WI: No Lend Lease

[History Learner]

HL

a) Right, I'll say it again. Reaching Moscow, even with more forces and earlier than OTL is not necessarily taking it. As I've said before its like Stalingrad but earlier and on a much bigger scale. Urban fighting is bloody difficult for an attacker, especially one at the end of a long supply lane and worn down by several months of hard fighting. The Germans can get parts of the urban area but the Soviets can fed in forces as available and necessary to hold them and let them bled out while building up for a counter-offensive. Its not a binary situation that the 1st battalion of German forces reaching the outskirts mean the city is immediately captured.

I understand this is your position but the problem with it that I'm trying to point out is that there were no Soviet forces in Moscow to turn it into a Stalingrad. This is why Zhukov stated the following:

“It was an extremely dangerous situation,” Zhukov says in the 1966 recording, responding to questions from the Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov. “In essence, all the approaches to Moscow were open.”​

Zhukov stated this because there were no troops in the city and he had only 90,000 outside of it. We also have the Soviet timetable of other formations arriving, which show serious reinforcements did not begin to arrive until November. Stalin nearly evacuated the City on October 15th, with panic spreading across the city precisely because the average cities realized they were unprotected. In short, what I'm trying to say is that Moscow could not become a "Stalingrad" because it would have no defenders. If we're assuming the invasion still starts on June 22nd and proceeds as historical, then there is a period of two to four weeks where, once the last defense line is broken, there are no defenders of the city. How do the Germans fail to capture it in such circumstances?

b) You still need to get those trucks and the fuel to where they need to operate, especially since there's no capacity, unlike in N Africa, to move stuff by sea to save oil and wear and tear on vehicles as they advance to the front. Those 6,000-8,000 extra trucks may be available but they won't solve all the problems, especially since their likely to be spread over all the fronts not just AGC. - That is assuming they exist as skimming through the link I can see a reference to 7,000 trucks the Italians used to support their own forces and to 2,000 used by Rommel in support of his forces for the attack in spring 42 which lead to the capture of Tobruk. I may have missed a reference but numbers are generally fairly easy to pick up. Even if he had that many at some point how many would be captured from British forces, which wouldn't be available in the proposed
scenario? I do notice that your not defending the idea that 70,000 additional trucks were available in 1941.

For one, there is the capacity to move things by sea, as illustrated by Army Group North using the Baltic ports for its advance on Leningrad. In terms of what Army Group Center could do, instead of driving them directly from Germany, they would use the railways, which is what they did to get them to North Africa. They were moved through the Alps to ports in Italy and the Balkans and then transported by ship to North Africa; said trains can be sent East instead of South here. The 8,000 figure is what Rommel requested in late 1941, and to which Hitler granted; it is exclusive of all the other numbers and is solely German production models (perhaps captured French models too, but nothing would change there) shipped from Germany itself.

As just mentioned, Rommel's request came later in 1941. This is important because, following the capture of Kiev, Hitler again prioritized Army Group Center for its advance upon Moscow, including stripping entire Panzer Armies from the other Army Groups and releasing 3,000 trucks from the strategic reserve to bolster their motor capacity. Given this prioritization, the trucks, which were released about the same time, would most likely go to Army Group Center. I specifically chose the 6,000 figure, as that leaves the remaining 2,000 to go to the other Army Groups, should Berlin so wish.

As stated, the 6,000 figure is inclusive of the expected losses. As stated before in the article, Army Group Center needed 13,500 tons of supplies a day and their existing motor lift capacity was only sufficient for 6,500 tons. An additional 3,000 trucks, based on their average capacity, would allow for the 13,500 to be reached. Why 6,000 then? Because, as you note, there would be wear and tear as well as enemy action. The average loss rate in North Africa and Russia that year was 30-40% in trucks, which means that 3,000 would not be sufficient alone as many would be lost. However, this is where the 6,000 comes in play:

6,000 * 0.35 (median) = 2,100
6,000 - 2,100 = 3,900

With 6,000 trucks, not only would Army Group Center be able to continuously meet its base needs in logistics, it would also be able to accumulate a surplus stockpile in case of need. As far as mud and road conditions, with Moscow in German hands, they would have access to multiple all weather roads; I've already brought up the Minsk to Moscow Military Highway, but there was others that would be in German hands.

c) Your evading the issue. Its not that such equipment might be available in the timescale Havlat listed, i.e. 41-43 but that they wouldn't be available in summer/autumn 41.

To that, I agree, in that everything would not be available in 1941 but your question, as I understood it, was concerning the need to occupy France continuously.

d) The quote from Horne you mentioned shows that such a statement - that France would look after its own interests by its own efforts - existed. It might well have been French bluster but that doesn't change that it occurred.

Yes but, to be frank, you're evading the context on that. The French did say that, but as Horne notes in the paragraph that is contained, the British were throwing it back at them in response to the French request for support in dealing with the Rhineland Crisis. The French said it, yes, but the moment they were tested on it they immediately sought help from the British.

e) As Horne mentions "It was an absurd exaggeration (see below, p. 75), " in terms of Gamelin's statement of German forces and that a sizeable proportion of them were already in the Rhineland. As you say he was a political soldier and no friend to the current government so that could be the reason he mislead them. Or possibly French intelligence was that bad, although that seems unlikely. In the latter case then a reasonably accurate report of German strength is a quite possible butterfly.

Yes, the German Army in 1936 was weak. However, as Horne also points out, so too was the French Army; it had been underfunded for years as a result of the Great Depression. The only way to rectify this was to order a general mobilization of the French Army, which was rejected because the elections were coming up and it would be, to put it mildly, extremely unpopular with the electorate which still had vivid memories of World War I. France had already prematurely pulled out of the Rhineland years earlier, so it was already clear, politically, where the French populace stood on the matter, particularly with Britain already taking the position it was fair for the Germans to secure their own territory.

f) France still had a markedly more powerful army than Germany at this stage. Which is why the German army had been ordered to beat a hasty retreat if France had acted. Similarly while the British home army was small the Italian one wasn't that great and to defeat Italy in a crisis over Ethiopia needs a navy more than an army and I doubt you would claim that the RN was up to the task! Even ignoring British control of Gibraltar and Suez. Plus the RAF may have had no Hurricanes at that time but what did Italy have?

Steve

That France, if it mobilized, was more powerful than Germany is not in dispute. The problem is there standing military was not sufficient and to mobilize before the election was out of the question; to give further context, 1936 saw the Popular Front sweep into power and replace the existing government. That the SFIO were no friends of the French Military and Defense spending cannot be exaggerated.

With regards to Italy, that's exactly the issue in part; Britain had to deal with two crisis at the same time and only had the resources for one. Given the rise of Germany, they had no interest in risking the Stresa Front further by confronting Italy, which is why they refused to persecute it and their own weakness in the Army is why they couldn't do much about Germany, even had the political will been there in 1936. Overall, however, it needs to be noted that, with only two Divisions able to be deployed, the Suez would've quickly been in Italian hands and Gibraltar did not matter to Italy, given their geographic position.

There are reasons why the Anglo-French acted as they did in 1936-1939; they were not stupid, but, as a result of previous decisions, their capacity to act was very limited.

 

[stevep]

I understand this is your position but the problem with it that I'm trying to point out is that there were no Soviet forces in Moscow to turn it into a Stalingrad. This is why Zhukov stated the following:

“It was an extremely dangerous situation,” Zhukov says in the 1966 recording, responding to questions from the Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov. “In essence, all the approaches to Moscow were open.”​

Zhukov stated this because there were no troops in the city and he had only 90,000 outside of it. We also have the Soviet timetable of other formations arriving, which show serious reinforcements did not begin to arrive until November. Stalin nearly evacuated the City on October 15th, with panic spreading across the city precisely because the average cities realized they were unprotected. In short, what I'm trying to say is that Moscow could not become a "Stalingrad" because it would have no defenders. If we're assuming the invasion still starts on June 22nd and proceeds as historical, then there is a period of two to four weeks where, once the last defense line is broken, there are no defenders of the city. How do the Germans fail to capture it in such circumstances?

Ah we might have been at cross purposes here. I misunderstood what you were saying as 90,000 troops inside Moscow. As such IF the Germans could get to the city they would have a chance to occupy it. [Depending on how much they could get in compared to any emergency militia the Soviets could organised at short notice. ]

For one, there is the capacity to move things by sea, as illustrated by Army Group North using the Baltic ports for its advance on Leningrad. In terms of what Army Group Center could do, instead of driving them directly from Germany, they would use the railways, which is what they did to get them to North Africa. They were moved through the Alps to ports in Italy and the Balkans and then transported by ship to North Africa; said trains can be sent East instead of South here. The 8,000 figure is what Rommel requested in late 1941, and to which Hitler granted; it is exclusive of all the other numbers and is solely German production models (perhaps captured French models too, but nothing would change there) shipped from Germany itself.

Yes you can move things by sea and by railway, although the sea would only take them to Baltic ports and railway would only go as far as where the rail-heads were and of course in the short term would restrict other supplies to AGC as they would take up capacity themselves. Would this need special wagons to carry them which might also be an issue?

As just mentioned, Rommel's request came later in 1941. This is important because, following the capture of Kiev, Hitler again prioritized Army Group Center for its advance upon Moscow, including stripping entire Panzer Armies from the other Army Groups and releasing 3,000 trucks from the strategic reserve to bolster their motor capacity. Given this prioritization, the trucks, which were released about the same time, would most likely go to Army Group Center. I specifically chose the 6,000 figure, as that leaves the remaining 2,000 to go to the other Army Groups, should Berlin so wish.

As stated, the 6,000 figure is inclusive of the expected losses. As stated before in the article, Army Group Center needed 13,500 tons of supplies a day and their existing motor lift capacity was only sufficient for 6,500 tons. An additional 3,000 trucks, based on their average capacity, would allow for the 13,500 to be reached. Why 6,000 then? Because, as you note, there would be wear and tear as well as enemy action. The average loss rate in North Africa and Russia that year was 30-40% in trucks, which means that 3,000 would not be sufficient alone as many would be lost. However, this is where the 6,000 comes in play:

6,000 * 0.35 (median) = 2,100
6,000 - 2,100 = 3,900

With 6,000 trucks, not only would Army Group Center be able to continuously meet its base needs in logistics, it would also be able to accumulate a surplus stockpile in case of need. As far as mud and road conditions, with Moscow in German hands, they would have access to multiple all weather roads; I've already brought up the Minsk to Moscow Military Highway, but there was others that would be in German hands.

So your saying that those 8,000 trucks were not what Rommel had at the time but additional resources that Hitler sent to him in autumn 41? I was thinking you were saying that was his total existing forces.

To that, I agree, in that everything would not be available in 1941 but your question, as I understood it, was concerning the need to occupy France continuously.

I did question what would be needed for a full occupation of France but the basis point here was resources sent to NA in the period 41-43 wouldn't all be available in 41.

Yes but, to be frank, you're evading the context on that. The French did say that, but as Horne notes in the paragraph that is contained, the British were throwing it back at them in response to the French request for support in dealing with the Rhineland Crisis. The French said it, yes, but the moment they were tested on it they immediately sought help from the British.

My point was simply that you said the French said that. That the British threw it back at them when France asked for support probably wasn't the most diplomatic move but might be understandable in the circumstances.

Yes, the German Army in 1936 was weak. However, as Horne also points out, so too was the French Army; it had been underfunded for years as a result of the Great Depression. The only way to rectify this was to order a general mobilization of the French Army, which was rejected because the elections were coming up and it would be, to put it mildly, extremely unpopular with the electorate which still had vivid memories of World War I. France had already prematurely pulled out of the Rhineland years earlier, so it was already clear, politically, where the French populace stood on the matter, particularly with Britain already taking the position it was fair for the Germans to secure their own territory.

That France, if it mobilized, was more powerful than Germany is not in dispute. The problem is there standing military was not sufficient and to mobilize before the election was out of the question; to give further context, 1936 saw the Popular Front sweep into power and replace the existing government. That the SFIO were no friends of the French Military and Defense spending cannot be exaggerated.

I must admit I'm not aware what the standing army for France was at this point. I know that for most of the intra-war period they did have the largest standing army in Europe west of the Soviets but its exact size at this point compared to the fully moblised strength I don't know. Germany had only started increasing its forces above those allowed under Versailles a year before in March 35 so its unclear how effective or how well equipped those new troops would have been.

With regards to Italy, that's exactly the issue in part; Britain had to deal with two crisis at the same time and only had the resources for one. Given the rise of Germany, they had no interest in risking the Stresa Front further by confronting Italy, which is why they refused to persecute it and their own weakness in the Army is why they couldn't do much about Germany, even had the political will been there in 1936. Overall, however, it needs to be noted that, with only two Divisions able to be deployed, the Suez would've quickly been in Italian hands and Gibraltar did not matter to Italy, given their geographic position.

The big problem was that France and Britain responded enough to anger Mussolini without doing anything to actual stop him. Britain could easily have done a lot more if the government had been willing.

There are reasons why the Anglo-French acted as they did in 1936-1939; they were not stupid, but, as a result of previous decisions, their capacity to act was very limited.

Those decisions and errors may still be made in this scenario but it didn't make them the right decisions, albeit that we have the huge advantage of hindsight.

 

[History Learner]

Ah we might have been at cross purposes here. I misunderstood what you were saying as 90,000 troops inside Moscow. As such IF the Germans could get to the city they would have a chance to occupy it. [Depending on how much they could get in compared to any emergency militia the Soviets could organised at short notice. ]

I apologize for the delay in responding until now.

The standing orders on October 15th were to destroy any vital infrastructure and evacuate the city; no orders were in place to raise militias and no weapons on hand with which to arm them. Efforts to do this earlier in the campaign had ended when the militias repeatedly broke in the face of German attack.

Yes you can move things by sea and by railway, although the sea would only take them to Baltic ports and railway would only go as far as where the rail-heads were and of course in the short term would restrict other supplies to AGC as they would take up capacity themselves. Would this need special wagons to carry them which might also be an issue?

By the start of September, the railways had been reconverted up to Minsk, which is 717 kilometers from Moscow and thus within the proscribed 500-800 km range of truck-based logistics; they did not stop converting railway infrastructure, however, with continuous effort past that point. By October 15th, the point of maximum danger to Moscow, based on their previous sustained efforts, I would estimate they had laid an additional 100 to 150 miles of track, further reducing the distance from the nearest railway departure point.

With regards to the carrying capacity, they could use the exact same trains they used to send them to Italian and Balkan ports, so there would not be diversion of existing supply trains nor need of special accommodation because the resources were already in hand and used historically.

So your saying that those 8,000 trucks were not what Rommel had at the time but additional resources that Hitler sent to him in autumn 41? I was thinking you were saying that was his total existing forces.

The 8,000 were reinforcements to his existing total, Rommel's Afrika Korps topped out at 10,000 to 12,000 trucks later in his campaigns, in terms of the DAK; Italian logistical needs were separate. I should also note the 10-12,000 is not his cumulative total, but rather what the Germans were able to sustain him at given losses.

I did question what would be needed for a full occupation of France but the basis point here was resources sent to NA in the period 41-43 wouldn't all be available in 41.

These resources include those used in France and Germany, as well as the overall MENA region. Many of the artillery guns cited, for example, were historically being used as FLAK against British and, later, American bombers.

My point was simply that you said the French said that. That the British threw it back at them when France asked for support probably wasn't the most diplomatic move but might be understandable in the circumstances.

Yes, the French did say that as I cited; I'm not sure what the point of bringing that up is then, if you agree it was just French bluster?

I must admit I'm not aware what the standing army for France was at this point. I know that for most of the intra-war period they did have the largest standing army in Europe west of the Soviets but its exact size at this point compared to the fully moblised strength I don't know. Germany had only started increasing its forces above those allowed under Versailles a year before in March 35 so its unclear how effective or how well equipped those new troops would have been.

The Germany had a weaker Army at this juncture is definitely, in general, true. The issue was that the French would have to still mobilize to defeat it, and this was the perception of her military officials. Even if, in theory, what they had on hand was sufficient we can only know this with hindsight; the French did not enjoy such a luxury in 1936, and especially not her politicians were already facing a serious domestic crisis.

The big problem was that France and Britain responded enough to anger Mussolini without doing anything to actual stop him. Britain could easily have done a lot more if the government had been willing.

With what forces and what money? Britain as far back as 1923 had backed down during the Chanak Crisis, and this outlook had only increased given the disastrous effects of the Great Depression.

Those decisions and errors may still be made in this scenario but it didn't make them the right decisions, albeit that we have the huge advantage of hindsight.

Whether "right" or "wrong" needs to be viewed as secondary to the process behind why the decisions were made. It's easy to say the British and French should've confronted Italy in 1936 or Germany in 1936 or 1938, but why they didn't is where such condemnations tend to examine. Italy entered the war in 1940 and the Royal Navy failed to cut off the supply lines until 1943, with the aid of the USN and vast amounts of Anglo-American airpower. Based off that, and given the lack of British Army forces to deploy to counter the Italians, there would be nothing to stop Italy from overrunning vast portions of the British position in the MENA area.

 

[Shipmaster Sane]

Lend Lease was critical to the Russian war effort, and Hitler would go much further without it, but the fundamental brokenness of the naSocialist economic plans and the regime's own endless ambitions for conquest would leave them a shattered bulk within a few years. No Nazis, no Russians, Europe becomes the bombed out wasteland it has been trying desperately to transform into for a century and a half. Communism dies an early death, American Hegemony is magnified tenfold.


So all in all, a better timeline.

 

[stevep]

I apologize for the delay in responding until now.

The standing orders on October 15th were to destroy any vital infrastructure and evacuate the city; no orders were in place to raise militias and no weapons on hand with which to arm them. Efforts to do this earlier in the campaign had ended when the militias repeatedly broke in the face of German attack.

That seems strange since Stalin committed himself to staying in the capital. I suspect militia did fail badly in some cases but not in all and in urban fighting their limitations would be reduced. Especially if their local which means their both motivated to defend their homes and know the locality.

By the start of September, the railways had been reconverted up to Minsk, which is 717 kilometers from Moscow and thus within the proscribed 500-800 km range of truck-based logistics; they did not stop converting railway infrastructure, however, with continuous effort past that point. By October 15th, the point of maximum danger to Moscow, based on their previous sustained efforts, I would estimate they had laid an additional 100 to 150 miles of track, further reducing the distance from the nearest railway departure point.

This would help but you still have all the problems of maintaining those vehicles and keeping them supplied in very bad conditions.

With regards to the carrying capacity, they could use the exact same trains they used to send them to Italian and Balkan ports, so there would not be diversion of existing supply trains nor need of special accommodation because the resources were already in hand and used historically.

By carrying capacity I meant that of the railway lines themselves. This is a limit separate to having the ability to transfer additional trains and wagons from other regions to those sections of track. Which might be more difficult than you think as it also means moving the crews and supply facilities to operate them. However there are limitations on the tracks themselves as to how much they can carry. As such moving a lot more vehicles by rail will mean for that period a drop in other items you can move on the same tracks.

The 8,000 were reinforcements to his existing total, Rommel's Afrika Korps topped out at 10,000 to 12,000 trucks later in his campaigns, in terms of the DAK; Italian logistical needs were separate. I should also note the 10-12,000 is not his cumulative total, but rather what the Germans were able to sustain him at given losses.

Does that include what he obtained from other sources, i.e. captured British/Commonwealth vehicles, which he said himself were vital to his operations?

These resources include those used in France and Germany, as well as the overall MENA region. Many of the artillery guns cited, for example, were historically being used as FLAK against British and, later, American bombers.

The point is that they were produced in the period 41-43 so their not available in 41.

Yes, the French did say that as I cited; I'm not sure what the point of bringing that up is then, if you agree it was just French bluster?

You cited it, then denied you had said it then said it was French bluster.

The Germany had a weaker Army at this juncture is definitely, in general, true. The issue was that the French would have to still mobilize to defeat it, and this was the perception of her military officials. Even if, in theory, what they had on hand was sufficient we can only know this with hindsight; the French did not enjoy such a luxury in 1936, and especially not her politicians were already facing a serious domestic crisis.

This was the perception presented by one albeit very influential military officer who as you said had some hostility towards the current French government so its possibly his information was somewhat bias.

With what forces and what money? Britain as far back as 1923 had backed down during the Chanak Crisis, and this outlook had only increased given the disastrous effects of the Great Depression.

Well at that time it had a much larger navy, a substantial army - albeit largely in locations like India and control of Gibraltar and the Suez canal. Given that air power was less developed in that time period as well if Britain had been willing to fight then it would have been pretty decisive in ending the Italian empire at the very least. It would also gain valuable military experience and possibly deter elements in Germany as well but I would settle for seriously crippling Mussolini's position.

Whether "right" or "wrong" needs to be viewed as secondary to the process behind why the decisions were made. It's easy to say the British and French should've confronted Italy in 1936 or Germany in 1936 or 1938, but why they didn't is where such condemnations tend to examine. Italy entered the war in 1940 and the Royal Navy failed to cut off the supply lines until 1943, with the aid of the USN and vast amounts of Anglo-American airpower. Based off that, and given the lack of British Army forces to deploy to counter the Italians, there would be nothing to stop Italy from overrunning vast portions of the British position in the MENA area.

Italy entered the war in 1940 at a time when Britain was pretty much fighting alone - other than the empire. Some errors, especially by Churchill and then the Japanese onslaught meant that Britain was largely fighting for its survival meant that realistic opportunities for victories without some luck or good judgement until the Soviets and then the US were brought into the war and able to apply their resources. As such that Britain wasn't able to clear N Africa until 1943 is not relevant to the far more different situation in 1936

The bit highlighted above doesn't make sense? Do you mean fail to examine or need to examine?

 

[History Learner]

That seems strange since Stalin committed himself to staying in the capital. I suspect militia did fail badly in some cases but not in all and in urban fighting their limitations would be reduced. Especially if their local which means their both motivated to defend their homes and know the locality

Stalin only committed to such on the 15th, and had a train prepared to take him to behind the Volga:

Moscow was defended by less than 100,000 troops and preparations were being made to move the government east, to Kuibyshev on the Volga. A secret document (no. 34) from the State Defence Committee, dated 15 October 1941, records that it had been decided ‘To evacuate the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the top levels of Government… (Comrade Stalin will leave tomorrow or later, depending on the situation)… In the event of enemy forces arriving at the gates of Moscow, the NKVD – Comrade Beria and Comrade Shcherbakov – are ordered to blow up business premises, warehouses and institutions which cannot be evacuated, and all Underground railway electrical equipment.’i​

​

Anastas Mikoyan, a member of the Soviet Politburo, later said that Stalin had told him on 15 October that he intended to leave the Soviet capital. Crucial communications equipment and documents were taken from the Kremlin and packed on board Stalin’s train, waiting at Moscow station. On the night of 16 October, key personnel were told to leave their offices and prepare to flee. ‘There was a car waiting outside [the Kremlin],’ recalls Nikolay Ponomariev, Stalin’s telegraphist. ‘We were driven away. Moscow was completely dark. The weather was wet. I saw we were heading for the railway station. I saw the armoured train and Stalin’s guards walking to and fro on the platform. It became clear to me that I would have to wait for Stalin and go into evacuation with him.’​

As for any hypothetical militias, no orders to raise them, no commanders to lead them and no weapons to arm them were available nor were there plans, as the No. 34 document shows, to raise any. Given these limitations, and the fact that efforts at raising militias earlier in the campaign had failed in every instance, I see no reason to assume would occur, especially given they failed to arise on October 14-15 when reports of Germans in the city were already circulating widely among the population:

Meantime, panic was growing amongst the population of Moscow. There were even rumours that Germans had been seen in the city. As a result, some shop owners opened their doors and told Muscovites to take whatever they liked, because soon the Germans would snatch it all. In the chaos, many people tried to flee the Soviet capital. The roads and rivers were blocked with people trying to escape from the city by any means they could.​

This would help but you still have all the problems of maintaining those vehicles and keeping them supplied in very bad conditions.

From Minsk to Moscow is a military grade highway, rated for all weather conditions, and there was others available; the entire fight at Borodino in early October was driven by the Germans working to secure this route for their advance. As far as losing vehicles to enemy action and breakdowns, again, I have accounted for that with the 6,000 figure. The loss rate overall in Russia during 1941 was 30-40%, a rate about matched in North Africa. You can apply the 40% rate to 6,000 and get 3,600 trucks left over after losses. Army Group Center only needs to keep 3,000 of this 6,000 in service to meet their logistical needs.

By carrying capacity I meant that of the railway lines themselves. This is a limit separate to having the ability to transfer additional trains and wagons from other regions to those sections of track. Which might be more difficult than you think as it also means moving the crews and supply facilities to operate them. However there are limitations on the tracks themselves as to how much they can carry. As such moving a lot more vehicles by rail will mean for that period a drop in other items you can move on the same tracks.

I understand, and there is the capacity. By late August, Minsk was already handling 24 trains a day and this rate increased throughout September. As far as crews and supplies, again, those are already on hand given they too had to be used to move them to Rommel, after all.

Does that include what he obtained from other sources, i.e. captured British/Commonwealth vehicles, which he said himself were vital to his operations?

That was his maximum on hand stockpile at any one time, yes.

The point is that they were produced in the period 41-43 so their not available in 41.

Sure, but we know at least some of them are and we know 8,000 trucks were available too.

You cited it, then denied you had said it then said it was French bluster.

I did not deny it anywhere, please do not make false claims about me or my statements. I was the one who cited it from Horne's book, and stated it was French bluster from the start by showing how they immediately sought British help in 1936.

This was the perception presented by one albeit very influential military officer who as you said had some hostility towards the current French government so its possibly his information was somewhat bias.

Again, please not do make statements up that I did not make, as I never stated that about Gamelin. The actual statement about the French military weakness is taken directly from the citation by Horne, who explained it as context behind why Gamelin did what he did. As Horne points out, the French military as a result of the Depression had been underfunded for years, creating serious weaknesses in it. If you disagree with this assessment, that is your right, but selectively quoting from Horne and misrepresenting what he stated is not. If you disagree with Horne's analysis, then the onerous is on you to provide counter-citations that show the French Army was viable.

Well at that time it had a much larger navy, a substantial army - albeit largely in locations like India and control of Gibraltar and the Suez canal. Given that air power was less developed in that time period as well if Britain had been willing to fight then it would have been pretty decisive in ending the Italian empire at the very least. It would also gain valuable military experience and possibly deter elements in Germany as well but I would settle for seriously crippling Mussolini's position.

Again, with what forces? Britain had only two divisions it could deploy from the UK itself to reinforce Egypt. The Royal Navy categorically failed to cut off Libya in 1940-1942, so why would it achieve such in 1936?

Italy entered the war in 1940 at a time when Britain was pretty much fighting alone - other than the empire. Some errors, especially by Churchill and then the Japanese onslaught meant that Britain was largely fighting for its survival meant that realistic opportunities for victories without some luck or good judgement until the Soviets and then the US were brought into the war and able to apply their resources. As such that Britain wasn't able to clear N Africa until 1943 is not relevant to the far more different situation in 1936

Japan wasn't in the war until December of 1941, which means from June of 1940 until then, 16 months, occurred without any concern of the Japanese Empire to explain the failure to cut off Libya. The USSR would not be able to join this struggle and we already know the French wouldn't either, so this would leave the British alone here too. Again, I ask how come the British failed to do this in 1940-1942?

The bit highlighted above doesn't make sense? Do you mean fail to examine or need to examine?

Fail to examine, yes.

 

[gral]

I'm not following the discussion closely, but...

Japan wasn't in the war until December of 1941, which means from June of 1940 until then, 16 months, occurred without any concern of the Japanese Empire to explain the failure to cut off Libya.

'without any concern' is an exaggeration - Japan was already an ally of Germany and Italy, and the British were worried about them. It certainly wasn't a higher priority than dealing with Italy and Germany, but you bet there was some thought about the situation in the Far East, as well as some allocation of resources to deal with events there.

 

[History Learner]

I'm not following the discussion closely, but...



'without any concern' is an exaggeration - Japan was already an ally of Germany and Italy, and the British were worried about them. It certainly wasn't a higher priority than dealing with Italy and Germany, but you bet there was some thought about the situation in the Far East, as well as some allocation of resources to deal with events there.

Major Naval units were not diverted to the Far East until 1941.

 

[gral]

Major Naval units were not diverted to the Far East until 1941.

They weren't - but they spent supplies with the troops being raised on the Far East to contain Japan, some of which could have been used elsewhere.

 

[stevep]

Stalin only committed to such on the 15th, and had a train prepared to take him to behind the Volga:

Moscow was defended by less than 100,000 troops and preparations were being made to move the government east, to Kuibyshev on the Volga. A secret document (no. 34) from the State Defence Committee, dated 15 October 1941, records that it had been decided ‘To evacuate the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the top levels of Government… (Comrade Stalin will leave tomorrow or later, depending on the situation)… In the event of enemy forces arriving at the gates of Moscow, the NKVD – Comrade Beria and Comrade Shcherbakov – are ordered to blow up business premises, warehouses and institutions which cannot be evacuated, and all Underground railway electrical equipment.’i​

​

Anastas Mikoyan, a member of the Soviet Politburo, later said that Stalin had told him on 15 October that he intended to leave the Soviet capital. Crucial communications equipment and documents were taken from the Kremlin and packed on board Stalin’s train, waiting at Moscow station. On the night of 16 October, key personnel were told to leave their offices and prepare to flee. ‘There was a car waiting outside [the Kremlin],’ recalls Nikolay Ponomariev, Stalin’s telegraphist. ‘We were driven away. Moscow was completely dark. The weather was wet. I saw we were heading for the railway station. I saw the armoured train and Stalin’s guards walking to and fro on the platform. It became clear to me that I would have to wait for Stalin and go into evacuation with him.’​

As for any hypothetical militias, no orders to raise them, no commanders to lead them and no weapons to arm them were available nor were there plans, as the No. 34 document shows, to raise any. Given these limitations, and the fact that efforts at raising militias earlier in the campaign had failed in every instance, I see no reason to assume would occur, especially given they failed to arise on October 14-15 when reports of Germans in the city were already circulating widely among the population:

Meantime, panic was growing amongst the population of Moscow. There were even rumours that Germans had been seen in the city. As a result, some shop owners opened their doors and told Muscovites to take whatever they liked, because soon the Germans would snatch it all. In the chaos, many people tried to flee the Soviet capital. The roads and rivers were blocked with people trying to escape from the city by any means they could.​

​

From Minsk to Moscow is a military grade highway, rated for all weather conditions, and there was others available; the entire fight at Borodino in early October was driven by the Germans working to secure this route for their advance. As far as losing vehicles to enemy action and breakdowns, again, I have accounted for that with the 6,000 figure. The loss rate overall in Russia during 1941 was 30-40%, a rate about matched in North Africa. You can apply the 40% rate to 6,000 and get 3,600 trucks left over after losses. Army Group Center only needs to keep 3,000 of this 6,000 in service to meet their logistical needs.

But he did make such a commitment OTL and hence could have done TTL.

I understand, and there is the capacity. By late August, Minsk was already handling 24 trains a day and this rate increased throughout September. As far as crews and supplies, again, those are already on hand given they too had to be used to move them to Rommel, after all.

Which shows that you don't understand what I was saying. Its not the material or personal being moved. Its that they need to be moved by rail - along with supplies to support them. This takes railway capacity which can't be spent on anything else while it occurs.

That crews and supplies were available in Italy OTL doesn't avoid that they also need to be moved, which involves additional resources. Also a lot of those would be Italians and I don't know how happy Mussolini would be with Germany hi-jacking a good chunk - or any - of the Italian railway personal and equipment.

That was his maximum on hand stockpile at any one time, yes.

I.e. including a lot of captured British equipment which wouldn't be available in TTL.

I did not deny it anywhere, please do not make false claims about me or my statements. I was the one who cited it from Horne's book, and stated it was French bluster from the start by showing how they immediately sought British help in 1936.

Again, please not do make statements up that I did not make, as I never stated that about Gamelin. The actual statement about the French military weakness is taken directly from the citation by Horne, who explained it as context behind why Gamelin did what he did. As Horne points out, the French military as a result of the Depression had been underfunded for years, creating serious weaknesses in it. If you disagree with this assessment, that is your right, but selectively quoting from Horne and misrepresenting what he stated is not. If you disagree with Horne's analysis, then the onerous is on you to provide counter-citations that show the French Army was viable.

I haven't made up anything.

Again, with what forces? Britain had only two divisions it could deploy from the UK itself to reinforce Egypt. The Royal Navy categorically failed to cut off Libya in 1940-1942, so why would it achieve such in 1936?

Except that British forces weren't only in the UK. Many of the forces that fought in the western desert were either British forces based in areas such as the ME or India or forces from India and ANZ.

Japan wasn't in the war until December of 1941, which means from June of 1940 until then, 16 months, occurred without any concern of the Japanese Empire to explain the failure to cut off Libya. The USSR would not be able to join this struggle and we already know the French wouldn't either, so this would leave the British alone here too. Again, I ask how come the British failed to do this in 1940-1942?

A totally unrealistic comparison. From June 40 Britain was faced with aireal bombardment, a perceived threat of invasion and a blockade by both subs and surface raiders. This also resulted in measures such as the blackout which had an impact on production. As such the bulk of British strength was based in or defending the UK. In 1936 none of this would be a factor ans Britain can concentrate a lot more, both naval and air against Italy. Even OTL with a couple of different decisions made there's a decent chance that Libya could have been fully occupied in early 1941 and hence plenty of opportunities in 36-37 say.

Japan was a factor throughout this period but only became a real threat to Britain's position with the occupation of the southern part of FIC in ~June 1941. Something which isn't going to happen with an undefeated France. By this stage of the war in Europe meant Britain was too heavily committed to switch forces from the FE theatre which had been moved westwards back east, let alone send additional forces until it was too late.

Fail to examine, yes.

OK thanks for clarifying.

 

[History Learner]

But he did make such a commitment OTL and hence could have done TTL.

Sure, but that results in a captured or dead Stalin.

Which shows that you don't understand what I was saying. Its not the material or personal being moved. Its that they need to be moved by rail - along with supplies to support them. This takes railway capacity which can't be spent on anything else while it occurs.

That crews and supplies were available in Italy OTL doesn't avoid that they also need to be moved, which involves additional resources. Also a lot of those would be Italians and I don't know how happy Mussolini would be with Germany hi-jacking a good chunk - or any - of the Italian railway personal and equipment.

Again, I do understand, that's why I cited the 24 trains per day on the Minks Railway bit by August; the capacity was there and increasingly so by late September/early October. As for the supplies and crews, said trucks were moved from Germany to Italian ports, meaning they were German crews; they do not need to take anything from Italy for this.

I.e. including a lot of captured British equipment which wouldn't be available in TTL.

In terms of his overall average, sure, as I've already said. In terms of the 8,000 on hand, no, because those were directly shipped from Germany.

I haven't made up anything.

With respect, you very much did:

You cited it, then denied you had said it then said it was French bluster.​

I also did not anywhere make any statements about Gamelin lying just because he hated the Government.

Except that British forces weren't only in the UK. Many of the forces that fought in the western desert were either British forces based in areas such as the ME or India or forces from India and ANZ.

Sure, there was Commonwealth wide participation in North Africa; they were also in just as bad if not worse position than the UK in 1936, in particular the ANZCs.

A totally unrealistic comparison. From June 40 Britain was faced with aireal bombardment, a perceived threat of invasion and a blockade by both subs and surface raiders. This also resulted in measures such as the blackout which had an impact on production. As such the bulk of British strength was based in or defending the UK. In 1936 none of this would be a factor ans Britain can concentrate a lot more, both naval and air against Italy. Even OTL with a couple of different decisions made there's a decent chance that Libya could have been fully occupied in early 1941 and hence plenty of opportunities in 36-37 say.

Japan was a factor throughout this period but only became a real threat to Britain's position with the occupation of the southern part of FIC in ~June 1941. Something which isn't going to happen with an undefeated France. By this stage of the war in Europe meant Britain was too heavily committed to switch forces from the FE theatre which had been moved westwards back east, let alone send additional forces until it was too late.

The difference is that, while there is a degree of strategic opening, the UK on the whole is a much weaker entity. If Britain has also over-committed to facing Italy, how exactly are they supposed to do anything about the Rhine Crisis?

OK thanks for clarifying.

You are welcome.

 

[stevep]

Sure, but that results in a captured or dead Stalin.

Only if the Germans actually capture Moscow. While your quoted only 90,000 troops in the way of the German attack on Moscow I also see a figure, from Lordroel's site, of ~80 divisions opposing the Germans.

Again, I do understand, that's why I cited the 24 trains per day on the Minks Railway bit by August; the capacity was there and increasingly so by late September/early October. As for the supplies and crews, said trucks were moved from Germany to Italian ports, meaning they were German crews; they do not need to take anything from Italy for this.

Clearly you don't understand. I'm not talking about the motor vehicles I'm talking about the trains, railway wagons and staff that move them by rail. Your not getting them moved from Italy to the eastern front even if there was the capacity to operate them.

In terms of his overall average, sure, as I've already said. In terms of the 8,000 on hand, no, because those were directly shipped from Germany.

Possibly that 8,000 but in terms of the vehicles available there would be less than OTL.

With respect, you very much did:

You cited it, then denied you had said it then said it was French bluster.​

I also did not anywhere make any statements about Gamelin lying just because he hated the Government.

You introduced the reference to the French stating that they would look after their own interests themselves, then referred to it as possibly being only French bluster. Later you denied such statements then suggested it was just bluster.

You quoted:

As Horne notes, Gamelin lied because the Army, as a result of being underfunded during the 1930s, was not in a condition to actually oppose the Germans.

So Gamelin did lie, at least according to your source. You also made reference to him being deeply hostile to the current government. Those were the points I raised.

Sure, there was Commonwealth wide participation in North Africa; they were also in just as bad if not worse position than the UK in 1936, in particular the ANZCs.

Ignoring the elephant in the room of the Indian army as well as British forces elsewhere in the empire. The British army didn't consist of solely the BEF!

The difference is that, while there is a degree of strategic opening, the UK on the whole is a much weaker entity. If Britain has also over-committed to facing Italy, how exactly are they supposed to do anything about the Rhine Crisis?

I'm not saying they do directly. Although a strong British response over Ethiopia might make either Hitler or opponents consider whether such a move is a good idea.

However if Britain was to take on and defeat Italy in 36/37 say, clearing them from their empire and destroying a good section of their navy, even if Mussolini stays in power is still a net gain for the democratic powers. It means if events still went as OTL Britain's position is markedly stronger and also you might get some valuable lessons learnt, both in combat and in areas such as production and management. If such a conflict resulted in Mussolini falling and a democratic government installed then things could be changed drastically.

The real problem for Britain in WWII was it faced three potential threats, Germany, Italy and Japan and found itself largely isolated and fighting all three simultaneously. Even a significantly weakened Italy chipping in as OTL and with no empire would be a substantial boost for Britain.

Steve

 

[stevep]

Further to the situation on the eastern front in late 41 - seen the latest post on Lordroel's site of the WWII day by day videos, which can be seen at WWII for week starting 1-11-1941, there is some interesting figures. It states that

a) By this stage the campaign had cost Germany 686,000 casualties which counting reserves which had been committed was about 20% of their force. Also that they had only 1/3 of their motor vehicles functional and panzer divisions were down to 35% strength.

Unlike other sources, such as the military history visualized ones this site unfortunately don't frequently give sources for their information but this was very closely following a quote from David Glantz's "BarbarossaL Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941" it may be from that.

b) It goes on to quote the following figures for the Soviet forces in the threatre.
i) German intel believed there were about 160 divisions and 40 brigades, which they thought most were at about half strength.

ii) In reality, which many units were at half strength there was a total of 269 divisions and 65 brigades.

iii) By a month later this was to be increased to 343 divisions and 98 brigades and the Red Army forces facing the Germans would be above 4M men.

The Germans believed that what Soviet forces were left were concentrated in front of Moscow or in the Rostov area to protect the approaches to the Caucaus region so some of their commanders were suggesting further deep advances and encirclements which would have been well beyond the actual capacity of the German forces in the condition they were in. On the other hand the commander of AGS was already asking for permission to settle into winter quarters and rebuild for further attacks the following year.

Steve

 

[History Learner]

Only if the Germans actually capture Moscow. While your quoted only 90,000 troops in the way of the German attack on Moscow I also see a figure, from Lordroel's site, of ~80 divisions opposing the Germans.

I do not know what site you refer to, but there are no citations for the claim of 80 Divisions around Moscow in October that I am aware of. Although I do not what resource they are using, it seems likely they have confused what was available in December-January for that in Mid-October. Alternatively of course, they were only looking at what was on hand at the start of Operation Typhoon, in which case you are ignoring the vast majority of that force was destroyed by the Germans by October 15th:

By October 6, the Soviet picture had grown worse. Koniev’s orders to his Sixteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth Armies to retreat toward Vyaz’ma could not be heeded due to the intense pressure from Bock’s Fourth and Ninth Armies. Budenny’s Thirty-second Army, which guarded the approaches to Vyaz’ma, collapsed under withering armored attacks from north and south of the city, and on the morning of October 7, panzers linked up east of Vyaz’ma, forming a pocket that trapped some 400,000 soldiers from the Sixteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-fourth, and Thirty-second Armies. That evening, five German infantry corps, plus heavy artillery and Luftwaffe bombers, were called in to begin the kessel (cauldron) battle that would result in the destruction of 25 rifle divisions and five tank brigades over the next five days.​

​

Farther south, General Guderian closed the Bryansk pocket, although his mobile forces were delayed when his fuel supply gave out on October 3. Three days later, his panzers finally reached Bryansk, and by October 9 he had loosely encircled the Soviet Third, Thirteenth, and Fiftieth Armies. But Guderian failed to seal the pocket effectively, and from October 9 to 13 large portions of the Third and Thirteenth Armies limped away, while parts of at least seven rifle divisions managed to escape the cauldron.​

​

All told, the first phase of Typhoon was another disaster for the Red Army. Despite the imperfect closure of the Bryansk pocket, Bock estimated that his army group had captured 673,098 prisoners, killed around 300,000 defenders, and destroyed or captured 1,277 tanks and 4,378 artillery pieces. The Red Army had lost 64 rifle divisions, 11 tank brigades, and 50 artillery regiments—about one million men—during Typhoon’s first two weeks, and Hitler’s propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, confidently informed foreign correspondents, “The annihilation of Timoshenko’s [sic] army group has definitely brought the war to a close.”​

Clearly you don't understand. I'm not talking about the motor vehicles I'm talking about the trains, railway wagons and staff that move them by rail. Your not getting them moved from Italy to the eastern front even if there was the capacity to operate them.

I understand, again, and as I have said repeatedly, they were moved from Germany into Italy using the same trains, railway wagons and staff for shipping to North Africa. They are, again, not coming from Italian stocks but the German stocks Hitler used to reinforce Rommel in North Africa historically. If you feel this is in error, how did Rommel get those trucks from Germany?

Possibly that 8,000 but in terms of the vehicles available there would be less than OTL.

Okay, why would this be the case? There is no Western Front to lose them upon here. Even if you want to take the position expressed here, again, I've stated only 6,000 are needed-meaning 20% of that 8,000 could be unavailable-and you would still have the 6,000 figure.

You introduced the reference to the French stating that they would look after their own interests themselves, then referred to it as possibly being only French bluster. Later you denied such statements then suggested it was just bluster.

Okay, as I've already stated, that is not what I said and I even quoted myself to prove this. If you feel otherwise, please cite where I said what you claim. What I did say is, by quoting Horne, that France in 1934 claimed they would look after themselves; when the Rhine Crisis happened in 1936, they immediately sought British support; thus showing their earlier claim was bluster.

You quoted:

So Gamelin did lie, at least according to your source. You also made reference to him being deeply hostile to the current government. Those were the points I raised.

He lied about the size of the German Army, but he did not lie just because he hated the Government and the reason for his lie was because, as Horne directly notes, the French Army was not capable of challenging the Germans because of the underfunding driven by the Great Depression.

Ignoring the elephant in the room of the Indian army as well as British forces elsewhere in the empire. The British army didn't consist of solely the BEF!

Which, as I said in the portion you quote, was likewise deeply affected by the depression and in an equally terrible material and force size situation.

I'm not saying they do directly. Although a strong British response over Ethiopia might make either Hitler or opponents consider whether such a move is a good idea.

However if Britain was to take on and defeat Italy in 36/37 say, clearing them from their empire and destroying a good section of their navy, even if Mussolini stays in power is still a net gain for the democratic powers. It means if events still went as OTL Britain's position is markedly stronger and also you might get some valuable lessons learnt, both in combat and in areas such as production and management. If such a conflict resulted in Mussolini falling and a democratic government installed then things could be changed drastically.

The real problem for Britain in WWII was it faced three potential threats, Germany, Italy and Japan and found itself largely isolated and fighting all three simultaneously. Even a significantly weakened Italy chipping in as OTL and with no empire would be a substantial boost for Britain.

Steve

By the time Japan entered, the USSR and the U.S. were both in the conflict. With regards to the strategic issue presented, it also leaves Britain exhausted by years of warfare when the Germans make their play, same for the Japanese. By 1943 historically, Britain was facing severe manpower shortages, and here you have moved that up. Likewise, the idea that a Democratic Italy would present serious issues must be weighed against the fact that Democratic Sweden and Switzerland remained neutral while Democratic Finland joined the Germans....

 

[stevep]

I do not know what site you refer to, but there are no citations for the claim of 80 Divisions around Moscow in October that I am aware of. Although I do not what resource they are using, it seems likely they have confused what was available in December-January for that in Mid-October. Alternatively of course, they were only looking at what was on hand at the start of Operation Typhoon, in which case you are ignoring the vast majority of that force was destroyed by the Germans by October 15th:

Its the same site & thread I linked to in my last post on this issue. Furthermore those figures are from the start of November.

I understand, again, and as I have said repeatedly, they were moved from Germany into Italy using the same trains, railway wagons and staff for shipping to North Africa. They are, again, not coming from Italian stocks but the German stocks Hitler used to reinforce Rommel in North Africa historically. If you feel this is in error, how did Rommel get those trucks from Germany?

I was making the assumption that large numbers of trains, wagons and staff supplying both German and Italian forces in N Africa via the Italian railway network were using Italian rail equipment and staff for the operation. If what your saying is accurate, that German trains using German drivers, firemen etc were used all the way down to Naples, Taranto or wherever the equipment was transferred to ships then there is markedly less use of Italian resources so your point would be accurate.

Okay, why would this be the case? There is no Western Front to lose them upon here. Even if you want to take the position expressed here, again, I've stated only 6,000 are needed-meaning 20% of that 8,000 could be unavailable-and you would still have the 6,000 figure.

I think you mean African front? I was talking generally rather than in terms of the 8,000 vehicles you said were sent to Rommel as the German drive in Russia was staggering to a halt due to logistics among other problems. Referring to the units he didn't get from captured British stock OTL.

Okay, as I've already stated, that is not what I said and I even quoted myself to prove this. If you feel otherwise, please cite where I said what you claim. What I did say is, by quoting Horne, that France in 1934 claimed they would look after themselves; when the Rhine Crisis happened in 1936, they immediately sought British support; thus showing their earlier claim was bluster.

That's exactly what I was arguing. I didn't, as far as I'm aware say you said that yourself - if you got that impression I apologise - but that you gave information that this was what happened. Which at least suggests you belived it was accurate.

He lied about the size of the German Army, but he did not lie just because he hated the Government and the reason for his lie was because, as Horne directly notes, the French Army was not capable of challenging the Germans because of the underfunding driven by the Great Depression.

The reason for his lie is not clear. [Just to make clear here that I consider it a lie only if he genuinely knew it was utterly false information. If he had been wrongly informed by French intelligence then I would not technically consider it a lie]. Given that the French leadership took his figures at face value then they would have considered mobilisation necessary. If they had known the accurate figures then they might well have considered the French army standing forces sufficient. Which as we have the advantage of knowing would have been accurate as the German forces sent into the Rhineland had orders to withdraw if the French intervened.

Its also clear he was deeply hostile to the current French government, because of a combination of its politics and the underfunding he felt the army had suffered from.

Which, as I said in the portion you quote, was likewise deeply affected by the depression and in an equally terrible material and force size situation.

Was it? There was still a need for an army in India throughout the period to protect internal order and prevent incursions. Also assuming that India was badly affected by the depression - I honestly don't know, that does mean there are a hell of a lot of potential local recruits for an enlarged army, let alone simply to fill in gaps left by elements of the army as units, whether British or Indian are sent west.

Plus lets consider the Italian position here. A determined British response means that a large chunk of their military, taking part in the attack on Ethiopia are now isolated in Eritrea and Italian Somalia, surrounded by British colonies and cut off from any supply by British control of the Suez canal. Their forces in Libya are also under threat as supply to them must now get past British forces and their merchant marine are vulnerable to British actions. Italy must climb down quickly or lose a hell of a lot.

By the time Japan entered, the USSR and the U.S. were both in the conflict. With regards to the strategic issue presented, it also leaves Britain exhausted by years of warfare when the Germans make their play, same for the Japanese. By 1943 historically, Britain was facing severe manpower shortages, and here you have moved that up. Likewise, the idea that a Democratic Italy would present serious issues must be weighed against the fact that Democratic Sweden and Switzerland remained neutral while Democratic Finland joined the Germans....

Totally wrong. Italy can't last long on its own and if Mussolini tries to insist on fighting until the end he's likely to be deposed. Here he has even less preparation for war, large forces isolated and is without support while fighting a markedly stronger power with the largest navy [shared with the US] in the world. It could mean a very quick climb down or last a few months in which case Italy loses all its colonies and many resources.

Britain will take some losses but it will also gain some useful experience, both in terms of battles and of equipment. Furthermore the surge in orders likely to result in a boost to the economy and a successful intervention to protect international law will undermine the pacifists in their opposition to rearmament.

If Italy becomes democratic its going to be less than happy with an expansive Nazi Germany, especially given the latter designs on the S Tyrol region Italy gained in WWI. It may not be an active member of an anti-Nazi alliance, although a democratic government isn't going to be a close ally of Hitler. [Finland is an invalid example here because it lose home territory to an attack, not distant and economically unsuccessful colonies due to the stupidity of its own leadership and hence had clear motivation for supporting an attack on Russia. Not to mention the Finns knew the intention was total conquest and they didn't know when Stalin might try again]. If it sits out the war and isn't attacked by Germany and assuming everything else goes as OTL in 1939-40 - which is by no means certain of course - then the Med remains largely open to British operations, Malta is not continually needing supply under desperate conditions and there is no drain from continued fighting in Africa. Plus of course while still the weakest of the great powers Italy is a lot bigger than any of the other nations you mention and has good defensive borders with Germany.

If Italy stays fascist it very likely acts similarly to OTL. Although it may be reluctant to fight Britain again. However it will have lost its colonies, so again no drain in Africa for Britain, taken a big economic hit during the war with Britain and could well have lost some military assets, especially ships that haven't let fully been replaced. As such it will proabably largely close the Med to merchantile traffic and pose a problem for Malta but it would be a lot easier supplying the island with bases as close as Tripoli. You may or may not have some gains in military experience depending on whether battle lessons win out over fascist party infighting and buck passing.

Assuming in the latter option that WWII goes similar to OTL then Britain has avoided a lot of losses of men and material and due to the somewhat more rapid rearmament - albeit possibly not by much - and has also avoided some naval losses. Even more-so if there is no Italian attack on Greece or no British intervention as a result. The ideal situation for Britain would be if it was building up forces in the region for an attack on say Sicily when the growing threat, or an actual attack from Japan prompts such forces being redirected eastwards, which could prevent the loss of Malaya and/or Burma and the former is also likely to mean a chunk of the DEI saved, which would considerably shorten the war in the Pacific and the impact on British strength during this period.

One other impact that just occurred to me. A successful military intervention against Italy over Ethiopia is very likely going to change a lot of politics inside the UK. Chamberlain may never become PM, or with rearmament accepted earlier more rational people than Churchill could end up leading after the fall of France.

 

[History Learner]

Its the same site & thread I linked to in my last post on this issue. Furthermore those figures are from the start of November.

I can't find this link you're referring to, but again, there's no citation about 80 Divisions by the start of November I'm aware of. The Second World War: The Eastern Front 1941–1945 by Geoffrey Jukes on Pages 33-34 says the following:

The official German assessment of 1 December, that the Red Army had no reserves left, now proved spectacularly wrong. From various sources, but particularly his spy Richard The fighting 33 Sorge in Tokyo, Stalin had learned that Japan intended to attack southward, against Europe’s and the USA’s Asian dependencies, not northward against the Soviet Union. He began transferring divisions from the Soviet Far East; adding them to newly raised formations, he accumulated a 58-division reserve by the end of November. ​

I was making the assumption that large numbers of trains, wagons and staff supplying both German and Italian forces in N Africa via the Italian railway network were using Italian rail equipment and staff for the operation. If what your saying is accurate, that German trains using German drivers, firemen etc were used all the way down to Naples, Taranto or wherever the equipment was transferred to ships then there is markedly less use of Italian resources so your point would be accurate.

Which I've repeatedly said, and even provided a linking previously to show.

I think you mean African front? I was talking generally rather than in terms of the 8,000 vehicles you said were sent to Rommel as the German drive in Russia was staggering to a halt due to logistics among other problems. Referring to the units he didn't get from captured British stock OTL.

And these 8,000 trucks were domestic in production, not captured British. I'm not sure how the general idea of greater German losses exist, but regardless, such does not apply to these 8,000 trucks.

That's exactly what I was arguing. I didn't, as far as I'm aware say you said that yourself - if you got that impression I apologise - but that you gave information that this was what happened. Which at least suggests you belived it was accurate.

Do I believe it was French bluster? Yes.

The reason for his lie is not clear. [Just to make clear here that I consider it a lie only if he genuinely knew it was utterly false information. If he had been wrongly informed by French intelligence then I would not technically consider it a lie]. Given that the French leadership took his figures at face value then they would have considered mobilisation necessary. If they had known the accurate figures then they might well have considered the French army standing forces sufficient. Which as we have the advantage of knowing would have been accurate as the German forces sent into the Rhineland had orders to withdraw if the French intervened.

Horne directly states the reasoning for Gamelin's statements to the Government is because the French Army was incapable, due to under-funding, to accomplish the mission with its standing forces. Knowing the actual size of German forces was irrelevant because to challenge it would require mobilization, which was politically unacceptable.

Its also clear he was deeply hostile to the current French government, because of a combination of its politics and the underfunding he felt the army had suffered from.

Horne doesn't state such, so if you have a citation you would like to introduce I welcome it.

Was it? There was still a need for an army in India throughout the period to protect internal order and prevent incursions. Also assuming that India was badly affected by the depression - I honestly don't know, that does mean there are a hell of a lot of potential local recruits for an enlarged army, let alone simply to fill in gaps left by elements of the army as units, whether British or Indian are sent west.

Plus lets consider the Italian position here. A determined British response means that a large chunk of their military, taking part in the attack on Ethiopia are now isolated in Eritrea and Italian Somalia, surrounded by British colonies and cut off from any supply by British control of the Suez canal. Their forces in Libya are also under threat as supply to them must now get past British forces and their merchant marine are vulnerable to British actions. Italy must climb down quickly or lose a hell of a lot.

Totally wrong. Italy can't last long on its own and if Mussolini tries to insist on fighting until the end he's likely to be deposed. Here he has even less preparation for war, large forces isolated and is without support while fighting a markedly stronger power with the largest navy [shared with the US] in the world. It could mean a very quick climb down or last a few months in which case Italy loses all its colonies and many resources.

Britain will take some losses but it will also gain some useful experience, both in terms of battles and of equipment. Furthermore the surge in orders likely to result in a boost to the economy and a successful intervention to protect international law will undermine the pacifists in their opposition to rearmament.

If Italy becomes democratic its going to be less than happy with an expansive Nazi Germany, especially given the latter designs on the S Tyrol region Italy gained in WWI. It may not be an active member of an anti-Nazi alliance, although a democratic government isn't going to be a close ally of Hitler. [Finland is an invalid example here because it lose home territory to an attack, not distant and economically unsuccessful colonies due to the stupidity of its own leadership and hence had clear motivation for supporting an attack on Russia. Not to mention the Finns knew the intention was total conquest and they didn't know when Stalin might try again]. If it sits out the war and isn't attacked by Germany and assuming everything else goes as OTL in 1939-40 - which is by no means certain of course - then the Med remains largely open to British operations, Malta is not continually needing supply under desperate conditions and there is no drain from continued fighting in Africa. Plus of course while still the weakest of the great powers Italy is a lot bigger than any of the other nations you mention and has good defensive borders with Germany.

If Italy stays fascist it very likely acts similarly to OTL. Although it may be reluctant to fight Britain again. However it will have lost its colonies, so again no drain in Africa for Britain, taken a big economic hit during the war with Britain and could well have lost some military assets, especially ships that haven't let fully been replaced. As such it will proabably largely close the Med to merchantile traffic and pose a problem for Malta but it would be a lot easier supplying the island with bases as close as Tripoli. You may or may not have some gains in military experience depending on whether battle lessons win out over fascist party infighting and buck passing.

At this point, agree to disagree on this. The purpose of this thread was to examine WWII without American Lend Lease, which this whole dialogue detracts from.

 

[stevep]

I can't find this link you're referring to, but again, there's no citation about 80 Divisions by the start of November I'm aware of. The Second World War: The Eastern Front 1941–1945 by Geoffrey Jukes on Pages 33-34 says the following:

The official German assessment of 1 December, that the Red Army had no reserves left, now proved spectacularly wrong. From various sources, but particularly his spy Richard The fighting 33 Sorge in Tokyo, Stalin had learned that Japan intended to attack southward, against Europe’s and the USA’s Asian dependencies, not northward against the Soviet Union. He began transferring divisions from the Soviet Far East; adding them to newly raised formations, he accumulated a 58-division reserve by the end of November. ​

Lordroel's site and the thread in question is at WWI day by day thread. At the top of that page is the video I gave a link to before. However if you can't get that the direct link is at #33 above but again is Stalin and the Red army at the start of Nov 41.

I'm talking about what forces the Red Army had at the start of Nov not the reserve surplus to that by the end of the month.

Horne directly states the reasoning for Gamelin's statements to the Government is because the French Army was incapable, due to under-funding, to accomplish the mission with its standing forces. Knowing the actual size of German forces was irrelevant because to challenge it would require mobilization, which was politically unacceptable.

Correction he either thought the French army was insufficient for the task or possibly mislead his government as a way of either getting more money out of them or possibly hoping to generate a position - by their 'failure' to respond to the crisis - which would lead to their removal.

Horne doesn't state such, so if you have a citation you would like to introduce I welcome it.

Your quote from Horne was:

The French Government called in General Gamelin, Weygand’s successor as Army Commander-inChief. Gamelin, already revealing himself a master of political if not military manoeuvre, temporized and equivocated in the style that was to prove so fatal to France four years later. Of course his Army was ready for instant action; but did the Government realize that the Germans had nearly a million men under arms, 300,000 of them already in the Rhineland? It was an absurd exaggeration (see below, p. 75), deliberately intended to avoid action and pass the responsibility on to the politicians. Without conceding that the Army might in any way be unfit for a swift offensive operation, Gamelin pointed out that it was numerically under strength owing to the reduction in military service (of course the fault of the politicians, he implied). Then he dropped the bombshell that, if it were to act over the Rhineland, the Government would have to face up to the prospect of general mobilization. 12

That definitely sounds like he's claiming that the French army without moblisation was inadequate to face the vastly inflated strength he was reporting for the German army. [As such without moblisation it might have been very effecient against the Germany intrusion, as we know it would have been as the German forces had orders to withdraw if opposed.] Also that he clearly blamed the government for this.

At this point, agree to disagree on this. The purpose of this thread was to examine WWII without American Lend Lease, which this whole dialogue detracts from.

Which we're doing. At least one possibility that is at least as likely as assuming that with such a butterfly things would go roughly as OTL until Sept 39. We started on this track because you, for some reason, picked on the idea of Britain standing up to Italy as being disastrous for Britain. I've been pointing out why I think that was almost certainly totally inaccurate. We can end it here but lets remember while its being discussed.

Steve

 

[History Learner]

Lordroel's site and the thread in question is at WWI day by day thread. At the top of that page is the video I gave a link to before. However if you can't get that the direct link is at #33 above but again is Stalin and the Red army at the start of Nov 41.

I'm talking about what forces the Red Army had at the start of Nov not the reserve surplus to that by the end of the month.

Jukes is saying they only had 58 Divisions at the end, not a 58 Division reserve in addition to the 80 alleged. Further, the video in question never states 80 Divisions. As a result, since they quoted from David Glantz at the start of it, I decided to check my copy of When Titans Clashed (2015 edition) and this is what Glantz says:

By 15 November, the ground had frozen sufficiently for Bock to resume his offensive. The Western Front, reinforced by the Kalinin Front’s 30th Army on its northern flank on 17 November, numbered 240,000 combat troops supported by 1,254 guns and mortars, 502 tanks, and 180 to 200 combat aircraft. Zhukov had anchored his defenses on the well-prepared Mozhaisk Line before Moscow, with other forces extending to Kalinin in the north and Tula in the south. 69 By this time, Bock’s Army Group Center numbered roughly 300,000 men supported by perhaps 900 tanks. However, Zhukov could also count on another 169,369 troops assigned to the new 1st Shock, 20th, and 10th Armies, then in the Stavka’s Reserve, which brought the correlation of forces in the region to rough parity (see Table F in the Appendix).​

In short, there were no 80 Divisions at the start of November, and especially not after October 12th-15th when the Germans were moving upon the city.

Correction he either thought the French army was insufficient for the task or possibly mislead his government as a way of either getting more money out of them or possibly hoping to generate a position - by their 'failure' to respond to the crisis - which would lead to their removal.

At this point, you need to cite something to back this up, particularly since Gamelin knew the alternative was the Popular Front which opposed military spending entirely.

Your quote from Horne was:

That definitely sounds like he's claiming that the French army without moblisation was inadequate to face the vastly inflated strength he was reporting for the German army. [As such without moblisation it might have been very effecient against the Germany intrusion, as we know it would have been as the German forces had orders to withdraw if opposed.] Also that he clearly blamed the government for this.

"Without conceding that the Army might in any way be unfit for a swift offensive operation"

The inflated numbers were used to shift the blame, not the source of Gamelin's belief. Horne is clearly saying Gamelin was of the opinion the standing Army was not sufficient.

Which we're doing. At least one possibility that is at least as likely as assuming that with such a butterfly things would go roughly as OTL until Sept 39. We started on this track because you, for some reason, picked on the idea of Britain standing up to Italy as being disastrous for Britain. I've been pointing out why I think that was almost certainly totally inaccurate. We can end it here but lets remember while its being discussed.

Steve

We originally went on this tangent because you suggested Britain would randomly oppose Italy in 1936 as a possible butterfly, despite the horrid state of their military being cited as factor not to do so by the British themselves and their own diplomatic service favoring an accord with the Italians via the Hoare–Laval Pact in order to maintain the Stresa Front.

 

[stevep]

Jukes is saying they only had 58 Divisions at the end, not a 58 Division reserve in addition to the 80 alleged. Further, the video in question never states 80 Divisions. As a result, since they quoted from David Glantz at the start of it, I decided to check my copy of When Titans Clashed (2015 edition) and this is what Glantz says:

By 15 November, the ground had frozen sufficiently for Bock to resume his offensive. The Western Front, reinforced by the Kalinin Front’s 30th Army on its northern flank on 17 November, numbered 240,000 combat troops supported by 1,254 guns and mortars, 502 tanks, and 180 to 200 combat aircraft. Zhukov had anchored his defenses on the well-prepared Mozhaisk Line before Moscow, with other forces extending to Kalinin in the north and Tula in the south. 69 By this time, Bock’s Army Group Center numbered roughly 300,000 men supported by perhaps 900 tanks. However, Zhukov could also count on another 169,369 troops assigned to the new 1st Shock, 20th, and 10th Armies, then in the Stavka’s Reserve, which brought the correlation of forces in the region to rough parity (see Table F in the Appendix).​

In short, there were no 80 Divisions at the start of November, and especially not after October 12th-15th when the Germans were moving upon the city.

I used the term reserve because that's what you quoted Jutes as saying in post #36 above. The forces you mention above are markedly higher than the 90k you were mentioning as facing AGC earlier in the thread.

At this point, you need to cite something to back this up, particularly since Gamelin knew the alternative was the Popular Front which opposed military spending entirely.

"Without conceding that the Army might in any way be unfit for a swift offensive operation"

The inflated numbers were used to shift the blame, not the source of Gamelin's belief. Horne is clearly saying Gamelin was of the opinion the standing Army was not sufficient.

Actually I don't. We're making different interpretations of the same text. Gamelin's falsification of data meant he could threaten the government that full moblisation of the reserves were needed, else why do it?

We originally went on this tangent because you suggested Britain would randomly oppose Italy in 1936 as a possible butterfly, despite the horrid state of their military being cited as factor not to do so by the British themselves and their own diplomatic service favoring an accord with the Italians via the Hoare–Laval Pact in order to maintain the Stresa Front.

I suggested a number of butterflies that could occur, of which this is one that was considered. You picked this up and made some inaccurate arguments as to why this would be disastrous for Britain and I've been countering them since.

 

[History Learner]

I used the term reserve because that's what you quoted Jutes as saying in post #36 above. The forces you mention above are markedly higher than the 90k you were mentioning as facing AGC earlier in the thread.

Because these forces are from Mid-November, a month after Stalin considered fleeing the city in Mid-October. As for Jukes, I'm aware he used the term "reserve" but the context of the rest of the sentence explains it.

Actually I don't. We're making different interpretations of the same text. Gamelin's falsification of data meant he could threaten the government that full moblisation of the reserves were needed, else why do it?

Because the standing Army could not do it on its own?

I suggested a number of butterflies that could occur, of which this is one that was considered. You picked this up and made some inaccurate arguments as to why this would be disastrous for Britain and I've been countering them since.

Either way, at this point, agree to disagree on this.