No, it isn't an indisputable fact. You're just warping every bit of evidence to fit the conclusion that you like.
Oh, but it is and that's why you never are able to cite evidence like I am despite me repeatedly asking you in the past. It's why you always avoid responding to the key fundamentals of this conflict when I bring them up, which are:
Russia has a population five times larger than Ukraine.
Russia has an economy 10 times larger than Ukraine.
There has never been a conventional war in history that has saw that level of superiority overcome, no matter how much you delude yourself with thinking elan can over come it.
Russia might win. This mobilization might give them the surge in strength that they need to turn the tides of war, which is necessary, because they are very clearly losing right now. Unlike you, I'm not blinded by some pre-conceived conclusion, so I'm capable of seeing that the outcome I do not like is still entirely possible.
Except you are, entirely, blinded by your own delusions of a preconceived conclusion to this conflict. Russia will win and you yourself counter signal your claim they are close to defeat in this post; you are being entirely schizophrenic in your argumentation even now precisely because of how fact free it is. I've engaged with you enough these past few months to see through it, which is why you tend to come in, make a few posts, refuse all requests for proof and then give up. I don't even have to @ you most of the time when I post in this thread because me popping the bubbles of your delusions draws you in on its own.
However, at this point it also is not likely. Ukraine spent months letting the Russians throw away lives, material, and ammunition to gain tiny bits of land piece by piece. It certainly took losses as well, retreating gradually from prepared position to prepared position in grinding attritional warfare, but the Kharkiv offensive very clearly demonstrates that this was a deliberate strategic decision.
Russia has, as stated, five to one advantage in manpower so pray to do tell why taking a 5:1 loss rate in Kherson, for example, is a winning strategy? Credible claims of equipment loss rates of 40% in the Kharkov offensive have been advanced, which fits with the sudden Ukrainian push for more AFVs from NATO; how exactly is that a winning strategy?
If you'd also bother to get out of your information bubble,
you'd also know the AFU General Staff has been heavily counter-signalling exactly what you're pushing here:
However, looking into the situation that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are likely face in 2023, these things don’t look so clear. In fact, for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the situation will be a complex mix of the actual location of the line of contact, the available resources, the pool of combat-ready forces, and, obviously, the strategic initiative that will remain in the enemy’s hands.
Along with this, pursuing the said logic, it is necessary to note reservations about the tentative line of contact from the Ukrainian perspective. Its outlines have an extremely disadvantageous configuration in the already mentioned Izyum and Bakhmut directions. Substantial efforts on the part of the Russians to wedge into Ukraine’s defenses constrain any operational maneuver and require essentially doubling the number of forces in the area to contain the enemy. The situation becomes especially acute amid the lack of firepower assets and insufficient air defenses.
The situation in the South and East looks no better. The threat of enemy advance toward Zaporizhia has already been mentioned. In addition, there is a persistent threat enemy gaining partial success from the direction of Hulyai Pole, which under certain conditions could create a threat of an entire grouping of Ukrainian troops in the east of Ukraine being encircled.
The fact that the enemy has an operational bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnipro River requires additional efforts to prevent its expansion.
While Russia was tapping out every resource it had, and going hat in hand to the friggin' Iranians and North Koreans for more war material, the Ukrainians let their new recruits go through long training cycles in the West, training up on new equipment and doctrine.
Ukraine has been in a general mobilization since February, they are now on their sixth wave. Russia is just now calling up reserve formations. Ukraine has been in a war economy since February and is completely dependent upon the West. Russia has yet to transition to a war economy and has been mostly existing off its own war stocks. Russia acquiring UAVs from Iran is somehow a negative to you (nevermind Ukraine with TB2s from Turkey and Switchblades from the U.S.), meanwhile AFU general staff is literally saying this:
Preparation of an offensive campaign demands that Ukraine sets up one or more operational (operational-strategic) groupings of forces consisting of 10 to 20 combined arms brigades, depending on the intent and ambitions of the Ukrainian Command. In the current situation, the above could be done exclusively by replacing the main types of armament available to the already existing brigades with modern ones, provided by Ukraine's partners. Separately, a need should be highlighted to obtain more missiles and ammunition, artillery systems, missile launchers, EW assets, etc. All of this will require consolidated efforts of all partner countries, while taking up a significant amount of time and financial resources.
Strictly speaking, all of this is directly and exclusively dependent on the resources available to Ukraine. While the situation with the number of forces is likely to look quite promising for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the same cannot be applied to heavy weaponry and ammunition. But, in any case, provided there is political will, timely and deliberate planning, with the use of the industrial base and reserves of the world’s leading powers, the task of setting up and properly equipping such groupings is seen as absolutely realistic.
Here is the chief of the AFU General Staff quite literally saying, in writing, their entire prospects depend on continued support from the West.
Then Ukraine deployed that strength to crushing strategic effect, retaking in days land and cities that it took the Russians months to conquer, seizing stockpiles of war material as they did so. The Kharkiv offensive proved that the counterattacks around Kyiv that drove the Russians out were not a fluke, that this is something the Ukrainians are capable of doing repeatedly, and something that Russia has not been able to repeat without the strategic surprise they got through invading another nation without even declaring war on it.
The AFU overwhelmed those areas precisely because the Russians were spread thin and decided to abandon them, this is why there was no major batch of prisoners or war material to go along with this success. Effectively, the Russians ceded this area rather than fight for it because time, ultimately, favors them.
Same goes for claims this is relevant for April, as the Pentagon noted at the time:
I've likewise already cited the Pentagon in this thread throwing cold water on claims this is something they can keep doing. They may yet score more victories-the situation around Krasny Lyman looks particularly dire at this moment-but that's it as far as strategic opportunities. Refer to the AFU General Staff article directly above saying as much. Ukraine was extremely lucky to hit in the one place Russia was not at in force, after months of preparation.
Of course, the Kharkiv offensive doesn't end the war. The Kyiv offensive didn't, and even if the slower-paced Kherson offensive is as smashing a success as well, that won't end the war either. Russia still occupies a huge chunk of Ukrainian territory, and judging by Putin's decision to push forth 'referendums,' he's planning on claiming those occupied territories as sovereign Russian soil, consequences be damned.
Indeed, what will end the war is Russian superiority in all categories that subjects Ukraine to attrition they cannot possibly sustain.
The war isn't over, and unless something even more crushing than the Kharkiv offensive happens, or someone succeeds at removing Putin from power, it isn't going to end any time soon.
Indeed, the more crushing blow coming up is going to be when Russia reserves begin to reach the SMO area in about two months, setting the stage for a winter offensive. Napoleon in 1812, Hitler in 1941-1942, and now Zelensky. That, followed by the Spring-Summer campaign(s) of next year is what will bring the war closer to culmination.
The problem Russia has though, is that while it can do the traditional Russian thing and throw more men at the problem, they have no demonstrated capability to train those men effectively, utilize effective maneuver doctrine in the field, or most important of all, convince the Ukrainians to surrender.
Except all of that is false, of course, as evidenced by the mobilization and official Western assessments of Russian use of maneuver warfare:
It is very, very clear that the Ukrainians have a stronger will to fight than the Russians, and that is one of the key factors in who wins a war.
Except it isn't and hasn't been since industrial warfare came about. This line of thinking lead to the slaughter of millions in World War I, and was directly tied into Imperial Japanese thinking that started WWII in the Pacific. Now, consider how that turned out for them in the face of the imbalance that exists between Ukraine and Russia. The inescapable conclusion is Russian victory, it's why I've directly told you my victory conditions.
At this point enough ink has been metaphorically expended between us, the cannons are talking now and when the smoke clears we can judge the results based off what I said.
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