That relations were bad as a result of the China War is not in question, but what is in question is if that made war with Japan inevitable and what role the Soviets played in forcing that about. It's worth noting that their had been war scares stretching back to the 1890s between Japan and the United States, with all, including the
Panay Incident, being resolved peacefully. What made 1941 different, and what pushed both sides into conflict?
As late as November of 1940, President Roosevelt had advised Pacific commanders in meetings that the United States would not go to war over a Japanese invasion of European colonies according to the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. In February of 1941, Gallup conducted a poll in which respondents were asked “Do you think the United States should risk war with Japan, if necessary, in order to keep Japan from taking the Dutch East Indies and Singapore?”. The response was Yes (39%), No (46%) and No opinion (15%). In October of 1940, American strategic planning groups were still expecting Japan to not only be neutral,
but even a part of an American-led "Grand Area" that would contain the Italo-German bloc in Europe according to
Tomorrow, the World by Stephen Wertheim:
Outside of the civilian side of planning, the Victory Plan of 1941, which was the chief military document outlining U.S. strategy in the 1941-1942 phase, also had as one of its baseline assumptions that Japan would remain neutral and the United States would be fighting a Europe-only conflict:
To attain the overall numerical superiority of 2 to 1 normally considered necessary before undertaking offensive operations, the Allied powers would therefore have to field 700 to 900 divisions, or a force, together with appropriate supporting and service troops, of approximately 25 million men. Wedemeyer believed that it was dangerous to depend upon a maximum effort from all of the present Allied belligerents in order to raise the requisite forces. In the interests of forestalling disaster, he had to assume that the war would proceed along the lines of the worst possible case. Thus he hypothesized that, as of 1 July 1943 (the earliest date America could enter the ground war), the only effective ally in the European Theater of Operations would be Great Britain, which would have reinforced its armed forces by drawing on the Dominions and India for manpower. Russia would be effectively out of the war, although far eastern Siberia would continue to resist. France would continue passive collaboration with Germany. On the positive side, he expected Japan to be decisively engaged in China and Axis military strength to be materially weakened through the economic blockade, British air and sea operations, and losses absorbed in the Russian campaign.
While Germany would be weakened until it could organize and exploit the conquered territory of the Soviet Union, and while Japan would probably pose no threat except in China, the upshot was that Great Britain was the only significant ally America could expect to heave. All of the ground forces needed to defeat Germany would have to come from the United States and Great Britain, both of which had to avoid debilitating their economic and industrial base through excessive calls on manpower. The two democracies, however, could not create a ground force of 25 million soldiers. England and the Dominions were nearing the end of their reserves, and the United States was unable to raise the bulk of a 25-million-man force unaided without grave disruption of the national economy. As early as September of 1941, Wedemeyer pointed out that the United Kingdom could not provide more than one million fully equipped and well-trained troops for battle in Europe. England still had to protect her home islands and far-flung empire, as well as sustain her economic and industrial effort.4 He therefore had to consider ways in which the smaller army America could field could still do the jobs required of it.
Outside of the strategic realm, the institution of the Export Control Act in 1940 had not removed Japan as the chief Asian trading partner of the United States, with the volume of exports to Japan constituting 56% of Asiatic trade in 1941. So too, was the United States the chief trading partner of Japan overall, and American companies in late 1940 were helping the Japanese to develop Manchuria oil prospects. From
"First Well Stimulates Search for Oil in Manchoukuo",
Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 9, No. 21 (Oct. 23, 1940), pp. 252-253 -
Geological surveys, started in 1938 by the Manchuria Petroleum Co. and two other mining development companies, confirmed the original discovery and found several anticlines in the Fuhsin area which indicated the presence of a large oil field. Test borings were begun in August 1939, and oil was finally struck on April 28 at a depth of about 100 meters. The extent of the new oil field is not definitely known, but apparently it is potentially important. Japanese reports not only state that further investigations have disclosed the presence of four oil-bearing strata running 100 kilometers east and west, but they also suggest that other deposits are to be found in the locality up to a depth of several thousand meters.
In the exploitation of the new field, Manchoukuo is reported to be negotiating with Japan for a supply of mining materials and for engineers, and the Japan Petroleum Co. may take a part in its development. However, the problem of who is to work the Fuhsin field is still up in the air. Three plans are said to be under consideration: first, development by the Manchuria Petroleum Co., which runs the Manchouku oil monopoly and operates an oil refinery at Dairen using imported crude oil; secondly, the formation of a new company; and thirdly, the detachment of the Fuhsin coal field from the Manchuria Coal Mining Co., and the formation of a new company for the joint exploitation of coal and iron resources. The latter seems the more logical method, for the oil strata at Fuhsin are said to be found above and below the coal seams. At Fushun, where the oil shale overlies the coal beds, both the coal mine and the oil shale plant are run by one company, the S.M.R. It is also important that the exploitation of the new oil field should not interfere with the expansion of coal production. The Fuhsin mines are the most successful of the new mines developed by the Manchuria Coal Mining Co. and are now second only to Fushun in output.
Here we have American oil companies helping the Japanese in Manchuria after said Japanese had occupied Northern French Indochina
and then signed the Tripartite Pact in September. So what changed?
Besides John Koster's book, we also have
Stalin's War: A New History of World War II by Sean McMeekin, which is both recent (released last year) and by a mainstream historian, who accepts the vast majority of Koster's premise. By early 1941, Stalin was fully aware of the coming battle for dominance with Hitler, having effectively instigated it
in part, and sought to secure his flank. To that end he divided the Japanese from the Germans, at least initially, by signing the Non-Aggression Pact in April and concurrently using the network of Soviet spies and unknowing agents to push American policy as hostile to Japan as possible in order to provoke a conflict. Whatever his formal role, Harry Dexter White had an outsized influence to his station given his connections to the White House and he wasn't alone in his efforts. When reading the timeline of events provided by Husky Khan, you see a sudden acceleration in mid-1941, which reflects what had been going on since Spring and helped to buildup tensions between the two countries, preventing a peaceful resolution of their issues
as had happened every single time before.
I can hardly do justice to either book in a single post, so as a service to the board, I'm
attaching a link here so that others may get a PDF copy of Koster's book to review the evidence for themselves. I cannot do the same for McMeekin's book, but I highly encourage everyone to get it; it's worth every penny.
