WI: Imperial Japan joins in Operation Barbarossa

[History Learner]

Yesterday marked the 80th anniversary of Operation Barbarossa, and befitting remembrance of that horrific event, I thought it worthwhile to create a thread discussing one of the big "what ifs" from that campaign.

Arguably, the failure to attach Japan to the coming campaign against the USSR represented the most serious policy failure of Hitler since triggering the Anglo-French declaration of war in response to his invasion of Poland. Japanese officials had been visiting Berlin in early 1941 and there was the opportunity to invite them into the planning for the coming war; rumors were indeed flowing and the Japanese foreign minister did make inquiries, but was rebuffed by his German counter-part. Unsure of German intentions, the Japanese therefore elected to seek a Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviets, securing their flank and allowing them to fully turn their focus southwards for the coming confrontation with the Western Powers; Operation Snow, triggered by Stalin by using Soviet agents within the United States, helped in this regard. Freed of the Japanese threat to the rear, the Soviets were able to fully force the Red Army upon the Wehrmacht and later on were able to import 50% of Lend Lease supplies-vital to the Soviet war effort-through Pacific ports which were only open due to the Japanese abiding by the aforementioned Pact with the Soviets.

This need not have been the case, however, as certainly the Japanese were interested in attacking the USSR and could be sufficiently convinced to do so. The IJA was firmly in favor of it, and was able to keep a lively debate in Tokyo concerning this ongoing until August of 1941, when events with America overtook such arguments and forced the hands of IGHQ. The Japanese foreign minister, despite being rebuffed by the Germans in April and having formed the Pact with the Soviets in the aftermath, was so staunchly in favor of the Strike North faction that he ultimately resigned over the refusal of the Imperial Government to denounce the Treaty he signed! Certainly German security concerns were valid, given the later revelation of the Sorge Spy Ring operating out of Japan, but the inclusion of dozens of Japanese divisions from the elite Kwantung Army as well as the cutting off of the Pacific ports would make such worthwhile. Furthermore, and arguably just as important, is that a Japan that has struck North is a Japan that has not conducted Pearl Harbor and brought the United States into the conflict...

 

[ATP]

Yesterday marked the 80th anniversary of Operation Barbarossa, and befitting remembrance of that horrific event, I thought it worthwhile to create a thread discussing one of the big "what ifs" from that campaign.

Arguably, the failure to attach Japan to the coming campaign against the USSR represented the most serious policy failure of Hitler since triggering the Anglo-French declaration of war in response to his invasion of Poland. Japanese officials had been visiting Berlin in early 1941 and there was the opportunity to invite them into the planning for the coming war; rumors were indeed flowing and the Japanese foreign minister did make inquiries, but was rebuffed by his German counter-part. Unsure of German intentions, the Japanese therefore elected to seek a Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviets, securing their flank and allowing them to fully turn their focus southwards for the coming confrontation with the Western Powers; Operation Snow, triggered by Stalin by using Soviet agents within the United States, helped in this regard. Freed of the Japanese threat to the rear, the Soviets were able to fully force the Red Army upon the Wehrmacht and later on were able to import 50% of Lend Lease supplies-vital to the Soviet war effort-through Pacific ports which were only open due to the Japanese abiding by the aforementioned Pact with the Soviets.

This need not have been the case, however, as certainly the Japanese were interested in attacking the USSR and could be sufficiently convinced to do so. The IJA was firmly in favor of it, and was able to keep a lively debate in Tokyo concerning this ongoing until August of 1941, when events with America overtook such arguments and forced the hands of IGHQ. The Japanese foreign minister, despite being rebuffed by the Germans in April and having formed the Pact with the Soviets in the aftermath, was so staunchly in favor of the Strike North faction that he ultimately resigned over the refusal of the Imperial Government to denounce the Treaty he signed! Certainly German security concerns were valid, given the later revelation of the Sorge Spy Ring operating out of Japan, but the inclusion of dozens of Japanese divisions from the elite Kwantung Army as well as the cutting off of the Pacific ports would make such worthwhile. Furthermore, and arguably just as important, is that a Japan that has struck North is a Japan that has not conducted Pearl Harbor and brought the United States into the conflict...

It was considered at least once - by Peter G.Tsouras /Hokushin - second russo-japaneese war/ in "Rising sun Victorious" anthology/most other scenarios do not let Japan win/
Basically japaneese come with help of NKWD officer who run to them before,win and soviet union ceased to be in 1941.
Good for Japan,not for Europe where germans would kill almost all slavic people now./author do not wrote about that - but it would be only logical end/

 

[stevep]

I'm not sure of the direct impact on the Soviets in the short term as much of the Japanese military were already tied up in China and coupled with the logistical problems that would occur they probably wouldn't get far if at all in the Soviet Pacific region. Plus its going to cripple Japan in the longer term as western sanctions especially from the US will follow which will set the clock ticking on oil, rubber, steel etc. Doubly so if the occupation of southern FIC still occurs. Also I have seen arguments that few if any Red army forces from the region actually took part in the fighting in Europe, at least in 41. Most of what did came from western parts of Siberia and also Central Asia. However there will be other issues.

a) As mentioned this would make L-L via Vladivostok impossible which would cause restrictions, especially in the latter stages of the war.

b) It's unclear when war between the US and the Axis would occur and what circumstances this would start with. A hell of a lot of butterflies here. War would almost certainly come sooner or later, and probably sooner but what the trigger would be and how things would go from there.

c) It would also pose a major diplomatic problem for Britain as Stalin would want a dow on Japan but Britain would be in no position to do so in 1941. We didn't declare war on Finland until IIRC Dec 41 although in part because of sympathy with Finland. With Japan there would be no sympathy but also concern about the vulnerability of the Far East even if the Japanese are in the southern part of FIC.

Steve

 

[Jaenera Targaryen]

First question: does Japan still occupy French Indochina in 1940 to 1941? If so, then the IJA does not have the manpower to go to war with the Soviet Union. Also, this would automatically result in the OTL sanctions which put the Japanese economy and war machine on a countdown to shutdown.

In short, once Japan occupies French Indochina, Japan is automatically committed to a war in SE Asia and by extension, the Pacific.

However, if Japan doesn't occupy French Indochina, then the IJA would have the manpower to attack into the Soviet Far East. It's also debatable if the US Congress would support FDR in sanctioning Japan if they invaded the Soviet Union. Occupying French Indochina was a direct threat to American soldiers and civilians in the Philippines, and also a blow against an (unofficial) ally and fellow democracy (Free) France. The Soviet Union, though, is a Communist state, which will make quite a few congressmen leery at just the notion of indirectly supporting them. It also moves Japanese troops away from American troops and civilians in the Philippines, and also reinforces the notion among isolationists of the war being fought between dictatorships, and thus none of America's business.

 

[DocSolarisReich]

First question: does Japan still occupy French Indochina in 1940 to 1941? If so, then the IJA does not have the manpower to go to war with the Soviet Union. Also, this would automatically result in the OTL sanctions which put the Japanese economy and war machine on a countdown to shutdown.

In short, once Japan occupies French Indochina, Japan is automatically committed to a war in SE Asia and by extension, the Pacific.

However, if Japan doesn't occupy French Indochina, then the IJA would have the manpower to attack into the Soviet Far East. It's also debatable if the US Congress would support FDR in sanctioning Japan if they invaded the Soviet Union. Occupying French Indochina was a direct threat to American soldiers and civilians in the Philippines, and also a blow against an (unofficial) ally and fellow democracy (Free) France. The Soviet Union, though, is a Communist state, which will make quite a few congressmen leery at just the notion of indirectly supporting them. It also moves Japanese troops away from American troops and civilians in the Philippines, and also reinforces the notion among isolationists of the war being fought between dictatorships, and thus none of America's business.

The problem for the IJA is that the red army has them beat in terms of quantity and quality of armor and artillery. I’m not so certain that the Soviets couldn’t fight both Germany and Japan at the same time.

The big difference is less to none Siberian skiborn units showing up to defend Moscow at the last moment.

Is that alone enough?

 

[Jaenera Targaryen]

The problem for the IJA is that the red army has them beat in terms of quantity and quality of armor and artillery. I’m not so certain that the Soviets couldn’t fight both Germany and Japan at the same time.

The big difference is less to none Siberian skiborn units showing up to defend Moscow at the last moment.

Is that alone enough?

Not too sure about that, TBH. I'll need to go and look up the relevant sources, but AFAIK, even at Kalkhin Gol, the Japanese actually had superior kill-rates against the Red Army, with Zhukov's victory dependent on actually stripping surrounding areas of trucks and tanks to achieve superior concentration of armor against the Japanese. And even then, like I said, the IJA inflicted heavier losses on the Soviets than they actually lost.

No question about quantity, but quality-wise...remember that the T-34 wasn't mainstream in the Red Army in 1941. The BT-7 was still their primary medium tank, and given the Heer was the bigger, more immediate threat to the Soviets, it'll be the European Front which will have priority for the KV-1 and T-34s, meaning the troops in the Far East will have to work with BT-7s. They'll still have superior artillery, but the question becomes if they can leverage that to their maximum advantage. The Japanese would still have better infantry forces, more flexible command structures, and even better officers, at least until Stalin finally loosens the leash on his officers.

All that said...Japan's biggest contribution to the war against the Soviets will still be strategic. Assuming Congress doesn't play ball with FDR on sanctioning Japan for invading the Soviets, FDR can still extend lend-lease (the President had the authority to extend it to any country he thought needed outside of the original Britain, Free France, and China that Congress originally extended it to) to the Soviets. However, fully half of those passed through Vladivostok, and included some of the most critical contributions too. Food and agricultural goods, in particular...if the Japanese can so much as cut the Trans-Siberian, something dreadfully easy to do as the railway actually passes within artillery range of the Manchu border, and the Soviets can't reopen it before winter...

...even if the Germans can't take Moscow in 1941, the food shortages in the winter will be devastating. Leningrad might actually fall, causing an implosion of the Northern Sector. The Germans might even take Murmansk in spring 1942, limiting the Arctic Route for lend-lease to Arkhangelsk, which unlike Murmansk is only open half the year. The Persian Route itself isn't viable, even IOTL, it took years of investment and buildup to get it functional towards the end of 1943.

And if the Germans take Leningrad and Murmansk, Hitler might just be encouraged to go for Moscow again in 1942, and this time, they might actually take it. And if Moscow falls, say goodbye to the Soviet war effort. Moscow is both the greatest strength and weakness of the Soviet/Russian command structure. The wheel and spoke network of railways and communications infrastructure branching out from Moscow makes it ideal for C3I and logistics, but if the Germans take it, the Soviet ability to supply and coordinate their armies collapses. And at the same time, the Germans will suddenly find it much easier to move supplies and reinforcements, using Occupied Moscow to their advantage against the Soviets.

 

[DocSolarisReich]

It’s not the the BT is great, it’s that the Chi-Ha was that bad. It was a first generation design from a Nation new to industrial warfare and with little automotive expertise.

All that being said, yes, if Japan can cut off lend-lease that might just be enough by itself. No Yankee rations, petrol, or Jeep’s and trucks to carry it.

 

[ATP]

The problem for the IJA is that the red army has them beat in terms of quantity and quality of armor and artillery. I’m not so certain that the Soviets couldn’t fight both Germany and Japan at the same time.

The big difference is less to none Siberian skiborn units showing up to defend Moscow at the last moment.

Is that alone enough?

They had 6:1 tank and 3:1 planes advantage over germans,better artillery - and still in first 3 weeks almost do not fight loosing 11.000 tanks/german infrantry dyvisions was making more then 20km per day,which mean that they practically do not fought - and lost 2 KIA for one soviet tank/
Which means,that soldiers simply do not wanted to fight for Stalin.If Japaneese do not made Hitler mistake and start treating soviet people like shit,they would take entire Syberia.If they behave like in Nankin,then soviets could win.

 

[stevep]

The problem for the IJA is that the red army has them beat in terms of quantity and quality of armor and artillery. I’m not so certain that the Soviets couldn’t fight both Germany and Japan at the same time.

The big difference is less to none Siberian skiborn units showing up to defend Moscow at the last moment.

Is that alone enough?

They can definitely fight both, at least for a while. The Japanese have the bulk of their forces tied up in China even without any moves further south and their going to be limited to possible expansion due to their logistical shortcomings and the sheer size, climatic and poor infrastructure of Siberia. The Soviets can hold the Japanese for quite a while with local forces and production I suspect as they have plenty of time and land to give up. Don't think it would make a substantial difference on the fighting against the Germans in 1941 or probably much 1942 as the forces that were sent west seems to have come largely from Central Asia and western Siberia rather than the Soviet Far East.

The problem would be as said, especially later in the war, a lot of the L-L went through Vladivostok and that's likely to be blocked here. Especially if the Japanese don't strike south and as a result there are no/less sanctions on Japan. Japan will still have problems as money is likely to be a major limiting factor in Japanese purchase of foreign materials.

The other issue here is when [and I suspect its when rather than if] Germany and the US go to war? Does this now automatically extend to war between the western powers and Japan? Difficult to see it not. If so how much warning would Japan get of the German decision and hence time, if they have the resources, to launch any attacks south. Once Japan is at war with the western powers and especially if it can't quickly overrun SE Asia its on a very limited time-table before its war machine is seriously impacted.

 

[DocSolarisReich]

They can definitely fight both, at least for a while. The Japanese have the bulk of their forces tied up in China even without any moves further south and their going to be limited to possible expansion due to their logistical shortcomings and the sheer size, climatic and poor infrastructure of Siberia. The Soviets can hold the Japanese for quite a while with local forces and production I suspect as they have plenty of time and land to give up. Don't think it would make a substantial difference on the fighting against the Germans in 1941 or probably much 1942 as the forces that were sent west seems to have come largely from Central Asia and western Siberia rather than the Soviet Far East.

The problem would be as said, especially later in the war, a lot of the L-L went through Vladivostok and that's likely to be blocked here. Especially if the Japanese don't strike south and as a result there are no/less sanctions on Japan. Japan will still have problems as money is likely to be a major limiting factor in Japanese purchase of foreign materials.

The other issue here is when [and I suspect its when rather than if] Germany and the US go to war? Does this now automatically extend to war between the western powers and Japan? Difficult to see it not. If so how much warning would Japan get of the German decision and hence time, if they have the resources, to launch any attacks south. Once Japan is at war with the western powers and especially if it can't quickly overrun SE Asia its on a very limited time-table before its war machine is seriously impacted.

That’s the potential butterfly, if Japan enters the war against the Soviets, does this stop Pearl?

If no Pearl, what excuse does FDR cook up to enter the war to make the world safe for communism?

 

[ATP]

That’s the potential butterfly, if Japan enters the war against the Soviets, does this stop Pearl?

If no Pearl, what excuse does FDR cook up to enter the war to make the world safe for communism?

He planned to send few small ships go near Taiwan and hoped,that Japan would sunk them.And send more destroyers to attack german submarines.He would finally get what he wonted,Pearl or not Pearl.
Difference is - would he manage to involve both Japan and Germany,or only one.

 

[Buba]

If no Pearl, what excuse does FDR cook up to enter the war to make the world safe for communism?

He will continue to put USN warships between U-boots and merchant vessels carrying munitions to the UK.

 

[Jaenera Targaryen]

It’s not the the BT is great, it’s that the Chi-Ha was that bad. It was a first generation design from a Nation new to industrial warfare and with little automotive expertise.

I wouldn't underestimate Japanese automotive capabilities even at the time, though. The Americans actually had complete technical readouts of the A6M Zero before the war started, but dismissed it as propaganda/Japanese misdirection, simply because they thought the Japanese had no capability to design much less build such a machine. This led to unpleasant surprises when the war started, with even American aces wary of dogfighting Zeroes until a new generation of American fighters began arriving in 1943.

And even as late as 1945, the Japanese were still designing and producing first-class planes, like the N1KJ Shiden-Kai or the Ki-84 Hayate, which could take on anything short of a Mustang (and even Mustangs had to be careful). Hell, even the obsolescent A6M was still something to be careful about in 1945. If it was a newbie at the controls, then all well and good. But if it was one of the surviving Japanese aces, then if you got careless, you'd be dead, obsolescent machine be damned.

Basically, Japan's problem still boiled down to their lack of ready access to natural resources, smaller manpower pool, and smaller industrial capacity to the USA. The IJA was also more...conservative, than the IJN, which while still conservative in many ways, had a bigger budget and were more willing to develop and accept new technologies.

And even in 1940, the IJA had the ShinHoTo Chi-Ha, which while still useless against the T-34, had more chances against BT-7s compared to the vanilla Chi-Ha.

They can definitely fight both, at least for a while. The Japanese have the bulk of their forces tied up in China even without any moves further south and their going to be limited to possible expansion due to their logistical shortcomings and the sheer size, climatic and poor infrastructure of Siberia. The Soviets can hold the Japanese for quite a while with local forces and production I suspect as they have plenty of time and land to give up. Don't think it would make a substantial difference on the fighting against the Germans in 1941 or probably much 1942 as the forces that were sent west seems to have come largely from Central Asia and western Siberia rather than the Soviet Far East.

Surprisingly enough, after Kalkhin Gol the Japanese wised up to the reality that they couldn't take Mongolia and the entire Soviet Far East, not with the war in China ongoing. The proposed war plan for 1941 actually had a very realistic set of goals: Soviet Sakhalin, the Maritime Province, and Vladivostok by the spring of 1942 at the latest. The IJA was also planning on elastic defense in Northern Manchuria, something they were very good at (even in 1945, with plenty of the Kwantung Army's assets obsolete and their few modern units sent back to Japan in preparation for Downfall, the Kwantung Army actually managed to avoid being overrun or pocketed, and retreated in good order despite the Red Army's overwhelming advantages on paper), at least until 1942. They'd then strike north, into Khabarovsk Krai and the Trans-Amur, before digging their heels in and waiting for the Soviets to make peace.

The problem would be as said, especially later in the war, a lot of the L-L went through Vladivostok and that's likely to be blocked here. Especially if the Japanese don't strike south and as a result there are no/less sanctions on Japan. Japan will still have problems as money is likely to be a major limiting factor in Japanese purchase of foreign materials.

The other issue here is when [and I suspect its when rather than if] Germany and the US go to war? Does this now automatically extend to war between the western powers and Japan? Difficult to see it not. If so how much warning would Japan get of the German decision and hence time, if they have the resources, to launch any attacks south. Once Japan is at war with the western powers and especially if it can't quickly overrun SE Asia its on a very limited time-table before its war machine is seriously impacted.

I'm not sure, TBH. It's commonly accepted that FDR would try and declare war if the Germans sank so much as a single American merchant ship, but I personally consider this far-fetched. Americans at the time in general were very lukewarm about joining the war, hell, even after years of total war IOTL, when news became public of FDR's postwar plans for Germany - the Morgenthau Plan i.e. Generalplan Germania - there was a massive outcry. In short, the American public was never really invested in seeing Germany as an enemy.

Assuming FDR manages to get enough votes in Congress to declare war over American merchantmen getting sunk by German U-Boats, even then there'd be strong opposition among the public and government opposition alike. I don't think FDR can go total war against Germany or the Axis in general in such a case, and if he can't show results by the time elections take place in 1944, he's out, and the USA is likely to look for a negotiated peace.

And if the USSR makes peace before the Americans - already hampered in this scenario by a lack of domestic support for the war - can really gear up against the Reich, there's no way the Allies can make real progress against Festung Europa. Carpet bombing would probably have begun, and the Allies would probably have made landings in Sicily and Southern Italy, but by the look of things, the (unwanted) war is shaping up to be long and bloody, with a growing butcher's bill that Americans wouldn't want to pay.

That’s the potential butterfly, if Japan enters the war against the Soviets, does this stop Pearl?

If no Pearl, what excuse does FDR cook up to enter the war to make the world safe for communism?

I don't think Japan would attack Pearl in this scenario. Bogged down as they would be in China and the Soviet Union, the Japanese government would never sanction Yamamoto's Plan Z. I mean, sure, Showa Era Japan had its reputation for coups and the like, but by the early 40s the situation had more or less stabilized, and the IJN leadership would have little taste to try and force the situation in such a way.

That said, if America declares war on Germany, Japan would have to back her ally. However, even then Yamamoto would abandon Plan Z, as there'd be no way to gain surprise. America would be at war, and any military bases forewarned. Yamamoto would likely attack the Philippines instead, but given their commitment in China and the Soviet Union, it's unclear how much territory Japan could take.

However, since FDR is still likely to go for Germany First, then again assuming in this scenario he gets booted out by 1944, and the USA seeks a negotiated peace, Japan is likely to get a status quo ante bellum peace after a couple of years of indecisive naval skirmishes in the North Pacific and the South China Sea. That, or FDR, desperate to get something out of the war which is going nowhere as election campaign begins, decides to finally talk to the Japanese. Like maybe "Leave the Axis, end the war in China, and we'll recognize Manchukuo and Mengjiang", which was the basic war goals of the Japanese anyway.

Not too sure about that, though.

 

[DocSolarisReich]

I wouldn't underestimate Japanese automotive capabilities even at the time, though. The Americans actually had complete technical readouts of the A6M Zero before the war started, but dismissed it as propaganda/Japanese misdirection, simply because they thought the Japanese had no capability to design much less build such a machine. This led to unpleasant surprises when the war started, with even American aces wary of dogfighting Zeroes until a new generation of American fighters began arriving in 1943.

Don’t get me wrong, we should absolutely respect the Japanese Nation for the what they where able to do with what they had, but they were playing catch up with extremely limited resources, especially in terms of of steels and alloys for them, rubber for gaskets as seals, and lubricants of all sorts.

That the Navy had priority on what little Japan did have was a big reason for the near open civil war levels of inter service rivalry between the IJA and IJN.

In short, the American public was never really invested in seeing Germany as an enemy.

No, but the psychopaths in the FDR and Churchill admins were.

He will continue to put USN warships between U-boots and merchant vessels carrying munitions to the UK.

But despite the USN making themselves undeclared combatants in the North Atlantic, German Uboat commanders were showing remarkable restraint and not giving the Yanks what they wanted.

 

[Buba]

But despite the USN making themselves undeclared combatants in the North Atlantic, German Uboat commanders were showing remarkable restraint and not giving the Yanks what they wanted.

Shit happens.
Sooner or later a USN vessel will eat a torpedo, allowing FDR to go before Congress waving the bloody long johns of Seaman Joe Doe, heroicaly deceased while protecting a shipment of off-brand powdered milk and Kellogg's "Khorne Flakes" for starving children in Britain paid for by charity contributions collected by the American Single Mothers Association*.

* something which we, the cynical people on this board, know to be a lie.

 

[BlackDragon98]

Japan wouldn't participate in OP Barbarossa.

They already had a taste of Soviet firepower and numbers in the 1938-1939 border conflicts.

Type 97 Shinhoto Chi Ha was only fielded starting 1942. BT-7s and T-26s were more than enough to deal with the Type 95s and Type 97s. Soviets outnumbered the Japanese in tanks and artillery by vast quantities.

There was also heavy fighting in China in late 1940 to late 1941, mostly in the city of Changsha but elsewhere as well. The Soviets were already providing assistance to the KMT and would provide even more aid to divert Japanese attention if Siberia was invaded.

Japanese treatment of Soviet civilians would be no difference than how Chinese civilians were treated. Many of the victims of Unit 731 were White Russians; men, women, and children. There would be a helluva guerilla war and the Soviets would be winning.

Southeast Asia had the resources that Japan need and it was grossly under-defended compared to Siberia. Imperial Japanese are monsters in human skin, but they aren't idiots.

 

[History Learner]

This randomly blew up today, so instead of a person by person response, I'll post in general. To quote the Russians themselves:

"If the Japanese enter the war on Hitler's side... our cause is hopeless."

Major General A. K. Kazakovtsev, Operations Chief of the Far Eastern Front in 1941

"We dreaded and we feared the specter of the Kwantung Army. We pleaded with the Russians, since the very day of Pearl Harbor, to pin down the Kwantung Army, relieve pressure upon our hardpressed forces in the Philippines, and thereby “save the Pacific” from the Japanese, as General MacArthur put it. At the same time we (and the Soviets) worried lest the Japanese assault the USSR first, like the jackal Mussolini had jumped the reeling French in 1940. . . . When, for example, the American Military Mission proposed to the Russians, in December 1943, that a U. S.-supplied logistical base be set up east of Lake Baikal in Siberia, the Soviet Army authorities were shocked by the idea and “literally turned white.”

ALVIN D. COOX, “The Myth of the Kwantung Army,” 1958

If IGHQ elected to attack the USSR in the Summer of 1941, the Northern half of French Indochina has already been occupied the year earlier with no repercussions; it is the occupation of the Southern half that occurred in 1941 and which was used as the official trigger of U.S. sanctions. I honestly have no idea how the assumption the occupation of the FIC and/or the China War prevents action by Japan against the USSR, given the former only required around 100,000 troops and the latter in 1941 was occupying about 40 Japanese divisions. To put that into context, during WWII the Japanese raised over 200 divisions and massively expanded the IJN on top of it, so neither commitment would prevent the IJA from going after the Soviet Far East.

On the tactical level, the IJA was the firm equal of the Soviets, contrary to what popular history holds. Outside of the events of 1939, which was a draw, the Japanese defeated the Red Army in all of their engagements in the 1930s. The military balance in 1941 was also, overall, in their favor and statements about tank warfare in particular fail to understand that it is not the machine itself alone which counts; good equipment is always important, but being able to use it effectively is often more so. See the Germans in 1941 in terms of tanks and the Americans in 1942 in terms of airpower in the Pacific for examples of this. Specific to the situation of 1941, the Kwantung Army is better quality wise than the Soviet far eastern forces and, ironically, will also have the numbers advantage as well:

The Soviets, on the other hand, operated under the shadow of the raging war with Germany. Although the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts had access to a formidable array of weaponry, the demands of the fighting in Europe meant that strength was siphoned away by the week. Moreover, the state of those vehicles that remained was often mixed: prior to the beginning of transfers westward in 1941 some 660 tanks[118] and 347 aircraft[119] were inoperable due to repair needs or other causes. Because the Soviets only possessed a limited offensive capability on the Primorye and Trans-Baikal directions, they could never hope to achieve a decisive victory over the Kwantung Army, even if they succeeded in slowing or stopping them.[120] Furthermore, attacking into the teeth of a prepared enemy, especially one with his own fortified regions and heavy concentrations of troops immediately opposite the border, was "the hardest kind of offensive," requiring "overwhelming numbers and massive means of assault" to succeed,[121] neither of which the Soviets possessed.[122]

Soviet forces in the Far East were dispersed over a vast arc from Mongolia to Vladivostok. Without the ability to capitalize on this deployment by striking deep into Manchuria from multiple axes, their strength would be fatally diluted and prone to piecemeal destruction at the hands of the Japanese, who could maneuver freely on their interior lines, concentrating their power at will while the immobile Red Army was fixed in place.[123] The only saving grace for the Soviets was that the remoteness of the Far East from European Russia meant that Japan alone could never hope to deal a mortal blow to the USSR, for which the former would be reliant on Germany.[124]

Organizationally, although Soviet forces in the Far East on paper amounted to some 32 division-equivalents by December 1941,[125] they were regarded as only barely sufficient for defensive operations. Compared to a typical Japanese division, pre-war Red Army units possessed slightly less manpower, but had greater access to long-range, higher caliber artillery. After the German invasion, however, the Red Army was reorganized so that each division had scarcely half the manpower and a fraction of the firepower of either its German or Japanese counterpart. Hence, to achieve superiority on the battlefield the Soviets would have to concentrate several divisions to counter each of the opponent's.[126]

Lastly, the quality of both personnel and equipment in the respective armies cannot be ignored. As the Soviets drained their best, most well-trained divisions to fight in the west, the overall standard of the forces in the east correspondingly diminished, forcing the STAVKA to rely more heavily on its fortified regions in defensive operations.[136] Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army opposite them then constituted "the cream of the entire Japanese armed forces,"[137] and was receiving reinforcements by the day. A large proportion of its units were elite Type A divisions,[n] many of which had seen extensive service in China. The quality of the Japanese officer corps was also very high, as many figures who would go on to have notable careers in the Pacific War including Tomoyuki Yamashita (head of the Kwantung Defense Command and later First Area Army), Isamu Yokoyama (1st Division, later 4th Army), Mitsuru Ushijima (11th Division),[139] and Tadamichi Kuribayashi (1st Cavalry Brigade, Mongolia Garrison Army)[140] held commands there. While both sides primarily relied on bolt-action rifles and light automatic weapons as the backbone of the infantry, Japanese artillery often found itself outranged by the heavy Soviet guns at Khalkhin Gol, to the point where the IJA felt compelled to move their 15 cm howitzers closer to the front in order to bring them to bear, even at the expense of cover.[141] Even though the Japanese managed to disable a considerable number of Soviet guns through counterbattery fire,[142] their lack of range at extreme distances and shortage of ammunition left them at a distinct disadvantage against the Red Army.[143]

Tanks presented a mixed picture as well: although the most modern machine available to the Kwantung Army in 1941, the Type 97 Chi-Ha, had thicker armor (up to 33 mm)[144] compared to the Soviet BT and T-26, its low-velocity 57 mm gun common to medium tanks of the era was outmatched by the long-barreled 45 mm weapons mounted on its opposite numbers, while the 37 mm gun used on the Ha-Go and Te-Ke had an effective range of less than a kilometer.[145] In general, while the "handcrafted, beautifully polished" Japanese tanks were more survivable thanks to their diesel engines (the gasoline powerplants used by the Russians were especially fireprone[146]), their lesser numbers meant that each loss was more damaging to the IJA than each destroyed "crudely finished," "expendable" BT or T-26 was to the Red Army.[147] The balance in the air would have been strongly in favor of the Japanese. Although the most modern fighter in the Soviet Air Force arsenal available in the Far East, the Polikarpov I-16, was a firm opponent of the Nakajima Ki-27,[148][o] the majority of planes in-theater were considerably older. Furthermore, the Soviets had no answer to either the Mitsubishi A6M, which had been fighting in China since 1940,[149] or the high-speed Ki-21 bomber, which could fly faster and farther than its contemporary, the SB-2.[150][151] Japanese pilots were also highly experienced, with IJNAS airmen averaging roughly 700 hours of flight time by late 1941, and IJAAF aviators averaging 500. Many of these fliers had already tasted combat against China or the VVS in previous battles.[152] In comparison, German pilots received about 230 hours of flying time and Soviet pilots even less.[153]

In terms of its effect on the war? The later diversion of forces from the Soviet Far East could probably allow the Germans to take Moscow in October but, failing that, this one picture alone explains the long term outlook:

 

[BlackDragon98]

This info above is literally cherry picked from the same Wiki page that said the Japanese invasion would run out of oil within 6-12 months.

The US and Allied wholesale embargo of Japan crippled their war industry, especially in terms of oil. And Siberia at the time was very underdeveloped, very few mines and industrial facilities.

Sure the Japanese can invade on June 22nd, 1941, but they'll be out of oil and other critical supplies by December 1941. Soviets will preform a two front counterattack and save their hide.

The Soviets have more equipment than they have men, which means they can simply conscript civilians. And I doubt the numbers of Soviet troops accounted for the reservists in the area as well. An error that cost the Germans dearly.

Japanese on the other hand, are running out of men and gear. The Battle of Changsha went badly for them and if the Chinese learned that the Japanese were occupied on another front, they would launch a massive counter-attack.

 

[stevep]

Don’t get me wrong, we should absolutely respect the Japanese Nation for the what they where able to do with what they had, but they were playing catch up with extremely limited resources, especially in terms of of steels and alloys for them, rubber for gaskets as seals, and lubricants of all sorts.

That the Navy had priority on what little Japan did have was a big reason for the near open civil war levels of inter service rivalry between the IJA and IJN.

Very true.

No, but the psychopaths realists in the FDR and Churchill admins were.

Corrected your typo. I wish this system didn't screw up things like bolding, colouring etc.

But despite the USN making themselves undeclared combatants in the North Atlantic, German Uboat commanders were showing remarkable restraint and not giving the Yanks what they wanted.

However Hitler will take the bait eventually as he did OTL. Probably some time in early 42.

 

[stevep]

That’s the potential butterfly, if Japan enters the war against the Soviets, does this stop Pearl?

If no Pearl, what excuse does FDR cook up to enter the war to make the world safe for communism?

Almost certainly stops Pearl along with more importantly the southern push, which makes the Japanese position dire from the start of a war with the western powers.

For all Roosevelt's stupid bias I wish people would stop the shit about him being some sort of secret communist.