raharris1973
Well-known member
During the first Ottoman-Egyptian War of 1831-1833, after the defeat at Konya, the Ottomans officially asked the Russians for military help.
The Russian Emperor directed the Russian Black Sea fleet to sail to Constantinople to secure the straits and check Ibrahim.
The following Russian forces arrived:
February 1833 - 9 ships (4 ships of the line, 5 frigates) plus 30,000 troops under Rear Admiral Lazarev
March 1833 - additional 11 ships (3 ships of the line, 1 frigate, 4 transport ships, and 3 supply ships) plus 5,500 troops under Rear Admiral Kuman
April 1833 - additional 17 ships (3 ships of the line, 2 other ships equipped with cannons, 1 transport, 11 supply ships) plus another 4,700 troops under Rear Admiral Storozhevski
Not willing to engage with the Russian expeditionary force, Ibrahim was forced to turn back and leave Taurus mountains (southern Turkey).
The Russian force left in June 1833 after the peace treaty was signed in May.
Looking at the scope of the Russian intervention of 1833, 10 ships of the line, 6 frigates, 5 transports, 14 supply ships, and 40,200 troops on both sides of the straits and the adjacent waters, I wonder if it was dependent on permissive, cooperative host-country Ottoman access, or would have been sustainable had Nicholas I gone rogue and betrayed the Ottoman Sultan and sought to take over control of the straits for Russia itself and perhaps partition of the empire with the Egyptians?
On the one hand, this was a relatively limited size force (albeit not a trifling force), operating at a very long distance from home, surrounded by hundreds of miles of Ottoman territory or open water before the nearest major domestic Russian production bases, depots, or bases. The Ottoman Sultan theoretically had garrison troops all over his Balkan provinces and western Anatolia he could use to beleaguer and ultimately destroy any Russian force trying to seize the Ottoman capital or straits by coup de main. On the other hand, the Sultan's forces had repeatedly shown their weakness and incapacity when facing the Egyptians in battle, and the Egyptians, while probably having superior numbers to the Russians, almost certainly had inferior artillery and training in its accurate employment, and less formidable ships.
With all these factors in mind, what if Nicholas I was a greedy, Machiavellian, devious double-crossing SOB, who attempted to use his alliance with the Ottoman Sultan to seize the capital and straits for himself. Could he have seized them for himself and Russia and sustained a permanent occupation of them, or would the Sultan's forces have driven him out inevitably? Or if not the Sultan's forces, Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim's Egyptians? Or if not the Egyptians or Ottomans individually, some combination of the British, other European, and local powers?
The Russian Emperor directed the Russian Black Sea fleet to sail to Constantinople to secure the straits and check Ibrahim.
The following Russian forces arrived:
February 1833 - 9 ships (4 ships of the line, 5 frigates) plus 30,000 troops under Rear Admiral Lazarev
March 1833 - additional 11 ships (3 ships of the line, 1 frigate, 4 transport ships, and 3 supply ships) plus 5,500 troops under Rear Admiral Kuman
April 1833 - additional 17 ships (3 ships of the line, 2 other ships equipped with cannons, 1 transport, 11 supply ships) plus another 4,700 troops under Rear Admiral Storozhevski
Not willing to engage with the Russian expeditionary force, Ibrahim was forced to turn back and leave Taurus mountains (southern Turkey).
The Russian force left in June 1833 after the peace treaty was signed in May.
Looking at the scope of the Russian intervention of 1833, 10 ships of the line, 6 frigates, 5 transports, 14 supply ships, and 40,200 troops on both sides of the straits and the adjacent waters, I wonder if it was dependent on permissive, cooperative host-country Ottoman access, or would have been sustainable had Nicholas I gone rogue and betrayed the Ottoman Sultan and sought to take over control of the straits for Russia itself and perhaps partition of the empire with the Egyptians?
On the one hand, this was a relatively limited size force (albeit not a trifling force), operating at a very long distance from home, surrounded by hundreds of miles of Ottoman territory or open water before the nearest major domestic Russian production bases, depots, or bases. The Ottoman Sultan theoretically had garrison troops all over his Balkan provinces and western Anatolia he could use to beleaguer and ultimately destroy any Russian force trying to seize the Ottoman capital or straits by coup de main. On the other hand, the Sultan's forces had repeatedly shown their weakness and incapacity when facing the Egyptians in battle, and the Egyptians, while probably having superior numbers to the Russians, almost certainly had inferior artillery and training in its accurate employment, and less formidable ships.
With all these factors in mind, what if Nicholas I was a greedy, Machiavellian, devious double-crossing SOB, who attempted to use his alliance with the Ottoman Sultan to seize the capital and straits for himself. Could he have seized them for himself and Russia and sustained a permanent occupation of them, or would the Sultan's forces have driven him out inevitably? Or if not the Sultan's forces, Muhammad Ali and Ibrahim's Egyptians? Or if not the Egyptians or Ottomans individually, some combination of the British, other European, and local powers?
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