WI: Italy abandoned, early 1944

[History Learner]

On another website, a discussion has been fostered concerning Erich von Manstein's strategic thoughts on Italy in 1943/1944, as detailed by Benoit Lemay's Erich von Manstein: Hitler's Master Strategist. Basically, Manstein was in favor of abandoning much of Italy to Allied occupation, a view Rommel had shared in 1943 before being transferred to France, wherein the Germans would form a much shorter defensive line anchored along the easily defended Alps, allowing for the mobile units of Army Group C to be pulled out of Italy and used elsewhere. There was a lot of questioning over the cost/benefits of such a decision, as OTL Field Marshall Kesselring was able to mount a very successful defense of Italy, keeping much of its industry and labor in Axis hands while making the Allies pay a very heavy toll to conquer the peninsula. Personally, however, I am convinced Rommel and von Manstein were correct in their views, especially in 1944.

Looking at Army Group C's OOB in April/May of 1944, Armeegruppe von Zangen (LXXV Army Corps, Corps Witthöft, and Corps Kübler) could be left to guard the Alp passes as well as the Ljubljana Gap effectively. Given the terrain, logistics and the quality of the German forces, it would be impossible for the Anglo-Americans to breakthrough them; if there is any concern, Korpsgruppe Hauck could be detached from the 10th Army. Honestly though, given the need to extend their logistics across half of Italy, I doubt the Allies would even be in a position to launch an offensive until the the Spring/Summer of 1945. So, this frees up the German Army Group Reserve, 14th Army (I Parachute Corps and LXXVI Panzer Corps), and 10th Army (XIV Panzer Corps and LI Mountain Corps, if Korpsgruppe Hauck isn't detached, that too).

So, what does this all mean?

First, from the Allied perspective, they are going to need to garrison Italy heavily both because of all the ex-Fascists running around (Especially any RSI partisans) but also just in case the Germans emerge from the Alps into the Po Valley again at the first opportunity. Likewise, the severe shipping constraints means there isn't any real way to use them in OVERLORD or in ANVIL; once those operations are completed, they could shift forces through the French Alps but that will not be of much help given the severe logistical issues that crippled Allied Armies in the Fall of 1944. Southern French ports, for example, were already strained supporting the FFI, 6th U.S. Army Group and 3rd U.S. Army Group; adding more would not help matters. How about operations in the Balkans? In theory possible, but really bad in a political sense:

The problems with this strategy, according to the jssc, were both military and political. Eastern Mediterranean operations would require previously committed U.S. naval support, Turkish belligerency the jssc rated an overall liability rather than an asset, and offensives at the end of long and tenuous supply lines in an area so mountainous and remote from the center of German power as to be indecisive and invite stalemate or defeat. Moreover, such operations were based on the assumption that indirect campaigns in the Mediterranean against Germany’s satellites, combined with blockade, bombing, and guerrilla operations, could force a German collapse. Dubious under the best of circumstances, this assumption ignored the fact that an approach relegating to the Soviet Union the brutal task of fighting the bulk of the Wehrmacht while London reaped political benefits in the eastern Mediterranean and Balkans, an area of historic Anglo-Russian rivalry, might so arouse Russia’s anger and suspicion as to make it ‘‘more susceptible’’ to German peace feelers— especially ones which would grant Moscow its centuries old desire to control the Dardanelles.

The resulting separate peace would leave Germany undefeated and dominant in Central and Western Europe and would make Allied victory impossible.31 Even if such an appalling scenario did not develop, a Mediterranean strategy would involve the use of American forces to achieve British political ends. More threatening than the nationalistic insult involved in this perceived repetition of the attempted World War I manipulation of U.S. forces, Britain’s approach would negatively affect America’s military position and national policies in the Far East and, with them, Washington’s ability to pursue a Europe-first strategy in the future. The essential problem was that the time-consuming and indecisive Mediterranean approach would delay vital operations against Japan and, in the process, wreak havoc with America’s military position, its interests in the Far East, and public support for a global war effort. Even before Casablanca the jssc had concluded in this regard that the ‘‘basic difference’’ between U.S. and British strategy was not over the appropriate follow-up to torch, as London had claimed, but over the ‘‘relation of the war in the Pacific to the war as a whole.’’ 32

From Mark Stoler's Allies and Adversaries, Page 110-112. How about the Germans? From Lost in the Mud: The (Nearly) Forgotten Collapse of the German Army in the Western Ukraine, March and April 1944 by Gregory Liedtke, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies:

The need to reassign resources in the wake of the second stage of the Dnieper-Carpathian Operation also proved deleterious to the Germans’ prospects of successfully defending France. The withdrawal of two panzer and one infantry divisions, one heavy tank battalion, and two assault gun brigades meant that OB West (High Command of the German Army in the West, or Oberbefehlshaber West) was deprived of a total of 363 tanks, assault guns, and self-propelled anti-tank guns on 6 June 1944.72 Although the II. SS-Panzerkorps with the 9. SS-Panzer and 10. SS-Panzer Divisions were ordered back to France on 12 June, Allied air interdiction and damage to the French railway net delayed their arrival at the invasion front until 29 June. While their commitment at this point ended the British Operation Epsom (26–30 June), it also meant that German hopes for launching a concerted effort to wipe out the British portion of the Allied bridgehead were stillborn; henceforth these two divisions were fully preoccupied with simply trying to contain the Allied lodgement.73 One can only speculate as to the possible consequences had the II. SS-Panzerkorps already been stationed in France on 6 June. However, with its two divisions possessing most of their required number of motor vehicles and hence a high degree of mobility, and since all the other fully operational panzer divisions in France were committed almost immediately, it seems likely that the II. SS-Panzerkorps would also have been employed against the Allied landings at a very early stage. While the early deployment of an additional two panzer divisions with 245 tanks and assault guns may not have sufficed to wipe out any of the Allied beachheads, it would nonetheless have represented a major reinforcement.74 At the very least, the German containment of the landings would have congealed far sooner, and, in turn, German defense lines would have become even more formidable. Although the eventual outcome of the campaign would probably have remained the same, for the Allies, breeching these defences would have entailed significantly higher costs of time and blood. With the British and Canadian armies already experiencing dire shortages of trained infantry replacements during the campaign, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill worried that fighting in Normandy was degenerating into positional warfare reminiscent of the Great War, the situation for the Allies could have been far worse.75

The Germans can also use this reserve effectively in the East:

Under the actual circumstances faced by Heeresgruppe Mitte, even the speedy arrival of the strategic reserve may not have prevented disaster, but it may at least have reduced its scale and subsequent impact. A rapid forward deployment could have permitted the Germans to establish blocking positions further east than was in fact the case, resulting in the interception and wearing-down of the leading Soviet tank units at an earlier stage of the battle. In turn, this would have increased the likelihood of rescuing the large numbers of German troops that had been trapped within a series of isolated, wandering pockets. In this regard it is worth noting that small elements of the 12. Panzer Division alone, which began to arrive on 27 June, did in fact manage to rescue 15,000–20,000 men of the 9. Armee who had been surrounded in the area around the city of Bobruisk.79

Any lessening in the scale of the German defeat during Operation Bagration would also have produced a corresponding reduction in the urgency to shift resources from other sections of the Ostfront, leaving them stronger and far more capable of dealing with the Soviet attacks staged in their sectors. Although these would probably still have resulted in Soviet victories, Germany’s short-lived strategic reserve had the potential to keep these defeats from becoming outright catastrophes. By most accounts, the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive already involved very heavy fighting during which the Soviets lost 289,296 men (representing 29 percent of their original force) and 1,269 tanks; had it retained a few of the formations it was forced to relinquish, Heeresgruppe Nordukraine would have posed an even greater challenge to the Red Army and may even have been strong enough to rescue its five divisions trapped around the city of Brody.80 Similarly, during the Jassy-Kishinev Offensive, the six panzer divisions given up by Heeresgruppe Südukraine would probably have been able to contain, and at the very least slow, the Soviet advance, thereby preventing the encirclement and annihilation of 18 German divisions. Without the destruction of over 50 of the 150 German divisions deployed on the Eastern Front in June 1944 during a series of pocket battles that summer, the westward advance of the Red Army would likely have taken far longer and cost far more lives than it did.

So the formation and transfer eastwards of the reserve allows the Germans to avoid the destruction of roughly half (24 of the 50) divisions they lost IOTL, as well as anchor their Southern line along the Carpathians in the heavily fortified FNB line, while continuing Romanian oil shipments. I'm making the assumption that, without the destruction of 6th Army and the failure of Normandy, the Romanian coup can be avoided or pre-empted at the least. Perhaps equally important is that there is now more than enough additional formations to achieve a riposte similar to what von Manstein did at Third Kharkov in front of Warsaw:

From GERMANY AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR, Volume VIII: The Eastern Front 1943–1944 by Karl-Heinz Frieser, pg 569 onward:

What now followed was a complete surprise. As if from nowhere, four German armoured divisions launched a sudden concentric attack on the area to the east of Warsaw, and the Soviet armoured units which had thrust forward in a preliminary attack were caught in the trap. The situation of Army Group Centre in July 1944 was similar to that of Army Group South on the Donets in February 1943, when the southern wing of the eastern front was threatened with encirclement and a ‘super-Stalingrad’. On that occasion Manstein had gained an armoured army as a mobile reserve by shortening the front, and had deployed it in a counter-blow after a wide-ranging castling movement.174 Exactly the same situation repeated itself in the summer of 1944 before Warsaw, although this time everything went much faster. Model had no time left to argue with Hitler for operational freedom of action. He simply took it for granted. In the given crisis, he had no alternative but to scrap Hitler’s rigid principle of linear defence and, like Manstein, pursue free combat in the rear. Model too took remarkably bold risks, withdrawing three armoured divisions from his army group’s shaky front for a counter-attack, which could only be done by yielding territory. In addition, Armoured Paratroop Division ‘Hermann Göring’ had just arrived in Warsaw. Together, these four armoured divisions possessed 223 tanks, plus 54 assault guns and tank destroyers. Those figures are purely theoretical, however, since the divisions in question did not arrive all at the same time but one after the other, and sometimes had to be withdrawn again at the height of the battle in order to ‘put a fire out’ at other places on the front. On the other side, 2nd Armoured Army had around 800 tanks and assault guns, although an unknown number had been lost in the meantime. The initial armoured strength of the Germans divisions on 2 August was as follows:175

• 19th Armoured Division: 26 Panzer IVs, 26 Panzer Vs, 18 light tank destroyers;
• Armoured Paratroop Division ‘Hermann Göring’: 35 Panzer IVs, 5 Panzer Vs, 23 Panzerjäger IVs;
• SS Armoured Division ‘Viking’: 8 Panzer IVs, 45 Panzer Vs, 13 assault guns;
• 4th Armoured Division: 40 Panzer IVs, 38 Panzer Vs.

According to Model’s operational plan, the first phase was to be a pincer attack on Okuniew to cut off the rear of the Soviet III Armoured Corps, which had advanced far to the north. The second phase was to be a concentrated attack by the four armoured divisions to destroy the units of the encircled Soviet corps. After that, the plan was to attack VIII Guards Armoured Corps, and finally XVI Armoured Corps. The assembly phase was the most complicated, however, since the four armoured divisions were located in completely different front sectors, from which they had to be withdrawn. Once that was done, they were to be shifted in a castling manoeuvre to the area east of Warsaw, and then to attack simultaneously from the four points of the compass. Given the far greater strength of the enemy, the right troops had to be concentrated in the right place at exactly the right time. The encirclement manoeuvre was extremely difficult to coordinate at operational level. Owing to the rapid course of events, tactical implementation could be carried out successfully only by officers trained in mission-type command. Knowing how much depended on the success of the operation, Field Marshal Model led the attack himself, leading his troops from the front.

At first only Armoured Paratroop Division ‘Hermann Göring’ was available, having just arrived in Warsaw from Italy. Although the bulk of the division was temporarily classified as ‘inoperational’, 176 on 28 and 29 July its few already available tanks were able, together with 73rd Infantry Division, to prevent the Warsaw suburb of Praga from being taken in short order by the advance troops of the Soviet 2nd Armoured Army. In the meantime, 19th Armoured Division had been withdrawn from its sector of the front at Białystok. Its first units arrived on 29 July, just in time to stop the Soviet tanks a little way short of the important Narew bridge at Zegzre. In a combined pincer attack, SS Armoured Division ‘Viking’ and 4th Armoured Division had just stopped the enemy forces which had broken through at Kleszczele. Now they too were hastily withdrawn from the front and reached the new deployment zone on 31 July and 2 August respectively.

The tank battle before Warsaw began on 1 August with a pincer attack on Okuniew. The spearheads of a combat group of 19th Armoured Division attacking from the west, and SS Armoured Division ‘Viking’ from the east, met to the north of Okuniew at 19.15, thereby cutting off the Soviet III Armoured Corps, which had advanced as far north as Radzymin. The attack by 4th Armoured Division, which had just arrived in the area, and by parts of 19th Armoured Division, was led by Field Marshal Model in person. The tank battle reached its climax on 3 August, when the Soviet III Armoured Corps was tightly concentrated in the area of Wołomin. The four German armoured divisions attacked concentrically from four directions: 4th Armoured Division from the north-east, SS Armoured Division ‘Viking’ from the south-east, Armoured Paratroop Division ‘Hermann Göring’ from the south-west, and 19th Armoured Division from the north-west. That day most of the Soviet units in the Wołomin area were destroyed, and the noise of the battle could be heard as far away as the centre of Warsaw. The next day, 4 August, the remaining sections of the Soviet 2nd Armoured Army were attacked, together with 47th Army, which had rushed to its assistance. The fighting was concentrated on Okuniew, where the Soviet VIII Guards Armoured Corps had taken up position. The plan had been to enclose and destroy that major formation too, but more bad news had since arrived from other sectors of the front. That same day 19th Armoured Division had to be withdrawn, and the following day it was the turn of Armoured Paratroop Division ‘Hermann Göring’. One after the other, the two divisions set off round the contested city of Warsaw towards Magnuszew to attack the Soviet bridgehead west of the Vistula, where 8th Guards Army, supported by 1st Polish Army and strong armoured forces, was trying to enlarge the bridgehead. In the evening of 4 August the German units at Okuniew went back on the defensive. The purpose of the operation—to prevent the enemy from advancing into the area east of Warsaw by means of ‘offensive defence’—had been achieved.177

With the additional firepower, Model should be able to encircle and destroy several formations of 1st Belorussian Front. In effect, you've replayed Early 1943 (~25 Divisions destroyed, Soviets regain territory but then the Germans revive and deliver a punch to the face) in 1944.

 

[sillygoose]

Though this does give some benefits in the near term in the East the problem is that in 1944 at some point the Wallies now have advanced air bases to pummel every part of Germany, which is fatal to their war effort. We can see what happened when the Wallies achieved their stop line in late 1944. Here that is simply sped up to late 1943 and with Allied forces who can then easily use Italy as a staging base to invade Southern France sooner if desired, but now with close enough airbases to do so. Then there is the issue of the Italians potentially revolting much sooner and whether the Italian Fascists who still fought for Germany would do so if most of Italy was abandoned without a fight.

IMHO despite what it did to the Eastern Front the fight for Italy was the right move strategically.
What should have been done was an earlier retreat in the East to a prepared line instead, the Panther Line, which would have made abandoning Italy unnecessary and saved the Axis a lot of casualties.

 

[History Learner]

Though this does give some benefits in the near term in the East the problem is that in 1944 at some point the Wallies now have advanced air bases to pummel every part of Germany, which is fatal to their war effort. We can see what happened when the Wallies achieved their stop line in late 1944. Here that is simply sped up to late 1943 and with Allied forces who can then easily use Italy as a staging base to invade Southern France sooner if desired, but now with close enough airbases to do so. Then there is the issue of the Italians potentially revolting much sooner and whether the Italian Fascists who still fought for Germany would do so if most of Italy was abandoned without a fight.

IMHO despite what it did to the Eastern Front the fight for Italy was the right move strategically.
What should have been done was an earlier retreat in the East to a prepared line instead, the Panther Line, which would have made abandoning Italy unnecessary and saved the Axis a lot of casualties.

The retreat would start in April/May of 1944, as the situation around Anzio and the Gothic Line becomes untenable. Said airbases did end up becoming available in 1944 anyway, so I don't see that being moved up that much given the need to actually occupy all of Northern Italy straining the logistics for several months; same with attempting to use Italy to invade Southern France, given the need to cross the French Alps and then depend on the same overstretched OTL ports. I have no doubt many Italians would seize the opportunity and many Fascists would quit the war, but the new German defensive line would be similar to that which Austria-Hungary took in WWI, based on the Alps and Isonzo River so it wouldn't be a problem once they are safely emplaced on it given the lack of significant Italians in their rear.

As far as the Panther Line, personally I think the right strategic move in 1943 was to concede the strategic initiative on existing lines but that is for another thread.

 

[sillygoose]

The retreat would start in April/May of 1944, as the situation around Anzio and the Gothic Line becomes untenable. Said airbases did end up becoming available in 1944 anyway, so I don't see that being moved up that much given the need to actually occupy all of Northern Italy straining the logistics for several months; same with attempting to use Italy to invade Southern France, given the need to cross the French Alps and then depend on the same overstretched OTL ports. I have no doubt many Italians would seize the opportunity and many Fascists would quit the war, but the new German defensive line would be similar to that which Austria-Hungary took in WWI, based on the Alps and Isonzo River so it wouldn't be a problem once they are safely emplaced on it given the lack of significant Italians in their rear.

As far as the Panther Line, personally I think the right strategic move in 1943 was to concede the strategic initiative on existing lines but that is for another thread.

Gotcha. I thought you meant in September 1943 when this sort of retreat was originally proposed since you didn't specifically mention an exact date for this.
Question is with the bombing of infrastructure which specific divisions would be pulled out and how long would that take? How long to get them to the Eastern Front? It would be impossible to move all at once.

Agreed on the strategic defensive in 1943 in the East. I mentioned the Panther Line as I thought we were talking about the period after the invasion of Italy, but prior to Kursk yes defending in position was the way to go IMHO.

 

[History Learner]

Gotcha. I thought you meant in September 1943 when this sort of retreat was originally proposed since you didn't specifically mention an exact date for this.
Question is with the bombing of infrastructure which specific divisions would be pulled out and how long would that take?

My bad, I've modified the thread title to say early 1944 to give a better idea of what I mean

And that is a good question, I am assuming it would start in April and could be finished by June although I lack hard data for such.

 

[PsihoKekec]

Given the terrain, logistics and the quality of the German forces, it would be impossible for the Anglo-Americans to breakthrough them

Nothing is impossible in war, while Germans could offer heavy resistance on the old Isonzo frontline, the area from Gorizia and Trieste is certainly breachable. They would get a respite due to allied logistics issues, but when the sufficient stockpiles are amassed they would be facing the same issues as in Italy, the allied superior firepower pushing them from hill after hill.

 

[sillygoose]

Nothing is impossible in war, while Germans could offer heavy resistance on the old Isonzo frontline, the area from Gorizia and Trieste is certainly breachable. They would get a respite due to allied logistics issues, but when the sufficient stockpiles are amassed they would be facing the same issues as in Italy, the allied superior firepower pushing them from hill after hill.

Eventually sure, but how long would it take to assemble the necessary forces and logistics? 1945 would be more likely, but at that point given that the choke points mean only the old Isonzo line is forceable and the Germans would build up defenses in depth and quite extensively. So the ground invasion is much less of an issue for the Germans than the air war. Question is how quickly that could be made to work.

If they prioritize the air war then logistically they should be able to get to get sufficient air forces operational in Autumn 1944 which is a big problem.

 

[Husky_Khan]

Would pursuing operations in the Balkans be considered 'far' from the German center? Sure, diddling about in the Aegean Sea or whatever would be one thing but the main concept of the ol' thirteen hundred Battles of the Isonzo River in World War One was because Vienna was just soooooo deliciously close once you got through those troublesome hills. I mean its not really that close to the Isonzo River.... and even farther from the Adriatic Coast but still seems like a legitimate target.

Granted there are political considerations with the Reds, but Yalta is almost a year away and having a large Allied force f'ing about in Yugoslavia is a great bargaining chip. And all things considered, advancing up through Austria seems like far more of a soft underbelly then advancing through the Italian Alps in any case even if its still far from soft. The US Navy not supporting the initiative might be a concern but I'm not sure how much amphibious shipping would actually be needed. For followup logistics though it could be a concern without a proper port captured in some manner of relative intactfulness (not a word).

It'd have the bonus of splitting attention for both the Allies and Axis come June 1944 as you'd have the 'static' front of the Italian Alps where the biggest thing at risk is the Po River Valley, the still existing Eastern Front, and both a Balkan/Austrian and a Western Front.

 

[History Learner]

Nothing is impossible in war, while Germans could offer heavy resistance on the old Isonzo frontline, the area from Gorizia and Trieste is certainly breachable. They would get a respite due to allied logistics issues, but when the sufficient stockpiles are amassed they would be facing the same issues as in Italy, the allied superior firepower pushing them from hill after hill.

Gorizia and Trieste are behind the Isonzo River:

Another good thing about this position for the Germans is that they can fortify on the mountainous terrain shown that overlooks the Venetian Plain "above" the river. It's basically a giant fire sack where their artillery can use the height advantage and superior viewing range to ravage Allied divisions. Even worse, it's a massive exposed flank that the Anglo-Americans must always guard, to the detriment of their forward push, lest the Germans come down from the mountains and encircle them by smashing into their rear.

Imagine being an Allied army group that gets a bloodbath taking Gorizia just for a Panzer Corps to come down the road from Belluno and take Venice, cutting your logistics and making it impossible to escape without naval transport and abandoning all of your heavy equipment....

 

[PsihoKekec]

If Germans dig in the foothills instead of Alps, in order to have the fire control of the Venetian plain, then the front length will be much longer than on the previous Italian front, negating the manpower savings.
Also an entire Panzer Corps advancing down one of the mountain valleys towards the Venetian plain would be a wet dream of Allied pilots.
Anyway the second Isonzo front intrigues me, I'll look up more information on this, so I can do a short timeline on this during the summer.

 

[Buba]

Intriguing idea.
I assume that in late '43 it was not evident that pulling back to the Alps would give Allied jabos free reign over Austria and South Germany? That Allied bombers based in Lombardy could have fighter escort when attacking targets which otherwise would had been outside fighter range (late 1943 range, naturally)?
Also - Allied airpower in Genoa area supporting potential summer '44 landings in South France? Such air operations being fed through much better ports (the facilities would had been wrecked by the Germans, but everything can be rebuilt) than those on Corsica.
Eventual push up the Rhone supported by aircraft operating from Turin area, supplied through different ports than the land forces to the west of the Alps?
Political fallout of abandoning Italy/Mussolini in Budapest, Sofia and Bukarest?

 

[sillygoose]

Gorizia and Trieste are behind the Isonzo River:

Another good thing about this position for the Germans is that they can fortify on the mountainous terrain shown that overlooks the Venetian Plain "above" the river. It's basically a giant fire sack where their artillery can use the height advantage and superior viewing range to ravage Allied divisions. Even worse, it's a massive exposed flank that the Anglo-Americans must always guard, to the detriment of their forward push, lest the Germans come down from the mountains and encircle them by smashing into their rear.

Imagine being an Allied army group that gets a bloodbath taking Gorizia just for a Panzer Corps to come down the road from Belluno and take Venice, cutting your logistics and making it impossible to escape without naval transport and abandoning all of your heavy equipment....

Don't forget about Allied airpower. Mortain and Arracourt as well as a bunch of fighting in Italy showed that airpower prevented such major counter offensives. "Brute Force" by John Ellis depicts those issues extremely well IMHO.

Also unlike WW1 because of said airpower they can really hurt the logistics behind the lines of the Germans and now instead of having to bomb Italy they can focus on a much smaller network of rail lines, which even with heavy FLAK concentrations is still going to get torn up at some point and locomotives are going to be heavily targeted, which if anything will be the worst part of the air offensive for the Germans. WW2 technology solved a lot of the issues the attackers had in WW1. Arguably offense became the less costly posture by 1918 and certainly was by late WW2 baring certain terrain issues.

 

[ATP]

It would help Germany - but as long as Hitler was in command,they would still lost.
But - they would hurt soviets more,which means free Hungary,Czech and Yugoslavia.So,except those countries,nothing change.

 

[History Learner]

Don't forget about Allied airpower. Mortain and Arracourt as well as a bunch of fighting in Italy showed that airpower prevented such major counter offensives. "Brute Force" by John Ellis depicts those issues extremely well IMHO.

Also unlike WW1 because of said airpower they can really hurt the logistics behind the lines of the Germans and now instead of having to bomb Italy they can focus on a much smaller network of rail lines, which even with heavy FLAK concentrations is still going to get torn up at some point and locomotives are going to be heavily targeted, which if anything will be the worst part of the air offensive for the Germans. WW2 technology solved a lot of the issues the attackers had in WW1. Arguably offense became the less costly posture by 1918 and certainly was by late WW2 baring certain terrain issues.

Undoubtedly Allied airpower is a major force multiplier but they still have to operate cautiously in this environment simply because the prospect of it. 1944 showed that while airpower could savage the German offensives as they develop they could still be implemented, sometimes successfully, and if the Anglo-American flanks are too weakly held the Panzers can still bust through. More specifically to the situation at hand, the poor weather of late 1944, which is the earliest an offensive can be undertaken I think, has to be considered; after all, the RSI was able to launch a successful offensive IOTL December at that time.....

 

[sillygoose]

Undoubtedly Allied airpower is a major force multiplier but they still have to operate cautiously in this environment simply because the prospect of it. 1944 showed that while airpower could savage the German offensives as they develop they could still be implemented, sometimes successfully, and if the Anglo-American flanks are too weakly held the Panzers can still bust through. More specifically to the situation at hand, the poor weather of late 1944, which is the earliest an offensive can be undertaken I think, has to be considered; after all, the RSI was able to launch a successful offensive IOTL December at that time.....

As I recall it was a small division level engagement in bad weather by infantry in the mountains, not a panzer corps offensive in more open terrain. Counterattacking was possible for limited engagements, especially if it included a lot of AAA or the weather was bad, but major offensives only worked if there was a long period of overcast skies that prevented aerial observation and attack, like the early parts of the Ardennes offensive; when the weather cleared the offensive got stuck and collapsed.

Also don't forget that the infrastructure of Italy would be much more intact if the Wallies don't have to do Operation Strangle and are able to take the northern ports of Italy intact; certainly German infrastructure destruction in the retreat would hurt, but that would be a lot less damage than what the bombers did throughout 1943-45.

Operation Strangle (World War II) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Plus it isn't as if the Allies didn't use night attacking to their advantage:

Operation Diadem - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[History Learner]

As I recall it was a small division level engagement in bad weather by infantry in the mountains, not a panzer corps offensive in more open terrain. Counterattacking was possible for limited engagements, especially if it included a lot of AAA or the weather was bad, but major offensives only worked if there was a long period of overcast skies that prevented aerial observation and attack, like the early parts of the Ardennes offensive; when the weather cleared the offensive got stuck and collapsed.

Also don't forget that the infrastructure of Italy would be much more intact if the Wallies don't have to do Operation Strangle and are able to take the northern ports of Italy intact; certainly German infrastructure destruction in the retreat would hurt, but that would be a lot less damage than what the bombers did throughout 1943-45.

Operation Strangle (World War II) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Plus it isn't as if the Allies didn't use night attacking to their advantage:

Operation Diadem - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

You're not wrong, but it is an example of what the Axis could achieve under the right circumstances. Say if the Allies are pushing on Trieste but have only left a single division to screen the mountain passes on the Venetian plain, it's a useful example. I agree that airpower can, under the right circumstances, shatter an offensive typically. My thinking also seems applicable in terms of an Italian "Bulge", in that they launch an offensive against logistically overstretched Anglo-Americans with the poor weather helping to screen them against the Allied airpower advantage.

As for the infrastructure and the like, presuming the pullout starts in April/May as the Gothic Line collapses, then Strangle has already been in effect for quite sometime.