Spanish Alternatives in the American War of Independence:

[raharris1973]

Consider, if you wish, some alternatives courses of action, or outcomes of their actions, in the American War of Indepence:

1) No Bernardo Galvez as Governor of Luisiana, Commandante del Lame-O instead: What if instead of the talented Sr. Galvez as Governor of Luisiana and commander of Spanish forces in North America from 1777-1783, there is a crappy, administratively and militarily less competent appointee?

As a result, the Crown and Ministry policy of first allowing arms-smuggling to the Americans occurs via Spanish New Orleans, but the Spanish campaign based out of Luisiana to reclaim Florida, which succeeded in taking Pensacola and West Florida, and securing Spain's claim to recover all Florida, completely fails, as does Spanish campaigning in the Bahamas.

What are the consequences? A continued British Florida? Of what size and extent? Or Britain conceding Florida to the young USA early? With what historical effect?

2) Super-Bernardo: Galvez has even more foresight and ambition as the war approaches, and support from the New Spain Viceroyalty and Spain, which broadens the scope of his offensive from Luisiana into West Florida into Pensacola. A parallel. northern prong positions a smaller, but meaningful, mixed Spanish, local Francophone and native force under Spanish command around St. Louis to cross the Mississippi, which, operating well before Yankee George Rogers Clark, defeats pro-British native tribes, British detachments, and forts, secures garrisons around the base of the Great Lakes, Chicago and Detroit areas, and secures the Kentucky/Tennessee settlements.

Thus, the most forward of Spanish claims to the Trans-Appalachian/Allegheny West made at OTL's Paris negotiation, is actually backed by de facto occupation, troop sweeps, deals with natives, from the current western border of Georgia up through the middle of Ohio to Lake Erie, placing Spain, the owner of the real Toledo, as the probable owner of the land that became in OTL, Toledo, Ohio.

3) Spain can't be bothered: What if Spain, despite all its butt-hurt feeling against Britain, and pining for lost Florida, Gibraltar, and Menorca, and its family alliance with France, just feels like it's bad precedent, bad karma, bad juju, and bad vibes to be supporting independence rebels of another colonial power. It's just too risky, win or lose, expensive, win or lose, and prone to fail anyway. So Spain doesn't help the American rebels, even though the French go all in, first with covert aid, then with recognition, alliance, and war with Britain.

How does an American revolutionary war/war of independence, with the American Patriots, and the French, going all in, but the Spanish staying all out, go differently from OTL, if at all? In terms of final outcomes on the map, perhaps not much different, except for near-certainly, no transfer of Florida from Britain to Spain [so what there, Florida stays British? Ceded to America? Ceded to France of all strange things?] Or maybe quite different - Maybe the Americans lose? Maybe the French do not get Tobago or Senegal?

But certainly some campaigns would be different. No focus on a siege of Gibraltar. A pretty good chance of no massed Bourbon Armada of 1779, because Spain was pushing more for that type of decisive massed assault at the heart of British power - France on its own may be more satisfied with an expeditionary naval duel focused on the North American and Caribbean theaters.

4) Spain is a scaredy gato and stays out of open war: Spain is cool with covert aid to the Americans, but eschews the risk, and the propaganda contradiction of open warfare with the British and relations with the Americans. So they pass material aid to the US and France under the table, but do not engage in combat or warfighting alliances. How does this change the war? It must change the campaigns the way I describe, but the resource picture is not as reduced for the Franco-American coalition as much as in scenario #3 I imagine. Difficult to see Britain getting any improved strategic result out of this except the possibility of keeping Florida.

 

[Buba]

3 and 4 = Founding Fathers do the Hemp Jig as the revolt is crushed.

I do not know enough as to comment on nos. 1 and 2

 

[Skallagrim]

1) No Bernardo Galvez as Governor of Luisiana, Commandante del Lame-O instead: What if instead of the talented Sr. Galvez as Governor of Luisiana and commander of Spanish forces in North America from 1777-1783, there is a crappy, administratively and militarily less competent appointee?

As a result, the Crown and Ministry policy of first allowing arms-smuggling to the Americans occurs via Spanish New Orleans, but the Spanish campaign based out of Luisiana to reclaim Florida, which succeeded in taking Pensacola and West Florida, and securing Spain's claim to recover all Florida, completely fails, as does Spanish campaigning in the Bahamas.

What are the consequences? A continued British Florida? Of what size and extent? Or Britain conceding Florida to the young USA early? With what historical effect?

Britain retains Florida. There would be no reason to hand it over to the USA, except in order to exchange it for cncessions elsewhere. (Such as a bigger chunk of the Great Lakes region remaining in British hands.)

Since Britain still occupied parts of Georgia and South Carolina when the war ended, it's probable that British Florida (if not exchanged for something else) will be fairly sizable. By which I mean: Georgia's claims to the West of the Proclamation Line and to the South of the 1732 Charter Boundary would presumably be included in British Florida. See map:

One assumes that the Northern regions of this territory (and possibly all/most of it) would become a Native vassal state of Britain, serving as a buffer against US (slavocrat) expansion into the Caribbean.

Meanwhile, if and when conflict arises between the USA and Britain (e.g. War of 1812), Britain will be in a better position to launch a campaign aimed at swiftly occupying New Orleans. Which they will certainly do. And they will not relinquish it again after the war.

2) Super-Bernardo: Galvez has even more foresight and ambition as the war approaches, and support from the New Spain Viceroyalty and Spain, which broadens the scope of his offensive from Luisiana into West Florida into Pensacola. A parallel. northern prong positions a smaller, but meaningful, mixed Spanish, local Francophone and native force under Spanish command around St. Louis to cross the Mississippi, which, operating well before Yankee George Rogers Clark, defeats pro-British native tribes, British detachments, and forts, secures garrisons around the base of the Great Lakes, Chicago and Detroit areas, and secures the Kentucky/Tennessee settlements.

Thus, the most forward of Spanish claims to the Trans-Appalachian/Allegheny West made at OTL's Paris negotiation, is actually backed by de facto occupation, troop sweeps, deals with natives, from the current western border of Georgia up through the middle of Ohio to Lake Erie, placing Spain, the owner of the real Toledo, as the probable owner of the land that became in OTL, Toledo, Ohio.

Spain doesn't have the logistics or the manpower to hold regions far inland. Holding on to these claims would also create needless conflict with the USA. The most probable outcome is that Spain and the USA negotiate some kind of deal whereby Spain surrenders all its inland claims West of the Mississippi to the USA, in exchange for American recognition of a sizable Spanish Florida. (I assume it would be comparable to the British Florida that I outlined.) This would be considered the definitive settlement of the "Florida question".

It's even possible that Spain and the USA reach an early type of Louisiana Purchase agreement, although on less overwhelmingly favourable terms to the USA. The Americans would only be buying the inland region (presumably on the cheap), while the Southernmost bit (roughly the present-day state of Louisiana) would be absorbed into Spanish Florida. The USA would gain guaranteed unhindered civilian shipping through New Orleans. (If France still occupies Spain, forcing Spain to surrender New Orleans would be impossible, since the agreement with the USA would no doubt forbid this.)

3) Spain can't be bothered: What if Spain, despite all its butt-hurt feeling against Britain, and pining for lost Florida, Gibraltar, and Menorca, and its family alliance with France, just feels like it's bad precedent, bad karma, bad juju, and bad vibes to be supporting independence rebels of another colonial power. It's just too risky, win or lose, expensive, win or lose, and prone to fail anyway. So Spain doesn't help the American rebels, even though the French go all in, first with covert aid, then with recognition, alliance, and war with Britain.

How does an American revolutionary war/war of independence, with the American Patriots, and the French, going all in, but the Spanish staying all out, go differently from OTL, if at all? In terms of final outcomes on the map, perhaps not much different, except for near-certainly, no transfer of Florida from Britain to Spain [so what there, Florida stays British? Ceded to America? Ceded to France of all strange things?] Or maybe quite different - Maybe the Americans lose? Maybe the French do not get Tobago or Senegal?

But certainly some campaigns would be different. No focus on a siege of Gibraltar. A pretty good chance of no massed Bourbon Armada of 1779, because Spain was pushing more for that type of decisive massed assault at the heart of British power - France on its own may be more satisfied with an expeditionary naval duel focused on the North American and Caribbean theaters.

4) Spain is a scaredy gato and stays out of open war: Spain is cool with covert aid to the Americans, but eschews the risk, and the propaganda contradiction of open warfare with the British and relations with the Americans. So they pass material aid to the US and France under the table, but do not engage in combat or warfighting alliances. How does this change the war? It must change the campaigns the way I describe, but the resource picture is not as reduced for the Franco-American coalition as much as in scenario #3 I imagine. Difficult to see Britain getting any improved strategic result out of this except the possibility of keeping Florida.

In both cases, the USA is weakened do to a reduction in foreign aid compared to OTL, which again means that Britain keeps (Greater) Florida. In this case, without even a fight. This presumably doesn't avert US independence, but it could give Britain an opportunity to force a peace more favourable to its own interests.

For instance, in addition to keeping an enlarged Florida, Britain might retain the part of New York state bordering the Great Lakes, as a Native buffer state. Similarly, the area roughly corresponding to the OTL states of Michigan and Wisconsin might remain held by the British. Finally, a significant chunk of Maine might be retained by the British.

All of this would greatly improve the prospects of British North America, as a super-Canada is now in the cards. At the same time, a large British Florida give Britain domination over the Caribbean. As in scenario 1, an occupation of New Orleans is now much easier. So is British power projection in the regions, which may well cost Revolutionary France all of its possessions in the Caribbean.

 

[ATP]

3 and 4 = Founding Fathers do the Hemp Jig as the revolt is crushed.

I do not know enough as to comment on nos. 1 and 2

3 and 4 - agree,althought there still could be smaller USA here.
2- do not know enough
1- Bigger british Florida,and possible bigger Canada,too.

 

[Buba]

Very interesting ideas about butterflies caused by British Florida - maybe the USA's southern border would run from the Savannah River (if not the Santee) along the 35th parallel to the Mississippi River?

 

[raharris1973]

3 and 4 = Founding Fathers do the Hemp Jig as the revolt is crushed.

I do not know enough as to comment on nos. 1 and 2

Wait, you are saying the full weight of France was insufficient for the Americans to win independence or the rebel leaders to survive? The full weight of France, plus covert supply from Spain was insufficient? The Americans needed the full weight of Spanish open material support and combat engagement against Britain to win independence and for the rebel leaders to survive?

 

[Buba]

The American rebellion was touch and go. IMO in #3 it gets crushed. In #4 - that's highly likely.

 

[ATP]

Wait, you are saying the full weight of France was insufficient for the Americans to win independence or the rebel leaders to survive? The full weight of France, plus covert supply from Spain was insufficient? The Americans needed the full weight of Spanish open material support and combat engagement against Britain to win independence and for the rebel leaders to survive?

If i remember correctly,there was about 10 moments when they would fail if they have less luck.

 

[Buba]

Neutral (even if unfriendly) Spain means British troops tied up in Menorca and Gibraltar (or used for classical British ankle biting operations like the attack on Honduras) are free to be used in the 13 Colonies.