Unmanifest Destiny - A tale of the Nootka Sound War of 1790 and it's aftermath

raharris1973

Well-known member
Introduction - The Nootka Sound Crisis of 1789-1790. Nootka Crisis - Wikipedia

This was a crisis started by the 1789 Spanish seizure of British ships and crews for violating what Spain called its exclusive territorial rights over the western coast of North America at least as far north as the Nootka sound. News got back to Britain in January 1790. The Pitt government pressed for an apology, compensation, and acknowledgement of British right to trade in the area, and was sanguine about the prospect of war (and gains from it, because they assumed Britain would win) if Spain didn't back down from Britain's stiff ultimatum.

A factor in Britain, and Spain's calculations was whether France would honor it's family compact alliance with Spain and throw its fleet into the scales on Spain's behalf. The French Revolution had begun in 1789, but the King was still on the throne, and not yet powerless. On the merits of the issue, all the Estates of the French were more sympathetic to the Spanish than British case. Nevertheless, the issue of the Spanish alliance got tied up with constitutional wrangling between the King, the King's Ministers, and the National Assembly over who had the right to declare war, the King or the National Assembly, and whether France could be bound by a Family Compact or only a National Compact.

Lacking a timely reassurance from the French in OTL, the Spanish backed down completely to Britain's ultimatum, somewhat to Pitt's relief and surprise.

Part I. Manifest Rapacity - Britain pushes farther than Spain can go, and war ensues

In the ATL, because of tighter British timelines on the ultimatum, greater rashness on behalf of RN commanders, slightly greater pride on behalf of the Spanish, false hope provided to Spain by factions in France, Spanish royal insistence on a little more firmness, or whatever, the British and Spanish fleets come to blows, followed by a declaration of war between their nations in 1790.

The French condemn British aggression, matching public opinion, but remain neutral. The more the monarchical or conservative factions in France push for immediate participation in the war on Spain's behalf, the more distracted the more revolutionary and republican factions in France get from the British actions and divert the debate to constitutional limitations on the King's war-making powers.

In realpolitik terms, Britain's allies, Netherlands and Prussia, are standing by Britain, while Spain's allies, France, Austria, Russia, sympathetic they may be, have other more pressing priorities, domestic (constitutional in France) or foreign (Ottoman and Polish affairs for Austria and France) to declare war on Britain or Britain's allies.

The Royal Navy has the better of the Spanish Navy for pretty much the entire war. It raids and blockades the coasts of Spain and the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Spain's colonies through 1790 and 1791.

Different factions in parliament and ministries and the Admiralty demonstrate an appetite for acquiring different parts of the Spanish colonial empire. If Pitt truly tried to satisfy them all, Britain wouldn't stop fighting until it seized all of the Spanish Americas, the Philippines, and the Balearics.

Britain also works with Spanish American dissidents, like Miranda from New Granada.

Britain's first victorious conquests are those closest to its bases in Halifax, Bermuda and Bahamas, with the invasion and occupation of St. Augustine Florida and San Juan Puerto Rico. British forces in the Gulf of Mexico go on to seize the West Florida towns of Pensacola and Mobile and finally New Orleans, Luisiana.

Other British forces land with exiled Spanish-Americans loyal to Miranda around Cartagena, Venezuela. In this tropical area, the British and Miranda forces don't make much headway inland, and few in the population rally to Miranda's cause.

Other operations off the coast of Mexico and La Plata and Chile are more of hit-and-run and probing nature. Some succeed and some fail. Some were intended as invasions, but get called raids after the fact when they fail.

For the most part in 1790 and 1791, British press and parliamentary opinion is enjoying this raucous adventure, engaging in anti-Catholic stereotyping, and speculating about how best to despoil the Spanish.

The Spanish meanwhile are enraged and rallying to defend their own territory and colonies. They do a decent job of defending the Balearics and run supplies through from colony to colony when they can, and make use of local resources. They lament losses, and celebrate the tactical victories they do win when they can.

The Spanish in Spain, and many in the new world, even those who conduct black market commerce with the British, nurture a blackhearted bitterness against British imperial greed. But they nurture just as intense a cynicism and bitterness towards their erstwhile European allies like France and Austria and Bavaria and Russia who have done nothing to help them.

Back in Britain, more sober heads are getting more and more concerned about the course of the French Revolution and the fate of Europe. By the summer of 1791, the Pitt Ministry is eager to conclude the war and to do so victoriously, which he can do, but without getting skewered domestically for not winning enough to satisfy the Manifest Rapacity of his national body politic.

The Austro-Prussian Declaration of Pillnitz in August 1791 is the real wake up call that war could break out any time in Western Europe, and speeds Pitt's efforts to conclude the Spanish War.

The British step up both diplomacy with the Spanish and military/naval operations with landings at Manila (in collaboration with their Dutch allies), and Havana, and La Plata, and by establishing "facts on the ground" with an onshore and offshore presence in the Pacific Northwest and occupation of San Francisco Bay.

With escalating crisis in France and Western Europe, and the Spanish tiring of beatings and willing to exchange territory that is hard to recover in exchange for a relaxation of the chokehold on more valuable territories, and a British rollback from the most extreme demands, the British-Spanish Treaty of Dublin is finalized February 1792.

By its terms, Spain cedes to Britain:

a) The Oregon/Nootka country
b) Alta California, its coast, and interior
c) The province of Santa Fe de Nuevo Mexico
d) The province Nueva Filipinas de Tejas (another name for Texas).
e) The province of Luisiana
f) East and West Florida
g) Porto Rico

Britain withdraws from any newly occupied territory in South America and the Philippines and Cuba in the late war.

Of the acquired territories, the British had the greatest inherent interest in Oregon/Nootka, the Floridas, Luisiana (especially New Orleans), and Porto Rico. British merchants and the Royal Navy also appreciate the potential of San Francisco Bay. Non-coastal California, New Mexico, and New Philippines/Texas are hardly worth much. Certainly Britain would have preferred Mexico or Peru, or Cuba, but Britain didn't have the time or money or manpower or medical knowledge to see through full campaigns to get such conquests done, and Spain was not going to give them up until long after the last finger of every last Spanish tercio was peeled off every rock and grain of soil. Spain was however, more willing to part with those less populated, more non-tropical American territories, and for London, they at least provide territorial continuity for all of the British North American Dominions.


Part II. Spain in Defeat - Manifest Misanthropy means Manifest Immobility

Defeat is a bitter pill for Spain to swallow, seasoned with bleeding and expense. The Spanish in Spain, and many in the new world, even those who conduct black market commerce with the British, nurture a blackhearted bitterness against British imperial greed. But they nurture just as intense a cynicism and bitterness towards their erstwhile European allies like France and Austria and Russia who had done nothing to help them.

As good Catholics, they find the anti-clericalism and anti-church crimes of the French revolutionaries abominable. But they cannot be rallied to participate in coalitions against France as they are so weakened, jaded, and disillusioned with the rest of the human race that the abominations of the revolutionaries don't so much stand out as seem par for the course. As far as the Spanish people and the Spanish monarch is concerned, there is God above, ever-glorious, on earth there is Spain, weak, perhaps pathetic, but still with honor, and in the rest of the nations, shitheads.

Spain's foreign policy, for as long as it is able, will be to only look after its own interests, and no one else's. It will fight any invader but not step forward for the collective good in a world of shitheads. Spain does not change its flag, but it's flag should be seen as the "Don't Tread on Me" banner.

Part III. The United States of America - Manifest Destiny? No. More like Manifest Debility

American ships were already active in whaling and the Pacific Northwest fur trade and they in fact witnessed the Anglo-Spanish Nootka Sound crisis unfold. Spectators to this minor conflict on the other side of a continent and an ocean, they hoped to avoid being drawn in. In common with the British, they disliked the idea of Spanish exclusivity over trade in the Pacific Northwest region. But they also disliked Britain's imperiousness with its ultimatum, and Spain had been an ally during the Independence fight ending only 7 years earlier.

When Anglo-Spanish war did break out on a global scale, most Americans, President Washington included, probably prayed America could stay out of it. Those who thought in more detailed terms probably prayed that somehow, both Britain *and* Spain could lose.

However, the size of Anglo-Spanish fleet engagements in the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico, even the west coast of North America compared the paltry number of American naval vessels was humbling. The numbers of professional British and Spanish soldiers involved in battles a stone's throw from Georgia, like St. Augustine, or of great importance to American commerce, like New Orleans, compared to available American militias was more humbling still.

It was one thing to be fortunate enough to be unmolested by a neighbor's war. It was quite another thing to be, objectively, helpless in making a difference in a fight on your own front lawn, and certainly unable to actually protect the doors and windows and fences of one's own house if the riot truly got out of control.

Yet that's where President Washington and Secretary of War Lincoln and Secretary of Treasury Hamilton suspected things were. If there was any doubt, a 1791 scuffle of Continental militia under the Indiana Governor against the war bands of either Little Turtle or Blue Jacket that turned into an absolute route and massacre, removed it. This refers of course to St. Clair's Defeat, or from the Indians' point of view, the victory with no name.

St. Clair's defeat - Wikipedia


If you wondered at all why America never lifted a finger while Britain came to surround it on three sides over the course of it's war with Spain, never protested, opposed or preempted the British occupation of Florida and New Orleans, you need look no further. The United States did not have the tools for the business of serious war in its kit at this time.

Epilogue:

----So here we have the set up.

Pitt the Younger is riding high but has also spent alot of money and put alot of wear on ships and crews fighting Spain.

British North America has by 1793 been made absolutely huge, but is of very light population, with very little of it English-speaking. BNA or Uber-Canada, just by being there, blocks every route of possible US landward expansion.

The American government of the day under George Washington knows his country's limits, and those limits are an objective reality at this time.
He is a level headed pragmatist, and knows there is nothing to gain by joining the wars of the French Revolution. It doesn't mean he will like the reality of contained America. He will support the formation of the Legion of the United States and later Army of United States and a Navy. He and his successors, will support the development of the western frontiers.

In British North America, John Simcoe and people like him will only be encouraged by St. Clair's defeat, and a desire to "fill in the corner" between British Upper Canada and British Louisiana to support an "Indian Barrier State" in the U.S. Northwest Territory. Indian barrier state - Wikipedia

For similar "corner-filling" reasons, British authorities in West Florida will probably support the northernmost interpretation of the West Florida boundary, inclusive of the Natchez and Tombigbee districts, and may conduct vigorous diplomacy with the 5 civilized tribes.

From London, the perspective will be different, with France and Europe taking geopolitical priority, and the Anglo-American consumer market taking the economic priority.

If Washington can get the Jay Treaty, on anything like OTL's terms, he will certainly take it - domestic criticism be damned. There might be less domestic criticism because of demonstrated British muscle-flexing, or perhaps more. (Perhaps retrospective whining that America missed a chance to rally a coalition on Spain's side with France and others before British encirclement became a fait accompli]

The U.S. won't get the favorable boundary change versus Florida that Jay got at San Lorenzo, given that he himself conceded to Britain the old Florida boundary during the ARW negotiations endgame.

Hopefully, Britain will be free, no fee traders about the Mississippi and New Orleans.

The development of North America will be something to watch. The United States will get more populous and stronger, but so will British North America. British North America will also be a serious competitor for some of British colonization flows that went to the Antipodes.

In Europe, I don't think we can get very far into 1793 without Britain and France getting embroiled in the War of the 1st Coalition, and basically staying embroiled until the French Revolutionary Wars, and their potential successor Napoleonic Wars, get played out.

As I said earlier, I think Spain will be of a mind and determination to show a hostile neutrality to all for several years. The question is how long it can and will sustain that, and how long Britain and France accept that as within their interests. Spain is a peninsula so it is not strictly speaking in the middle or on the way to everywhere. It theoretically could remain neutral and be bypassed by war on its soil like the Scandinavian peninsula was - and that could make a huge historical difference. But given the relative ease with which armies of the age moved over mountains I suspect Spain will be invaded by somebody eventually. The question is by whom and when.

What are your thoughts on what you expect to happen in this world, especially in Europe and America, from 1793 to about 1900?
 
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raharris1973

Well-known member
A couple ideas off the bat-

All the territorial gains in North America for Britain add to Britain’s long term potential power. They don’t add enough net revenue to decisively tilt things to an early win of French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

those wars shouldn’t be any shorter as a knock-on consequence.

odds are high of a war of 1812 equivalent in the 19th century. It will have a southern and western front as well as eastern and northern. Although American militias will still suck, I think Georgia andCarolina militias, more paranoid about slave revolts and more eager to gaine Florida and New Orleans, will fight better and harder than New York militias for Canada.

I don’t think they will prevail. The southern front will permit many more slave escapes. Status quo ante vellum is still most likely territorial result.

I don’t know if British North America will ultimately be one federation or several.
 

Buba

A total creep
First thing - the USA stays in 1783 borders.
If it is lucky/does not piss off Britain i.e. the buddies of the ruling clique the USA will not lose the Old Northwest.
But maybe Britain will let go of Florida(s), seeing that the area is a useless malaria riden swamp :)
Second thing - Britain probably does not colonise Australia, being busy with settling "Colombia" (which is a much nicer name than BNA).
Due to size and easy of travel by waterways I can imagine BNA splitting into:
- Canada (Ontario, Quebec, Minnows)
- Louisiana (the purchase)
- the two Provincias Internas (look up in wikipedia). Maybe the eastern province expands at cost of western.
- Nootka (US Northwest, BC and Alaska)

Hence, with USA, six countries in North America.

USA - if no Florida, ends up with 10 Slave States. Versus c.13 Free States.
With Florida - 11:13.
Good luck with slavery being abolished before 1890.

For you lazy fucks :)
799px-Mapa_del_Virreinato_de_la_Nueva_Espa%C3%B1a_%281819%29.svg.png
 

stevep

Well-known member
Guys

Some interesting ideas here. Not sure that, especially after the mess of the US revolution, Britain would want that much largely empty land. The Pacific coastal region to secure trade there, possibly southern Louisiana to secure access to the Mississippi for British traders and perhaps Texas as a region for settlement but the interior areas I don't think they would be greatly bothered by, as too much hassle to administer. More likely they would be interested in more Caribbean islands. Both very wealthy in many cases and much easier and cheaper to govern. IIRC we hadn't taken places like Trinidad from Spain yet so some of those are likely to be either taken or traded for other territory. [Although there is a counter argument that apparently one reason why Britain gave back so many 'sugar islands' in 1763 was because the existing Caribbean planter interests didn't want additional competition so again that could be restricted]. Furthermore I'm not sure Pitt the Younger was that eager for war as his primary issue when he became PM was the national debt, which had been further expanded by the American conflitc. As such I think the gains mentioned are distinctly unrealistic but if we go with it for the purpose of the thread.

Britain had already claimed eastern Australia in 1770 and the "first fleet" established what became New South Wales, landing on 26-1-1788 which is before the POD so that will still occur but agree its likely that Australia will attract less settlers, at least until gold is discovered. Even then its going to be less populated and you could see Western Australia or New Zealand possibly ending up under other management. [No All-Blacks!!:eek: :D ]

Spain largely sitting out the French revolutionary wars would be a huge butterfly. Assuming that the rebellion isn't crushed quickly that would probably still be an advantage to the 'allies' as they won't have to consider Spanish opposition from 1785 onward. Which means the French fleet is largely on its own and Gibraltar is secure for instance. Also, as long as whoever rules France respects Spanish neutrality their other possessions/interests might also be respected. This could include the Two Sicilies who were ruled by a Bourbon prince. Such a period of neutrality in a period of major and continued warfare could be handy for Spain and its empire provided its well governed [which could be an issue here] and takes advantage of being at peace as opposed to possibly being split into factions on internal government, treatment of its extensive colonies and possessions and political/economic conflicts related to the French revolution or any combination of those three. Of course later on without a Spanish ulcer that could be to the French benefit although that depends on things going as OTL.

If Spain manages to stay neutral until the end of the conflict, which could difficult then their likely to be economically and militarily stronger, for instance still having a substantial fleet but in turn could be politically isolated. As such their empire could well last longer although its likely to start falling apart at some time in the 19thC.

Would agree with Buba that if Britain maintains all this territory, possibly even gaining more, its not going to become a single nation as its going to be too diverse, espcially when large scale self-government occurs say circa 1860-80. A lot would depend on the details but at least a Canada, Pacific state and Louisiana with possibly some more.

Anyway inital ideas about events.


Assuming no other great butterflies in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars then two issues relating to N America especially come to the fore.
a) Is the move against 1st the slave trade and then slavery itself in Britain and elsewhere in Europe greatly affected in terms of the rate it occurs?
b) Does the US try something like 1812 to break out of the British encirclement prior to France being removed as a massive threat to the UK? - If they try something after the breaking of French power its pretty certain to end badly for them.

There are other things. Are relations between the two nations fairly good, say with free access to both sides traders up the Mississippi? Or possibly do elements in Britain, inspired by the success against Spain and the St Clair fiasco, possibly recognise some sort of Indian alliance in what's called the old NW? That could well lead to a quick war but with British concerns in France and Europe how that ends could go any way.

If there was a 1812 conflict while Britain's still battling the French again how has the US responded to its new geographical position? While the French revolution enable the US to renege on debt repayments to France does it have the resources and the political will to expand its army after ~1793 and maintain this until war breaks out. Does it make attempts to crush resistance in the old NW earlier, which would remove somewhat a buffer to Upper Canada [Ontario] although logistics would still be an issue.

Another factor here might be the settlement of the new British territory. Especially probably the lower Mississippi and the Texas region, although not sure how attractive the latter would be at this time. As well as more people from Britain, no doubt some being diverted from moving to the US OTL, you might see a lot of French loyalists and posisbly others fleeing chaos in Euripe moving there. Or is London's priority stability with the region largely under indirect rule with attempts to set up Indian blocs as protectorates?

Assuming and I think its likely there will be a conflict while Britain is tied up with France then what will be the results. The US could well secure at least parts of Florida, especially as the western region controls river access to the interior of what OTL became Alabama and Mississippi states. New Orleans is likely to be bitterly contested but is important enough that I think Britain would be determined to hold it. The old NW could end up independent or under direct control of either side or partitioned. Britain might cede northern parts of Louisiana if hard pressed. If things go badly or the war last long enough then you could see some equivalent of the Hartford Convention and NE dissatisfaction with Washington's decisions leading to a break away there. Assuming that britain is relying largely on indirect rule in much of the region then its going to get a lot of support from the local Indians, who could be better organised and armed here and also might end up, as in the revolutionary wars, welcoming black slaves willing to fight for their freedom. Many different possibilities here.
 

ATP

Well-known member
USA would eventually expand,but never to OTL boundaries.So -USA would never become superpower.
Spain - in OTL Napoleon invaded it becouse it was enemy,now ,as long as they do not support England,it not happen.
Less losses for his army means draw,not defeat in 1813.
His state would dominate Europe.

We could imagine some war about 1900 when USA,France,its clients would fight England and Russia.Who would win,i wonder ?
With Spain selling to both sides.

As for Spain - becouse they would care only about Spain ,its colonial empire would last longer,too.Becouse they would honestly try help there.
 

Buba

A total creep
Spain - in OTL Napoleon invaded it becouse it was enemy
Napoleon invaded Spain in spite of it being an ALLY.
He simply was THAT greedy ...
In this respect nothing changes - Spain becomes ally first of the 1st French Republic, then of the 1st Empire.
 

ATP

Well-known member
Napoleon invaded Spain in spite of it being an ALLY.
He simply was THAT greedy ...
In this respect nothing changes - Spain becomes ally first of the 1st French Republic, then of the 1st Empire.

No,they would not ally to anybody but get money from all.They become bitter,remember ? and made army and navy stronger,but unused.
Napoleon was greedy,but aside his fantasies about Alliance with Russia,not stupid.Attacking state with unused from 1791 army and fleet would be extremally stupid.
 

stevep

Well-known member
No,they would not ally to anybody but get money from all.They become bitter,remember ? and made army and navy stronger,but unused.
Napoleon was greedy,but aside his fantasies about Alliance with Russia,not stupid.Attacking state with unused from 1791 army and fleet would be extremally stupid.

Think you will find Buba is talking of OTL. True he sneaked his army in while supposed being largely there for attacks on Portugal and the Spanish Bourbons had become a serious disappointment for him in terms of their corruption, incompetence and infighting. However it was still bloody stupid for him to overthrow the dynasty and put his own brother on the throne.

TTL then Napoleon, assuming he still rises to power, may decide to attack Spain at some stage. With him it was very much if your not for me/my satellite your against me so it could happen. Likely to succeed unless the Spanish have drastically improve their military compared to OTL but your likely then to see the Spanish monarchy doing what the Portuguese did and flee to the colonies, which as with Brazil for Portugal could have some dramatic impacts on their development. Albeit that neither Charles IV or his son Ferdinand VII seem that likely to be decent, let alone competent rulers. Not saying he will end up at war with Spain but sooner or later there is likely to be some clash. At least this way a lot more of the Spanish fleet will survive and you might not have the same level of devastation as OTL.
 

ATP

Well-known member
Think you will find Buba is talking of OTL. True he sneaked his army in while supposed being largely there for attacks on Portugal and the Spanish Bourbons had become a serious disappointment for him in terms of their corruption, incompetence and infighting. However it was still bloody stupid for him to overthrow the dynasty and put his own brother on the throne.

TTL then Napoleon, assuming he still rises to power, may decide to attack Spain at some stage. With him it was very much if your not for me/my satellite your against me so it could happen. Likely to succeed unless the Spanish have drastically improve their military compared to OTL but your likely then to see the Spanish monarchy doing what the Portuguese did and flee to the colonies, which as with Brazil for Portugal could have some dramatic impacts on their development. Albeit that neither Charles IV or his son Ferdinand VII seem that likely to be decent, let alone competent rulers. Not saying he will end up at war with Spain but sooner or later there is likely to be some clash. At least this way a lot more of the Spanish fleet will survive and you might not have the same level of devastation as OTL.

Then he would lost just like in OTL,when spaniards would keep their empire longer.British would be concerned with fighting USA,after all.
But if they become strong enough to be not attacked,France would dominate Europe with Russia as only real opponent.
What is interesting is turning spaniards into some kind of Warhammer Fantasy dwarves keeping their grudges and dreaming about lost glory.If they add decent military,they could last with smaller empire till our times.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
If as Stevep suggests, Britain is less interested in massed of interior territory and more interested in islands and coastal enclaves, here is an alternative map for a less ambitious set of annexations. I still like my first map better, but this one is an alternative leaving Luisiana to the Spanish (and maybe subject to later American encroachment), that leaves Britain with less American interior but still leaves it the "toll collector" of American commerce through the west coast and Gulf of Mexico:

whRordL.jpg


And since I got carried away making maps, and thinking about different ways the original PoD could develop and branch out, I came up with this other map. I won't spell out what happens, but I'll leave you to figure out and guess what started happening differently from my OP and when:

Wq1KhDj.jpg
 

stevep

Well-known member
If as Stevep suggests, Britain is less interested in massed of interior territory and more interested in islands and coastal enclaves, here is an alternative map for a less ambitious set of annexations. I still like my first map better, but this one is an alternative leaving Luisiana to the Spanish (and maybe subject to later American encroachment), that leaves Britain with less American interior but still leaves it the "toll collector" of American commerce through the west coast and Gulf of Mexico:

whRordL.jpg


And since I got carried away making maps, and thinking about different ways the original PoD could develop and branch out, I came up with this other map. I won't spell out what happens, but I'll leave you to figure out and guess what started happening differently from my OP and when:

Wq1KhDj.jpg

With the 1st map I like it although I think it would lead to war with the US sooner or later. Even assuming that both then and Spain were allowed free trading access that would mean both the Mississippi and Great Lakes/St Lawrence routes from the interior are under British control which I think would be unacceptable to the US. [In this scenario I suspect that they might purchase the Louisiana region from Spain as without the New Orleans region I think its of relatively little use to Spain. Plus with Florida controlling the other rivers on the Mexican Gulf US development of what became Alabama and Mississippi would be dependent on British friendship.

How that war goes would depend on the circumstances but the most likely I suspect would be a 1812 equivalent as the US while we know it could grow very powerful still over time would probably not want to wait and if Britain's clashing with a Napoleon equivalent it would be too tempting an option. In this scenario you might see it happen earlier, which could complicate matters for everybody.

In such a case the key issue is whether Britain hold's Florida and especially New Orleans. If they do its probably going to be a win for the UK and you could see gains in the north. Say securing Michigan and points to the west which would secure the upper Great Lakes. Then assuming that the US gets the rest of Louisiana at some stage instead of the 49th parallel the border might be something like the 40th or 42nd say. Such a change might occur even if the south is lost if both sides decide they prefer their respective gains. Anyway initial thoughts on the issue.

If we ended up with your initial Britainnia Triumphant map then definitely war between Britain and the US, possibly on a fairly frequent basis during the 19thC which would have huge consequences on world history.

With the 2nd Canada is French if I read it correctly but assuming Napoleon wins rather than it ending up in Royalist hands. Unless possibly it never falls in the 7YWs but that would give a hell of a lot of butterflies. Or possibly the clash over the Nootka sound does happen but for some reason France avoids the revolution, supports Spain and the Bourbon powers win.

Great maps by the way. A lot easier to visualize the situation with a map in such cases. :D
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
First thing - the USA stays in 1783 borders.
.......
Good luck with slavery being abolished before 1890.

I presume your logic here being a stable long-term free-state/slave-state balance means no American Civil War to end slavery violently, and any peaceful alternative would be painfully gradual?

That’s interesting and I can appreciate that argument. The lack of an American Civil War has some other interesting economic consequences for the United States as well. Assuming that not only is there no Civil War, the lack of deustruction will preserve much more American wealth and its 19th century merchant fleet. [This assumes also there are no new wars with Britain after at most a ‘War of 1812’, and no territorial losses in that war or prior from the 1783 borders]. Although Florida and America west of the Mississppi have a great deal of agricultural and mineral resources, above all, oil, the east of the Mississippi portion is the more populous, industriazable, and valuable part economically that could see more intensive rather than extensive development.

The Pacific coastal region to secure trade there, possibly southern Louisiana to secure access to the Mississippi for British traders and perhaps Texas as a region for settlement

Why Texas here, especially any more so than Florida?

My rationale isn't that the land is great, it's just that the land connects other holdings and its called New Philippines, so it distracts from the fact they can't get the real Philippines. ;)

[Although there is a counter argument that apparently one reason why Britain gave back so many 'sugar islands' in 1763 was because the existing Caribbean planter interests didn't want additional competition so again that could be restricted].

That’s the logic I was going for, plus I figured Spain is going to be more stubborn in peace talks about Cuba, core Mexico, core Peru, New Granada, than anything further north, and the Brits will start squinting harder at the European situation.

Even then its going to be less populated and you could see Western Australia or New Zealand possibly ending up under other management. [No All-Blacks!!:eek: :D ]

Good point, Australia was already claimed, the first fleet had sailed. I agree with the first part of your sentence, but I honestly don’t understand what are you talking about in the last part of the sentence...?
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
Would agree with Buba that if Britain maintains all this territory, possibly even gaining more, its not going to become a single nation as its going to be too diverse, espcially when large scale self-government occurs say circa 1860-80. A lot would depend on the details but at least a Canada, Pacific state and Louisiana with possibly some more.

Maybe – But why are we so sure? With the later part of the 19th century, Britain’s precocious industrializing and iron-mongering, access to capital and finance, access to cheap Irish, Indian, Caribbean, and Chinese and Chinese labor, the British could bind the North American Dominions of “Columbia” together with railroads and steamships and have it be a big Confederation under one Governor-General.

a) Is the move against 1st the slave trade and then slavery itself in Britain and elsewhere in Europe greatly affected in terms of the rate it occurs?

I don’t think there’s anything that should particularly disrupt this timeline, especially the slave trade abolition which came earlier after the divergence, by 1806. The only difference is that Britain has a few more communities under its thumb with many slaveholders and plantations, these include southern Louisiana, some of the towns of West Florida, and Puerto Rico. But these slaveowners are mainly conquered Catholic Spanish and French-speakers without a lot of clout in parliament. This has even less chance of derailing Britain’s anti-slavery timelines than, for a example, a scenario where Britain retained a significant part of the US South (like Georgia and Carolinas, or especially Virginia), or if they keep all the North American colonies and fear antislavery moves would bring the hassle of another revolt, or have to contend with empowered North American representatives and lobbyists in parliament in addition to Caribbean ones.

b) Does the US try something like 1812 to break out of the British encirclement prior to France being removed as a massive threat to the UK?
In my opinion, the Napoleonic Wars and Anglo-American War of 1812 were *highly* interrelated because of the trade, embargo, and impressment issues they caused. I think in the 1790s, in Washington’s lifetime, and in the tenure of Federalist successors like Adams, we could on the US to step lightly if it has a choice, but I think if the Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars last as long as they did, an Anglo-American conflict by the 1807-1815 timeframe is pretty much inevitable over these causes, because the Americans will have a new generation of rising politicians, a greater population, and gotten a rest from the Revolutionary War and forgotten some of its worst parts.

- If they try something after the breaking of French power its pretty certain to end badly for them.

I agree, But I don’t think the Americans in most cases will initiate something where the timing is that bad. In large part because after the French are broken, the British will start lifting all their maritime provocations.

Now one recipe for repeated conflict may be if the British intercede aggressively to support an American Indian “barrier” state in the U.S. Northwest Territory in the 1790s, because Britain feels strong, and the U.S. looks weak, or because the American side for some reason can’t bring itself to sign the Jay Treaty.

Britain would totally win in the northwest with its Indian allies in any 1790s round, but it would become a cause of enduring American revanchism, that would cause later wars, possibly an American attack on the territory in the 1807-1815 timeframe in parallel with Napoleon’s campaigns. The Americans could win or stalemate again.

If they don’t get back the Northwest, there could be more rounds of conflict later. If the US is too unrelenting an attack dog about it in say the 1820s, 1830s, 1840s, the British may feel they have no choice but to do a total war or conquest and subjugation.

Or, the U.S. may take longer intervals and be a more militarized country earlier, always seeking a European ally, that becomes a serious drain and distraction to Britain, maybe eventually winning some border territory at some point in the 19th century.

USA would eventually expand,but never to OTL boundaries.So -USA would never become superpower.

Even limited to its east of the Mississippi dimensions, the U.S. could be a really, really great power- we’re talking at least France or Germany ranked.
 
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Buba

A total creep
presume your logic here being a stable long-term free-state/slave-state balance means no American Civil War to end slavery violently, and any peaceful alternative would be painfully gradual?
Yes, this is the angle I was going for.

As to US' economic growth with no ACW - IMO a mixed bag.
No war related destruction, true, but think of all the Californian gold not going into the American economy.
Same applies to all other commodities mined/harvested/manufactured west of the Big River.

Still, with 2,5M km2 of resource rich territory, the USA should become a Great Power, up there with BG, France, Germany by 1900.

Now, superpowerism is much less likely :)

 
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stevep

Well-known member
I presume your logic here being a stable long-term free-state/slave-state balance means no American Civil War to end slavery violently, and any peaceful alternative would be painfully gradual?

That’s interesting and I can appreciate that argument. The lack of an American Civil War has some other interesting economic consequences for the United States as well. Assuming that not only is there no Civil War, the lack of deustruction will preserve much more American wealth and its 19th century merchant fleet. [This assumes also there are no new wars with Britain after at most a ‘War of 1812’, and no territorial losses in that war or prior from the 1783 borders]. Although Florida and America west of the Mississppi have a great deal of agricultural and mineral resources, above all, oil, the east of the Mississippi portion is the more populous, industriazable, and valuable part economically that could see more intensive rather than extensive development.

I'm not sure that, other factors aside, slavery would last longer in the smaller US. You would have the same conflict between slave and free labour interests and they might come even earlier if there's no expansion west of the Mississippi to release some land conflict pressure.

Of course other factors could intervene. For instance a 1812 conflict that goes very badly for the US, especially with most of the old NW territories coming under British control and New England breaking away could give an overwhelming advantage to slavery in the union. In that case a civil war might come from an attempted break-away by some of the rump northern states, centred around say New York, Pennsylvanian and Ohio from the dominant pro-slave nation. ;) This could be even worse if say in the conflict Britain lost Florida, which is the most vulnerable of its new territories to the US as that further strengthens slavery.

If the US never pushes past the Mississippi it would still have immense resources, more than any other western state other than Russia or what BNA may become. However its lost a lot of mineral wealth while a lot would depend on how it developed and especially its relations with Britain. Contined and deep seated hostility between the two, which is unlikely but possible would reduce considerably immigrants and wealth reaching the US and probably also mean markedly greater government spending on the military especially and social impacts as well. You might get an earlier and stronger nativist movement say which prompts much earlier immigration restrictions.

Why Texas here, especially any more so than Florida?

My rationale isn't that the land is great, it's just that the land connects other holdings and its called New Philippines, so it distracts from the fact they can't get the real Philippines. ;)


Probably a bit of a dubious decision on my part, especially since at this time its largely underdeveloped and seems of little value but it does give depth to the lower Louisiana which is otherwise a narrow neck of territory between the US north of Florida and a Spanish presence in Tejas as I think it was then. Also with Florida looking so exposed to US pressure it could seem too vulnerable.

I take your point, It looks especially attractive possibly on a map in a European office. ;)

That’s the logic I was going for, plus I figured Spain is going to be more stubborn in peace talks about Cuba, core Mexico, core Peru, New Granada, than anything further north, and the Brits will start squinting harder at the European situation.

I agree and I suspect that anything on the mainland south of the Rio Grande, other than possible expansions of existing interests in Belize and the Mosquito coast regions is unlikely to be that attractive as it means taking on too many 'Spanish' Catholics which could seem too dangerous a burden to ~1790's Britain. Plus as you say there's a minor issue developing in Europe that will distract both Britain and Spain.


Good point, Australia was already claimed, the first fleet had sailed. I agree with the first part of your sentence, but I honestly don’t understand what are you talking about in the last part of the sentence...?

Sorry, cultural reference. See All Blacks for some details. While other nations are probably closing the gap a bit in the past couple of decades for pretty much the last century when it comes to Rugby Union New Zealand has been the team to beat, despite their small size. I was expressing both horror at them not being present and hope that others can get more of a look in. ;)

Steve
 

stevep

Well-known member
Maybe – But why are we so sure? With the later part of the 19th century, Britain’s precocious industrializing and iron-mongering, access to capital and finance, access to cheap Irish, Indian, Caribbean, and Chinese and Chinese labor, the British could bind the North American Dominions of “Columbia” together with railroads and steamships and have it be a big Confederation under one Governor-General.

I think that its simply too large an area for the technology of the time plus, provided that the US isn't a massive threat there's no great incentive for the assorted colonies to merge. Also such a large formation is likely to exclude Quebec, possibly parts of Louisiana if they keep their French identity, as they wouldn't want to be totally swamped by Anglo-speakers. It happened with the US because it was concerned with unity from the start, which was only strengthened by the civil war. For the colonies that for most of the 1st 50+ years will have very little connection with each others the same incentive isn't there.

Plus also if its getting that big Britain itself may want a number of smaller blocs, especially if this is alongside any sort of imperial federation as otherwise the old country is going to be dwarfed itself. I could be wrong, especially if there's a clear foreign threat - US, Russia, possibly very bad relations with the UK or a Mexico that doens't become the OTL disaster or some combination with. However that's my gut feeling.


I don’t think there’s anything that should particularly disrupt this timeline, especially the slave trade abolition which came earlier after the divergence, by 1806. The only difference is that Britain has a few more communities under its thumb with many slaveholders and plantations, these include southern Louisiana, some of the towns of West Florida, and Puerto Rico. But these slaveowners are mainly conquered Catholic Spanish and French-speakers without a lot of clout in parliament. This has even less chance of derailing Britain’s anti-slavery timelines than, for a example, a scenario where Britain retained a significant part of the US South (like Georgia and Carolinas, or especially Virginia), or if they keep all the North American colonies and fear antislavery moves would bring the hassle of another revolt, or have to contend with empowered North American representatives and lobbyists in parliament in addition to Caribbean ones.

I agree although there are possibilities. See my previous response. Most dangerously for the US if you got the sort of worst case scenario [for the US] I suggested could be that the gulf is worsened by the US identifying itself with slavery and the UK with hostility to it. That could lead to both sides doubling down on the issue. Plus in Britain and Europe there did seem to be a moral movement against the slave trade initially and then the institution as a whole, not just in the Americas but around the world. Agree its unlikely although due to a greater planter influence in parliament things might move a little slower in Britain.

In my opinion, the Napoleonic Wars and Anglo-American War of 1812 were *highly* interrelated because of the trade, embargo, and impressment issues they caused. I think in the 1790s, in Washington’s lifetime, and in the tenure of Federalist successors like Adams, we could on the US to step lightly if it has a choice, but I think if the Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars last as long as they did, an Anglo-American conflict by the 1807-1815 timeframe is pretty much inevitable over these causes, because the Americans will have a new generation of rising politicians, a greater population, and gotten a rest from the Revolutionary War and forgotten some of its worst parts.

Both those issues and that Britain's distraction with Napoleon especially at his height gave the US a perceived opportunity. Plus as you say with a generational change on politicians its more likely that people on both sides could be more rash.

I agree, But I don’t think the Americans in most cases will initiate something where the timing is that bad. In large part because after the French are broken, the British will start lifting all their maritime provocations.

Now one recipe for repeated conflict may be if the British intercede aggressively to support an American Indian “barrier” state in the U.S. Northwest Territory in the 1790s, because Britain feels strong, and the U.S. looks weak, or because the American side for some reason can’t bring itself to sign the Jay Treaty.

Britain would totally win in the northwest with its Indian allies in any 1790s round, but it would become a cause of enduring American revanchism, that would cause later wars, possibly an American attack on the territory in the 1807-1815 timeframe in parallel with Napoleon’s campaigns. The Americans could win or stalemate again.

If they don’t get back the Northwest, there could be more rounds of conflict later. If the US is too unrelenting an attack dog about it in say the 1820s, 1830s, 1840s, the British may feel they have no choice but to do a total war or conquest and subjugation.

Or, the U.S. may take longer intervals and be a more militarized country earlier, always seeking a European ally, that becomes a serious drain and distraction to Britain, maybe eventually winning some border territory at some point in the 19th century.

Agree that the US would be bloody stupid to start something when Britain isn't seriously distracted but if they fail to do it in the Revolutionary/Napoleonic period - or try then and fail badly they may feel they could have no other choice if they wish to expand the borders. Doubly agree that if they were to lose the 'old NW region' as its both a diplomatic/political blow and it in itself seriously upsets the balance on slavery. Well unless the US were to say have Georgia expand to the Mississippi rather than have its western claims become Alabama and Mississippi possibly.

It might be different in a TL where the US have received some serious military defeats including loss of territories but there is the danger of American exceptionalism meaning there will be periodic challenges to the status quo. The good thing for Britain here - and bad for the US - is that they are likely I suspect to be too overconfident in their superiority and attack too soon. Of course Britain and its colonies could also become too complacent but unless there are crisis elsewhere that seriously distract the homeland's attention it should have the resources to recover from any early losses, at least until ~1900 if not beyond.

The other danger as you say is that the US looks for European allies. The issue here is that it will have different interests from most/all allies unless the aim is purely defensive so this could be an issue.

I can't see the UK going for a total conquest, if it means seeking permanent rule over the US. Steadily pecking away at it in frequent wars and possibly separating off parts that find they no longer want to be part of the US, especially if it means ruinous wars with the UK every generation or so. The US is simply too damned big. However beating the crap out of areas every time it starts a war could cause an ultimate decision by most to either sit down hard on any politician banging the war drum or as I say deciding "we're going for independence".

If the US can avoid any serious clashes with the UK until its got its own industrial base, circa 1870-80 OLT but possibly a bit later here or Britain has serious problems with BNA or Britain is seriously threatened by some issue in Europe then that I think is the best chance for US expansion but I suspect that by ~1860-70 if BNA has developed decently and no major clashes have occurred/are occurring with London it could be too late.



Even limited to its east of the Mississippi dimensions, the U.S. could be a really, really great power- we’re talking at least France or Germany ranked.

Agreed, although I would say a level higher than them.
 

raharris1973

Well-known member
No war related destruction, true, but think of all the Californian gold not going into the American economy.
Same applies to all other commodities mined/harvested/manufactured west of the Big River.

The California gold and the Nevada silver are big deal. I think that the California, Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Alaska oil are an even bigger deal long-term.

Thankfully for small U.S. industry, if it keeps its full 1783 borders, the Mesabi Iron Range and other iron ranges of Minnesota are almost entirely within the northeast corner, east of the Mississippi.

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raharris1973

Well-known member
How that war goes would depend on the circumstances but the most likely I suspect would be a 1812 equivalent as the US while we know it could grow very powerful still over time would probably not want to wait and if Britain's clashing with a Napoleon equivalent it would be too tempting an option. In this scenario you might see it happen earlier, which could complicate matters for everybody.

Oh, so @stevep, you're imagining it happening earlier, like sometime between 1804 and 1812? It would "complicate matters for everybody". Whose situation would get more complicated? Meaning would the US (a younger nation) or the UK (with more Napoleonic fighting ahead of it) suffer more from the early start and have more to lose? How would an Anglo-American war be likely to end if it starts between 1804-1809, and there's still several more years Napoleonic Wars and maritime provocations to go? Could a peace last?


If it is lucky/does not piss off Britain i.e. the buddies of the ruling clique the USA will not lose the Old Northwest.
But maybe Britain will let go of Florida(s), seeing that the area is a useless malaria ridden swamp :)
The US could well secure at least parts of Florida, especially as the western region controls river access to the interior of what OTL became Alabama and Mississippi states.
In such a case the key issue is whether Britain hold's Florida and especially New Orleans. If they do its probably going to be a win for the UK and you could see gains in the north. Say securing Michigan and points to the west which would secure the upper Great Lakes. Then assuming that the US gets the rest of Louisiana at some stage instead of the 49th parallel the border might be something like the 40th or 42nd say. Such a change might occur even if the south is lost if both sides decide they prefer their respective gains. Anyway initial thoughts on the issue.
This could be even worse if say in the conflict Britain lost Florida, which is the most vulnerable of its new territories to the US as that further strengthens slavery.

There's been alot of discussion so far in this thread of Anglo-American conflict evolving in a way where the USA perhaps wins Florida, and perhaps loses territory in the north (Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, maybe the whole northwest, maybe Maine, take your pick).

I get where this is coming from. Florida sticks out like a sore thumb, or some other dangling piece of anatomy. It's swampy and malaria ridden without great freshwater sources. Meanwhile the northwest territory/Michigan are around the core of developing Upper Canada settlements and the St. Lawrence, providing a buffer, and populated with some allied Amerindians.

On the other hand, the same factors that make Florida unattractive, make it hard for the Americans to pacify. The Americans took forever to win their wars agiainst the Seminoles and needed to pension off their chiefs as part of the surrender deals. Florida is arguably a buffer of sorts for New Orleans, the Bahamas and the rest of the Caribbean and is susceptible to Britain's superior navy.

Also, depending on how much Anglo-American wars involve campaigning in the south or the British try to gain a moral advantage and tactical advantage with anti-slavery policies, see the comment here...

also might end up, as in the revolutionary wars, welcoming black slaves willing to fight for their freedom.

...Florida and southern Louisiana may end up as big refuges for escaped slaves (and Amerindians) rallying to the British banner. Britain might feel a moral commitment not to give that sanctuary up.

At it's most extreme, in a super-escalated war of 1812 or follow-on war, I could imagine British forces conducting a "Sherman's march" through Georgia and the Carolinas that ends slavery there and leads to an exodus of slaves and practical end of slavery there, whether or not the British permanently occupy any extra territory. Freedmen could serve as cheap farm labor or herdsmen for the British in Florida, Louisiana, or Texas.

USA - if no Florida, ends up with 10 Slave States. Versus c.13 Free States.

If the territory is divided up as it was historically (no combining east Minnesota with Wisconsin for example) the ratio would would be 10 Slave States to 15 Free States

1) Delaware 2) Maryland 3) Virginia 4) North Carolina 5) South Carolina 6) Georgia 7) Kentucky 8) Tennessee 9) Mississippi (shrunken) 10) Alabama (shrunken); 1) Pennsylvania 2) New Jersey 3) New York 4) Connecticut 5) Rhode Island 6) Massachusetts 7) New Hampshire 8) Vermont 9) Ohio 10) Indiana 11) Illinois 12) Maine 13) Michigan 14) Wisconsin 15) Minnesota

Such a period of neutrality in a period of major and continued warfare could be handy for Spain and its empire provided its well governed [which could be an issue here] and takes advantage of being at peace as opposed to possibly being split into factions on internal government, treatment of its extensive colonies and possessions and political/economic conflicts related to the French revolution or any combination of those three. Of course later on without a Spanish ulcer that could be to the French benefit although that depends on things going as OTL.

If Spain manages to stay neutral until the end of the conflict, which could difficult then their likely to be economically and militarily stronger, for instance still having a substantial fleet but in turn could be politically isolated. As such their empire could well last longer although its likely to start falling apart at some time in the 19thC.
What is interesting is turning spaniards into some kind of Warhammer Fantasy dwarves keeping their grudges and dreaming about lost glory.If they add decent military,they could last with smaller empire till our times.

Indeed, this is a very interesting aspect to speculate upon. I truly wonder how the society of Spain internally, and the Spanish overseas empire would develop if it is able to be left alone in neutrality and not torn apart by wars, invasion, the peninsula war, and the independence wars from 1793 to the 1820s. Would it be staunchly conservative, or would it develop an indigenous form of liberalism or of prosperous, conservative sophistication?

One off-the-wall idea I imagine is that the economy continues to develop, modern ideas continue to spread, the empire remains an intercontinental behemoth, but the institutions remain stubbornly inadequate and backward, stunting the development of a responsible parliament and middle class body politic, even as the industrial revolution stirs. The Spanish Empire comes to resemble another massive reactionary empire with an increasingly alienated working-class, peasantry, and intelligentsia- Russia. When the right external and internal shocks hit the Spanish empire in the late 19th or early 20th century, the Spanish Empire becomes the world's first Socialist Revolutionary state.

Great maps by the way. A lot easier to visualize the situation with a map in such cases.

Thanks!

With the 2nd Canada is French if I read it correctly but assuming Napoleon wins rather than it ending up in Royalist hands. Unless possibly it never falls in the 7YWs but that would give a hell of a lot of butterflies. Or possibly the clash over the Nootka sound does happen but for some reason France avoids the revolution, supports Spain and the Bourbon powers win.

I highlighted the scenario I had in mind behind the map. Basically, British aggressiveness towards Spain forges a consensus in France that suspends the revolution in it's tracks and puts constitutional disputes on ice, while the French Army and Navy are still in an organized state. This saves Louis' head and Lafayette's political power as the National Assembly votes for war in solidarity with Spain, and calls upon America to honor her alliance.

The still formidable French fleet rendezvous successfully with the Spanish fleet and makes for the Americas. Despite reluctance and some temporizing and then trying to use the situation to gain concessions from Britain peacefully, when this doesn't work in a timely manner, the United States breaks off negotiations and relations with Britain. Austria and Russia join the anti-British coalition, then finally the USA joins in.

The USA sucks at fighting, but it serves as a great resupply and tactical base for the Spanish and French fleets and French troops. The USA, with some French aid, gradually builds up some skill to be able to eventually beat some northwest Indians, and occasionally wins some privateering victories.

The French and Americans do a joint invasion of Canada, where the French based out of New York and New England do almost all the work. The Americans would have preferred to get all of mainland Canada or at least half, but with their poor performance relative to the French, their claim is weak.

The Franco-Spanish-American-Austrian-Russian coalition is successful at pinning down the Anglo-Dutch-Prussian Triple Alliance, mainly through fleet operations that force the British to guard the channel and force the British to try to protect the Caribbean and Canada.

The result is that in Europe, there's not much cross border movement - neither the Prussians nor the Austrians nor Russians take big risks. In North America, the Spanish hold all their own territory and vindicate their Pacific Northwest claims. The French succeed in crossing the St. Lawrence and conquering upper and lower Canada, New Brunswick, and contesting Nova Scotia. They are greeted with acclaim in Montreal and Quebec by the Canadiens.

At the peace settlement, the French gain back Quebec/Lower Canada, lesser populated Upper Canada, the Hudson't Bay region for good measure and extra security, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia (renamed Acadia). The exception in Canada is that the Americans demand and get all the islands upon the Great Lakes and the Ontario/York peninsula, south of the Ottawa river. Britain retains Newfoundland.
 

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