Alternate History WI the US-led Coalition occupying Iraq tried to keep employing most of the Iraqi Army and Administration?

[raharris1973]

WI the US-led Coalition occupying Iraq tried to keep employing most of the Iraqi Army and Administration?

A big critique of the occupation was the decommissioning and laying off of the whole Army, and the de-Baathification process, which may have been a similar process of laying off civil administrators with Baath Party ties (which was probably a broad group because it was probably mandatory for lots of government jobs) and privileging Shia and Kurdish opposition parties.

What if, for stability's sake, the Coalition Provisional Authority/Bremer or the Pentagon if left in charge had tried to keep the Iraqi Army and Administration largely intact, setting Iraqi military members and administrators to work with US personnel and contractors on reconstruction work and an organized demobilization? Of course Saddam and his family would be removed. So would a regime 'inner circle' however defined, and regime members with the most infamous reputations. Perhaps everyone on the DoD's most-wanted deck of cards would be disqualified from power, but everybody else would have an opportunity for promotion. Most-wanted Iraqi playing cards - Wikipedia. Or even just a subset of the deck of cards, maybe just the "face cards". Political prisoners would be released and political prisons would be shut down (except for now housing whatever former regime inner circle goes there, and any al-qaeda related terrorists who end up being found or old school guys from the 80s who end up being found like Abu Nidal or Abul Abbas). The opposition parties, ethnosectarian and non-ethnosectarian, would all be allowed to participate.

Would the US have found a broad, critical, or overwhelming mass of takers for this collaboration offer to the mid and working level of the Baathist Army, Administration, deep state? Or would a broad, critical, or overwhelming mass of those personnel have chosen to play violent resister or spoiler or insurgent, for reasons of pride, patriotism, self-interest, delusions/ambitions of negotiating or dictating a better deal? That is why I posed the question, what if the USA "tried", because proponents of this course of action and critics of the US 'mistake' in abolishing Iraqi state institutions seem to take it for granted that members of these institutions would have just accepted any deal offered by the US. I'm not sure that assumption is warranted. But maybe it would have been the best US bet in the circumstances the US had itself in by March-April 2003.

Anyway, how do you see the occupation, establishment of next Iraqi government, turnover of authority, any insurgent activity, and any US withdrawal or permanent relationship (involving basing or not) evolve with the US taking the approach described here? Does it make Iraq a notably quieter, less lethal place for US forces?

Does George W. Bush ride such quiet to deeper and longer political success? Does he squander the quiet in Iraq, by using that simply as a platform for launching an invasion of Iran or Syria in his second or remaining years of first term?

 

[stevep]

WI the US-led Coalition occupying Iraq tried to keep employing most of the Iraqi Army and Administration?

A big critique of the occupation was the decommissioning and laying off of the whole Army, and the de-Baathification process, which may have been a similar process of laying off civil administrators with Baath Party ties (which was probably a broad group because it was probably mandatory for lots of government jobs) and privileging Shia and Kurdish opposition parties.

What if, for stability's sake, the Coalition Provisional Authority/Bremer or the Pentagon if left in charge had tried to keep the Iraqi Army and Administration largely intact, setting Iraqi military members and administrators to work with US personnel and contractors on reconstruction work and an organized demobilization? Of course Saddam and his family would be removed. So would a regime 'inner circle' however defined, and regime members with the most infamous reputations. Perhaps everyone on the DoD's most-wanted deck of cards would be disqualified from power, but everybody else would have an opportunity for promotion. Most-wanted Iraqi playing cards - Wikipedia. Or even just a subset of the deck of cards, maybe just the "face cards". Political prisoners would be released and political prisons would be shut down (except for now housing whatever former regime inner circle goes there, and any al-qaeda related terrorists who end up being found or old school guys from the 80s who end up being found like Abu Nidal or Abul Abbas). The opposition parties, ethnosectarian and non-ethnosectarian, would all be allowed to participate.

Would the US have found a broad, critical, or overwhelming mass of takers for this collaboration offer to the mid and working level of the Baathist Army, Administration, deep state? Or would a broad, critical, or overwhelming mass of those personnel have chosen to play violent resister or spoiler or insurgent, for reasons of pride, patriotism, self-interest, delusions/ambitions of negotiating or dictating a better deal? That is why I posed the question, what if the USA "tried", because proponents of this course of action and critics of the US 'mistake' in abolishing Iraqi state institutions seem to take it for granted that members of these institutions would have just accepted any deal offered by the US. I'm not sure that assumption is warranted. But maybe it would have been the best US bet in the circumstances the US had itself in by March-April 2003.

Anyway, how do you see the occupation, establishment of next Iraqi government, turnover of authority, any insurgent activity, and any US withdrawal or permanent relationship (involving basing or not) evolve with the US taking the approach described here? Does it make Iraq a notably quieter, less lethal place for US forces?

Does George W. Bush ride such quiet to deeper and longer political success? Does he squander the quiet in Iraq, by using that simply as a platform for launching an invasion of Iran or Syria in his second or remaining years of first term?

It would have to be done carefully but I think would have a much better chance of getting a reasonably stable Iraq than OTL. You don't have the alienation of the people with most military and civilian experience of running the country because their been effectively made outcasts in their own country.

You would still need to remove the worst of the crooks and murderers and also would need to make sure that the Shia's and Kurds weren't excluded from government but its likely to make a Sunni resistance a lot less powerful because so many more people have an interest in the new regime. Going to be difficult juggling those interests and assorted other ones but a better hope for a lasting peace than OTL. Also, as long as you don't go too far with it and alienate the Iraqi Shia majority, it gives a common interest in resisting the threat from the clerical regime in Iran which could be a unifying factor.

There is the danger that having 'won' more decisively in Iraq W could look to further adventures, of which Syria or Iran could be obvious options.

 

[raharris1973]

When and how is this seeming 'better' to the American public than OTL? How is it affecting the Democratic primary and 2004 election? When is Saddam found? The embarrassment of finding no active WMD program or WMD stockpile is still there. Importantly, without a stressing insurgency blowing up in Iraq in '04 and 2nd term, what alternate foreign policy moves does Bush-Cheney make vs. Axis of Evil?

 

[stevep]

When and how is this seeming 'better' to the American public than OTL? How is it affecting the Democratic primary and 2004 election? When is Saddam found? The embarrassment of finding no active WMD program or WMD stockpile is still there. Importantly, without a stressing insurgency blowing up in Iraq in '04 and 2nd term, what alternate foreign policy moves does Bush-Cheney make vs. Axis of Evil?

Well, while it might be a target for opponents of the current President - although that might be more rival Republicans than Democrats in this scenario - as being 'soft' on the Iraqis it does have considerable advantages in removing a lot of people from the opposition. Quite likely that Saddam gets pointed out by a former party or army member as they will know more about where he might be hiding and it would given them distinct brownie points with both the US and the new government in Iraq.

The fact that many people - including myself - were tricked into supporting the occupation by false reports of a WMD programme and threats to - in my case British people and territory - which didn't exist will come back to bite those responsible at some stage. However its likely to be fairly trivial if Iraq is markedly less of a cluster-f**k than OTL. Although note I say if. Still plenty of opportunity for Bush and his cohorts to screw things up badly while a settlement which is possibly more favourable to the Arab Sunni minority risks more problems with the Kurds and the Shia majority.

 

[lordhen]

WI the US-led Coalition occupying Iraq tried to keep employing most of the Iraqi Army and Administration?

The once that are clean of course of crimes against their people during the regime, if that is possible.

 

[49ersfootball]

WI the US-led Coalition occupying Iraq tried to keep employing most of the Iraqi Army and Administration?

A big critique of the occupation was the decommissioning and laying off of the whole Army, and the de-Baathification process, which may have been a similar process of laying off civil administrators with Baath Party ties (which was probably a broad group because it was probably mandatory for lots of government jobs) and privileging Shia and Kurdish opposition parties.

What if, for stability's sake, the Coalition Provisional Authority/Bremer or the Pentagon if left in charge had tried to keep the Iraqi Army and Administration largely intact, setting Iraqi military members and administrators to work with US personnel and contractors on reconstruction work and an organized demobilization? Of course Saddam and his family would be removed. So would a regime 'inner circle' however defined, and regime members with the most infamous reputations. Perhaps everyone on the DoD's most-wanted deck of cards would be disqualified from power, but everybody else would have an opportunity for promotion. Most-wanted Iraqi playing cards - Wikipedia. Or even just a subset of the deck of cards, maybe just the "face cards". Political prisoners would be released and political prisons would be shut down (except for now housing whatever former regime inner circle goes there, and any al-qaeda related terrorists who end up being found or old school guys from the 80s who end up being found like Abu Nidal or Abul Abbas). The opposition parties, ethnosectarian and non-ethnosectarian, would all be allowed to participate.

Would the US have found a broad, critical, or overwhelming mass of takers for this collaboration offer to the mid and working level of the Baathist Army, Administration, deep state? Or would a broad, critical, or overwhelming mass of those personnel have chosen to play violent resister or spoiler or insurgent, for reasons of pride, patriotism, self-interest, delusions/ambitions of negotiating or dictating a better deal? That is why I posed the question, what if the USA "tried", because proponents of this course of action and critics of the US 'mistake' in abolishing Iraqi state institutions seem to take it for granted that members of these institutions would have just accepted any deal offered by the US. I'm not sure that assumption is warranted. But maybe it would have been the best US bet in the circumstances the US had itself in by March-April 2003.

Anyway, how do you see the occupation, establishment of next Iraqi government, turnover of authority, any insurgent activity, and any US withdrawal or permanent relationship (involving basing or not) evolve with the US taking the approach described here? Does it make Iraq a notably quieter, less lethal place for US forces?

Does George W. Bush ride such quiet to deeper and longer political success? Does he squander the quiet in Iraq, by using that simply as a platform for launching an invasion of Iran or Syria in his second or remaining years of first term?

Now that's a good question & very intriguing TL to go into full detail.