With a German-British Entente or Alliance in the early 20th century would France-Russia ever dare attack them?

[raharris1973]

Here's the set up: By any point from 1892 or so onward, there is an informal but effective Anglo-German Entente understood to be in existence by both of them and third parties, that lasts well into the early 20th century. (the model here is the OTL Entente Cordiale or Triple Entente and associated naval understandings and implied commitments). Alternatively, there is an actual Anglo-German alliance, with terms pretty much matching the Anglo-Japanese alliance of OTL (not a guarantee of support for every one-on-one war, but a promise to provide support against a second power).

If this Anglo-German combination existed, would the Franco-Russian alliance ever dare provoke a war with it, or judge it too powerful to fight? The attached poll is on this question.

If the Franco-Russians measure by industrial production, wealth, and trade ties, they could be deterred/intimidated, but if they judge on troops numbers they could end up believing they have an advantage.

But the question I am polling on isn't the only question. Armed with alliance in their diplomatic arsenal, what types of foreign policies would Britain and Germany pursue? What ambitions if any, would they pursue with war, and against whom? Just campaigns against the usual WOGs sitting on desirable resources in Africa, Asia, or the Pacific? Or would Britain, having German support, take a hard line on all colonial questions against France or America? Would Germany, with British support, begin blatantly bullying its continental neighbors, making economics, security, territorial demands?

 

[sillygoose]

IOTL it is said that had certain leaders in the British cabinet told the Franco-Russians that they wouldn't back them in the war there would have been no WW1. So since this POD is basically ensuring Britain would not back them at all there would be no world war.

 

[Skallagrim]

I say 'yes', but it would presumably have to be a move born of desperation. Scenarios where that comes to pass are conceivable. The fact is, most scenarios where a Great War still occurs in this scenario would see the Anglo-British camp instigate the conflict, because they'd know they have the better chances. But because the Franco-Russian camp knows that, too, they may jump at a perceived chance to start a war on favourable terms. (So... desperation. They wouldn't ordinarily do it, but since they expect war to come anyway, and since they're convinced they'll lose if the enemy gets to start it on their terms, they decide to throw the first punch and pray for a lucky knock-out.)

Alternatively, the war may just be delayed, in which case Russia will have time to build up its population and industry. As I've often argued, communism is a disaster for any country on which it is inflicted. World War I was, obviously, also a disaster for Russia. So if there's no war at that time, and thus no communism, you can simply extrapolate pre-war trends, and then you reach the inevitable conclusion that the Russian Empire is going to be really powerful. If the war is delayed until the late 20s/early 30s or so, then Franco-Russian aggression becomes viable again. (More accurately: Russian aggression, with France as a hanger-on.) By this point, the Germans in particular would grudually have moved towards desperation, and the Russians would have grown increasingly confident. So then the "instigating potential" as I outlined in my first paragraph actually ends up getting flipped.

Of course, a lot depends on the details. As far as alliances go, flipping Britain to the German camp means that it becomes highly improbable for Italy to join the Franco-Russian side. Portugal is also going to side with the camp Britain is in, for what that's worth. So that does a bit to weaken the Franco-Russians and strengthen the Anglo-Germans. More importantly, Anglo-German alliance makes it vanishingly unlikely that the USA is going to get involved.

The big question mark is, obviously, the Ottoman Empire. Their role in this depends on whether the Germans throw them under the bus to serve British ambitions, or the British agree to curb certain ambitions to broaden their alliance. If the Germans drop the Ottomans to appease the British desire to dismember the Ottomans and (essentially) vassalise Arabia, then we'll get the allohistorical shocker of Russian-Ottoman rapprochement and subsequent entente. If the British agree to flip their position concerning the Ottomans, then the Franco-Russians are really, really isolated. But either way, the Anglo-German side will win any Great War that happens even vaguely on schedule. Once we get to the point that the ATL war becomes more of a stand-in for World War II, Tsarist Russia will have developed to such an extent that it can do anything Stalin did, but about two times better. (Since they'll havea much larger population -- much of it at fighting age -- and a booming, expanding economy.)

In short: as always, timing is everything.

 

[Earl]

then we'll get the allohistorical shocker of Russian-Ottoman rapprochement and subsequent entente

Im now imagining the Czars looking at that letter from Pete the Great telling them to go forth and conquer Constantinople and going "Yeah, lets put this in the closet shall we"

 

[WolfBear]

Maybe in or after 1940, but probably not beforehand. Russian power would really have to bloom and blossom before the Franco-Russians would actually be willing to consider doing this. In such an alt-WWI, Russia's main hope would be to initially focus most of its forces on Germany and A-H in the hope of crushing them with an overwhelming blow (a Russian Schlieffen-style plan, if you will) while playing defense elsewhere and only going on the offensive elsewhere after Germany and A-H are both decisively crushed and defeated. But if the Franco-Russians will fail to quickly crush and defeat Germany and A-H up to the point that Germany and A-H are actually knocked out of the war, then the Franco-Russians' position will become much more vulnerable as the war progresses and British and Imperial British troops arrive in Europe in ever greater numbers.

 

[Skallagrim]

Maybe in or after 1940, but probably not beforehand. Russian power would really have to bloom and blossom before the Franco-Russians would actually be willing to consider doing this. In such an alt-WWI, Russia's main hope would be to initially focus most of its forces on Germany and A-H in the hope of crushing them with an overwhelming blow (a Russian Schlieffen-style plan, if you will) while playing defense elsewhere and only going on the offensive elsewhere after Germany and A-H are both decisively crushed and defeated. But if the Franco-Russians will fail to quickly crush and defeat Germany and A-H up to the point that Germany and A-H are actually knocked out of the war, then the Franco-Russians' position will become much more vulnerable as the war progresses and British and Imperial British troops arrive in Europe in ever greater numbers.

I don't automatically agree that it would take this long for "Russian aggression" to become a viable scenario. It depends on a few factors, and (I think) most particularly on which side the Ottoman Empire joins.

If we look at the OTL pre-Great War economic and demographic trends for Russia, we can see where it's all going. The best comparison for Russia is, as I've occasionally argued, the USA. Both are vast countries that have, in stages, gobbled up vast tracts of under-developed "back yard" (in the West and East, respectively). Their frontier lands are uder-developed, but the countries themselves are devoping swiftly -- more s than many observers realise at the time.

Circa 1900, Russia is about 10 million people behind the USA, demographically. When we consider how rapidly industrialisation goes, they're about 20 years behind the USA around that time. (Which checks out, when we see what they ultimately achieved in OTL, even under such a deletrious system as communism.)

On the eve of World War II, Russia is more like 25 million people behind the USA, demographically, and its degree of industrialisation is lagging further behind, rather than keeping pace. By the time the USSR finally, groaningly, collapses into a scrap-heap, Russia is over 100 million people behind the USA, demographically. And when we look at the economy and the industry that the Soviet period left behind... well, the less said about that, the better.

Given these numbers, and OTL trends, I'd say that by 1930 or so, we'd have about 125 million Russians (as opposed to roughly 100 million around that time in OTL), and much of that population would be young and fighting age. To compare: Germany had c. 65 million inhabitants at the time, but without the Great War and its aftermath, I'd expect that to be closer to 75 million around 1930 (going by the observed trends). That's, uh... that's a 50 million man difference.

Of course, Britain's rather vast Empire is going to outweigh France in this equation. But I don't see Austria-Hungary reforming to become a powerhouse, really. Italy, as mentioned, will be nominally on the Anglo-German side, but do you see that materialising into much concrete action?

This is why I called the Ottomans the "Big Question Mark". If they are on the Anglo-German side, they can drive a dagger right into Russia's belly. By this point, the ATL surviving Ottomans will be so oil-rich that they can afford to build up considerable infrastructure, a high-end national education system (vital for national development!) and considerable industry (because infrastructure + educated population + loads of investments available = good things happen). I'll readily agree that if this is the case, Russia will not be ready to fight such a broad coalition by 1930.

However, if the Ottomans instead side with the Franco-Russians (presumably because the British remain a threat to the Ottomans, and the Germans decide they prefer a British alliance), then things are different. The Russian flank is now well-guarded, and the British have an additional opponent that they'd like to focus on. And a war against a much more developed Ottoman Empire won't be easy; it'll take a load of British resources. This means any BEF in Europe is likely to be mostly a force to invade France, more-or-less taking the pressure of Germany in the West. And in the meantime (when it comes down to it), the Germans are duking it out with the Russians. I don't see the Germans winning that fight, given the premises as outlined. so in this scenario, I stand by my position that the Russians could well favour war c. 1930, because they'd -- reasonably -- expect to win.

 

[raharris1973]

But I don't see Austria-Hungary reforming to become a powerhouse, really.

In 1914 it was the fastest growing economy in Europe, and on track to get bigger than France, and starting to correct its miliitary underspending problem.

 

[Skallagrim]

In 1914 it was the fastest growing economy in Europe, and on track to get bigger than France, and starting to correct its miliitary underspending problem.

In the context of my post, 'powerhouse' refers to 'military powerhouse'. Austria-Hungary, in the absence of the Great War, had a bright economic future ahead of it. Its relatively small government and the existence of Austrian economics were clear positives. (It should be noted that the economic 'Austrians' were not the rigid AnCaps that many of their modern-day admirers are, and often had roles in the government bureaucracy -- which they helped reform and improve.)

On the other hand, the empire was politically grid-locked, and I don't see easy ways out. In a way, this ties positively into the above: the grid-lock utterly prevented any kind of ambitious plans to expand governmental power, which is without question a Very Good Thing for the economy. On the flip-side, it also prevents the government from doing anything that would strengthen the empire in non-economic ways.

I can see the military improving, certainly, if only because a booming economy just ensures that more money is going to be available across the board -- so also for military spending. It also helps that the Austrian School economists (again, not actually being AnCaps) actually supported an increase in military spending. However... I'm not expecting miracles. The multi-ethnic empire really was a mess, and getting any real reform done (e.g. military reform) would require that first, the fundamental issue of the empire's structure be addressed.

Simply put: either the Hungarians get kicked in the nuts, and a proper hard kick, too... or they'll hold the empire hostage forever. The supposed "renegotiations" that are occasionally touted in AH are much overblown. For my money, the empire was looking at decades of discontent, with successive attempts at reform being a long process of trial and error, and with the Hungarians slowly being worn down (perhaps even revlting a time or two), before things could be set in order.

Economic prosperity would help, but it's not a panacea that can fix institutional stagnation and internal frustrations and rivalries. In fact, looking at the prevailing attitudes in the empire, I'd expect growing wealth to be used to buy off a local elites who might otherwise make trouble. That avenue would keep things moslly functioning, while reforms are introduced piecemeal, as a result of lots and lots of rounds of back-room dealing.

In summary: Austria-Hungary may well be a wealthy empire in this scenario, but I don't expect it to be an empire that's going to project a lot of military power. (Nor would it particlarly desire to be such an empire, I think.)

 

[WolfBear]

I don't automatically agree that it would take this long for "Russian aggression" to become a viable scenario. It depends on a few factors, and (I think) most particularly on which side the Ottoman Empire joins.

If we look at the OTL pre-Great War economic and demographic trends for Russia, we can see where it's all going. The best comparison for Russia is, as I've occasionally argued, the USA. Both are vast countries that have, in stages, gobbled up vast tracts of under-developed "back yard" (in the West and East, respectively). Their frontier lands are uder-developed, but the countries themselves are devoping swiftly -- more s than many observers realise at the time.

Circa 1900, Russia is about 10 million people behind the USA, demographically. When we consider how rapidly industrialisation goes, they're about 20 years behind the USA around that time. (Which checks out, when we see what they ultimately achieved in OTL, even under such a deletrious system as communism.)

On the eve of World War II, Russia is more like 25 million people behind the USA, demographically, and its degree of industrialisation is lagging further behind, rather than keeping pace. By the time the USSR finally, groaningly, collapses into a scrap-heap, Russia is over 100 million people behind the USA, demographically. And when we look at the economy and the industry that the Soviet period left behind... well, the less said about that, the better.

Given these numbers, and OTL trends, I'd say that by 1930 or so, we'd have about 125 million Russians (as opposed to roughly 100 million around that time in OTL), and much of that population would be young and fighting age. To compare: Germany had c. 65 million inhabitants at the time, but without the Great War and its aftermath, I'd expect that to be closer to 75 million around 1930 (going by the observed trends). That's, uh... that's a 50 million man difference.

Of course, Britain's rather vast Empire is going to outweigh France in this equation. But I don't see Austria-Hungary reforming to become a powerhouse, really. Italy, as mentioned, will be nominally on the Anglo-German side, but do you see that materialising into much concrete action?

This is why I called the Ottomans the "Big Question Mark". If they are on the Anglo-German side, they can drive a dagger right into Russia's belly. By this point, the ATL surviving Ottomans will be so oil-rich that they can afford to build up considerable infrastructure, a high-end national education system (vital for national development!) and considerable industry (because infrastructure + educated population + loads of investments available = good things happen). I'll readily agree that if this is the case, Russia will not be ready to fight such a broad coalition by 1930.

However, if the Ottomans instead side with the Franco-Russians (presumably because the British remain a threat to the Ottomans, and the Germans decide they prefer a British alliance), then things are different. The Russian flank is now well-guarded, and the British have an additional opponent that they'd like to focus on. And a war against a much more developed Ottoman Empire won't be easy; it'll take a load of British resources. This means any BEF in Europe is likely to be mostly a force to invade France, more-or-less taking the pressure of Germany in the West. And in the meantime (when it comes down to it), the Germans are duking it out with the Russians. I don't see the Germans winning that fight, given the premises as outlined. so in this scenario, I stand by my position that the Russians could well favour war c. 1930, because they'd -- reasonably -- expect to win.

Are the Ottomans going to be sufficiently strong by 1930 to think that they are going to be capable of deterring the Franco-Russians by themselves in the event that the Franco-Russians will ever decide to attack them in spite of them nominally being allied to them? If they are, though, then I wonder what they will demand in exchange for a Franco-Russian alliance. Expansion into Persian Khuzestan? The liberation of Egypt from British rule? Franco-Russian support for expansion into the Arabian Peninsula?

 

[Skallagrim]

Are the Ottomans going to be sufficiently strong by 1930 to think that they are going to be capable of deterring the Franco-Russians by themselves in the event that the Franco-Russians will ever decide to attack them in spite of them nominally being allied to them? If they are, though, then I wonder what they will demand in exchange for a Franco-Russian alliance. Expansion into Persian Khuzestan? The liberation of Egypt from British rule? Franco-Russian support for expansion into the Arabian Peninsula?

If the Ottomans survive and thrive, they won't really need help in securing more-or-less effective control over the Arabian peninsula. Control over the Suez will be an obvious aim for them. They'd also want Cyprus back from the British.

Designs on Persia are presumably a longer-term matter, but their interests may co-incide with those of Russia there.[*] Khuzestan would be the primary target for land-grabbing, followed by Persian Kurdistan and Qeshm Island (to control the Strait of Hormuz).


[*] Russia would probably be interested in grabbing (parts of) Northern Persia, and if they're already allied with the Ottomans, a team-up makes sense. France may even get in on the action, grab some coastal ports. Of course, this is presuming that they've indeed prevailed in the ATL Great War.

 

[WolfBear]

If the Ottomans survive and thrive, they won't really need help in securing more-or-less effective control over the Arabian peninsula. Control over the Suez will be an obvious aim for them. They'd also want Cyprus back from the British.

Designs on Persia are presumably a longer-term matter, but their interests my co-incide with those of Russia there. Khuzestan would be the primary target for land-grabbing, followed by Persian Kurdistan and Qeshm Island (to control the Strait of Hormuz).

Interesting. Care to post a map on how you think a Russo-Ottoman partition of Persia will look like? Indeed, could we even see a Franco-Russo-Ottoman vs. British war over the question of partitioning Persia?

 

[raharris1973]

More importantly, Anglo-German alliance makes it vanishingly unlikely that the USA is going to get involved.

Unlikely to get on the Franco-Russian side against the Anglo-German? Or unlikely to get on any side at all?

 

[WolfBear]

Unlikely to get on the Franco-Russian side against the Anglo-German? Or unlikely to get on any side at all?

If the French and/or Russians ever decide to launch USW against the Americans, that could bring the US into the war, but I don't know just how likely that is. Still, this is actually what happened in one TL:

Up With the Star: A different kind of Civil War ATL:

Thanks for the update. Perhaps just a list is needed to start with, names and year admitted. A different settlement pattern, that sounds interesting? Does Oklahoma or what is Oklahoma OTL become a state sooner? A Deseret instead of Utah would be great. If I can make a request, can there be an...

www.alternatehistory.com

• Mar 25, 2011
• #258

Snake Featherston
Banned
November 1917:

"Let it not be said that the wars of the Old World are unnoticed in the New. Instead, let it be said that with a common spirit as our boys depart to serve with their Germanic brethren that we find a common unity in language, in soul, and in martial spirit-" President Robert La Follette in the speech asking for a declaration of War on the Allies.

The story of how US entry into the Great War happened is a complex one. As the Central Powers had begun to shift noticeably to the victorious side, with Russia facing multiplying challenges in distant wars in and around Afghanistan and in Kamchatka and the costly and bitter battles against Germany, and as Austria began to experience anew stirs of Hungarian nationalism in the wake of promises by the Central Powers to treat the Hungarians with more independence than the Habsburgs had done, the USA had for the first part of the Great War pursued a cautious neutrality.

US leaders, while building up the Army to match an existing Naval build-up were aware that if they were to back the losing side, the military situation in the United States could be quite uncomfortable, and so for the first time in peacetime the USA built a large standing military. Complications over what this would mean for the Colored Caste delayed the build-up for a few months, but Southern politicians gritted their teeth and accepted the increased numbers in the Caste, a few smarter ones in the Deep South recognizing benefits in terms of new, loyal constituencies that could ensure locks on the governor's offices.

Too, the legacy of the USA's ties by language to Britain and the cultural memory of Baron von Steuben, who assumed an increasingly powerful and poignant role in propaganda by pro-Central Powers interventionists, as well as the powerful lure of commercial ties to the Central Powers and recognizing the potential naval threat to the Philippines and elsewhere posed by the Royal Navy and the Germans and the Japanese helped bring the USA to favor the Central Powers.

Recognition of this fact convinced a French submarine commander, who was quite overzealous to torpedo an American ship with the new French ambassador (the old one recalled after a minor scandal) on it, the shooting accidental but a sufficient cause of outrage for the USA to break off diplomatic recognition with France.

Claims of a "Germanic conspiracy" triggered an emotional declaration of war by the French Prime Minister, delivered in the name of Emperor Napoleon IV, and so the Central Powers would gain a new ally who would provide stronger naval weight and even more manpower to bring to bear against their enemies, always a help as while the Allies were weakened by losses and the ever-multiplying fronts, weakened was a far cry from crippled as several new Allied offensives would show....