raharris1973
Well-known member
What if Nationalist China refuses to sign a treaty conceding Soviet rights in Manchuria on August 14, 1945?
This treaty, which Nationalist China's Foreign Minister TV Soong, and his replacement Wang Shijie signed a day before Hirohito's recorded surrender announcement on August 15, provided international ratification, from the Chinese side, of the concessions of control over Manchurian Railways and ports to the Soviet Union that the USA had offered to the Soviet Union at Yalta in Feb 1945 in return for Soviet participation in the war against Japan.
Soong and Wang had been in Moscow since June 30th negotiating with Stalin, and intermittently consulting with the US Ambassador to the USSR, Averell Harriman, who actually in the final weeks of negotiation had urged the Chinese to nitpick over the degree of exclusivity of administrative control the Soviets would be granted over Dalian port, the civilian twin port to Lushun (Port Arthur) naval port.
In OTL, the Chinese Nationalists ultimately took the opportunity of the Sino-Soviet negotiations to make a virtue out of circumstance --- the impending, and then after August 9th, real, Soviet participation in the war on Japan, on Chinese territory, played 'the good sport' within the already established Russo-American Yalta framework, and ratified the existing Soviet occupation (by Aug 14th) of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and the not yet complete, but soon to be completed Soviet occupations (as of Aug 14) of the South Manchurian railroad, and Lushun and Dalian ports in the Kwangtung peninsula. They also extracted a timetable for Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria, and a promise that the Soviets would work with only the Nationalist central government as the governmental authority and not treat Communist forces as such. The other concession the Chinese Nationalists made was recognizing Outer Mongolia's right to be separate.
However, what if the Chinese Nationalist government chose to take an unyielding stance on the issues that originally divided the parties, at least from August 6th on, once they had seen the atomic bomb in action and could rate the chances of Japanese surrender without Soviet intervention or prolonged Soviet intervention more highly?
This is somewhat risky because it leaves the Soviets free from signed, bilateral obligations to the Nationalists, and leaves China at odds with the Russo-US Yalta bargain. The Soviets are theoretically more free to treat with the Chinese Communists as a governing authority, and would obviously be capable of operating across their own border into Chinese claimed territory. However, the Chinese Nationalists may not consider this a huge risk, if they are already starting from a premise of extreme distrust of the Soviets, especially on matters like recognizing the Nationalist/KMT monopoly of power, given the Soviet's longstanding shenanigans in Xinjiang province and ideological ties to the CCP. Harriman's encouragement of firmness on specific negotiating points may embolden them to think the Americans are ready to have Chinese objections be advanced as an excuse to overturn the earlier Yalta understandings on Manchuria. Ambassador Patrick Hurley's pro-Chiang attitudes waxed eloquently in Chongqing may have a similar effect.
Other Chiang Kai-shek could have other, domestic political, motives, for avoiding a treaty conceding sovereign rights in Manchuria to the Soviet Union, despite the risks. Firstly, it strengthens his Nationalist and patriotic brand among the powerful right-wing factions of the KMT for it to be known that talks with the USSR broke down because Chiang would not compromise on strictly Chinese controls over Manchurian rails, ports, and industries, and Chinese claims on all Mongolia. If the Soviets actually sign something recognizing all China's claims (not expected) that's a victory too. Additionally, in the expected political and public opinion struggle against the Chinese Communists, highlighting inherent contradictions between Chinese and Soviet national interests places the Chinese Communists in an inherently awkward position vs. the Chinese public, the international Communist movement, the Soviet Union, or all three. This can be a 'wedge issue' separating the Chinese Communists from many of its 'fellow travelers' acquired in wartime, and much centrist opinion and the opinion of various 'democratic' parties, students, and intelligentsia.
Being stubborn about making a deal with Soviet Union on anything but maximum Chinese terms risks blowback, in terms of Soviet material support for the Communists, but Chiang and the Nationalists can be betting that the Americans can match and exceed Soviet support, and despite tensions with US personnel in country and past frictions including Roosevelt's letter in '44 and the Stilwell affair, in any polarized situation where the Soviets are seen to be pushing and taking on Japan's old role as aggressor in Manchuria or China, Sino-American links will only tighten and American support will only increase.
Chiang may even have a sense that while Stalin may push back, and use the Communists as a tool to retaliate to a degree, Stalin ultimately fears American economic might and air and seapower to the point he would not push back hard enough to mount an existential threat to the Chinese Nationalist regime in the Chinese core, as opposed to possibly some borderlands in the far northeast and northwest.
How do things work out with Chiang pursuing a bold strategy like this? Does Chiang end up getting a one-sidedly positive treaty with the Soviets? Does he single-handedly make the Cold War bloom a few years early? Does he bring on a Soviet and Chinese Communist escalation before the US is prepared to match it? Does the Chinese Civil War become like a giant Korean War and Vietnam War rolled into one, leaving the US with something worse than a 'Vietnam Syndrome' but an anti-interventionist 'China syndrome' from the very start of the Cold War?
This treaty, which Nationalist China's Foreign Minister TV Soong, and his replacement Wang Shijie signed a day before Hirohito's recorded surrender announcement on August 15, provided international ratification, from the Chinese side, of the concessions of control over Manchurian Railways and ports to the Soviet Union that the USA had offered to the Soviet Union at Yalta in Feb 1945 in return for Soviet participation in the war against Japan.
Soong and Wang had been in Moscow since June 30th negotiating with Stalin, and intermittently consulting with the US Ambassador to the USSR, Averell Harriman, who actually in the final weeks of negotiation had urged the Chinese to nitpick over the degree of exclusivity of administrative control the Soviets would be granted over Dalian port, the civilian twin port to Lushun (Port Arthur) naval port.
In OTL, the Chinese Nationalists ultimately took the opportunity of the Sino-Soviet negotiations to make a virtue out of circumstance --- the impending, and then after August 9th, real, Soviet participation in the war on Japan, on Chinese territory, played 'the good sport' within the already established Russo-American Yalta framework, and ratified the existing Soviet occupation (by Aug 14th) of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, and the not yet complete, but soon to be completed Soviet occupations (as of Aug 14) of the South Manchurian railroad, and Lushun and Dalian ports in the Kwangtung peninsula. They also extracted a timetable for Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria, and a promise that the Soviets would work with only the Nationalist central government as the governmental authority and not treat Communist forces as such. The other concession the Chinese Nationalists made was recognizing Outer Mongolia's right to be separate.
However, what if the Chinese Nationalist government chose to take an unyielding stance on the issues that originally divided the parties, at least from August 6th on, once they had seen the atomic bomb in action and could rate the chances of Japanese surrender without Soviet intervention or prolonged Soviet intervention more highly?
This is somewhat risky because it leaves the Soviets free from signed, bilateral obligations to the Nationalists, and leaves China at odds with the Russo-US Yalta bargain. The Soviets are theoretically more free to treat with the Chinese Communists as a governing authority, and would obviously be capable of operating across their own border into Chinese claimed territory. However, the Chinese Nationalists may not consider this a huge risk, if they are already starting from a premise of extreme distrust of the Soviets, especially on matters like recognizing the Nationalist/KMT monopoly of power, given the Soviet's longstanding shenanigans in Xinjiang province and ideological ties to the CCP. Harriman's encouragement of firmness on specific negotiating points may embolden them to think the Americans are ready to have Chinese objections be advanced as an excuse to overturn the earlier Yalta understandings on Manchuria. Ambassador Patrick Hurley's pro-Chiang attitudes waxed eloquently in Chongqing may have a similar effect.
Other Chiang Kai-shek could have other, domestic political, motives, for avoiding a treaty conceding sovereign rights in Manchuria to the Soviet Union, despite the risks. Firstly, it strengthens his Nationalist and patriotic brand among the powerful right-wing factions of the KMT for it to be known that talks with the USSR broke down because Chiang would not compromise on strictly Chinese controls over Manchurian rails, ports, and industries, and Chinese claims on all Mongolia. If the Soviets actually sign something recognizing all China's claims (not expected) that's a victory too. Additionally, in the expected political and public opinion struggle against the Chinese Communists, highlighting inherent contradictions between Chinese and Soviet national interests places the Chinese Communists in an inherently awkward position vs. the Chinese public, the international Communist movement, the Soviet Union, or all three. This can be a 'wedge issue' separating the Chinese Communists from many of its 'fellow travelers' acquired in wartime, and much centrist opinion and the opinion of various 'democratic' parties, students, and intelligentsia.
Being stubborn about making a deal with Soviet Union on anything but maximum Chinese terms risks blowback, in terms of Soviet material support for the Communists, but Chiang and the Nationalists can be betting that the Americans can match and exceed Soviet support, and despite tensions with US personnel in country and past frictions including Roosevelt's letter in '44 and the Stilwell affair, in any polarized situation where the Soviets are seen to be pushing and taking on Japan's old role as aggressor in Manchuria or China, Sino-American links will only tighten and American support will only increase.
Chiang may even have a sense that while Stalin may push back, and use the Communists as a tool to retaliate to a degree, Stalin ultimately fears American economic might and air and seapower to the point he would not push back hard enough to mount an existential threat to the Chinese Nationalist regime in the Chinese core, as opposed to possibly some borderlands in the far northeast and northwest.
How do things work out with Chiang pursuing a bold strategy like this? Does Chiang end up getting a one-sidedly positive treaty with the Soviets? Does he single-handedly make the Cold War bloom a few years early? Does he bring on a Soviet and Chinese Communist escalation before the US is prepared to match it? Does the Chinese Civil War become like a giant Korean War and Vietnam War rolled into one, leaving the US with something worse than a 'Vietnam Syndrome' but an anti-interventionist 'China syndrome' from the very start of the Cold War?