WI the Franco-Prussian War went the other way?

Buba

A total creep
As for the colonies, if the British want to oppose French support of the Carlists without confronting them directly, perhaps they could try constructing a 'legitimate Spanish government in exile' either headed by Amadeo (if he doesn't abdicate) or the Isabeline bloodline in Havana?
Up to a certain point there also was the Republican Gov't. So Britain fostering "republics" in Cuba/PR and Philippines is not out of the question. Depends on where the people Her Majesty's Ministers went to school with invested their money.
If Prussia retains the 'Rhenania' area, maybe there'd be a bigger backlash tied in with pan-German nationalist revanchism and consequently a bigger Old Catholic Church in that region if the Pope & France are perceived to be joined at the hip?
Loss von Rom was also a thing in Bavaria, Czechia, Switzerland ... true that in Prussia it might had received official support. Whowever, I'd expect the Prussian Gov't (not known for subtelty) pushing Old Catholicism to backfire and making the affected populations rabidly papist (see Great Poland).
 
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ATP

Well-known member
Up to a certain point there also was the Republican Gov't. So Britain fostering "republics" in Cuba/PR and Philippines is not out of the question. Depends on where the people Her Majesty's Ministers went to school invested their money.

Loss von Rom was also a thing in Bavaria, Czechia, Switzerland ... true that in Prussia it might had received official support. Whowever, I'd expect the Prussian Gov't (not known for subtelty) pushing Old Catholicism to backfire and making the affected populations rabidly papist (see Great Poland).


Indeed.In Great Poland prussian really made all poles there good catholics by their stupid actions.The same would be true for Rhineland and other catholic german countries.

Which eventually would led to WW1 when Prussia would get crushed,and England pick up some french colonies - just like 7th years war.
Becouse Russia would join France,they would get Constantinopole and most Balkans.They really was big on making slavic empire ruled by russians.And create from Great Poland and other german held territories some puppet polish state,just like soviets after WW2 did.

Maybe they would even add Warsaw and russian occupied territories would polish majority.No matter- it would be still vassal state.
 
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stevep

Well-known member
This list has a bunch of assumptions that don't hold up.

-- Britain is a huge question mark, depending on who is looking like the greater threat to the balance of powers. Calling Britain a "highly probable" Prussian ally is very much an over-hasty conclusion.

-- Japan siding against Britain? Guess again. Britain can actually threaten them. Japan will be 100% neutral if Britain sides with Prussia/Russia, and 100% with Britain if Britain sides against Russia.

-- Denmark is not "likely Prussian", because russia scewed them over. They'll be neutral until and unless Prussia is losing, in which case they'll jump on the anti-Prussian bandwagon in order to be rewarded with a mild border adjustment.

-- USA as "likely" on the Prussian side, too? No way. Neutrality until and unless American interests are harmed. If Britain sides with Prussia, you may see Atlantic warfare, and a Lusitania-esque incident may follow. If Britain is neutral or pro-French, the Atlantic is less likely to be heavily contested, and the USA will presumably just stay out.

-- The 'Unknowns' and Scandinavia are all bound to be neutral, unless attacked.

-- China is barely a factor to be considered. Assuming its history proceeds roughly as in OTL, it may join the Prusso-Russian revanchist bloc in a hypothetical Second Great War. (In which case we'll get the war Mackinder saw coming, in its archetypal form: the combined Eurasian Heartland versus the united Periphery.)


Anyway, this produces the following list:

Highly Probable Prussian Side:
Prussia/North Germany
Russia
Italy

Highly Probable French Side:
France
Austria
South Germany
[Rhenania, if it exists]

Likely Prussian Side or Pro-Prussian Neutral:
Serbia ("because fuck Austria, that's why")

Likely French Side or Pro-French Neutral:
Ottoman Empire
Spain
Denmark (neutral until/unless France is winning)

Neutral Unless Attacked:
Switzerland
Belgium
Netherlands
Sweden
Norway
USA
South American Nations
China

Unknown:
Britain
Japan (neutral, or pro-French if Britain is also pro-French)
Portugal (follows Britain's lead)
Greece (likely pro-Prussian because anti-Ottoman, certainly if Britain is also pro-Prussian)
Bulgaria (likely pro-Prussian because anti-Ottoman, but may be in conflict with Greece and/or Serbia)
Romania (definitely doesn't like Austria, but doesn't like Russia, either)


....This is all an exceedingly long way of saying "Britain decides who wins this thing".


Depending on the circumstances as to the last bit. ;) Britain and then the US were vital in OTL WWI but both sides made so many mistakes that it could have gone either way. Definitely whoever has Britain has a big advantage due to their naval and economic/fiscal power, although without changes its industrial power won't be as influential as it was but, baring the point I made about nitrate supplies earlier Britain is a certain decider of the entire conflict. If there is a powerful N Germany, having seen something like OTL post-1870 growth - although that could be interrupted with the Rhineland taken away from it - allied with Russia that's going to be a hell of a force to defeat.

I think the discussion shows how many variables there are so that ~40 years after a different 1870 conflict the strenght of individual states, as well as their political and diplomatic alignment can easily be so different to OTL.

Steve
 

stevep

Well-known member
Well there's too many butterflies to count but if we want a good long thick Great War it should be noted then that Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch both did a lot of their work and IIRC met each other through their alma mater of the University of Heidelberg and did their work on the Haber-Bosch Process while the former was the Professor of Chemistry at the University of Karlsruhe, both of which were in Baden-Wurttenburg and then they opened the first Haber-Bosch process plant (that sounds funny) in Baden-Wurttemberg as well since the first chemical company that sponsored and industrialized the process, BASF, was also based in Baden-Wurttemberg.

Baden-Wurttemberg throughout the 19th Century was also rather firmly in the Austrian camp then the Prussian one as well. That changed with the sweep of Germanic patriotism (though they'd always be antagonistic of Prussia and vice versa) with the Franco-Prussian War but if there's a reversal there's little reason to see this go to Austria (and France's) gain in the wake of a French victory in 1870. Plus France (as well as other countries like Norway and the USA etc) had found more expensive alternatives or methodologies of doing something similar to the Haber-Bosch process. There were many skilled French Chemists at the time including Henry Le Chatelier who in fact had some good experiments with often even more explosive results (though that was due to pressure ;)) which may or may not have the same effects it does in OTL.

So excusing other butterflies, the non-British coalition could potentially get amany of the ammonia noms.

Interesting thanks. Sorry I missed this earlier but that could mean that the same people develop the process and/or the French but that its deployed on the anti-Prussian side.
 

stevep

Well-known member
The Spanish forces actually outnumbered the U.S. ones in the Spanish-American War; what actually did the Spanish in was the Cuban and Filipino independence movements and the USN bitch-slapping their squadrons at Manila Bay and Santiago de Cuba -the Spanish ended up recalling the rest of their navy (the more modern parts) in order to protect Spain itself.

I’m not sure what the Carlists’ attitude towards the colonies would be, but unless they’re really good at placating the locals (and given Spain’s track record in dealing with its colonies I wouldn’t bet on that), then it’s a sideshow between the two -historically, the European powers told Spain just to accept the Americans’ demands, but between split public opinion in Cuba and then the Maine exploding, it was too late.

I seriously doubt that a new Spanish-American War would wind up being what spirals into World War I: Whether an empire or a republic, there is no upside to France going to war with the U.S., not to mention they have no staging ground for any worthwhile operations against the U.S. The only country that can do that is Britain, and as @Circle of Willis noted, they aren’t going to support the Carlists. In fact, the U.S. might actually leverage that to get a naval base in Cuba. Which would be...interesting.

As it is, if Bismarck gets fired for incompetence, then Prussia might turn out very differently (I think German unification still happens, but I don’t think it will be as belligerent, especially if Friedrich III manages to get a much more progressive regime in place.

Wouldn’t that be interesting...the militaristic belligerent on the Continent being France. Of course, they probably wouldn’t be able to wreak the havoc Germany did in both wars but still...

I would agree that its unlikely it would trigger a WWI but if France is a lot more powerful and confident with a Rhinese protectorate and related economic development and a Carlist Spain as an ally/puppet it might seek to protect that ally and its interests. After all while the US, barring dramatic butterflies, will have a significantly larger economy by ~1898 if that's when the crisis occurs it still has a relatively weak navy in comparison to France and a puny army. The European powers, other than probably Britain tended to grossly underestimate the US in this time period so Paris could decide that a show of force could make the 'Yankees' back down and it spirals downwards from there. Which if France is distracted could prompts others, most especially Prussia/N Germany [as I suspect there will still be some sort of N German confederation] to seek 'revenge' for 1870.

One other issue just occurred to me which might increase tension between Washington and Paris. Might imperial France be more successful in building a Panama canal in the 1880's than Republican France was? Probably not unless the importance of the mosquito as a disease vector is discovered earlier but if France gets a canal through the isthmus in the 1880's and no doubt a lot of influence in Columbia [as Panama wouldn't exist as an independent state here] that is likely to raise tensions with Washington. It would also make an incentive for France to further develop its colonial possessions in the region to help in defending its interests.

Not saying you would get such a clash but its a possibility and a possible French canal is something that might increase the tensions further.

It might be too late to rescue the more liberal option for Germany as Bismarck had helped the Kaiser bypass the Liberal Parliament in the early 1860's and after a defeat by France it might become more militaristic. However possibly it could cause a crisis that enables liberal reforms. Possibly since I have read that Wilhelm was on the verge of abdicated over the clash with Parliament a defeat in 1870 and following crisis might mean he abdicates then and his more liberal son Frederick III might have more than a few months in power. It could mean a drastic change in Prussia and hence N Germany as a whole. However my gut feeling is that Wilhelm I would dig in, having won considerable successes in the previous wars against Austria and Denmark, and the desire would be a more powerful army rather than increasingly the power of the Parliament over it. How Wilhelm II develops in this case I don't know, although since he's already 10-11 by the POD I fear he would be similar. There would be the wasted arm and also probably tensions with his mother pushing him in similar directions.

Depending on how things go France could become the more militaristic state however. With Napoleon IV coming into power as a young monarch shortly after the 'glorious' victory over Prussia and its German allies you could see a desire for more prestige activities and territorial expansion, even if largely outside Europe. By ~1910 he would be a settled ruler however so might be calmer but if he died say about 1910 and has a son who looks to expand on the dynasties fame, and possibly has been brought up with stories of the 1st Napoleon - suitable tailored probably to overlook his errors and final fall you could have a confident and powerful France with a young emperor looking for ways to demonstrate French power and his own military abilities. Which could be a worrying thing for the rest of Europe, not to mention the world..
 

Circle of Willis

Well-known member
The European powers, other than probably Britain tended to grossly underestimate the US in this time period so Paris could decide that a show of force could make the 'Yankees' back down and it spirals downwards from there. Which if France is distracted could prompts others, most especially Prussia/N Germany [as I suspect there will still be some sort of N German confederation] to seek 'revenge' for 1870.
France I think might be one of the less likely European great powers to underestimate the US, actually: it was one of the greats which had already blinked in a deadly staring contest with Washington in the mid-19th century. Lincoln confronted Napoleon III in the aftermath of the ACW, and warned him to get out of Mexico; Philip Sheridan even led an army of 50,000 to the Mexican border (and covertly supplied the Mexican republicans) to hammer that message home. Napoleon complied that time, resulting in Imperial Mexico falling and Maximilian's execution at the hands of Benito Juarez four months later. It was quite an international embarrassment for France, since they had to go home after getting thousands of their men & a Habsburg royal killed for absolutely nothing in the end.

Whether this bit of history means that France will be more wary about challenging the US in its sphere down the road or actually more inclined to get revenge for causing their Mexican ambitions to fail is entirely up in the air, of course. It's not like they can bring Max back from the dead, but as you suggest there's other roads to get a Franco-American collision such as Panama. I'd imagine it would depend on how threatening the situation back in Europe seem to be for France, Napoleon IV would probably be far more reluctant to antagonize the US if he thinks Britain is going to attack him and/or a Rhenania doesn't exist than in a situation where the inverse is true for example.
 

Buba

A total creep
Excellent point in bringing up the Panama Canal. Nice flashpoint :)
Another possibility - French project wallows in the swamps (i.e. OTL situation) while the USA builds canal through Nicaragua or Costa Rica ...
 
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History Learner

Well-known member
The French Crime of 1873, or Was the International Gold Standard Really Inevitable?
International monetary economics of the nineteenth century is not my strong point, so does anyone here who knows more about it than me want to comment on Marc Flandreau's "The French Crime of 1873: An Essay on the Emergence of the International Gold Standard", Journal of Economic History, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Dec. 1996)? http://www.econ.tcu.edu/quinn/finhist/readings/Flandreau Crime of 1873.pdf (The "Crime of 1873" was of course a term used by Populists to demonize the US decision to demonetize silver in 1873; Flandreau suggests that there was a far more important blow to bimetallism delivered by France that same year.)

Flandreau rejects four conventional explanations for the emergence of the international gold standard in the 1870's. First, the increased production of silver did not make the gold standard inevitable: "the rise was proportionately much smaller than the one that had affected gold after 1848 without determining dramatic changes." Second, Germany's turn to gold in the early 1870's was not in itself decisive: "France would have been able to buffer the impact of Germany's move to gold so that Germany's reform could not by itself trigger the move away from silver." [1] Third, the argument that silver, being bulkier than gold, was less suitable for international transactions is also dismissed: "it is not true that gold strongly dominated silver as an instrument for international transactions." Fourth, the explanation that the bourgeoisie/creditor class as the dominant class in Europe favored the gold standard as a guaranty of stability reads later developments into the early 1870's: "before 1873 the political support in favor of gold was much less homogeneous than what is commonly believed: as a creditor-debtor opposition, it developed after the emergence of the gold standard, not before."

Indeed, Flandreau argues, "far from being preordained for structural, technological, or political reasons, the making of the gold standard was an accident of history." After 1870, the Franco-Prussian War gave Germany the resources necessary to switch to the gold standard. "It also planned to get rid of its demonetized silver through the agency of France's bimetallic system, which had so far acted as a stabilizer of the international monetary system. The French retaliated in suspending silver coinage in an attempt to block Germany's move to gold. But the bulk of legislation adopted in Germany in the early 1870s prohibited such a reversal, and France's decision only provoked the world's flight away from silver. In other words, the emergence of the gold standard was a blatant failure of international cooperation...

"...The collapse of bimetallism after Germany moved to gold was avoidable provided that France be induced to maintain unlimited silver coinage. Does that mean that there was a French crime of 1873, of much more dramatic consequences than the American one? Indeed, French policymakers seemed to underrate the fact that their actions would undermine the credibility of their commitment to bimetallism. Likewise, they clearly overlooked that their moves, by leading to the demise of silver, would have deflationary consequences. However, this was not perceived by the Germans, either. For had German authorities realized it, they should have stepped back, instead of going further. But in the fight for gold that developed in the early 1870s, staying pegged to gold became a matter of national pride. Thus there was a French crime of 1873, but there was a German crime, too..."

So--assuming Flandreau is right--suppose the French realize that their decision to suspend silver coinage will *not* block Germany's move to gold, and *will* undermine bimetallism internationally--and they decide not to do it? (Of course avoiding the Franco-Prussian War could also avoid the switch to the gold standard, but I would prefer not to use that as the POD, because it would have so many other effects.) Effects on the deflation of 1873-1896? (It should be noted that deflation and depression are not necessarily synonymous. In the US there were serious depressions in 1873- 75 and 1893-96 and some lesser depressions in between, but overall the 1873-96 period was one of economic growth.)

There will also of course be effects on the debate on monetary policy in the US, not just because of the effects of less deflation in Europe on the US economy, but also because a common argument used by opponents of free silver here was that almost all the civilized nations of the earth used the gold standard.
 

Buba

A total creep
I've read that somewhere around this time Netherlands went from Bi-metallic Standard to Silver Standard and dumped their gold reserves on the French market. This put some sort of pressure on bi-metallism - the article I read on this went over my head at this point ...
As to the increased supply of gold post-1848 - note that the quantity of gold anually put on the market/into Treasury vaults went from thirtyish tons a year to about 200 tons a year.
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
Britain signed the entente with France [and 1907 with Russia] because of the growing threat and hostility from Berlin. Before that France and Russia were still seen as the primary threats
Actually the threats posed by the French and Russians far outstripped the capabilities of the Germans. It was for this reason why Britain decided to ally with its historic enemies against Germany
 

stevep

Well-known member
Actually the threats posed by the French and Russians far outstripped the capabilities of the Germans. It was for this reason why Britain decided to ally with its historic enemies against Germany

Actually if that had been the case Britain would have been driven to put up with the erratic behaviour of Berlin and seek some sort of agreement with them.

In this period neither France or Russia could seriously threaten the British home islands and even the potential Russia threat to the ME and India was probably overstated. Unless Britain responded to Germany's naval build up - which of course it did - Germany with its large army combined with such a fleet could pose a potentially fatal threat to the country.
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
Actually if that had been the case Britain would have been driven to put up with the erratic behaviour of Berlin and seek some sort of agreement with them.
How so? If anything that would bring France and Russia's attention to Britain instead of away which was the whole point.

In this period neither France or Russia could seriously threaten the British home islands and even the potential Russia threat to the ME and India was probably overstated.
Not the home islands, rather the empire. Overstated, maybe, but still widely believed in the Foreign Office at the time.
 

stevep

Well-known member
How so? If anything that would bring France and Russia's attention to Britain instead of away which was the whole point.

Because Britain was willing to face up to problems at the time, at least in terms of foreign threats. A power or coalition that overwhelmingly dominated the continent was an existential threat to Britain and the government knew it. That's why Britain has virtually always reacted to a single power getting too powerful by opposing it - whether it was Phillip II's Spain., France under Louis XIV or Napoleon or Germany under Wilhelm II or Hitler. I think the only example of things going the other way was the latter stages of Charles II's reign when he made an alliance with Louis XIV against the Dutch. Which was largely because he wanted a French subsidy to make him independent of Parliament, which fortunately failed to occur.

Note that this is a a general policy of powers in Europe in recent centuries. Britain is more famous for it because our island nature and relatively strong economy meant we were able to better resists such potential hegemonic powers than most others.


Not the home islands, rather the empire. Overstated, maybe, but still widely believed in the Foreign Office at the time.

See the above. No point in defending an overseas empire if you lose your homeland.
 

SpicyJuan

Active member
Because Britain was willing to face up to problems at the time, at least in terms of foreign threats
Not by 1904-1907 she wasn’t.
See the above. No point in defending an overseas empire if you lose your homeland.
Germany never posed a threat to Britain’s homeland, much less her colonies. France and Russia however did pose a direct threat to British colonies.

That's why Britain has virtually always reacted to a single power getting too powerful by opposing it
The British knew this policy was untenable by 1914. This is why she backed Russia and France over the Central Powers, although those two sides were already equal: better to be allied with your biggest threats for that way they can be occupied with other powers. Had the British backed the Germans, there is not much the British could have done to help the war effort other than blockade Russia and France. This would not have prevented the French and Russians from steamrolling into Germany and leaving Britain isolated like in the Napoleonic Wars. I’m not saying this WOULD have happened, rather it was the thinning of the time.
 
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ATP

Well-known member
I never understood the British body politik's mass hysterics about Russia somehow being a threat to India ... we have seen how it unfeasible it was, not working even with late 20th century logistics.

Indeed.All Russian could was send some cossack,and what they would achieve there ? It would worked only if local rulers joined them.
 

PsihoKekec

Swashbuckling Accountant
I never understood the British body politik's mass hysterics about Russia somehow being a threat to India ... we have seen how it unfeasible it was, not working even with late 20th century logistics.
Basically, after 1815 the empire needed a new nemesis, since France and Spain were in shambles, with Russia being the only country in the world that could be portrayed in such way without being laughed at by everyone.
 

ATP

Well-known member
Basically, after 1815 the empire needed a new nemesis, since France and Spain were in shambles, with Russia being the only country in the world that could be portrayed in such way without being laughed at by everyone.
And they basically built their next nemesis - Germany - by supporting Prussia in conqering other german states.
 

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