annexation​

—of California and the Southwest—had crowned victory over Mexico in the 1846–48 war,​

and history might repeat itself in 1913–14. Woodrow Wilson confessed his shame over the​

Mexican War and in a major speech on Latin America before the Southern Commercial​

Congress in Mobile pledged that the United States would “never again” seek “one additional​

foot of territory by conquest.” Yet his anti-imperialist policy, twisted back on itself by contact​

with the tenebrous reality of Mexico, seemed headed toward war and conquest.​

Maybe a different US President would have been more aggressive in seizing this opportunity?

 

[SpicyJuan]

Maybe a different US President would have been more aggressive in seizing this opportunity?

The most likely alternative to Wilson would be Champ Clark. I haven’t gone far enough in my research of him to know what his thoughts were regarding annexation of Mexican land, but based on one of the speeches I have of his re: the Philippines, I believe he would be opposed to any annexation since it would mean bringing in more non-whites into the country

 

[WolfBear]

The most likely alternative to Wilson (I would go so far to say most likely candidate)

Hughes? Or TR?

 

[SpicyJuan]

Hughes? Or TR?

Champ Clark

 

[History Learner]

That's an interesting statement because @SpicyJuan directed me to The Lost History of 1914 by Jack Beatty and I'm currently going through its chapter on Mexico and American relations with it.

More, concerning the Veracruz Incident:

Wilson had as much to regret in his supporters as in his critics. The Confederate veterans of​

Huntsville, Alabama, wanted it known they were available to serve, as was Theodore​

Roosevelt, who volunteered to raise a brigade of Rough Riders to invade Mexico. In a​

preview of scenes soon to be enacted in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg,​

men were reported “standing in lines a block long at Army and Navy recruiting stations” in​

Chicago, an example of a widespread “rush to enlist in the Army.”80​

​

American xenophobes exercised their patriotism on Mexicans and labor radicals protesting​

the intervention. In New York a mob pulled two Mexican Americans off a streetcar and a​

Mexican American baseball player was killed by his YMCA teammates. At Notre Dame,​

eleven Mexican boys were thrown into a river. Students at a Topeka high school forced​

Mexican railroad workers to salute the flag. Appleton, Wisconsin, youth marched in a​

torchlight parade under banners reading AVENGE THE FLAG! Wilson received a string of​

letters urging him, in the words of a Philadelphia piano tuner, to “let Uncle Sam take off his​

coat, roll up his sleeves, and pitch into those Mexicans ... and teach them to behave​

themselves.” Senator William E. Borah, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee,​

evoked Manifest Destiny: “Once the U.S. forces enter Mexico as an armed body, we are​

starting on the march to the Panama Canal.”81​

​

Wilson recoiled from the jingoism incited by his demagogic address to Congress. “I had a​

feeling of uneasiness as I read the papers this morning as if the country were getting on fire​

with war enthusiasm,” he remarked at a press conference. “I have an enthusiasm for justice​

and for the dignity of the United States, but not for war.” The army had “plans” to march on​

Mexico City from Veracruz, but he would not hear of that now; wiser by experience, the​

president who had tried to outsmart tomorrow in Mexico said, “Events must take their​

course.” When Argentina, Chile, and Brazil offered to mediate the conflict, he accepted with​

alacrity.82​

 

[WolfBear]

More, concerning the Veracruz Incident:

Wilson had as much to regret in his supporters as in his critics. The Confederate veterans of​

Huntsville, Alabama, wanted it known they were available to serve, as was Theodore​

Roosevelt, who volunteered to raise a brigade of Rough Riders to invade Mexico. In a​

preview of scenes soon to be enacted in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg,​

men were reported “standing in lines a block long at Army and Navy recruiting stations” in​

Chicago, an example of a widespread “rush to enlist in the Army.”80​

​

American xenophobes exercised their patriotism on Mexicans and labor radicals protesting​

the intervention. In New York a mob pulled two Mexican Americans off a streetcar and a​

Mexican American baseball player was killed by his YMCA teammates. At Notre Dame,​

eleven Mexican boys were thrown into a river. Students at a Topeka high school forced​

Mexican railroad workers to salute the flag. Appleton, Wisconsin, youth marched in a​

torchlight parade under banners reading AVENGE THE FLAG! Wilson received a string of​

letters urging him, in the words of a Philadelphia piano tuner, to “let Uncle Sam take off his​

coat, roll up his sleeves, and pitch into those Mexicans ... and teach them to behave​

themselves.” Senator William E. Borah, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee,​

evoked Manifest Destiny: “Once the U.S. forces enter Mexico as an armed body, we are​

starting on the march to the Panama Canal.”81​

​

Wilson recoiled from the jingoism incited by his demagogic address to Congress. “I had a​

feeling of uneasiness as I read the papers this morning as if the country were getting on fire​

with war enthusiasm,” he remarked at a press conference. “I have an enthusiasm for justice​

and for the dignity of the United States, but not for war.” The army had “plans” to march on​

Mexico City from Veracruz, but he would not hear of that now; wiser by experience, the​

president who had tried to outsmart tomorrow in Mexico said, “Events must take their​

course.” When Argentina, Chile, and Brazil offered to mediate the conflict, he accepted with​

alacrity.82​

Not clear if these Americans wanted to outright annex Mexico or merely to turn it into a US protectorate, but Yeah, it does make sense for Wilson, as a support of national self-determination, to oppose this as well as the US's previous war of conquest in this region in the form of the Mexican-American War.

 

[WolfBear]

The most likely alternative to Wilson would be Champ Clark. I haven’t gone far enough in my research of him to know what his thoughts were regarding annexation of Mexican land, but based on one of the speeches I have of his re: the Philippines, I believe he would be opposed to any annexation since it would mean bringing in more non-whites into the country

Clark opposed incorporating Filipinos into the US because they were Catholic non-whites? If so, then his position would make sense for an early 20th century white Southerner.