Aaron Fox
Well-known member
... what. A. Fucking. Idiot. I'm surprised at that man's stupidity...
What if america joined the central powers
- Thread starter Cherico
- Start date
Basileus_Komnenos
Imperator Romanorum Βασιλεύς των Ρωμαίων
For something like this you need a pod perhaps a decade earlier in the 1890's as that was when the US began drifting towards the UK and the rest of the Anglosphere due to similar cultural heritage and economic ties. You'd probably have to avoid Woodrow Wilson coming to power as he was a rabid Anglophile. Honestly removing that pretentious ideologue probably allows for there to be a much better peace agreement in postwar Europe.LOL!
I missed the "1916" in the OP
Sadly the OP deigned to tell us when in 1916.
Nevertheless that changes things somewhat, as by then the Entente has become accustumed to buying from the US.
Austria-Hungary almost made it out of the war in otl intact until Wilson started pushing for "self-determination" based on his idealistic 14 points program which threw the Balkans/Central Europe into chaos.
Aaron Fox
Well-known member
1912 having the Progressives win would be the biggest game-changer, for Theodore did not like Britain at all.
ShadowLord
Well-known member
Really? That's certainly news for me. Mind sharing where you're getting this from?
Knowledgeispower
Ah I love the smell of missile spam in the morning
This is what happens when you let Woodrow Wilson of all people become president and pick cabinet secretaries. Mind you an alternative timeline where the USN gets 5 more 16" armed capital ships(all of which would have had better deck and belt armor than they actually got by around a half an inch in both cases)would make the Washington Naval Treaty have some....interesting negotiations
Skallagrim
Well-known member
On this point, I must disagree. TR was in fact a highly vocal proponent of intervention on the Entente side. Keep in mind, Wilson was the guy who promised to keep the USA out of the war. Roosevelt wanted intervention from day one. He was very critical of Wilson's refusal to dive head-first into the war.
Geostrategically, Roosevelt didn't allow any personal 'likes' or 'dislikes' to enter into his ideas. He was keenly aware of the same realities that Halford John Mackinder outlined in 1904: Eurasia is a 'world island', and whoever assumes true control over the heartland of that world island is by definition a contender for global hegemony. For this reason, Roosevelt was resolute that the American geopolitical position regarding Eurasia should always be to support the states of the periphery against those of the interior. Whatever else one may think of the man (and opinions are so often coloured by our own politics), he was highly astute on this subject.
In fact, TR outright predicted that of all Eurasian nations, Russia was the one most susceptible to a communist revolution. He understood that over a decade before it happened, mind you. He noted that while Germany -- with its vision of 'Mitteleuropa' -- was vying to become the hegemonic power of (initially Western, and in the longer term all of) Eurasia, and had to be stopped for that reason alone. But he also understood that if Amerca and the Euopean periphery (England, France, the Low Countries, etc.) united to defeat Germany, they would thereby empower Russia to advance from the East. He even tied that prospect to his premonition of a radicalised Russia. Basically, TR predicted the Cold War decades in advance. He was an Imperial thinker, and he was motived by the interests of an Imperial America.
For this reason, he would never, under any circumstance, side with the power(s) of the Eurasian interior. He would side with the peripheral powers to contain the interior powers, thereby securing a geostrategic buffer zone for America. (And if the process just so happened to dismantle the British Empire... so much the better.)
Thanks for coming to my
Apologies on my part. I may have been reading something else but a sudden dow by the US at some point in 1916 would cause serious if not fatal problems for the allies and secure a German victory.
One better feature in 1916 rather than 1914 is that Canada may be better positioned for defence, in the short term anyway as they have people training up there and also have built up a fair sized armament industry. I do remember reading someone suggesting the US going rogue in ~1915 in a discussion on another site a few years back and someone else pointed out that at that point there were more Canadians under arms than Americans. Albeit this may be discounting the assorted militia units.
The primary problems for the allies would be:
a) Getting food to replace that shipped from N America. That is probably a killer in itself, especially since if we're talking about late 1916 the Germans have gone over to USW again. Possibly also oil. The allies had ramped up their own military production by this time so were pretty much self-sufficient there and historically supplied a lot of stuff to the US army in France.
b) Supporting Canada and allied possessions in the Caribbean. [Both British and French here] Again a serious problem as the allies have suffered, as have Germany, in big offensives this year and also the issue of supplying men and supplies to Canada especially. Despite the fact its after Jutland - if a lat 1916 POD - so Britain is rapidly seeking to implement lessons from that battle this is going to be very difficult even assuming that Japan is willing to help its ally, which seems pretty likely. [They already see the US as the primary threat to their independence let alone expansion and also can't afford to see Germany win in Europe without having two powerful and hostile powers on their doorsteps.
c) Doing this while maintaining a defensive front against Germany. THis could actually help the allies here as there would be a strong disincentive for the ruinous Nivelle and Passchendale campaigns. Its just possible, assuming that the Russians still have the February revolution the Germans will decide on another all out offensive in the west and exhaust themselves a year earlier, albeit there would still be a lot of potential for them given some time to recover.
If the US is for whatever reason determined enough to go to war and the population doesn't fairly quickly decide "what is this idiot Wilson doing, get rid of him" then the allies are almost certainly doomed.
Steve
Because only Britain had big enough navy to excuse the sort of navy the USN was arguing for. [Other than possibly an imperial Germany that had won domination in Europe].
That they stated Britain did unpleasant things to secure their survival means nothing. I could probably fairly easily mntion some US activities during this period as well. Especially since by 1921 Britain had already accepted de-facto inferiority to the US in naval strength and that War Plan Red was already in existence. Also you have to allow for US creation myths here. Britain has traditionally been the villain because its Britain the US fought to come into existence and any threat to the US after the fall of Napoleon could only come from or with British tolerance.
I do remember reading once, although never saw it again unfortunately that Teddy Roosevelt once stated that the US should never do anything to undermine the RN because it was the best protection that the US had. Especially since it came for free.
Given that OTL Wilson refused to make any preparation for war until his actual dow against Germany and that there's no good reason for declaring war on the allies - and plenty of reasons not to - it seems unlikely that the US would be any more prepared for war in this scenario than they were OTL.
Steve
Aaron Fox
Well-known member
Largely -from what I understand- from the fact that Britain wasn't really a friend to the US for most of its existence. Not only that, Britain had been largely semi-antagonistic to the US since day one...
[grumbles about letting Dixiecrats getting into power]
From what I understand, TR thought that Britain was someone not to be trusted, largely because Britain would rather enflame problems than extinguish them to keep their hegemony...On this point, I must disagree. TR was in fact a highly vocal proponent of intervention on the Entente side. Keep in mind, Wilson was the guy who promised to keep the USA out of the war. Roosevelt wanted intervention from day one. He was very critical of Wilson's refusal to dive head-first into the war.
Geostrategically, Roosevelt didn't allow any personal 'likes' or 'dislikes' to enter into his ideas. He was keenly aware of the same realities that Halford John Mackinder outlined in 1904: Eurasia is a 'world island', and whoever assumes true control over the heartland of that world island is by definition a contender for global hegemony. For this reason, Roosevelt was resolute that the American geopolitical position regarding Eurasia should always be to support the states of the periphery against those of the interior. Whatever else one may think of the man (and opinions are so often coloured by our own politics), he was highly astute on this subject.
In fact, TR outright predicted that of all Eurasian nations, Russia was the one most susceptible to a communist revolution. He understood that over a decade before it happened, mind you. He noted that while Germany -- with its vision of 'Mitteleuropa' -- was vying to become the hegemonic power of (initially Western, and in the longer term all of) Eurasia, and had to be stopped for that reason alone. But he also understood that if Amerca and the Euopean periphery (England, France, the Low Countries, etc.) united to defeat Germany, they would thereby empower Russia to advance from the East. He even tied that prospect to his premonition of a radicalised Russia. Basically, TR predicted the Cold War decades in advance. He was an Imperial thinker, and he was motived by the interests of an Imperial America.
For this reason, he would never, under any circumstance, side with the power(s) of the Eurasian interior. He would side with the peripheral powers to contain the interior powers, thereby securing a geostrategic buffer zone for America. (And if the process just so happened to dismantle the British Empire... so much the better.)
Thanks for coming to myTED Talkshameless derail.
Skallagrim
Well-known member
Be that as it may, he nevertheless advocated intervention on the Entente side. He did so from day one, he did so very loudly, and he actually raised volunteer forces on his own (whose service Wilson declined). It's not a matter of being pro-Britain, it's a matter of being anti-German. TR saw Germany as a threat with far greater potential in the long run.
Therefore, whatever else we may say, "Roosevelt wins in 1912" is a poor POD to get the USA on the side of the Central Powers. It's actually a great POD to get the USA to enter on the Entente side in 1914. But, you know, that's another scenario altogether...
Regarding the scenario that's actually being discussed here: @Cherico, are we to assume that everything goes as in OTL until we arrive at some point in 1916, where some incident leads the USA to reverse course and become hostile to the Entente? Or are we to assume a scenario where the USA has a Germanophile and/or Anglophobe President as of 1912 or something, and the USA relates to the Central Powers just as it did to the Entente in OTL, and does so right from the start?
lets assume some one screws up big.
Skallagrim
Well-known member
That means, of course, that we get a nicely tangled-up mess. Just as in OTL, from an early point, US public opinion will see a majority leaning anti-Germany (a position that became consolidated when the first news of atrocities in Belgium made the news). The peace-time USA will, is in OTL, see American banks extending huge loans to Britain and France. So up until somebody messes up in a huge way, the expectation will be continuing friendly-to-the-Entente neutality, or active entry on the Entente side.
But then, the board gets flipped. The USA is now in an unexpected position. Wilson will, as in OTL, have made only the barest minimum of preparations for a land war. The army will still be on its modest peace-time footing. Regarding public opinion: anything dramatic enough to get Congress to declare war on the Entente powers will no doubt also be sufficient to get the populace clamouring for this. (In fact, we may expect it to be the other way around: since entry on the side of the Central Powers is a wild swerve at this stage, it seems likely that public opinion essentially forces the decision on Congress -- on penalty of a major electoral shift come 1918, should Congress refuse.)
This means that the POD must be dramatic indeed. Supposing the Brits do something Lusitania-esque, even, the the expected reaction is that the USA demands apologies, assurances that it'll never happen again, and of course compensation. We may safely assume Britain would grant all this at once. Even if it messes with their whole Atlantic strategy and the american demands basically give the germans free reign... that's still better than having the USA enter on the German side. So that's saying something. There must be some War-of-1812 type of animosity building up, here.
But let's assume something really bad happens, as a direct result of British policy, and that a combination of wrong-guys-in-the-wrong-jobs and miscommunications, against a back-drop of a Britain that feels it's backed into a corner, leads to a conflict neither side wants, but both sides think is unavoidable. Stranger things have happened.
What would the outcome be? The USA would, for one, naturally cease all its support for the Entente. Instead, all such efforts would now go to backing the Central Powers. Quite actively so, because with britain as an enemy, a British/Entente victory now means that the USA never gets any of its loans back. Conversely, a Central Powers victory means the USA can demand all it is owed (and more) as part of the peace settlement after the war. (Germany, at the moment thanking God most profusely, will be all too happy to back any claim the Americans wish to put forward come that day.)
The Entente is now in major trouble. The Royal Navy can still dominate the Atlantic, and can presumably intercept any material support the Americans might send to the Central Powers. But that doesn't matter. The fact is, having expected American loans to continue, the Entente is now in a lurch. They're already leveraged to the hilt. Finding new benefactors will be a non-starter at this point. Especially so because it now seems near-certain that they'll lose.
After all, Britain can now choose between sacrificing Canada, or trying to defend it... in which case they'll have correspondingly less means and men to dedicate to other theatres. The war has just become a no-win scenario for the Entente. Theoretically, their best option is to immediately sue for some semblance of "peace with honour", if they can get it. Germany might be reasonable (it being 1916), and then the war ends before the USA even has to do anything. The USA will demand reparations for whatever slights it has suffered, and the Entente will have to pay its debts, but otherwise, the war in the West ends with a Central Powers victory. In the East, Russia may become the victim of German ambitions -- which can now be realised without sending over mr. Lenin. The Germans will have enough men freed up to overwhelm the Russians. Of course, this also depends on German demands and the Russian response. If Germany isn't too greedy, Russia (now alone) may just cut its losses. If German demands become outrageous, Russia probably will fight on, hoping the Germans will tire of war come winter.
There is the alternative scenario, of course. Germany might be so emboldened by US entry that the Kaiser feels ge can go wild with his demands all-round. To such a degree that the Entente fights on, despite the dim prospects. The war rages on. The financial realities will catch up to the Entente, and they will eventually collapse. German demands at the war's end will be as vindictive as can be. Meanwhile, the American part in all this will boil down to: all those guys who went to Europe in OTL are marching North instead. At the end of the war, the USA will simply be the new owners of Canada. ("You may now cede the parts we haven't occupied yet, and if you don't, we'll add the expected costs of our trouble to your war reparations.")
The outcome of this second scenario are hard to estimate. Veering into speculation, I can imagine the collapse of the British Empire. France would be a mess, too. Italy would be humiliated. On the winning side: the USA, its work cut out for it, having to digest Canada. (Would probably demand Bermuda and the British Caribbean, too -- for strategic reasons.) Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans would all be bloated by their post-war annexations. Lots of unhappy new subjects all over the place. Germany would probably demand a lot of colonies, too. What it can't annex, it might just seek to cut off from Britain and France altogether. Suddenly-independent India? That's an option. Anyway, there's a good chance that not only Russia goes red, but France, Britain and Italy as well. (United against Mitteleuropa, common cause makes the most sense. So even if some kind of fascism wins out, it'll lean left to close ranks with the Soviets.) If Britain really goes red, places like Australia will almost certainly go independent.
All in all, it would be a huge mess, and a second war would be inevitable.
LOL as if it ever wasn't an inevitability, the second the First World War starts the Second is almost an inevitability.
I agree with your scenario though, the U.S. will probably also end up with a few islands in the pacific as well.
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Skallagrim
As you say it would mean something bloody huge happening on the entente side for such a swing in the US position, especially considering how Germany's diplomatic position was steadily worsening. [Repeated USW, initiating use of lethal gas attacks, reported attrocities on occupied territories, involvement in attacks on US facilities etc. Plus blame by association for what the Turks are doing in Armenia.] It might be less likely that Britain does something, as it know how important the US is economically and has most to fear from aggression by the US than another ally, although hard to see what France or Russia either could do to p**s off the US that much.
If somehow this happens and enrages the US population that much that they will support a war against the entente then almost certainly the latter lose, possibly heavily depending on the circumstances. As you say one option is for the entente to look for a quick peace with either the CPs or the US and they might be willing to throw Serbia, most of Belgium and possibly even Russia under the bus in such a case. It would then depend on what the reaction in Berlin is.
If that did happen, while Russia is very likely to lose I wouldn't say its totally certain. While the material issue has changed massively against them two changes are in their favour, IF the Germans go OTT in their demands.
a) Its now a defensive war rather than Russia frequently having to launch attacks to take pressure off the western powers. This also means it can become a war for national survival for the Russian - and most other Slavic peoples in the empire - which would greatly reduce any anti-war feeling.
b) Given the lack of any real air or motorised forces and even more feeble [compared to 1941] Russian logistics infrastructure the CPs are going to need a hell of a lot of men to simply garrison let along conquer large areas of Russia and their own logistics are going to be horrendous.
Most likely in such a scenario Russia is forced to make peace, possibly a very humiliating one, but there's at least a chance they can inflict such horrendous losses on the CP forces that the latter finally decides that continuing the war is pointless. This could be either a decision by the leadership or by the population as a whole. Plus it would depend on what happens in this case in the US - entente war. Russia would be a mess after such a conflict and might then see dramatic reform or radical revolution as OTL. However a massive German victory isn't certain.
If both the US and Germany seek a draconian peace against the EPs their going to win but the costs are likely to be heavy for them. The US would probably seek to annex both Canada and all British and French colonies in the Americas but they could be costly possessions to hold as well as to take. [Britain was no centre of racial equality but I suspect many of the Carribean colonies would find a ~1914 US, especially with Wilson as President, a lot less palitable. Ditto with Canada as its huge with a lot of wild terrain so resistance groups could cause problems for a long while. Coupled with the demographic simularities this could be extended to sabotage attacks inside the US itself.
If we had a quick peace between the western EPs and Germany then the US could suddenly find itself with a problem, as its small army would have little time to expand and train new recruits. However the entente would have problems with food and possibly some other materials.
Overall its bad for the EPs, especially if for whatever reason the US is intent on a war of destruction, which would mean they can forget about reparations, and Germany also decides on similar. However conflict is rarely simple when humans get involved.
Steve
Knowledgeispower
Ah I love the smell of missile spam in the morning
It didn't help that the UK cut all Germany's underwater transatlantic telegraph cables in violation of several treaties they sponsored which meant that the Germans couldn't spread their version of events nearly as easily and had to run encoded messages from EP lines for any message traffic they needed to do outside of the territory of the CP which as the famous Zimmerman telegram will attest could be decoded
Aaron Fox
Well-known member
The Zimmerman telegram has some of the signs of Britain's intelligence shenanigans from what I've heard, so it is possible that Britain purposely edited the telegram to get the US into the fight. Most of the US is -surprisingly- anti-Britain outside of the former Confederacy, with many of the anti-Britain groups being in the North and West.
History Learner
Well-known member
The Command of Gold Reversed: American Loans to Britain, 1915-1917 by John Milton Cooper, Jr., Pacific Historical Review, May, 1976, Vol. 45, No. 2 (May, 1976), pp. 209-230:
The American retaliatory legislation also prompted the British government in September and October 1916 to initiate its first comprehensive inquiry into dependence upon American trade. Up to that time, the Treasury, War Trade Advisory Council, and Ministry of Munitions had separately studied the situation. The suggestion for a broad review of British dependence first came on September 5, 1916, from Richard Sperling, a clerk in the American Section of the Foreign Office. Sperling proposed the review as a preliminary step toward counterretaliatory measures. The suggestion found favor with his superiors, and on September 13, the Foreign Secretary asked for representatives of other ministries to meet with members of his department in order to "ascertain definitely how far this country is dependent financially and commercially on the United States... ." Delays ensued, and not until October 3 did an interdepartmental committee from the Foreign Office, Treasury, Board of Trade, Admiralty, Board of Agriculture, Ministry of Munitions, War Office, and Colonial Office meet to review the American situation.'3
The interdepartmental committee made a shocking discovery. The chairman, Lord Eustace Percy of the Foreign Office, reported, ". .. it developed at once at the conference that there was really nothing to deliberate about because our dependence was so vital and complete in every respect that it was folly even to consider reprisals." The committee had found that in food, raw materials, and particularly steel, "American supplies are so necessary to us that reprisals, while they would produce tremendous distress in America, would also practically stop the war." Even worse, in order to finance the war orders, the Treasury had to "find something over ?2,000,000 sterling a day in New York." By March 1917, British reserves of gold and securities would be gone. "Now, in these circumstances," wrote Percy, "our job is not merely to maintain decently friendly relations with the United States, but to keep sentiment in America so sweet that it will lend us practically unlimited money." No record was kept of the discussion that produced those conclusions, but it is not hard to guess what happened at the meeting. The Treasury representative to the committee was Keynes, and Percy's comments on finance recapitulated views that Keynes had often expressed. Not only was Keynes the best in-formed person about the American situation on the committee, but throughout his adult life the economist's quick mind and ready turn of phrase made him excel in swaying small groups of experts. The interdepartmental committee, it would seem, furnished an ideal forum for the Treasury's brilliant Cassandra.'4
At the end of October 1916, the Foreign Office circulated three sets of documents from the committee to the Cabinet. These included a resolution against reprisals, a memorandum by Percy urging conciliation toward the United States, and papers on British dependence by different departments. The most incisive arguments came in the Treasury paper prepared by Keynes. Dwindling stocks of gold and securities could meet less and less of the financial requirements, he noted. More and more money would therefore have to come from loans. But loans carried great dangers. "A statement," Keynes warned, "from the United States executive deprecating or disapproving of such loans would render their flotation in sufficient volume a practical impossibility." Even official approval, he further warned, might not be enough. "The sums which this country will require to borrow in the United States of America in the next six to nine months are so enormous, amounting to several times the national debt of that country, that it will be necessary to appeal to every class and section of the investing public." Keynes's conclusion was chilling: "It is hardly an exaggeration to say that In a few months time the American executive and the American public will be in a position to dictate to this country on matters that affect us more dearly than them.""5
62% of grain, 29% of aero engines and 95% of British oil came from abroad (i.e. the United States) in 1917, as far as imports specifically go.
"On 11 December Bérenger reported that France was dependent on its Allies for supplies and transport of oil. Three days later Clemenceau attended a meeting of the Comité Général du Pétrole. The immediate need was for tanker tonnage to bring oil to France; the next day Clemenceau issued a plea to President Wilson for extra tanker tonnage. There was a risk that a 'shortage of gasoline would cause the sudden paralysis of our armies and drive us all into an unacceptable peace.' French stocks of gasoline were currently 28,000 tons, compared with a target minimum of 44,000 and consumption of 30,000 tons per month. Wilson must get the US oil companies to allocate an additional 100,000 tons of tankers to France. These could come from the Pacific and from new construction. Clemenceau's final lines to Wilson were: "There is for the Allies a question of public salvation. If they are determined not to lose the war, the fighting French must, by the hour of supreme Germanic blow, have large supplies of gasoline which is, in the battle of tomorrow, as necessary as blood."
Citation here.
In short, it was not a "shortage of Dollars", but instead a fundamental dependence on the United States as the only country in the world that had the capabilities to supply them with, as Clemenceau noted, resources/goods as vital as blood itself.
Buba
A total creep
I was responding, erroneously, to "what if USA joined the CP in 1914".
A scenario in which no such dependency and thus need for Dollars would had ever formed.
Now, as to finding replacements for those imports in 1916/17 once the USA joins the CP in 1916 - oil can be sourced from ME and NOI. It wasn't as USA is nearer. Same goes for grain.
However, probably there would be no replacement for those aero engines in the short term, unless Japan can ramp up production quickly. So the Entente loses 3/10ths of aero engine supply, which it will have to repalce by mix of more domestic production, fewer airplanes and/or more Japanese imports.
Another thing - as we are dealing with an AU - would USA jump in the CP camp out of the blue, or would it be more fence sitting than in OTL, with a more "arms' length" relationship with the Entente, thus a lesser than OTL Entente dependency on the Dollar trade forming in the 1914-16 period?
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