WI: German-Soviet Peace, 1943

[stevep]

Yes, as noted by Weinberg, both Goebbels and Ribbentrop were and there was hope of a restoration of the trade deals that preceded the invasion; Weinberg indicates Stalin was open to such. In terms of knowing how much of an effect Lend Lease would have on the Soviets? Probably not, but that isn't really a mark against this given they were in favor of it without said knowledge.

Well that could be interesting. Possibly Stalin might make such a deal but whether he would keep it and for how long? It would still be a drop in what they could expect from looting the region I suspect and this time around it might be Stalin dragging his feet on deliveries instead of the Germans. Plus how much would Germany lose in material send to the Soviets? - Assuming that it would be a two sided deal like the initial one with items going both ways.

The whole Lend Lease period.

OK thanks for clarifying.

The U.S. Army studied both options and rejected them upon logistical grounds, citing the lack of sufficient railways and roadways to support an advance through the Balkans as well as the highly defensive terrain and long distance from Germany comparative to France. Given France is on the North European Plain, allowing for a decisive armored advance upon Germany, while the Balkans isn't, proved to be another point in their favor.

Germany committed a few divisions to Greece in response to American deception operations, but by 1943 had come to the same conclusion as the Americans the landings would come in France too; France thus always constituted the majority of the German focus too. As for Italy, given what ended up happening there with actual Allied invasion, that can't really be held against them I would argue.

That's if your assuming a medium sized force advancing into Germany in co-operating with the Soviets coming in from the east. If the latter is lacking and your not willing to commit a larger army then you consider what you can do with that force. In that case the Balkans can be attractive for the reasons you mention. The Germans will have difficulty responding due to the poor logistics, especially in face of allied air superiority. Plus you can do considerable harm to the Nazi empire here, especially if your able to close down much of the Danube for enemy shipping.

Its basically common sense if you decide you can't take on the core of the enemy army in terrain that favours them so you fight them where they can't concentrate their main strength.

American planners were right to call it a road to nowhere, precisely because it meant that, even if they achieved a successful landing, it precluded any advance on Germany because of the same logistical limitations, making it a repeat of the Salonica Front of WWI. On the flipside, it also removes any chance of shutting down the Rhine River that occurred in late 1944 thanks to Allied air power operating from France and precludes the cutting off of Swedish Iron Ore deposits that happened due to diplomatic pressure at the same time.

The Rhine is a non issue as its not an option in this scenario anyway.

It was also, again, Logistics. Italy's coastline is long, but ports and landing sites are few and viable logistics points in terms of roadways and railways are too. Why did Anzio fail? Logistics.

Which makes for potential for a side with [and willing to use] naval superiority has opportunities to isolate and destroy enemy units.

On which side?

Sorry wasn't clear here. It will hit US prestige and probably cause some division. Also if their turning their back on Europe not only does that mean future lost economic opportunities but also their likely to end up fighting Japan even more, most especially getting to a full scale invasion as neither the B-29 with mods to its use for carpet bombing of Japanese cities nor nuclear weapons going to be available in time.

Such had already occurred, but even then the entire reason the UK turned over Tube Alloys is because they had come to the conclusion they could not complete the project on their own in a relevant timeframe; this was confirmed by them not achieving nuclear capability until the 1950s.

Actually not. I was referring to the US freezing Britain out of access to resources/knowledge after 45. In this scenario its quite possible the joint project will continue until completion as OTL and then the US will see the merits of not freezing out the UK. [Since that could be an easy way for the US to see the Nazi issue resolved without being committed themselves.]

How quickly Britain could complete a nuclear weapon of its own, whether or not the US cut us out or not would depend on circumstances but it could easily be a few years earlier than OTL.

The Soviets explicitly did kill on the basis of racial identity and accusations of Pro-German sympathies of the groups in question are baseless:

The deportation was prepared from at least October 1943 and 19,000 officers as well as 100,000 NKVD soldiers from all over the USSR participated in this operation. The deportation encompassed their entire nations, as well as the liquidation of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The demographic consequences of this eviction were catastrophic and far reaching: of the (according to Soviet archives; Chechen sources put the deportees at 650,000[1]) 496,000 Chechens and Ingush who were deported, at least a quarter perished. In total, the archive records show that over a hundred thousand people died or were killed during the round-ups and transportation, and during their early years in exile in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSR as well as Russian SFSR where they were sent to the many labor camps in the forced settlements. Chechen sources claim that 400,000 perished presuming a higher number of deportees.[1] Chechens suffered a higher proportional loss of life than any other ethnic group persecuted by population transfer in the Soviet Union.[4] Chechens were under administrative supervision of the NKVD officials during that entire time.​

The European Parliament in 2004 likewise recognized it as a genocide.

As I said deportation rather than deliberate genocide. If it had been the latter then none of either group would have survived into the 1950's say. Brutal and barbaric but not genocide in terms of intend or outcome.

Steve

 

[History Learner]

@sillygoose I figured you might want to give this a read and comment on it, given your recent threads.

 

[sillygoose]

@sillygoose I figured you might want to give this a read and comment on it, given your recent threads.

In terms of the OP I thought that since the 1970s it was known that the negotiations were not serious on the Soviet side and were bluff to get the Wallies to open that 2nd front ASAP.

Perhaps you're right though that Hitler being out of the picture would change everything if Stalin then could get what he wanted without paying the blood price for restoration of the 1941 border and ensure that the betrayer of their previous deals wasn't in charge anymore. Of course it could also be that Stalin used it as a demoralizing bluff to play the Germans and discredit the peace party. Assuming though that Stalin did cut a deal then the Wallies probably have to cut a deal themselves and IIRC were planning to if Stalin was out of the picture.

As far as the scope of such a deal, as Weinberg notes, the Soviets were open to a new deal on the basis of the 1939-1941 agreements, including the economic ones. They had even proposed such, in undefined terms, to Himmler's SS envoy in 1943-1944. The Germans could rest easy knowing that the Soviets would take years to rebuild and that, by making the deal with them, the Soviets would sunder their relationship with the Anglo-Americans, cutting off Lend Lease supplies so vital to maintaining the Red Army's mobility and logistics. Even if it didn't, based on their own experience, it would take at least a year of preparation for the Soviets to backstab the Germans from the 1941 borders, meaning they would have ample time to prepare for such.

This book by the guy who claims to have organized the 1941-2 peace feelers said they were never serious offers:

Special tasks : Pavel Sudoplatov : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

archive.org

 

[ATP]

In terms of the OP I thought that since the 1970s it was known that the negotiations were not serious on the Soviet side and were bluff to get the Wallies to open that 2nd front ASAP.

Perhaps you're right though that Hitler being out of the picture would change everything if Stalin then could get what he wanted without paying the blood price for restoration of the 1941 border and ensure that the betrayer of their previous deals wasn't in charge anymore. Of course it could also be that Stalin used it as a demoralizing bluff to play the Germans and discredit the peace party. Assuming though that Stalin did cut a deal then the Wallies probably have to cut a deal themselves and IIRC were planning to if Stalin was out of the picture.


This book by the guy who claims to have organized the 1941-2 peace feelers said they were never serious offers:

Special tasks : Pavel Sudoplatov : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

archive.org

One world of advise - never belive what commie say,but look what they really did.They practically always lied,but their actions speak about their goals.
Here we have situation when they talk with germans till 1943,which means that till 1943 they belived that cutting deal with Hitler was viable option.
And memories of soviet officials ? they always change to agree with official version of ruling party.Unless you find real version,do not bother with reading them.

 

[sillygoose]

One world of advise - never belive what commie say,but look what they really did.They practically always lied,but their actions speak about their goals.
Here we have situation when they talk with germans till 1943,which means that till 1943 they belived that cutting deal with Hitler was viable option.
And memories of soviet officials ? they always change to agree with official version of ruling party.Unless you find real version,do not bother with reading them.

I don't disagree that the claims shouldn't be taken at face value, however I don't necessarily think peace negotiations are necessarily honest either, so just offering something in 1943 doesn't mean they were serious about making a deal. Especially when they were trying to leverage their position within their alliance.

 

[ATP]

I don't disagree that the claims shouldn't be taken at face value, however I don't necessarily think peace negotiations are necessarily honest either, so just offering something in 1943 doesn't mean they were serious about making a deal. Especially when they were trying to leverage their position within their alliance.

Of course.But remember,that soviets planned backstab Hitler from 1939,only he was faster,and that Stalin planned backstab Allies ,but was killed before ha had chance.
That is soviet politics for you - first choose those who gave more,kill with them competitor,and then backsatb them.
Difference between them and old Empires - old empires usually keep promises for long time.
For example - when Russia and Prussia destroyed Poland in 1795,they keep their bargain till 1914.When soviets and germans destroyed Poland in 1939,they start fighting in 1941.

 

[History Learner]

In terms of the OP I thought that since the 1970s it was known that the negotiations were not serious on the Soviet side and were bluff to get the Wallies to open that 2nd front ASAP.

Perhaps you're right though that Hitler being out of the picture would change everything if Stalin then could get what he wanted without paying the blood price for restoration of the 1941 border and ensure that the betrayer of their previous deals wasn't in charge anymore. Of course it could also be that Stalin used it as a demoralizing bluff to play the Germans and discredit the peace party. Assuming though that Stalin did cut a deal then the Wallies probably have to cut a deal themselves and IIRC were planning to if Stalin was out of the picture.

Weinberg and others have pointed out evidence that suggests there was serious interest on the Soviet side, in particular through discussions with the Japanese and the like. I'm inclined to believe its true as the contacts with German agents, with ample supporting documentations, extended into 1944; at that point, they had nothing to gain from such given the Western Allies were already in Italy, then France and Greece so they had no reason to try to spur them on. It also fits with Stalin's actions and beliefs at prior times.

This book by the guy who claims to have organized the 1941-2 peace feelers said they were never serious offers:

Special tasks : Pavel Sudoplatov : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet Archive

archive.org

I will review the source; does he say anything of the 1943-1944 efforts?

 

[sillygoose]

Weinberg and others have pointed out evidence that suggests there was serious interest on the Soviet side, in particular through discussions with the Japanese and the like. I'm inclined to believe its true as the contacts with German agents, with ample supporting documentations, extended into 1944; at that point, they had nothing to gain from such given the Western Allies were already in Italy, then France and Greece so they had no reason to try to spur them on. It also fits with Stalin's actions and beliefs at prior times.

Since you've done more research than I on this I will defer to you.

I will review the source; does he say anything of the 1943-1944 efforts?

I'll take a look and edit this comment with what I find out.
Edit:
Looks like he claims to have only been involved in the 1941 effort. No mention of the 1942 or 43 efforts.

 

[History Learner]

Since you've done more research than I on this I will defer to you.


I'll take a look and edit this comment with what I find out.
Edit:
Looks like he claims to have only been involved in the 1941 effort. No mention of the 1942 or 43 efforts.

One big issue is the Soviets/Russians have not really opened their archives on the matter too, which I find telling. The Germans had serious documentation for the contacts that started coming out Post-War and then IIRC in the 70s and with Weinberg's work the Japanese angle started to emerge as well. Taken all together, I think it's compelling and it fits with other citations I've seen; you've sourced before on Stalin's opposition to Unconditional Surrender before.

 

[lordhen]

In March of 1943, Anti-Hitler conservatives in the German Army launched Operation Flash, arguably one of the closest times Hitler came to an unnatural death. Incredibly, however, all three attempts on March 17th failed, and Hitler carried on as the ruler of Germany until his death in 1945 despite the close call of the July 22nd, 1944 bombing effort. What if he hadn't and had been successfully killed? One effect, I believe, is that there would've been a separate peace in the East between the Soviets and Nazis.

In 1943 the USSR was still tottering on the brink of collapse due to starvation and was experiencing a severe manpower crisis too. Stalingrad was a great victory, to be sure, but it was actually not the main effort; that was Operation Mars against Army Group Center near Moscow, which saw 9:1 losses in the favor of the Germans. Operation Mars is, in part, why Operation Little Saturn was the way it turned out. Originally it was to be "Operation Saturn" and envisioned a Soviet thrust to Rostov, which would've encircled not only Army Group B around Stalingrad but also Army Group A in the Kuban and Northern Caucasus too. Manstein's Operation Winter Storm prevented this, allowing for Army Group A to escape and then Manstein compounded his success by performing Third Kharkov, which brought the Soviet advance to a complete halt with massive losses and shifted the momentum back to the Germans.

Thus, until the Summer with the Battle of Kursk, both sides were in a stalemate and reluctant to act as both recognized that a misstep at this point would be fatal. In the context of this strategic situation, Stalin was willing to seek a compromise peace, it was only Hitler's intransigence which prevented it:

Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War II
The Spectre of a Separate Peace in the East: Russo-German 'Peace Feelers', 1942-44

Besides the linked articles, A World At Arms by Gerhard L. Weinberg (1994) and Hitler's War by Heinz Magenheimer (1998) support it. I don't have access to Magenheimer, but I do have Weinberg and I'll quote from that.

Page 609:

Until access to Soviet archives enables scholars to see more clearly into these murky episodes, this author will remain convinced that it was the shock of German military revival so soon after the great Soviet victory at Stalingrad which reinforced Stalin's inclinations during 1943 to contemplate the possibility of either a separate peace with Hitler's Germany or with some alternative German government. With the road to Berlin so obviously a difficult one, the temptation to sound possible alternatives was enormous. Surely by now the Germans must realize that their hopes of defeating the Soviet Union were illusory. The German government had had sense enough in 1939 to work out an accommodation with the Soviet Union on terms both sides had found advantageous; the same people were still in charge in Berlin. In the winter of 1940-41 they had refused to reply to the Soviet proposals for Russia to join the Tripartite Pact, but instead had insisted on attacking her; perhaps in the interim they had learned better in the hard school of war.​

​

As for the Soviet Union, she had demonstrated conclusively that she could defend herself, but this defense had been immensely costly. A new agreement with Germany would provide a breathing space for reconstruction and recovery, would remove German occupation without either further Red Army casualties or economic destruction, and would leave the Soviet Union dominant in all of Eastern Europe, especially in Poland where a Soviet puppet government would replace the pre-war regime. It may have been known to the Soviet government that there were elements in the German government and military apparatus who wanted an agreement with Moscow, and it was certainly known that Japan was very strongly in favor of a German-Soviet peace.​

Pg 610:

On the Soviet side, the position appears to have been that Germany must evacuate all the occupied territory, certainly to the 1941 border, possibly later on, after the Soviet victory in July 1943, back to the 1914 border (thus turning over central Poland to the Soviet Union). German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop appears to have been at least slightly interested in some compromise peace; he saw himself as the architect of the 1939 pact with the Soviet Union and had always given priority to the war against Great Britain. Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, favored negotiations with Stalin and so advised Hitler, almost certainly much more strongly than von Ribbentrop. Hitler, however, was unwilling to have any negotiations with the Soviet Union. Some of the sources make a great deal out of his suspicions about a key intermediary in Stockholm being Jewish, but Hitler's explanations to Goebbels and Oshima go to the core of the issue: he wanted to keep territory, especially the Ukraine, which he was certain Stalin would not give up; and on this point, if no other, his assessment of the Soviet Union was certainly correct. While Stalin might have been willing to negotiate about territory to the west of the 1941 border of the country, he was certainly not about to leave the Germans in occupation of portions of it, least of all the rich agricultural and industrial areas of the Ukraine. The latter would, if necessary, be retaken in battle, and in the fall of 1943 and the winter of 1943-44 that is exactly what the Red Army did.​

How much can the Germans trust the Soviets not to backstap them, lets say a year later when the Allies do D-day.

 

[sillygoose]

How much can the Germans trust the Soviets not to backstap them, lets say a year later when the Allies do D-day.

There would be no D-day, let alone 12 months later, if the Soviets weren't in the war.

 

[History Learner]

How much can the Germans trust the Soviets not to backstap them, lets say a year later when the Allies do D-day.

Presuming Lend Lease is cut off once a Soviet peace deal is cut, I don't think there is really any risk of the Soviets backstabbing the Germans.

 

[lordhen]

Presuming Lend Lease is cut off once a Soviet peace deal is cut, I don't think there is really any risk of the Soviets backstabbing the Germans.

The Allies would consider this a betrayal and most likely would cut of Lend Lease, but was Lend Lease already a lot in 1943.

 

[lordhen]

There would be no D-day, let alone 12 months later, if the Soviets weren't in the war.

But there was a Allied landing in Italy, depending on the time the German-Soviet peace deal was signed.

 

[History Learner]

The Allies would consider this a betrayal and most likely would cut of Lend Lease, but was Lend Lease already a lot in 1943.

The Soviets and historians-both East and West-consider it decisive in preventing a Soviet collapse from 1942 onward.

 

[sillygoose]

But there was a Allied landing in Italy, depending on the time the German-Soviet peace deal was signed.

It gets stuck there then and there is probably a negotiation given all that the Germans could bring to bear against them. Italy would be a stalemated front for the Allies, which politically was unaffordable.

 

[ATP]

It gets stuck there then and there is probably a negotiation given all that the Germans could bring to bear against them. Italy would be a stalemated front for the Allies, which politically was unaffordable.

Indeed.I remember bad joke about that,then Allies tried to wear Italian boot from wrong side.
They would need to wait for A-bomb - and mass produce them,too.Probably in 1946 war would end.
Considering,that Stalin would get nothing,peace would be better for everybody then OTL

 

[sillygoose]

Indeed.I remember bad joke about that,then Allies tried to wear Italian boot from wrong side.
They would need to wait for A-bomb - and mass produce them,too.Probably in 1946 war would end.
Considering,that Stalin would get nothing,peace would be better for everybody then OTL

No way they could wait. Allied politicians understood public morale and willingness to sacrifice was entirely based on things happening in the war, which is what caused them to undertake less smart operations to try and keep the public engaged in fighting the war. Like the costly and rather unproductive (until 1943) bomber offensive or 1941-42 Rhubarb and Circus daylight attacks in France. Stalemate and economic warfare are not enough to keep the public in democracies willing to endure rationing, air attacks, unlimited conscription, etc. Plus in 1943 no one knew the A-bomb would even work and they certainly weren't going to tell the public about it until it was used for the first time, so there isn't even a reason for the public to wait things out that long anyway, since they would have no knowledge that they had a potential trump card to wait years for.

As to it being better for everyone...I doubt the civilians being murdered by the Nazis would agree. Or the Poles and Czechs dealing with oppressive occupation. Same with the Soviets facing General Plan East.

 

[Husky_Khan]

The Soviets would likely backstab zee Germans at the point of maximum opportunity, so if the WAllies hypothetically did perform an invasion of Northwestern France or otherwise was able to threaten the German core. I can't see any reason why the Soviet Union, which despite its pre-1944 losses and no Lend Lease, wouldn't try to be sanely opportunistic and launch an invasion of Eastern Europe if the Western Allies are advancing towards the Rhine or around the Alps or whatever.

If the peace is settled with the pre-1941 borders the alliances with Romania and Finland (as odd as the latter was) would likely be harmed. Especially in the case of poor Romania since they'd apparently lose Bessarabia again despite offering so much blood and treasure and bombing targets to assist the German war effort. I doubt it'd fracture the Axis alliance of course, because Nazi Germany would still be the pre-eminent European power by far and could just swallow Romania like it did every other country (minus Russia ofc) even in spite of Romanian industry, military size and any spirited defense.

Finland might be in a better position to do whatever it wants since it's separated by the Baltics (minus occupied Norway) and Finland still has to deal with the Soviet Union still owning the bits of Finland that the Finns would have lost twice now in four years. But I imagine there'd still be strong residual resentment and if things shift against Nazi Germany significantly... opportunity would come knocking.

A Western Allied landing in France would be really hard because even though Nazi Germany would have to leave hundreds of thousands of troops on its Eastern borders just in case, it'd still free up significant forces for the Atlantic Wall. The Italian Campaign would be the main front, as lame as that would be for all involved. And even if the Western Allies could make a Normandy style landing (and maybe they could, having a massive naval supremacy could clobber any attempts at pushing back into the sea) they could likely still be bottled up rather assuredly a couple dozen miles inland via hedgerow country. Maybe landings in Southern France would have more success due to the terrain. But the fight for France would be a hard, hard slog.

I don't think the United States would find this politically unfeasible to endure a war in Italy and France into 1946... after all there is still the Pacific Campaign to keep the Americans captivated and nothing here would dramatically shift the balance of power in the Pacific (though Japan may get worried that the Soviet Union would wanna turn Eastward eventually even if they never do) but alas... it does seem like a 1946 Campaign would tragically involve the employment of atomic weapons upon Germany to compel it to surrender because one thing that would truly be a strain is invading both Japan AND a (one front focused) Germany in late 1945 or 1946 conventionally.

It could mean a less communist Europe though which would be a positive (especially if finding France intractable, the Americans follow the British in pursuing a front in the Balkans or whatever), but the Holocaust would likely be even more successful then it already was.

 

[ATP]

No way they could wait. Allied politicians understood public morale and willingness to sacrifice was entirely based on things happening in the war, which is what caused them to undertake less smart operations to try and keep the public engaged in fighting the war. Like the costly and rather unproductive (until 1943) bomber offensive or 1941-42 Rhubarb and Circus daylight attacks in France. Stalemate and economic warfare are not enough to keep the public in democracies willing to endure rationing, air attacks, unlimited conscription, etc. Plus in 1943 no one knew the A-bomb would even work and they certainly weren't going to tell the public about it until it was used for the first time, so there isn't even a reason for the public to wait things out that long anyway, since they would have no knowledge that they had a potential trump card to wait years for.

As to it being better for everyone...I doubt the civilians being murdered by the Nazis would agree. Or the Poles and Czechs dealing with oppressive occupation. Same with the Soviets facing General Plan East.

And becouse of public opinion Allies could not made peace,too.So,we would have Italian campaign plus bomber offensive till A bomb come.And Allied bomber offensive destroyed Luftwaffe in OTL till the end of 1944 in situation when East front was keep by 2 fighter regiments and Ju87.

About Czech - germans burned there one village.In Poland - about 1000.But if we remain free after WW2,it would be still worth it.Becouse difference between gestapo and NKWD was that NKWD was more cruel - and germans do not made polisch children learn poems about how great gestapo was.Soviets made our children learn poems about how great NKWD/or rather its polish version/ was.