raharris1973
Well-known member
In this challenge, I ask, what was the best, most enduringly beneficial deal France could have gotten for itself that:
a) the French legislature/public/bureaucracy would have plausibly signed on to, b) the other victorious powers would have signed onto, c) the Germans would have signed on to or been effectively powerless to oppose.
The PoD can be any time after the November 11, 1918 armistice, so the armistice still provides French and it allies the exact same amount of leverage over Germany. No earlier PoDs or alterations of the armistice terms allowed.
What is the range of greater "hardness" or "softness" the French body politic can even accept compared to OTL's Versailles treaty?
How can France can get the best, most enduring, interwar cooperation with, and commitments from its wartime allies like the US, UK, Belgium, Italy, Japan?
Or Germany?
How much of the answer could be found with concrete bilateral horse-trading with any of these other countries over French concessions towards or support for those countries specific territorial, geopolitical, or economic ambitions? And how much of the interwar/postwar behavior of France's wartime allies predetermined by their own internal politics, interpretations of the Great War experience and mood swings, not susceptible to anything France could bargain with them over?
I tend to think that a bilateral, horse-trading solution had some potential to improve France's relative position if used with Italy, and may have kept Italy friendly to France and out of any Germany alliances in later decades. If Paris had favored Italy in getting all its desires from the Treaty of London, treated her as an equal of the other Allies, and basically favored her in any territorial dispute with more minor allies like Greece or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Italy would have been far more likely to remain a status quo power in favor of the post-Versailles territorial order.
I think the bilateral, horse-trading, approach with the United States probably didn't have any potential for France at all. The US's course of action was going to be dictated by its mood swings on the war, which meant postwar buyer's remorse about participating in the war, and the kingdom of heaven not arriving (inflated expectations not being met), so strongly that territorial or geopolitical bribes from France that America never solicited wouldn't change American behavior. What could France offer? Caribbean islands, that America didn't want or need? French Polynesia, that America didn't want or need? An alliance against Japan, that America wouldn't anticipate needing?
With Belgium, I don't know.
I suspect the UK, like the US, would be somewhat impervious to any French "bargains" to support French continental policy of things like a Rhenish Republic, or a permanent Anglo-French alliance, or extended support for the new post-Versailles states of central Europe, even if France offered Britain concessions in other regions, like conceding the British or their puppets the mandate over Syria or even Lebanon, or supporting Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy. But maybe I underestimate trade-space here.
Could any greater, more enduring cooperation have been achieved through economic angles? I'm not sure on the specifics of a French economic deal with America, but I could imagine a proposed early coal and steel community consisting of the former European Entente members, UK, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy.
Your thoughts?
a) the French legislature/public/bureaucracy would have plausibly signed on to, b) the other victorious powers would have signed onto, c) the Germans would have signed on to or been effectively powerless to oppose.
The PoD can be any time after the November 11, 1918 armistice, so the armistice still provides French and it allies the exact same amount of leverage over Germany. No earlier PoDs or alterations of the armistice terms allowed.
What is the range of greater "hardness" or "softness" the French body politic can even accept compared to OTL's Versailles treaty?
How can France can get the best, most enduring, interwar cooperation with, and commitments from its wartime allies like the US, UK, Belgium, Italy, Japan?
Or Germany?
How much of the answer could be found with concrete bilateral horse-trading with any of these other countries over French concessions towards or support for those countries specific territorial, geopolitical, or economic ambitions? And how much of the interwar/postwar behavior of France's wartime allies predetermined by their own internal politics, interpretations of the Great War experience and mood swings, not susceptible to anything France could bargain with them over?
I tend to think that a bilateral, horse-trading solution had some potential to improve France's relative position if used with Italy, and may have kept Italy friendly to France and out of any Germany alliances in later decades. If Paris had favored Italy in getting all its desires from the Treaty of London, treated her as an equal of the other Allies, and basically favored her in any territorial dispute with more minor allies like Greece or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Italy would have been far more likely to remain a status quo power in favor of the post-Versailles territorial order.
I think the bilateral, horse-trading, approach with the United States probably didn't have any potential for France at all. The US's course of action was going to be dictated by its mood swings on the war, which meant postwar buyer's remorse about participating in the war, and the kingdom of heaven not arriving (inflated expectations not being met), so strongly that territorial or geopolitical bribes from France that America never solicited wouldn't change American behavior. What could France offer? Caribbean islands, that America didn't want or need? French Polynesia, that America didn't want or need? An alliance against Japan, that America wouldn't anticipate needing?
With Belgium, I don't know.
I suspect the UK, like the US, would be somewhat impervious to any French "bargains" to support French continental policy of things like a Rhenish Republic, or a permanent Anglo-French alliance, or extended support for the new post-Versailles states of central Europe, even if France offered Britain concessions in other regions, like conceding the British or their puppets the mandate over Syria or even Lebanon, or supporting Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy. But maybe I underestimate trade-space here.
Could any greater, more enduring cooperation have been achieved through economic angles? I'm not sure on the specifics of a French economic deal with America, but I could imagine a proposed early coal and steel community consisting of the former European Entente members, UK, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy.
Your thoughts?
