WI: German-Soviet Peace, 1943

And becouse of public opinion Allies could not made peace,too.
That I disagree with. If they had to pay the full price for victory I don't see how the public would be willing to continue. Without the USSR bearing the greatest burden/paying the highest blood price the Wallies probably would fight on for a little while and when losses became too high they would see what sort of deal they could make. Unconditional surrender was only an option if the Soviets are in the war. Besides the US public saw Japan as their primary enemy throughout the war. Britain did what the US said by 1943 anyway, including accepting unconditional surrender despite Churchill's vehement opposition privately.

So,we would have Italian campaign plus bomber offensive till A bomb come.And Allied bomber offensive destroyed Luftwaffe in OTL till the end of 1944 in situation when East front was keep by 2 fighter regiments and Ju87.
You have a bloody 1943-44 with no prospect for victory. The public knows nothing about the A bomb and it wasn't clear until 1945 that the bomb would even be ready until later that year...and no one knew it would work until they tested it in July.

With no USSR likely the Germans shift to fighters aircraft in 1943 and without the cost of fighting in the east can focus on producing the greatest number of pilots possible. They can even demobilize men to work in the factories as well.

About Czech - germans burned there one village.In Poland - about 1000.
Yes, though I thought there were more burned villages in the Czech areas than that. Certainly the brutality that Heydrich introduced to 'pacify' the Czechs scared them into avoiding resistance, but that first came with a lot of bloodshed even if villages weren't being burned.

But if we remain free after WW2,it would be still worth it.Becouse difference between gestapo and NKWD was that NKWD was more cruel - and germans do not made polisch children learn poems about how great gestapo was.Soviets made our children learn poems about how great NKWD/or rather its polish version/ was.
Without Warsaw being burned to the ground in 1944 maybe. However the mass murder of Poles, Christian and Jewish, was in the millions by 1943 and would likely only get worse as colonization of Poland started. The Gestapo may not have done what you said, but then the Gestapo didn't have Polish members, nor a Polish Nazi collaborationist government, nor was there a Polish army fighting alongside the Germans unlike the situation with the Soviets.
 
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@SpicyJuan and @sillygoose brought it my attention recently, but some recent research into II SS Panzer Korps at Kursk reveals that their AFV strength was actually very strong at the end of the battle despite having effectively destroyed 5th Guards Tank Army. Such has effectively vindicated the Manstein Hypothesis of a "Lost Victory", that was first elucidated in his own autobiography in the immediate Post-War era. Had Operation Roland been allowed to continue, Soviet operational reserves latter used in the 4th Battle of Kharkov would've been destroyed and the frontline would've been shortened by anchoring it on the line of the Psel River.

Such, in my opinion, derails the entirety of Soviet strategic moves for the second half of 1943 and into 1944. In addition, the chance for another victory seems obvious to me, in the form of the Soviet breakthrough on the Mius front having an exposed flank upon which Manstein could exploit with Army Group South's armored forces. This was actually something Manstein suggested historically in the lead up to Kursk, in that he wanted to re-play his triumph at 3rd Kharkov but along the Azov. Here, the Soviets have inadvertently given him the chance to do so. Soviet losses, between the two defeats, are probably at least 500,000 or so higher than historical and they have failed to gain much of anything in terms of territorial gains. This has grave implications, given the emerging food and manpower crises.

Personally, I think at this point the situation would be sufficiently serious for both sides to realize their need to cut a deal. The Germans have the situation on the Western Front becoming increasingly dangerous while the USSR is running out of its ability to fight the conflict at all. It is better to grab what they can at the peace table than continue to take the massive losses they can no longer afford just for the Anglo-Americans to gobble everything up.
 
@SpicyJuan and @sillygoose brought it my attention recently, but some recent research into II SS Panzer Korps at Kursk reveals that their AFV strength was actually very strong at the end of the battle despite having effectively destroyed 5th Guards Tank Army. Such has effectively vindicated the Manstein Hypothesis of a "Lost Victory", that was first elucidated in his own autobiography in the immediate Post-War era. Had Operation Roland been allowed to continue, Soviet operational reserves latter used in the 4th Battle of Kharkov would've been destroyed and the frontline would've been shortened by anchoring it on the line of the Psel River.

Such, in my opinion, derails the entirety of Soviet strategic moves for the second half of 1943 and into 1944. In addition, the chance for another victory seems obvious to me, in the form of the Soviet breakthrough on the Mius front having an exposed flank upon which Manstein could exploit with Army Group South's armored forces. This was actually something Manstein suggested historically in the lead up to Kursk, in that he wanted to re-play his triumph at 3rd Kharkov but along the Azov. Here, the Soviets have inadvertently given him the chance to do so. Soviet losses, between the two defeats, are probably at least 500,000 or so higher than historical and they have failed to gain much of anything in terms of territorial gains. This has grave implications, given the emerging food and manpower crises.

Personally, I think at this point the situation would be sufficiently serious for both sides to realize their need to cut a deal. The Germans have the situation on the Western Front becoming increasingly dangerous while the USSR is running out of its ability to fight the conflict at all. It is better to grab what they can at the peace table than continue to take the massive losses they can no longer afford just for the Anglo-Americans to gobble everything up.
Soviet negotiated with Hitler from 1941 till Teheran/1943/,but it never get anything becouse both/Stalin and Hitler/ wanted too much.
If you want soviet/german peace,then one of them must die and be replaced by somebody more reasonable.
What about german succes in 1943 on East front,and SS killing Hitler in 1944 when he refused another peace deal with soviets?
Then they would blame Wermacht,purge it,made peace with Stalin on Dniepr river ,and...still lost after USA deliver A bomb to Berlin instead of Hiroschima.
Much better for Europe - all states would remain free,and soviets could not cosplay as german enemies.
 
@SpicyJuan and @sillygoose brought it my attention recently, but some recent research into II SS Panzer Korps at Kursk reveals that their AFV strength was actually very strong at the end of the battle despite having effectively destroyed 5th Guards Tank Army. Such has effectively vindicated the Manstein Hypothesis of a "Lost Victory", that was first elucidated in his own autobiography in the immediate Post-War era. Had Operation Roland been allowed to continue, Soviet operational reserves latter used in the 4th Battle of Kharkov would've been destroyed and the frontline would've been shortened by anchoring it on the line of the Psel River.

Such, in my opinion, derails the entirety of Soviet strategic moves for the second half of 1943 and into 1944. In addition, the chance for another victory seems obvious to me, in the form of the Soviet breakthrough on the Mius front having an exposed flank upon which Manstein could exploit with Army Group South's armored forces. This was actually something Manstein suggested historically in the lead up to Kursk, in that he wanted to re-play his triumph at 3rd Kharkov but along the Azov. Here, the Soviets have inadvertently given him the chance to do so. Soviet losses, between the two defeats, are probably at least 500,000 or so higher than historical and they have failed to gain much of anything in terms of territorial gains. This has grave implications, given the emerging food and manpower crises.

Personally, I think at this point the situation would be sufficiently serious for both sides to realize their need to cut a deal. The Germans have the situation on the Western Front becoming increasingly dangerous while the USSR is running out of its ability to fight the conflict at all. It is better to grab what they can at the peace table than continue to take the massive losses they can no longer afford just for the Anglo-Americans to gobble everything up.
Much would depend on whether it was possible to actually pull this off and how many e. tire units were wiped out. If mauled units survived to be replenished, then the Soviets can continue to fight on, but if entire armies are wiped out wholesale, then you could well see Stalin being much more open to cutting a deal. Question is, as ATP points out, if Hitler would be actually interested in what Stalin has to offer.
 
Much would depend on whether it was possible to actually pull this off and how many e. tire units were wiped out. If mauled units survived to be replenished, then the Soviets can continue to fight on, but if entire armies are wiped out wholesale, then you could well see Stalin being much more open to cutting a deal. Question is, as ATP points out, if Hitler would be actually interested in what Stalin has to offer.

Alternative, of course, is a relative slowdown in combat operations until that winter when the Soviets launch a final offensive that carries them to the Dnieper, about four to six months late. At that point, their own manpower and food issues preclude much more in terms of advancing, even with the recovery of East Ukraine, while the Germans now are sitting on the (probably much stronger than OTL) Panther Line. At that point, it makes sense for both sides to come to the table.
 
Soviet negotiated with Hitler from 1941 till Teheran/1943/,but it never get anything becouse both/Stalin and Hitler/ wanted too much.
If you want soviet/german peace,then one of them must die and be replaced by somebody more reasonable.
What about german succes in 1943 on East front,and SS killing Hitler in 1944 when he refused another peace deal with soviets?
Then they would blame Wermacht,purge it,made peace with Stalin on Dniepr river ,and...still lost after USA deliver A bomb to Berlin instead of Hiroschima.
Much better for Europe - all states would remain free,and soviets could not cosplay as german enemies.

If we go with the original POD I put forward in the OP, we'd see an Anti-Hitler Coup in March and then the new government approaches Stalin for a peace deal along 1941 borders i.e. Pre-Barbarossa. Personally I am of the belief that, if peace is successfully concluded with Stalin in the Spring of 1943, the Germans can successfully forces the Western Allies to a peace agreement.
 
If we go with the original POD I put forward in the OP, we'd see an Anti-Hitler Coup in March and then the new government approaches Stalin for a peace deal along 1941 borders i.e. Pre-Barbarossa. Personally I am of the belief that, if peace is successfully concluded with Stalin in the Spring of 1943, the Germans can successfully forces the Western Allies to a peace agreement.
I agree.Manchattan project was still in development,so USA would not gamble on it.And soviet plants near FDR made him support uncle genocider Joe no matter what.
All we need for such scenario is Hitler deatch before 1943.
Of course,Stalin being Stalin would just wait till his spies in USA get him A bomb,and invade german Europe about 1950.Probably succesfully this time - becouse german being german would turn any surviving slavic nations into soviet supporters by that time.
So,entire soviet Europe instead of only half.
Well,England would be saved,maybe Spain,Italy,Switzerland and Scandinavia,too.
 
I've cited it elsewhere before but while using it in another site it occurred to me this article has some important citations useful for looking at this what if:

Because of the massive casualties the Germans inflicted during Barbarossa (by February 1942, the Red Army had lost over 3 million men captured by the Germans, and another 2,663,000 killed in action) and the huge population centers lost to the Germans the Soviet industrial labor force fell from 8.3 million people in 1940 to 5.5 million people in 1942. This also impacted the Red Army. September 1942 estimates done by E.A. Shchadenko (the man responsible for creating new Red Army units) found that more than five and a half million military age men had been lost from Red Army usage due to the German occupation of Soviet western territories. This meant that list strength of rifle divisions fell from a pre-war total of 14,483 men to 11,626 men in December of 1941. Though many point to the Soviet Union's huge size as the major impediment to any chance of German success in the war this misses a number of crucial points. Not least of which is that the Red Army's major source of reliable manpower was in the Western Soviet Union, and much of that was under German occupation in 1942.​
This is not to say that the Red Army did not try to make use of the manpower that could be found in the Caucuses and Central Asia - it just didn't work out. Language barriers represented a formidable obstacle to integrating non-Russian speaking populations into the Red Army. The Red Army raised twenty-six rifle or mountain divisions from the Caucuses, Central Asia, and Baltic states, but almost none of these were deployable against the Germans. Though four Armenian rifle divisions saw combat, as well as the majority of Georgian units, those cases proved the exception rather than the rule. For instance, only three of fifteen Uzbek units saw combat and the Chechen-Ingush cavalry divison never came close to a battlefield. The loss of population in Western Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine therefore had an outsized impact on Soviet military potential as a whole. Moreover, there is a strong argument that that had the Germans, even in failing to meet the goals of their 1941-1942 campaigns, merely been able to hold onto the Soviet population centers captured in 1941-1942 that the Red Army may have been in deep trouble. That's because as early as January of 1943 a key component in the Red Army's ability to rejuvenate its strength would be its ability to move west and recapture land and population lost to the Germans. For evidence as to that we need look no further than the Voronezh Front's experiences early in 1943 as it pursued German forces withdrawing from Southern Russia as the German pocket at Stalingrad was slowly being reduced.​
From January 13th to March 3rd 1943 the Voronezh Front's pursuit operations further beat up the Axis armies in Southern Russia but at a cost of 100,00 casualties (this included 33,331 irrecoverable losses) from the front's total initial strength of 350,000 men. To help ameliorate these losses the front received nearly 50,000 replacements during January and February. However, less than 10,000 of these replacements represented trained manpower released from the Stavka reserves. The largest single category of replacements comprised 20,902 men press-ganged into service from recaptured territory as the front moved west. The remainder consisted of front reserve units, previously sick or wounded men released from hospitals, liberated prisoners of war, penal troops (men released from the gulag and prisons) and the like. This meant that forty percent of the Voronezh Front's replacement manpower only came about because the front was able to move west. Nor was this situation unique. At this point in the war the Red Army was running short in the trained reserves needed to replenish the massive losses still being incurred while it also built up a strategic reserve and created new units.​
The manpower problems facing the Red Army proved a constant throughout the Second World War. Even December 1944 revisions to the shtat of rifle divisions (when the Red Army was otherwise knocking on Germany's door) saw the number of rear-area personnel assigned to a rifle division cut in half compared to where it had been in June of 1941 (1,852 to 3,359 such personnel). At the same time the Red Army had spent 1944 making strenuous efforts to locate and press into immediate service (i.e. without training) men as old as 45 from the recaptured territories in the Western Soviet Union. By 1945 the Red Army was even taking Soviet citizens and POW's found on the march into Germany. These people, who had previously been rounded up by the Germans for service in the Third Reich's factories, were being sent to flesh out front-line ranks even though most were hardly in the physical condition needed to perform adequately in combat. Going back to early in 1942 we find entire rifle divisions being manned by far from inexhuastible sources of manpower. For instance, in April of 1942 the 112th Rifle Division was manned by Siberian Russians and penal troops.​

So PoD becomes clear, in that you have the Anti-Nazi plotters kill Hitler and perhaps Himmler, leading to Goering taking over backed by the Army. Goering and much of the Army would be opposed to what became Citadel, and thus we have no historic Kursk. Probably sometime in July, Stalin will give into his desire to attack and order an offensive against the Germans, who have remained on the defensive. Based on what happened historically along the Mius and in Belarus from late 1943 into early 1944, and with the ATL benefit of not having exhausted themselves on the offensive, the Germans will likely stand firm, inflicting heavy casualties and surrendering territory only moderately, perhaps even minorly.

At that point, the USSR is shot as an offensive power and the Germans are increasingly too tied by the Anglo-Americans to take advantage of the situation. It strikes me as likely both sides will cut a deal in that context and abide by it.
 
If you kill Hitler before Kursk - very plausible.Germans would hold part of Ukraine and Belaruss.USA would made peace.
German Europe,with german puppet states instead of soviets.
And it would fall becouse of economic,just like soviets.
I remember some story about Poland becoming independent again about 1990 after economical fall of Germany - ruled by sons of german agents instead of sons of soviet agents like in OTL.
Becouse Goering would stop genocide after Hitler death,so there would be enough surviving poles.And,he would crush Himmler and SS,like Kruszczow crushed Beria.
 
If you kill Hitler before Kursk - very plausible.Germans would hold part of Ukraine and Belaruss.USA would made peace.
Nope. The German resistance offered to remove Hitler and surrender the entire country with the only condition being no Soviet occupation zone in Central Europe and were ignored. FDR wanted it to be a fight to the bloody finish.
 
Nope. The German resistance offered to remove Hitler and surrender the entire country with the only condition being no Soviet occupation zone in Central Europe and were ignored. FDR wanted it to be a fight to the bloody finish.

Did ATP mean accept peace immediately or accept peace after Stalin did? Since your argued that the US would give up if the Soviets made a separate peace.
 
It read to me like he was saying the US would make peace first. Ask ATP to clarify. If I misinterpreted what he said then I withdraw my statement.

No,Sralin would ask for peace first in this scenario,after loosing his army in failed 1943 offensive.FDR was Sralin useful idiot,so he would follow his example.
 
@sillygoose

From Absolute War, by Chris Bellamy Pg 596:

If Rokossovskiy thought he had bad news, Stalin had already received worse — or so it seemed. Relations between Russia and its allies had already been shaken in April when, on the 13th, the Germans announced that they had found the mass graves of Polish officers at Katyn. The Poles in exile in London, including General Anders and Prime Minister Sikorskiy, were furious and deeply concerned, having attempted to track down the missing officers for three years. Relations between Soviet Russia and the London Poles virtually ceased. Meanwhile, in Russia, moves begun by the SPP —the Union of Polish Patriots, a group opposed to the ‘London Poles’— were accelerated. The SPP had been formed in Moscow in early spring, to create a new Polish army linked to the Red Army. Then, at the Trident conference in Washington between 11 and 27 May, Churchill and Roosevelt had decided to postpone the cross-Channel invasion from late summer 1943 until May 1944. Stalin knew almost straight away, of course, but was told officially on 4 June. On 11 June he told his western allies that this created ‘exceptional difficulties for the Soviet Union’. The Red Army would have to do the job ‘almost single handed’, and the Soviet people would be deeply disappointed. Kerr warned the British government that Stalin’s icy politeness masked a very real lack of faith in the ‘Grand Alliance’.49​
While relations between the western Allies and the Russians quavered, the Germans were not happy, either. It is now widely acknowledged that in Hitler’s mind, ‘clear military victory over the Soviet Union was impossible to achieve’.50 However, he wanted to conduct one more massive attack, perhaps to persuade his Quisling allies, and also continued diplomatic manoeuvres.51 German agents approached Russian representatives in Sweden about a separate peace with Moscow, and also contacted the British and Americans. The first half of 1943 was therefore full of diplomatic tensions, although they abated after Quebec in August. The Russian view, and the traditional view, is that Kursk was meant to restore German prestige and deal the Soviet Union a mortal blow by encircling and destroying the largest single grouping of Soviet forces on the eastern front. Subsequently, the Germans intended to regroup and drive through the Steppe Military District, north-north-east, cutting Moscow off from the rest of the country. It was meant not only to tidy up the battlefront and achieve attrition but, in so doing, to achieve a massive psychological victory. Its ultimate aim was ‘shock and awe’ or, as it is now called, ‘effects based warfare’.52​
Some Germans now see it differently. Hitler and the German General Staff ‘were fully aware of the fact that it was no longer possible to achieve a decisive victory on the eastern front, certainly not in a single battle’.53 Therefore the OKH pursued only two, limited objectives. The first was to establish a shorter defensive line by pinching o the troops in the Kursk bulge, which might have released 20 divisions or so. The second was to weaken the Red Army, whose largest concentration of forces — estimated at 60 divisions — was concentrated in the salient.54 Of 6 million troops on the eastern front, the Red Army had about 1.3 million from the Central and Voronezh Fronts in and close to the Kursk bulge for the defensive phase.55​
 
Some thoughts:

1. If Hitler is killed in 1943, he's replaced by Goering, right?
2. If my premise in #1 here is correct, does Goering attempt to rapidly build up the Panther-Wotan Line and withdraw to it as soon as he can? This line is partly based on rivers (the Dnieper and Daugava), so it shouldn't be too difficult for Nazi Germany to defend if it can actually build a solid defensive line there in time.
3. If the Soviets look like they're about to make a separate peace, might the Western Allies offer to either move D-Day up to the summer of 1943 or else send some or even many of their own troops to the Eastern Front (under the command of their own generals, of course)? The latter course of action would obviously entail the Western Allies taking HUGE casualties, but no one said that winning a war would necessarily be easy.
 
Some thoughts:

1. If Hitler is killed in 1943, he's replaced by Goering, right?
2. If my premise in #1 here is correct, does Goering attempt to rapidly build up the Panther-Wotan Line and withdraw to it as soon as he can? This line is partly based on rivers (the Dnieper and Daugava), so it shouldn't be too difficult for Nazi Germany to defend if it can actually build a solid defensive line there in time.
3. If the Soviets look like they're about to make a separate peace, might the Western Allies offer to either move D-Day up to the summer of 1943 or else send some or even many of their own troops to the Eastern Front (under the command of their own generals, of course)? The latter course of action would obviously entail the Western Allies taking HUGE casualties, but no one said that winning a war would necessarily be easy.
Summer 1943 wouldn't work given the diversion of shipping to the Mediterranean. It would take too long to shift forces and equipment to make that TL work. Any later and D-day wouldn't likely work due to the Soviets being out for too long. They'd just have to go through Italy and the Balkans, but I doubt the British and US public had the stomach for the necessary casualties that would entail and of course Britain didn't have the manpower to sustain those losses.

Who knows if Goering would, but I think he would given he was more easily to influence than Hitler and fobbed off decisions on others.

No way Stalin would accept Allied forces in Russia, that was offered IOTL and turned down. Some bombers were for a short time based at Poltava in Ukraine, but that ended relatively quickly once Stalin got what he wanted from that deal.
 
Summer 1943 wouldn't work given the diversion of shipping to the Mediterranean. It would take too long to shift forces and equipment to make that TL work. Any later and D-day wouldn't likely work due to the Soviets being out for too long. They'd just have to go through Italy and the Balkans, but I doubt the British and US public had the stomach for the necessary casualties that would entail and of course Britain didn't have the manpower to sustain those losses.

Who knows if Goering would, but I think he would given he was more easily to influence than Hitler and fobbed off decisions on others.

No way Stalin would accept Allied forces in Russia, that was offered IOTL and turned down. Some bombers were for a short time based at Poltava in Ukraine, but that ended relatively quickly once Stalin got what he wanted from that deal.
When exactly was this offered in real life (last paragraph)?
 
When exactly was this offered in real life (last paragraph)?
IIRC in 1942, but info is hard to find at the moment. I think it came up in a visit Churchill made in 1942 but Stalin waved it off and it wasn't seriously pursued. Given how British sailors were treated while delivering L-L to Murmansk, it was clear the Soviets were very concerned about Imperialists infiltrating agents into the country.

In terms of air units it was brought up at Tehran by the US for the first time:
 
IIRC in 1942, but info is hard to find at the moment. I think it came up in a visit Churchill made in 1942 but Stalin waved it off and it wasn't seriously pursued. Given how British sailors were treated while delivering L-L to Murmansk, it was clear the Soviets were very concerned about Imperialists infiltrating agents into the country.

In terms of air units it was brought up at Tehran by the US for the first time:
Interestingly enough, Stalin actually did allow Free French pilots to operate from the Soviet Union, if I recall correctly:

 
Some thoughts:

1. If Hitler is killed in 1943, he's replaced by Goering, right?
2. If my premise in #1 here is correct, does Goering attempt to rapidly build up the Panther-Wotan Line and withdraw to it as soon as he can? This line is partly based on rivers (the Dnieper and Daugava), so it shouldn't be too difficult for Nazi Germany to defend if it can actually build a solid defensive line there in time.
3. If the Soviets look like they're about to make a separate peace, might the Western Allies offer to either move D-Day up to the summer of 1943 or else send some or even many of their own troops to the Eastern Front (under the command of their own generals, of course)? The latter course of action would obviously entail the Western Allies taking HUGE casualties, but no one said that winning a war would necessarily be easy.

1. Presumably
2. Maybe? It would mean sacrificing a large amount of Ukraine and associated economic capacity.
3. The decision had already been made, based on the global shipping situation, in January that there would be no Cross-Channel invasion; the best they could do was Italy and maybe other Med-associated operations.
 

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