Stalin's approval of the Kovel option unravels German Ostfront in 1944

[raharris1973]

Credit goes to the HistoryLearner for discovering this idea-

History Learner said: From Germany and the Second World War, Volume VIII: The Eastern Front, 1943-1944 by Karl Heinz Frieser, Pages 599 to 600:

The Soviet operation in Belorussia doubtless achieved a great deal, but it did not do what appears to have been possible with hindsight, that is, bring about the collapse of the German eastern front with a single mighty blow. In the spring of 1944 the war was not only lost for Germany, but was already almost over. The situation was particularly critical in the east, where the Wehrmacht’s inferiority had attained dramatic proportions.In those circumstances the OKH feared the Soviet command would exploit Germany’s acute vulnerability at the beginning of the invasion in the west to launch an offensive that would decide the war. It was believed that the Russians would concentrate all available forces in one place to deliver a death blow to the German eastern army. Foreign Armies East, under Maj.-Gen. Gehlen, had long since located the Archimedean point at which the German front could be operationally dislodged. That point was the Kovel salient, from which Red Army armoured units could rapidly advance to the Baltic via Warsaw and enclose two German army groups. Then the whole eastern front would collapse and the road to Berlin would be open. In retrospect it seems highly likely that such an encirclement attack would have succeeded. Today, unlike the Soviet leadership in the early summer of 1944, we possess precise information as to the real relative strength of the two sides and the subsequent course of events. At all events, in the summer of 1944 the Red Army rapidly achieved an operational breakthrough in every offensive. On 18 July, 1st Belorussian Front began a secondary offensive at Kovel and, although only its left wing took part in the attack, the German defenders were simply swept away. Only a few days later there was a gap almost 100 kilometres wide in the German front.It is therefore easy to imagine the avalanche that would have been set in motion if Operation BAGRATION had been carried out from Kovel in the direction of Warsaw, rather than from the Belorussian balcony in the direction of Minsk. It was, after all, the greatest mass of forces ever deployed in an offensive till that time. The Red Army command nevertheless made the mistake of dispersing its strategic potential at operational level. The glorificatory Soviet historiography repeatedly invoked Stalin’s ‘ten blows’ (offensives) of 1944, but close examination shows that they were several blows too many. The fact is that in the summer of 1944 the Soviet command did not risk mustering its forces for the decisive death blow, but contented itself with inflicting a multitude of wounds on the enemy. Instead of a decisive strategic offensive in a single sector, it conducted a series of operational strikes along the whole front. Operation BAGRATION against Army Group Centre was only the main blow of the summer of 1944. It was followed by other major offensives, staggered from the outset, with the result that all four German army groups on the eastern front were attacked simultaneously.
Further, on Page 601:

During the ongoing offensive there was nevertheless a second chance to put that idea into practice. On 8 July, given the surprisingly favourable course of the operation, Zhukov called for the establishment of a new point of concentration. The plan which the German general staff so feared was now on the table. The Soviet attacking forces concentrated near Kovel were to turn north towards Warsaw, and from there advance on East Prussia in a bold manoeuvre that would have cut off the whole north wing of the German eastern front. But Stalin refused. Not until 27 July did he instruct Rokossovsky to turn a section of his troops north towards Warsaw. It was too late, however, since Field Marshal Model had meanwhile brought up his last armoured reserves, with which he was able to stop the advance on Warsaw at the last moment. The result was a second ‘miracle on the Vistula’. Having lost the first battle by risking too much, Stalin lost the second by risking too little. Thus, the end of the war was needlessly postponed. Hitler and his regime were granted another stay of execution, and the bloody battles ended only in 1945.Inspired by a debate me and @ObssesedNuker have in another thread, but what if Stalin had been less cautious in early July and approved of Zhukov's suggestion for a deep strike? Army Group Center would unquestionably be encircled and destroyed in its entirety and quite probably Army Group North too, given the inability of the Germans to launch Operation Doppelkopf as per OTL in August of 1944; even in a best case scenario, the most AGN could do is withdraw into East Prussia, which is likewised encircled by the Soviet strike to the mouth of the Vistula.

On the whole, this seems to me to be the type of PoD that could actually end the war by Christmas, as the Germans would likely be forced to pull everything they can from other fronts to screen Berlin. IOTL, the Western Allies very nearly broke into the Po Valley in August and Operation Luttich probably delayed things in France by two to three weeks. Likely the Anglo-Americans will meet the Soviets further West than they did historically. One ironic bit is that, while the Soviets will be stronger in Central Europe, they might be less so in the Balkans; Bulgaria here might be a NATO member and Romania neutral like Czechoslovakia was IOTL until 1948.

ObssesedNuker said:

While I can see Soviet influence in the Balkans being lessened, I don’t see it being those two countries. The Red Army is still well poised to reach Romania and Bulgaria first. I figure it would be Soviet influence over Hungary that would be lessened, since they are further afield and Hungary is liable to be better poised to jump ship compared to OTL, when the Germans thwarted their defection attempt via pre-emptive coup. And there’s Yugoslavia of course, but then as the Tito-Soviet split shows it wasn’t like Soviet influence specifically was quite that strong there.

Chris S said:

I think if this occurred you still get Soviet influence in Bulgaria since the war in Europe being over by Christmas possibly means the Soviets still go into Bulgaria by September. Hungary jumping ship might be more effective though and as a result they might escape full Soviet domination and end up more like Finland.

Even if the Soviets meet the western allies further west they will will withdraw towards the agreed zonal boundaries which had mostly taken shape by 1944 anyway (besides which Stalin will still get on fairly well with Roosevelt relatively speaking and will also want to confirm Soviet gains for entering the war with Japan; if they don't go with the zonal borders that they and the British had independently agreed the outline on initially in 1943 then they can kiss any agreements on the post-war order in Asia goodbye..).

What will change is what the Soviets can grab before pulling back - some German scientists who in OTL ended up in the West might end up in the East or dead in TTL and I can easily see the USSR stripping the temporarily occupied areas of agri-food stuff and industrial stuff as reparations. This alone should make for interesting PODs on how it changes (or not) Western and Eastern military and space research.

This will also change the war in the Pacific as it allows for earlier Soviet entry, gives time for French entry into the Pacific and for the Americans, British and Soviets to actually throw even more at the Japanese since presumably they all lose less men as a result of a speedier collapse of Germany (for instance the Americans might lose say...7,000-10,000 less men killed in action probably and they get to free up 15+ divisions almost 5 months earlier than in OTL..) . It might even bring forward Allied moves to such an extent that American forces are already on Kyushu (at the start of the equivalent of Operation Olympic, whatever it would be called) when the first atomic bombs are used and the British have retaken Malaya, Singapore and taken Sumutra.

ObssesedNuker and Chris S, discussed with the OP and believed that in the rush to exploit the German collapse in the east the Soviets could not be as thorough in occupying *all* the same Central or Southeastern European countries as OTL while trying to fast-track themselves through Poland and into Berlin.

ObssesedNuker and Chris S. both believed it was Hungary that was more likely to be skipped over by the Soviets than Bulgaria.

Supposing that is correct, a thought occurs to me about the effects of a noncommunist, free market, neutralist Hungary throughout the Cold War.

If the Kovel Option ends the war early, and leaves Hungary outside of the Soviet sphere, it could have interesting consequences. Hungary could be a western aligned island, or a Finlandized or Austrianized neutral. Austria could be a pro-western republic.

In any case, with Hungary non-communist, and smallholders and bourgeois parties dominating, its politics will be different. Romania will be in the Soviet sphere and Sovietized. The Czechoslovakian Communist party will be strong and seek Moscow's permission to obtain total power, and seize it at some point, Yugoslavia will still have its own strong native communist movement under Tito, that will brook no opposition.

I wonder if a likely side effect of this divide, the Trianon-benefitting countries all becoming communist dictatorships, while Hungary remains capitalist, and possibly democratic, results in mass voluntary exodus of ethnic Hungarian populations from Romania, Slovakia and Vojvodina, basically eliminating coherent blocks of Hungarian majority territory in the formerly Hungarian majority lands lost in Trianon. Communism becomes a force making the post-Trianon Hungarian state be the only true national home for Hungarians, and, presuming that the Communist regimes ever do fall in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia in later decades, there might no longer be any coherent demographic-territorial basis to support Hungarian claims to lands lost in Trianon - the ethnic Hungarians having voted with their feet to live in relatively much more prosperous Trianon Hungary over the prior generations?

 

[ATP]

1. - soviets would not only take more german territories,but maybe even Denmark.It change history,too - they could start conventional WW3 beliving in short victorious war,which change everything.

Even if WW3 do not stary,germany would be economically crippled and unable to take over Europe again using EU.Good for everybody.

About Hungary - in theory true,in practice... - soviet rulers there would not agree to fleeing of hungarian slaves.Who would work for them in that case ?

 

[Buba]

Interesting.
I suppose that there were worries over a counterattack from the north cutting off the Soviet spearhead coming out from Kovel.
Kovel to Warsaw is 350-400 km - hence withing one-jump distance, albeit near its edge (as seen in OTL).
It is another 200-250km to the coast - that'd need another jump, only possible after rail supply catches up (6 weeks minimum, prolly eight).
I'm not sure about there being railways supporting a Kowel based "to the Baltic" major offensive. I'm fairly sure that Belarus had more rail lines (built pre-WWI with French money for the attack on Germany).

Speaking of RR - taking Warsaw basically cuts off AG Nord and Mitte, as the city is the railhub for lines running to Moscow and Sankt Peterburg. North of Warsaw, up to Koenigsberg, top-of-mind there are 4? lines (not all double tracked) supplying the millions of troops in Belarus, forcing a pullback (or creating a disastrous pocket).

So, ALT-Kovel Offensive reaches Warsaw in late July, there is a major battle around it, with German reserves coming from Belarus. Then a strike in October/November to get to the Baltic coast and thus cut off AG Nord and Mitte, or force their withdrawal.
Producing a gigantic battle along the lower Vistula with the forces pulling out from Belarus.

Hence I see an alt January Offensive starting in January , but with jump off positions slightly more to the west, with no East Prussian overhang, and against much(?) weaker opposition. So, two months shaved off war, ending with Berlin stormed in early March.

Probably no Ardennes Offensive as there would be no troops for that.

I simply do not believe in "single strike war winners" ... with the rail&truck logistics of the day, 500km jumps were the maximum.

 

[sillygoose]

Credit goes to the HistoryLearner for discovering this idea-



WI: Stalin approves of the Kovel Option, July 1944

WI: Stalin approves of the Kovel Option, July 1944

ObssesedNuker and Chris S, discussed with the OP and believed that in the rush to exploit the German collapse in the east the Soviets could not be as thorough in occupying *all* the same Central or Southeastern European countries as OTL while trying to fast-track themselves through Poland and into Berlin.

ObssesedNuker and Chris S. both believed it was Hungary that was more likely to be skipped over by the Soviets than Bulgaria.

Supposing that is correct, a thought occurs to me about the effects of a noncommunist, free market, neutralist Hungary throughout the Cold War.

If the Kovel Option ends the war early, and leaves Hungary outside of the Soviet sphere, it could have interesting consequences. Hungary could be a western aligned island, or a Finlandized or Austrianized neutral. Austria could be a pro-western republic.

In any case, with Hungary non-communist, and smallholders and bourgeois parties dominating, its politics will be different. Romania will be in the Soviet sphere and Sovietized. The Czechoslovakian Communist party will be strong and seek Moscow's permission to obtain total power, and seize it at some point, Yugoslavia will still have its own strong native communist movement under Tito, that will brook no opposition.

I wonder if a likely side effect of this divide, the Trianon-benefitting countries all becoming communist dictatorships, while Hungary remains capitalist, and possibly democratic, results in mass voluntary exodus of ethnic Hungarian populations from Romania, Slovakia and Vojvodina, basically eliminating coherent blocks of Hungarian majority territory in the formerly Hungarian majority lands lost in Trianon. Communism becomes a force making the post-Trianon Hungarian state be the only true national home for Hungarians, and, presuming that the Communist regimes ever do fall in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia in later decades, there might no longer be any coherent demographic-territorial basis to support Hungarian claims to lands lost in Trianon - the ethnic Hungarians having voted with their feet to live in relatively much more prosperous Trianon Hungary over the prior generations?

It is an interesting concept, but I'm not sure the logistics really work out for such an operation, nor that they could really stop AG-Center from breaking out from the Kovel thrust, potentially inflicting severe damage on the way out. Clearly the Soviets had a reason to do as they did IOTL, so I'm guessing it was about logistical limitations and rightful fear of counterattacks, which had so often bloodied their forces when Stalin's demands for major offensives got overly ambitious. That moots the point about the Balkans.

However if we wave away any restraint and just say it works and collapses the German war effort, I do't see how this really keeps the Soviets out of the Balkans. The Wallies did not have the logistics to move into the region given how they'd be more fixated on occupying Western Europe and Italy and at most parts of Austria and West Germany in the event of a collapse along their fronts due to transfers East. Bombing had wrecked the rail infrastructure and the port situation similarly was a massive constraint that combined really hamstrung the Wallied advance after August 1944 and jacked up their casualties despite the sorry state of the Wehrmacht. Honestly I don't think this changes all that much in terms of Soviet occupation areas compared to OTL, it just arguably saves more lives due to the shortened war while making the Soviets considerably more powerful in the aftermath of the war due to avoiding millions more casualties than they would have taken otherwise while the areas they occupy are more intact, so more economically useful.

In the Far East there is the issue of earlier Soviet entry and occupation of major parts of Asia. Given how far the Allies were from Japan the Soviets would occupy all of Korea and Manchuria and ensure Mao has a much earlier and easier victory, while Korea is united under Kim Sung Il in 1945.

Effectively this ensure Stalin a substantially greater powerbase post-war and the Morgenthau Plan would be carried out. The Communist slave empires are more likely locked in going forward and Asia probably falls to Communist regimes as CCP run China is able to entrench itself earlier, not having to deal with the Korean War, can really get itself involved in SE Asia sooner and to a much greater degree, and take advantage of the US weakness in the 1940s. Given the greater power of the Soviets here I'd imagine they'd be much more active in the immediate post-war era in supporting the various Communist groups in Europe, especially as the US and UK relied heavily on Communist groups to form the core of their guerrilla movements in Italy and France as well as in the Balkans. If Stalin is that much more powerful and the war ends at least 6 months sooner then expect the US government to roll over to whatever Stalin wants, especially with FDR in charge of the post-war peace deals and occupation conferences. Truman actually removed a lot of the Communist agents (or agent adjacent and influenced) that FDR had kept in office, so if FDR and his team are running the equivalent of the Potsdam conference and the war ends before there is a Yalta they really are going to give away the plot to Stalin and ensure the Soviets effectively run continental Europe even if clandestinely through influence networks.

Eurasia is basically screwed ITTL.

 

[ATP]

It is an interesting concept, but I'm not sure the logistics really work out for such an operation, nor that they could really stop AG-Center from breaking out from the Kovel thrust, potentially inflicting severe damage on the way out. Clearly the Soviets had a reason to do as they did IOTL, so I'm guessing it was about logistical limitations and rightful fear of counterattacks, which had so often bloodied their forces when Stalin's demands for major offensives got overly ambitious. That moots the point about the Balkans.

However if we wave away any restraint and just say it works and collapses the German war effort, I do't see how this really keeps the Soviets out of the Balkans. The Wallies did not have the logistics to move into the region given how they'd be more fixated on occupying Western Europe and Italy and at most parts of Austria and West Germany in the event of a collapse along their fronts due to transfers East. Bombing had wrecked the rail infrastructure and the port situation similarly was a massive constraint that combined really hamstrung the Wallied advance after August 1944 and jacked up their casualties despite the sorry state of the Wehrmacht. Honestly I don't think this changes all that much in terms of Soviet occupation areas compared to OTL, it just arguably saves more lives due to the shortened war while making the Soviets considerably more powerful in the aftermath of the war due to avoiding millions more casualties than they would have taken otherwise while the areas they occupy are more intact, so more economically useful.

In the Far East there is the issue of earlier Soviet entry and occupation of major parts of Asia. Given how far the Allies were from Japan the Soviets would occupy all of Korea and Manchuria and ensure Mao has a much earlier and easier victory, while Korea is united under Kim Sung Il in 1945.

Effectively this ensure Stalin a substantially greater powerbase post-war and the Morgenthau Plan would be carried out. The Communist slave empires are more likely locked in going forward and Asia probably falls to Communist regimes as CCP run China is able to entrench itself earlier, not having to deal with the Korean War, can really get itself involved in SE Asia sooner and to a much greater degree, and take advantage of the US weakness in the 1940s. Given the greater power of the Soviets here I'd imagine they'd be much more active in the immediate post-war era in supporting the various Communist groups in Europe, especially as the US and UK relied heavily on Communist groups to form the core of their guerrilla movements in Italy and France as well as in the Balkans. If Stalin is that much more powerful and the war ends at least 6 months sooner then expect the US government to roll over to whatever Stalin wants, especially with FDR in charge of the post-war peace deals and occupation conferences. Truman actually removed a lot of the Communist agents (or agent adjacent and influenced) that FDR had kept in office, so if FDR and his team are running the equivalent of the Potsdam conference and the war ends before there is a Yalta they really are going to give away the plot to Stalin and ensure the Soviets effectively run continental Europe even if clandestinely through influence networks.

Eurasia is basically screwed ITTL.

Add Africa.If Sralin take Europe,he would take their african colonies,too.
British maybe save South,but that would be all.

 

[sillygoose]

Add Africa.If Sralin take Europe,he would take their african colonies,too.
British maybe save South,but that would be all.

I wouldn't be surprised if Britain went Communist given the power of Labour at the time and if Stalin was able to get France to go Communist, since that would be an ideal base to stage operations out of. Coupled with the Cambridge Five being able to aid Soviet infiltration of Britain things could get interesting.

 

[Buba]

All this talk of the SU grabbing even more than in OTL ... what about a reaction? Operation Unthinkable is launched

 

[sillygoose]

All this talk of the SU grabbing even more than in OTL ... what about a reaction? Operation Unthinkable is launched

If the Soviets can pull this off and end the war at least 6 months earlier...I highly doubt the Wallies would risk fighting the Soviets, especially with the A-bomb so far off and Japan still to be dealt with.

 

[Buba]

I consider "6 months earlier" to be implausible. Two, maybe three months maximum.
And the push and shove afterwards will take a few months. Nuking Moscow in August '45 will be tempting ...

 

[sillygoose]

I consider "6 months earlier" to be implausible. Two, maybe three months maximum.

I agree, but was just trying to stick to the spirit of the OP. Logistically it was probably impossible to do anything different than OTL in that regard and concentrations of force like that would invite concentrated counterattacks that wouldn't be easy to repel for such a bold maneuver like the one proposed.

And the push and shove afterwards will take a few months. Nuking Moscow in August '45 will be tempting ...

Politically it would be impossible to go to war with the USSR here and FDR staying in charge for a longer part of the post-war period would ensure nothing like this could happen.

 

[ATP]

I wouldn't be surprised if Britain went Communist given the power of Labour at the time and if Stalin was able to get France to go Communist, since that would be an ideal base to stage operations out of. Coupled with the Cambridge Five being able to aid Soviet infiltration of Britain things could get interesting.

It could worked.With Eurasia and Africa in soviet hands,they would genocide billions before finally falling becouse of economic.
Becouse commie navies always suck,so they would not get USA.
Either that,or mutual anihilation.Unless somebody in USA mass produce H bombs,bombers, missiles - and used them all before soviets could do the same.
In that case,USA would survive - but,we need smart president supported by smart elites.Almost impossible in USA.

 

[stevep]

I wouldn't be surprised if Britain went Communist given the power of Labour at the time and if Stalin was able to get France to go Communist, since that would be an ideal base to stage operations out of. Coupled with the Cambridge Five being able to aid Soviet infiltration of Britain things could get interesting.

Utterly implausible. Labour at the time - or later - were never that extreme. Even under Foot in the early 80's. Not to mention the Labour of 1945, trained in the hard practicalities of survival in wartime are far less likely to listen to the suggestions of a number of inbred aristocrats who put their personal delusions ahead of reality.

 

[sillygoose]

Utterly implausible. Labour at the time - or later - were never that extreme. Even under Foot in the early 80's. Not to mention the Labour of 1945, trained in the hard practicalities of survival in wartime are far less likely to listen to the suggestions of a number of inbred aristocrats who put their personal delusions ahead of reality.

IOTL sure. But if France and maybe Italy had had a communist revolutions as a result of Stalin's extra success and prestige, plus ability to get agents more easily into France and Italy? With France communist and the ability of Soviet and French agents to easily infiltrate Britain post-war it would be a whole different ball game. The workers of Britain were quite a bit more radical than other segments of society, especially after WW2 (how else could you get a massive Labour victory, toss out a victorious Churchill, and get an NHS?) and Stalin's reputation and more importantly resource ITTL would be even greater. What would occupation zones look like with greater Soviet prestige and an earlier victory as a result?

 

[History Learner]

@raharris1973

Ironically, I had recently re-posted that thread elsewhere so it's funny you've done so here too. To quote myself from elsewhere:

So let's say the Soviets do this, advancing rapidly through Poland until reaching Danzig in August, effectively cutting off both Army Groups North and Center; the scattered survivors withdraw into East Prussia, which becomes the Courland analogue in this ATL. The Soviets on the North European Plain thereafter take time to rest and rebuild their supply lines, while the focus shifts South to where the Germans are collapsing as the Romanians, Hungarians and Bulgarians flip sides or outright collapse. Army Group South basically disintegrates and German resistance only really congeals in Western Hungary and Slovenia, with the Partisans liberating most of Yugoslavia with Soviet aid. The grand finale for the Soviets comes in December, with their "Oder Offensive" overrunning everything up to the Elbe, encircling Berlin and in the Balkans they advance upon Vienna.​

​

In the West, Operation Luttich still happens but is less powerful; some of the SS Divisions have been stripped to fight in the East and that enables the Allies to close off the Falaise Gap entirely. The Western Allies liberate Paris ahead of schedule and cut off the 15th Army in early September, which surrenders and enables the opening of Antwerp by the start of October. ATL Market Garden still happens but here the German forces are in no position to resist. With Antwerp open, Patton can also advance into and clear the Rhineland in October, crossing the Rhine in tandem with Dever's 6th Army to the South in November while the British do the same in the North via the Netherlands.​

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The Western Allies and and Soviets meet somewhere between the Wesser and Elbe in late December, possibly around Christmas time, but maybe as late as January. Regardless, WWII has ended several months ahead of schedule, with resulting effects on casualties and battle damage to all involved parties. The Soviets have vastly more prestige, and their further advance has given them an advantage in future reparations claims and securing German tech; more than likely, a lot of scientists, data, etc that went West in Operation Paperclip will be going Eastwards here.​

 

[stevep]

IOTL sure. But if France and maybe Italy had had a communist revolutions as a result of Stalin's extra success and prestige, plus ability to get agents more easily into France and Italy? With France communist and the ability of Soviet and French agents to easily infiltrate Britain post-war it would be a whole different ball game. The workers of Britain were quite a bit more radical than other segments of society, especially after WW2 (how else could you get a massive Labour victory, toss out a victorious Churchill, and get an NHS?) and Stalin's reputation and more importantly resource ITTL would be even greater. What would occupation zones look like with greater Soviet prestige and an earlier victory as a result?

The population of Britain was a lot more radical than Churchill who was the poster-child so to speak of the Tory campaign and was making idiotic rants that a Labour victory would end up with an HKVD type secret police. They had seen the 'ignore problems - they will go away eventually' attitude of the Tories fail miserably in the 1930's and then a more active government achieve dramatic performances during the war so were definitely eager for change and reform. This was shown by the fact that the army itself, which unlike in the 1918 election was allowed to vote, came out heavily in Labour's favour.

The NHS was supported because it was an obvious answer to a serious need for the vast majority of the population. Despite ~40 years of Tory attempts to cripple it by adding excessive bureaucracy that's why its still extremely popular today. Simply put its a very cheap and reliable solution to the issue of how you provide health services to a population.

There was a lot of sympathy for the USSR, in part because it was understood it had carried the major burden of the war against Germany and in part because of the intensive propaganda under both Churchill and Roosevelt to make them more acceptable allies against the Nazis. Which in hindsight was an error. However if you start getting Soviet arranged coups in Italy and France then that's not going to last long.

Not sure how the zones of influence might change with such a big Soviet success. Its probably going to shorten the war but then not all in Stalin's favour. Its going to prompt Germany to commit as much as possible to keeping the Slavic hordes at bay so you could see more commitments to the eastern front. Quite possibly no Ardennes Offensive in TTL and once the Soviets get close to Berlin your likely to see local commanders eager to surrender to allied forces in the west to avoid coming under Soviet rule. Many things would depend on TTLs alternative to Yalta but how that would go I don't know. Stalin got just about as much as he could OTL. The only issues where he might demand more is possibly Denmark and/or past of NE Italy coming into the Soviet zone.

 

[sillygoose]

Not sure how the zones of influence might change with such a big Soviet success. Its probably going to shorten the war but then not all in Stalin's favour. Its going to prompt Germany to commit as much as possible to keeping the Slavic hordes at bay so you could see more commitments to the eastern front. Quite possibly no Ardennes Offensive in TTL and once the Soviets get close to Berlin your likely to see local commanders eager to surrender to allied forces in the west to avoid coming under Soviet rule. Many things would depend on TTLs alternative to Yalta but how that would go I don't know. Stalin got just about as much as he could OTL. The only issues where he might demand more is possibly Denmark and/or past of NE Italy coming into the Soviet zone.

Assuming the scenario plays out like this with AG-North and Center cut off and effectively much more destroyed than even IOTL we could well see the coup against Hitler then have much more support and even if Hitler survives an ATL assassination attempt the coup probably works anyway given the lack of hope left at that point. Rommel could well make good on his supposed plan to 'open the door' for the Wallies to advance in France since the success of the Soviet operation would make further resistance futile and would only give the Soviets time to take more of Germany.

Digesting two army groups and occupying major regions would hamstring Soviet Fronts for some time, so you could well be right about the above. Question is whether the coup works in Germany and if there is an immediate unconditional surrender, as there is no way that the Wallies would accept only a surrender to the West under FDR.

I also still question the ability of the Soviets to logistically sustain such a massive advance from Ukraine given their logistical issues that hamstrung operations there for months with much smaller forces and the ability of said single thrust to prevent a westward breakout of the army groups even with their LOC cut. As it was the Soviets with a much smaller force sent out of the Kovel region were stymied by scratch defenses slapped together from odds and ends on the Vistula for months (in large part too due to logistics and casualties) despite AG-Center being effectively destroyed in June. If AG-Center isn't engaged due to the forces of Bagration instead used in Ukraine with only pinning forces used there, that means AG-North Ukraine's reserves stay with it and German reserves are actually well placed to deal with the Soviets were they would be attacking (remember Bagration worked so well because AG-Center's reserves were sent to AG-North Ukraine), which slows their ability to not only break through, but break out to the Vistula.

Since FHO and OKW were worried about this specific attack by the Soviets they ignored all the warning signs of the attack in Belarus IOTL and it is highly unlikely the Soviets could reverse the 'maskirovka' operation, as a massive build up in Ukraine was detected IOTL and an even larger one would be even more obvious (the Ukrainian insurgents were a big help in gather intel for the Germans), especially as all remaining Luftwaffe rail interdiction operations were still being launched in Ukraine to slow the Soviet build up and ability to sustain an attack. So rather than this thrust being so likely to succeed as big as described it could just as easily, perhaps even more so, end up a disaster, as the northern army groups have to retreat to avoid being trapped and instead get out even if they lose a lot of equipment; saving the manpower would be vastly more important and likely more equipment is saved in the process than IOTL, while the Soviets might well end up losing quite a bit more men and equipment as two army groups have to retreat through a logistically unsustainable single pincer and pinning Soviet armies can't actually prevent the army groups from retreating west en masse. That means a massive mess for everyone, but when it finally gets sorted the Germans might end up saving a lot more men and concentrating the remainder of their forces much more strongly on the Vistula thereafter instead of AG-Center being largely smashed, AG-North trapped in Courland, and AG-North Ukraine is ultimately folded into AG-Center. Depending on Soviet losses and how off balance Soviet forces are Romania might not even be able to be attacked in August, same with Hungary in September/October, which then gets really messy.

Anyway, even though they would end up forcing a major retreat for German forces this could well turn into a major problem for the Soviets which in the end makes things even difficult for them later on.

My take is Gehlen doesn't deserve his reputation and badly misinterpreted what was even feasible for the Soviets to do, as the appreciation of logistical factors doesn't seem to factor in to this proposed Kovel operation at all. Granted though we do have hindsight about what the historical operations were even like and the issues they had, which means we have a lot more knowledge than FHO had.

 

[WolfBear]

@raharris1973

Ironically, I had recently re-posted that thread elsewhere so it's funny you've done so here too. To quote myself from elsewhere:

So let's say the Soviets do this, advancing rapidly through Poland until reaching Danzig in August, effectively cutting off both Army Groups North and Center; the scattered survivors withdraw into East Prussia, which becomes the Courland analogue in this ATL. The Soviets on the North European Plain thereafter take time to rest and rebuild their supply lines, while the focus shifts South to where the Germans are collapsing as the Romanians, Hungarians and Bulgarians flip sides or outright collapse. Army Group South basically disintegrates and German resistance only really congeals in Western Hungary and Slovenia, with the Partisans liberating most of Yugoslavia with Soviet aid. The grand finale for the Soviets comes in December, with their "Oder Offensive" overrunning everything up to the Elbe, encircling Berlin and in the Balkans they advance upon Vienna.​

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In the West, Operation Luttich still happens but is less powerful; some of the SS Divisions have been stripped to fight in the East and that enables the Allies to close off the Falaise Gap entirely. The Western Allies liberate Paris ahead of schedule and cut off the 15th Army in early September, which surrenders and enables the opening of Antwerp by the start of October. ATL Market Garden still happens but here the German forces are in no position to resist. With Antwerp open, Patton can also advance into and clear the Rhineland in October, crossing the Rhine in tandem with Dever's 6th Army to the South in November while the British do the same in the North via the Netherlands.​

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The Western Allies and and Soviets meet somewhere between the Wesser and Elbe in late December, possibly around Christmas time, but maybe as late as January. Regardless, WWII has ended several months ahead of schedule, with resulting effects on casualties and battle damage to all involved parties. The Soviets have vastly more prestige, and their further advance has given them an advantage in future reparations claims and securing German tech; more than likely, a lot of scientists, data, etc that went West in Operation Paperclip will be going Eastwards here.​

Question for you, HL:

Do you believe that such a Soviet maneuver would have saved the remaining 67,000 or so Jews of the Lodz Ghetto? They were murdered in August 1944 and here the Soviet military would already be in Warsaw by then. But based on the Polish railroad and German railroad networks, I suspect that it would have been more likely that the Soviets would have moved up from Warsaw to Danzig (or around there) and thus still condemned the remaining Lodz Ghetto Jews to their fate? Is my analysis here correct? Or is there something here that I am missing?

 

[WolfBear]

All this talk of the SU grabbing even more than in OTL ... what about a reaction? Operation Unthinkable is launched

So, 1991 happens almost half a century earlier, and with much more US deaths and casualties?

 

[WolfBear]

I wonder if a likely side effect of this divide, the Trianon-benefitting countries all becoming communist dictatorships, while Hungary remains capitalist, and possibly democratic, results in mass voluntary exodus of ethnic Hungarian populations from Romania, Slovakia and Vojvodina, basically eliminating coherent blocks of Hungarian majority territory in the formerly Hungarian majority lands lost in Trianon. Communism becomes a force making the post-Trianon Hungarian state be the only true national home for Hungarians, and, presuming that the Communist regimes ever do fall in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia in later decades, there might no longer be any coherent demographic-territorial basis to support Hungarian claims to lands lost in Trianon - the ethnic Hungarians having voted with their feet to live in relatively much more prosperous Trianon Hungary over the prior generations?

I could definitely see Communist Romania signing up for this considering that AFAIK it was already willing to allow its Germans and Jews to emigrate in real life in exchange for money. So, why not its Hungarians as well? That said, though, the Szekely Land in the middle of Romania was *very* solidly Hungarian and thus even if a lot of its Hungarians will emigrate, it might still remain Hungarian-majority afterwards, just with a smaller majority. But the more isolated Hungarian pockets in Romania could become much more Romanianized as a result of mass emigration. I know that, even in real life, Romanian cities such as Oradea experienced significant Romanization over the last 100+ years, for instance--and this was *without* the mass emigration of their Hungarian residents!

 

[WolfBear]

Assuming the scenario plays out like this with AG-North and Center cut off and effectively much more destroyed than even IOTL we could well see the coup against Hitler then have much more support and even if Hitler survives an ATL assassination attempt the coup probably works anyway given the lack of hope left at that point. Rommel could well make good on his supposed plan to 'open the door' for the Wallies to advance in France since the success of the Soviet operation would make further resistance futile and would only give the Soviets time to take more of Germany.

Digesting two army groups and occupying major regions would hamstring Soviet Fronts for some time, so you could well be right about the above. Question is whether the coup works in Germany and if there is an immediate unconditional surrender, as there is no way that the Wallies would accept only a surrender to the West under FDR.

I also still question the ability of the Soviets to logistically sustain such a massive advance from Ukraine given their logistical issues that hamstrung operations there for months with much smaller forces and the ability of said single thrust to prevent a westward breakout of the army groups even with their LOC cut. As it was the Soviets with a much smaller force sent out of the Kovel region were stymied by scratch defenses slapped together from odds and ends on the Vistula for months (in large part too due to logistics and casualties) despite AG-Center being effectively destroyed in June. If AG-Center isn't engaged due to the forces of Bagration instead used in Ukraine with only pinning forces used there, that means AG-North Ukraine's reserves stay with it and German reserves are actually well placed to deal with the Soviets were they would be attacking (remember Bagration worked so well because AG-Center's reserves were sent to AG-North Ukraine), which slows their ability to not only break through, but break out to the Vistula.

Since FHO and OKW were worried about this specific attack by the Soviets they ignored all the warning signs of the attack in Belarus IOTL and it is highly unlikely the Soviets could reverse the 'maskirovka' operation, as a massive build up in Ukraine was detected IOTL and an even larger one would be even more obvious (the Ukrainian insurgents were a big help in gather intel for the Germans), especially as all remaining Luftwaffe rail interdiction operations were still being launched in Ukraine to slow the Soviet build up and ability to sustain an attack. So rather than this thrust being so likely to succeed as big as described it could just as easily, perhaps even more so, end up a disaster, as the northern army groups have to retreat to avoid being trapped and instead get out even if they lose a lot of equipment; saving the manpower would be vastly more important and likely more equipment is saved in the process than IOTL, while the Soviets might well end up losing quite a bit more men and equipment as two army groups have to retreat through a logistically unsustainable single pincer and pinning Soviet armies can't actually prevent the army groups from retreating west en masse. That means a massive mess for everyone, but when it finally gets sorted the Germans might end up saving a lot more men and concentrating the remainder of their forces much more strongly on the Vistula thereafter instead of AG-Center being largely smashed, AG-North trapped in Courland, and AG-North Ukraine is ultimately folded into AG-Center. Depending on Soviet losses and how off balance Soviet forces are Romania might not even be able to be attacked in August, same with Hungary in September/October, which then gets really messy.

Anyway, even though they would end up forcing a major retreat for German forces this could well turn into a major problem for the Soviets which in the end makes things even difficult for them later on.

My take is Gehlen doesn't deserve his reputation and badly misinterpreted what was even feasible for the Soviets to do, as the appreciation of logistical factors doesn't seem to factor in to this proposed Kovel operation at all. Granted though we do have hindsight about what the historical operations were even like and the issues they had, which means we have a lot more knowledge than FHO had.

The coup might succeed, but if it fails, I don't think that Hitler would be removed anyway since if the coup fails, any additional attempt to remove Hitler would almost certainly result in one getting executed by the Nazi regime. Why choose this fate when the regime is about to fall anyway?

Also, question: When is Lodz liberated in this scenario? It's relevant because Lodz still had around 67,000 surviving Jews until August 1944 in real life, when they were murdered en masse.