Alternate History Could Operation Barbarossa had been succesful megathread

[themarcksplan]

I'd argue that the reason for the high losses in 1941 was more due to the fluidity of the fighting and the very high partisan/straggler effect. The more I can find from personal accounts of this period and the guerrilla war there was a huge amount of ambushes and general partisan warfare going on throughout 1941 as the pockets allowed for Soviet troops to flee into the woods and continue fighting.

Partisan warfare wasn't a big factor until well into 1942 and even then only ~10% of Ostheer was engaged in security operations (and the worst 10% of Ostheer at that).

there were also a lot of troops who continue to fight on and did quite well ambushing German rear area troops.

Stragglers were an issue but what proportion of casualties inflicted? To argue that this is the main factor in 1941 German casualties, we'd have to see 30-50% of German casualties occurring behind the front lines. Is there any evidence that was the case? There's good evidence otherwise: straggler ambushes fell disproportionately on the rear area troops but we know that casualties were disproportionately concentrated in the front troops.

 

[sillygoose]

Partisan warfare wasn't a big factor until well into 1942 and even then only ~10% of Ostheer was engaged in security operations (and the worst 10% of Ostheer at that).

Organized partisan warfare wasn't a significant factor until 1942, but in 1941 it was out of control for much of the year due to the leaky pockets and civilian resistance (possible due to all the military arms being left all over the place) in part organized by soldiers fleeing capture. It is mentioned over and over again in German reports, diaries, and memoirs. Hence the extreme brutality they unleashed behind the lines to try and deal with it. The reason it was so bad in Belarus from the beginning was due to the leaky pockets and ability of the Soviets to infiltrate agents behind German lines (staying in contact by radio was impossible due to all the retreats however, so they were 'uncontrolled' groups).

10% of the Ostheer is still something like 300,000 men and doesn't count the security elements. That is a HUGE diversion of resources when the Ostheer was outnumbered more than 2:1 at the front. That also doesn't count the Romanians and Hungarians who were used extensively in anti-partisan efforts. The Romanians too face enormous and brutal partisan warfare, so they got extremely brutal themselves:

Wikiwand - Moldovan resistance during World War II

The Moldovan resistance during World War II opposed Axis-aligned Romania and Nazi Germany, as part of the larger Soviet partisan movement. The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), presently Moldova, had been created in August 1940 after a Soviet annexation, and liberated by Romania during...

www.wikiwand.com

https://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/173775/HARWARD-DISSERTATION-2018.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=n

Though it is downplayed in most literature there was major overlap in the Einsatzgruppen massacres and the partisan war and the overall brutalization of the war in the East. Nazi racism made it worse (as did the NVKD prison massacres and murder/mutilation of PoWs, something well documented by the Wehrmacht war crimes bureau, which validated Nazi propaganda about the Soviets and NKVD), but the experience of partisan warfare and their support by anti-Nazi, pro-Soviet Jewish communities contributed to the policy of 'making a desert and calling it peace' by the mobile death squads. As we can see the Romanians, who in 1941 didn't have Nazi race politics at the time and had just a couple of years earlier been allied to the Soviets, engaged in their own brutal massacres without prompting by the Germans.

Stragglers were an issue but what proportion of casualties inflicted?

It is very difficult to say for sure given how fluid the fighting was. I just keep finding anecdotes about it in memoirs and diaries that have been published about the 1941 campaign as well as reports on the guerrilla war.
Plus of course in Soviet records, which are probably very conservative estimates given how their reporting system broke down in 1941:

Soviet partisans - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

By Soviet estimates, in August 1941 about 231 detachments were operating already. Units formed and inserted into Belarus totaled 437 by the end of the 1941, comprising more than 7,200 personnel.[13] However, as the front line moved further away, conditions steadily worsened for the partisan units, as resources ran out, and there was no large-scale support from beyond the front until March 1942. One particular difficulty was the lack of radio communication, which was not addressed until April 1942. The partisan unit also lacked the support of local people.[14] For several months, partisan units in Belarus were virtually left to their own devices; especially difficult was the winter of 1941–42, with severe shortages in ammunition, medicine and supplies. The actions of partisans were generally uncoordinated.

German pacification operations in the summer and autumn 1941 were able to curb the partisan activity significantly. Many units went underground, and generally, in late 1941 to early 1942, the partisan units were not undertaking significant military operations, but limiting themselves to sorting out organizational problems, building up support and establishing an influence over the local people.[14] Although data is incomplete, at the end of 1941, 99 partisan detachments and about 100 partisan groups are known to have operated in Belarus.[15] In winter 1941–42, 50 partisan detachments and about 50 underground organisations and groups operated in Belarus.[16][17] During December 1941, German guard forces in the Army Group Center rear comprised 4 security divisions, 1 SS Infantry Brigade, 2 SS Infantry Brigades, and 260 companies from different branches of service.[18]

To argue that this is the main factor in 1941 German casualties, we'd have to see 30-50% of German casualties occurring behind the front lines. Is there any evidence that was the case?

I didn't argue that though. I'd say 20-25% is probably more likely, which given that over the course of 1941 the Germans took over 850k casualties would mean something like 160-200k casualties to stragglers and partisans across the entire front for 6 months. However how do you separate straggler casualties from the general fighting given how messy the pocket battles were in 1941, especially in Belarus? Or for that matter spontaneous civilian resistance after Stalin's July 3rd address? Or even before that?

There is really no way to be sure about anything given the general chaos going on and atrocities on both sides from the very beginning.

There's good evidence otherwise: straggler ambushes fell disproportionately on the rear area troops but we know that casualties were disproportionately concentrated in the front troops.

No shit, the front line fighters saw more combat, but what is a front line fighter? Just the infantry? Or does it include supply and sustainment units attached to combat divisions? Are we just talking about the 'Grossraumtransport' and administrative apparatus as well as deep logistics as 'the rear'?

Also I think you're inaccurate about it being only against rear area personnel since reinforcements marched or took trains to the front, same with replacements, casualties came back and forth too, units went into reserve to rest and get replacements, etc. The Eastern Front was very messy in 1941 and everything was a combat zone until the lines started settling down over the winter. Then things started calming down unless within 100km of the front lines, since the deep rear was out of range of guerrilla sustainment from the rump USSR and food became and issue that largely defeated resistance. Alexander Hill's study about the situation behind AG-North's lines once they hit Leningrad is quite detailed from 1941-43.

Also the massively brutal anti-partisan sweeps and massacres of 1941 actually did work in tamping down resistance. It only really flourished in Belarus from 1942 on due to it being in range from Moscow and was therefore easier to supply and reinforce as well as contact via radio than any other area. Plus in Ukraine there was very little interest in supporting Stalin. Not only that, but when it looked like the Germans were going to win and after the initial heavy violence of occupation collaboration was actually quite popular since it was the best option to survive at that point in the war.

 

[themarcksplan]

It [partisan attacks] is mentioned over and over again in German reports, diaries, and memoirs.

I know, I'm just trying to shift the discussion into more analytical/quantitative bent. If partisans inflicted just 1% of German casualties in the first year that'd ~12k casualties and you'd see extensive mention of them because 12,000 people is a lot of people.

Nonetheless, "a lot" objectively isn't sufficient to imply great significance on the Eastern Front.

I'd say 20-25% is probably more likely, which given that over the course of 1941 the Germans took over 850k casualties would mean something like 160-200k casualties to stragglers and partisans across the entire front for 6 months.

Based on what evidence though?

One thing to look at would be the combat intensity in the military rear areas. In this document, AGC breaks down PoW hauls by armies and the rear area (assigned to Befehlshaber rueckwaertiger Heeresgebiet). <10% of PoW were captured in the army rear areas, which indicates the relative significance of combat in those areas.

While ambushes are probably favorable to enemy soldiers, they're not every rear area combat situation - especially considering these were large numbers of stragglers (though, again, small relative to Eastern Front totals) and ambushes revealed their positions. After initial ambushes the combat power of stragglers would have been extremely small given their disorganization and lack of heavy weapons and supplies. As the large numbers of rear area PoW's attest (again - small numbers relatively), even stragglers eventually surrendered. I'd be surprised if Ostheer casualties in the rear areas were 10% of the total. I would guess Ostheer took fewer losses per PoW captured in the rear areas than at the front. At the very least, I see no reason to believe they took more casualties per PoW, which makes attributing 10% of German casualties to the rear areas unlikely.

More relevant to our discussion, that proportion probably increased after 1941 as the partisans became more powerful. So I can't see strong evidence that Ostheer was losing proportionately more in rear areas during 1941 than in 1943.

My argument is that RKKA was killing at the front about as many in 1941 as in 1943, I don't see any way around that judgment.

Also I think you're inaccurate about it being only against rear area personnel since reinforcements marched or took trains to the front, same with replacements, casualties came back and forth too, units went into reserve to rest and get replacements, etc.

I never said "only" rear area personnel. Again, it's a matter of proportional impact. If rear area casualties were a giant factor in 1941 then we'd see proportionately more casualties among rear area troops who - even though infantry sometimes traversed the rear areas - were the predominant German population in those areas.

Also the massively brutal anti-partisan sweeps and massacres of 1941 actually did work in tamping down resistance. It only really flourished in Belarus from 1942 on due to it being in range from Moscow and was therefore easier to supply and reinforce as well as contact via radio than any other area. Plus in Ukraine there was very little interest in supporting Stalin. Not only that, but when it looked like the Germans were going to win and after the initial heavy violence of occupation collaboration was actually quite popular since it was the best option to survive at that point in the war.

No argument here but, again, I don't see how these facts demonstrate that equality of German losses in 1941 vs. 1943 is explained by higher 1941 German losses in the rear areas. Partisan warfare was certainly not less intensive in 1943 than in 1941.

 

[WolfBear]

As we can see the Romanians, who in 1941 didn't have Nazi race politics at the time and had just a couple of years earlier been allied to the Soviets, engaged in their own brutal massacres without prompting by the Germans.

FWIW, the Romanians' attitude towards the Jews sometimes turned bloody even before the start of Operation Barbarossa, such as here:

Iași pogrom - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[sillygoose]

I know, I'm just trying to shift the discussion into more analytical/quantitative bent. If partisans inflicted just 1% of German casualties in the first year that'd ~12k casualties and you'd see extensive mention of them because 12,000 people is a lot of people.

That's the problem it is very hard to come up with stats anyone agrees on because at best it is guestimation due to the fluidity of the situation and arguments about who qualified as a partisan/guerrilla and who didn't; who was a straggler and who was a front line fighter in the context of pocket battles.

That's part of the issue with quantitative reasoning, it leaves out all the messy parts of how it really went.

Nonetheless, "a lot" objectively isn't sufficient to imply great significance on the Eastern Front.

A lot in the context of the east, since that is the impression given, would be though, even if hardly decisive. It be yet another straw on the camel's back. Also it was a factor that basically didn't exist during any previous invasion with some exception in Poland, so would go toward explaining why the Eastern Front was more costly per month in general than any previous invasion. It was also much more possible given the enormous space and low manpower per square miles as well. Think of how much larger the territory seized in June and July 1941 was compared to what was taken in Poland or France.

Based on what evidence though?

Anecdotal since there is no clear definition or ability to find numbers that would be helpful.
Consider though that number the absolutely maximal definition of straggler inflicted losses in combination with behind the lines resistance from civilians and agents as well as hidden bombs like those detonated in Kiev after its capture.

One thing to look at would be the combat intensity in the military rear areas. In this document, AGC breaks down PoW hauls by armies and the rear area (assigned to Befehlshaber rueckwaertiger Heeresgebiet). <10% of PoW were captured in the army rear areas, which indicates the relative significance of combat in those areas.

Don't forget though that escaped prisoners also joined the partisans groups, so they were a factor as well. Clearly not all, but there really is no way to tell how many 'partisans' there were as time went on in 1941. Even in 1942 and on we can only really speculate based on German and Soviet estimates. Wikipedia says 90,000 in 1941.

So if we say roughly 9% of PoWs were captured in rear areas would you, for the sake of argument, say that roughly 9% of German losses were due to rear area fighting? That would yield about 77,400 casualties (out of 860,000) due to behind the lines fighting in 1941. Assuming that is about the proportion in June and July 1941 is that enough to explain the casualty differentials compared to earlier campaigns? Controlling for sheer scale of the fighting of course.

While ambushes are probably favorable to enemy soldiers, they're not every rear area combat situation - especially considering these were large numbers of stragglers (though, again, small relative to Eastern Front totals) and ambushes revealed their positions. After initial ambushes the combat power of stragglers would have been extremely small given their disorganization and lack of heavy weapons and supplies. As the large numbers of rear area PoW's attest (again - small numbers relatively), even stragglers eventually surrendered. I'd be surprised if Ostheer casualties in the rear areas were 10% of the total. I would guess Ostheer took fewer losses per PoW captured in the rear areas than at the front. At the very least, I see no reason to believe they took more casualties per PoW, which makes attributing 10% of German casualties to the rear areas unlikely.

Some surrendered, many could have fought on. Estimates were about 90,000 partisan behind the lines in 1941. I have no idea how that number was arrived at though.

The problem with the reasoning above is you're only considering the captured PoWs behind the lines, not how many continued to resist above that.

More relevant to our discussion, that proportion probably increased after 1941 as the partisans became more powerful. So I can't see strong evidence that Ostheer was losing proportionately more in rear areas during 1941 than in 1943.

In 1943 the rear areas were pretty well developed and security detachments and a highly coordinated, so they were more effectively able to counter them, which led to more focus on train derailment, which was tough to deal with and resulted in extreme 'countermeasures' (like in Vietnam that generally meant destroying any civilian areas nearby so that partisans couldn't gain sustainment or intel from them). It was probably a lot easier to engage in 'potshots' earlier in the war then later when troops realized the dangers behind the lines and adapted to them. Plus with partisans more directed from Moscow they'd focus on things like derailing trains to help the front line and intel gathering rather than fighting enemy troops, which was more dangerous than other tasks.

My argument is that RKKA was killing at the front about as many in 1941 as in 1943, I don't see any way around that
judgment.

See above for a counter argument.

I never said "only" rear area personnel. Again, it's a matter of proportional impact. If rear area casualties were a giant factor in 1941 then we'd see proportionately more casualties among rear area troops who - even though infantry sometimes traversed the rear areas - were the predominant German population in those areas.

Have you seen a breakdown in rear vs. front casualties? Or differentiation between divisions, corps, and army level areas in terms of casualties? I have really only seen large data sets that do no make that differentiation. I'm sure if you had archival access you could find division level breakdowns that have that data, but that is a LOT of leg work to compile to get any sort of useful data set.

No argument here but, again, I don't see how these facts demonstrate that equality of German losses in 1941 vs. 1943 is explained by higher 1941 German losses in the rear areas. Partisan warfare was certainly not less intensive in 1943 than in 1941.

No, but it was more focused on blowing up trains, intel, and killing collaborators rather than killing German troops.

 

[themarcksplan]

That's part of the issue with quantitative reasoning, it leaves out all the messy parts of how it really went.

We're discussing entirely quantitative matters:

1. That RKKA killed more Germans per day in 1941 than did similar-sized Western armies in France.
2. That RKKA killed about as many Germans per day in 1941 as in 1943.

The stats are clear - I assume you know that (1) and (2) are true. Specifically, RKKA killed about twice the Germans per day in Summer '41 as did Western armies in France. Indeed RKKA killed nearly as Germans in nine June days (22k) as Germany lost conquering Western Europe (27k). That's an astounding accomplishment for a country as poor as the Soviet Union, given that per-capita GDP and combat effectiveness are highly correlated.

If you want to say that 1941 RKKA casualty infliction is mostly a matter of rear area casualties, that's an entirely quantitative contention that should be proven quantitatively.

Re (1), to show that RKKA wasn't killing more Germans at the front than did the West, you'd have to show that ~50% of German casualties were in the rear.

Re (2), showing 1943 German front losses were higher than in 1941 you'd have to show that 1943 rear area losses were much lower.

If you want to talk about something else - e.g. that Ostkrieg was messier than Westkrieg - that's fine and can be discussed qualitatively.

The problem with the reasoning above is you're only considering the captured PoWs behind the lines, not how many continued to resist above that.

The reasoning is this:

1. Take rear area PoW as a percentage of total PoW. For now let's say 10% - I could give a finer estimate but being lazy.
2. Posit a ratio of German casualties to PoW taken.
3. Test your hypothesis that rear area casualties explain the delta of 1941 Ostheer average daily losses above Heer average daily losses in the Westfeldzug (Ostheer's were ~2x higher).

The above demonstrates that, for your quantitative response to my quantitative assertion to be correct, the PoW:GerCasualty ratio has to be >5x higher in rear area actions than in front actions. That doesn't seem plausible for the reasons I stated upthread, regardless of how many partisans/stragglers there were.

 

[sillygoose]

We're discussing entirely quantitative matters:

1. That RKKA killed more Germans per day in 1941 than did similar-sized Western armies in France.
2. That RKKA killed about as many Germans per day in 1941 as in 1943.

I thought we were discussing the reasons why, not that the numbers are what they are.
For one thing the campaign went on longer than the western one and there were many more Soviets, less German aircraft, and guerrilla war that didn't exist in the west.
But when did #2 come into discussion?

The stats are clear - I assume you know that (1) and (2) are true. Specifically, RKKA killed about twice the Germans per day in Summer '41 as did Western armies in France. Indeed RKKA killed nearly as Germans in nine June days (22k) as Germany lost conquering Western Europe (27k). That's an astounding accomplishment for a country as poor as the Soviet Union, given that per-capita GDP and combat effectiveness are highly correlated.

You're mistaken about the June 1941 casualties:

German casualties in Barbarossa 1941 - Axis History Forum

According to Das Deutsche Reich u. d. 2. Weltkrieg, Bd. 5/1, p. 885 :
[Verluste d. Ostheeres ohne AOK Norwegen] :

Month / Dead / Wound. / Miss. / Illness + Frostbite

June / 8,883 / 29,474 / 2,701 / 54,000

About 1000 per day. That was considerably less than in Case Red.

Of the numbers you cited only thing I can think of that would have generated that level of dead for June would be lagging reports for Balkan casualties, casualties in North Africa, naval and air losses against the British, and of course less than half of the total being on the Eastern Front.

That completely changes the equation then, especially considering the correct total for German deaths in 1940 western Europe was about 49,000. Granted that includes soldiers who later died of wounds and non-combat losses, but it also includes MIA who were confirmed later as KIA. Given that MIA were at least 18,000 I'd say a total of 35,000 KIA is probably closer to accurate than 27k.

I mean no offense, but given that the above changes just about everything you're arguing I'm going to leave aside the rest of your post until you've at least replied to the above so we can discuss how this changes your position.

 

[ATP]

Which is why when the Germans say 22,000 Heer soldiers were killed in June 1941, you should believe them.

Unless you think horseflies killed all those Germans, it can't be denied that RKKA was putting up a fight.



I don't know about multiple times higher. That would imply bloody casualty parity between Heer and RKKA, which almost never happened no matter how well-prepared were the Soviets and run-down was the Ostheer.

During 3 weeks,when they made 400-500km,breaked 2 fortified lines,and soviet lost million soldiers and 11.000 tanks -most of which german found abadonned,yet fully functional.
If germans infrantry dyvisions could made more then 20km on foot through rivers and fortified lines,and lost 2KIA for one soviet tanks,it mean 2 possible things:
1.German soldiers were superhumans for first 3 weeks
2.Almost all Soviet soldiers do not fought for the first 3 weeks.

You could belive version 1,but second is far more logical.

 

[sillygoose]

During 3 weeks,when they made 400-500km,breaked 2 fortified lines,and soviet lost million soldiers and 11.000 tanks -most of which german found abadonned,yet fully functional.
If germans infrantry dyvisions could made more then 20km on foot through rivers and fortified lines,and lost 2KIA for one soviet tanks,it mean 2 possible things:
1.German soldiers were superhumans for first 3 weeks
2.Almost all Soviet soldiers do not fought for the first 3 weeks.

You could belive version 1,but second is far more logical.

There is option 3 as well:
A synthesis fo the above thesis. The Germans were the most veteran, best organized/led/equipped, and most victorious force on the planet at the time fighting an army that had at best a mixed record in combat in the 1939-41 period and was massively unprepared for war on June 22nd 1941 for a variety of reasons (potentially not least of which being that they may have been caught building up for an offensive, not preparing to defend). That means the Soviets did fight, just not very well because they were seriously unprepared for what they faced, which was the best military in the world at the time; the Germans were hardly superhuman, but their Wehrmacht was arguably one of the most effective militaries of all time in 1941 and the performance of 1941 is an example of that. It is a testament to the insane abilities for recovery of the Russians though that they were able to survive and win despite being practically disemboweled in a matter of months in summer-autumn 1941.

 

[ATP]

There is option 3 as well:
A synthesis fo the above thesis. The Germans were the most veteran, best organized/led/equipped, and most victorious force on the planet at the time fighting an army that had at best a mixed record in combat in the 1939-41 period and was massively unprepared for war on June 22nd 1941 for a variety of reasons (potentially not least of which being that they may have been caught building up for an offensive, not preparing to defend). That means the Soviets did fight, just not very well because they were seriously unprepared for what they faced, which was the best military in the world at the time; the Germans were hardly superhuman, but their Wehrmacht was arguably one of the most effective militaries of all time in 1941 and the performance of 1941 is an example of that. It is a testament to the insane abilities for recovery of the Russians though that they were able to survive and win despite being practically disemboweled in a matter of months in summer-autumn 1941.

Half of german forces never fought anybody - and at least half of milion soviets fought in Finland,so it was not veterans versus greenhorns.
Soviet guns was as good or better then germans.
Soviet modern planes/Mig3,Pe2/,was as good as best germans.Other when wors,still have 3:1 numerical advantage.

Soviet tanks - 900 KW1/2 alone should wipe out germans,becouse Wermacht had no weapon capable of destroing it.One,which fought,stopped german dyvision for one day - and they need 88mm gun from Luftwaffe for that.
And older tanks all have 45mm guns,capable of destroing every german tank - and have 5:1 numerical advantage.

You would be right,if soviets faced germans from 1944,but in 1941 soviets had as good or better stuff.

 

[sillygoose]

Half of german forces never fought anybody - and at least half of milion soviets fought in Finland,so it was not veterans versus greenhorns.

You mean the new divisions they built up? Yes, but they had veteran troops, officers, and NCOs as well as extensive training based on successful combat experience of others.

How many casualties did the Soviets suffer against Finland? Yes that many may have fought, but at least half became casualties. Given that the Soviet military was 5 million men in 1941 that means less than 10% had combat experience in Finland given how many died or were disabled.

Soviet guns was as good or better then germans.

That may be, but if not used effectively the best weapon is useless.

Soviet modern planes/Mig3,Pe2/,was as good as best germans.Other when wors,still have 3:1 numerical advantage.

Not really. Soviet spec never lived up to reality in this period. Build quality was a problem, lack of training and maintenance, etc. In 1941 over half of Soviet aircraft lost were non-combat losses, which means they crashed for whatever reason.
Apparently that numerical advantage doesn't matter when half were effectively useless.

Soviet tanks - 900 KW1/2 alone should wipe out germans,becouse Wermacht had no weapon capable of destroing it.One,which fought,stopped german dyvision for one day - and they need 88mm gun from Luftwaffe for that.
And older tanks all have 45mm guns,capable of destroing every german tank - and have 5:1 numerical advantage.

No weapons to destroy them? 88mm FLAK, 105mm artillery (the SK18 were used in direct fire roles), aircraft, satchel charges, etc. Plus you can mission-kill a tank by damaging the gun or tracks and then pick it off later, which is what happened. Plus Soviet tank quality sucked, so they broke down regularly and were abandoned since a tank that can't operate is useless.

The claim that a single KV stopped an entire division is Soviet propaganda. It apparently held up a part of one division for several hours, but that's it.

Older Soviet tanks didn't run. Just because the Soviets never discarded old equipment doesn't mean it was useful even if it looks impressive on paper for Stalin. Plus the older tanks were all killable by the 37mm PAK, Czech 47mm gun, and all the heavier stuff too. German tanks didn't fight enemy tanks if possible, they exploited into the enemy's rear area; AT guns fought enemy tanks. That or Stukas bombed them.

You would be right,if soviets faced germans from 1944,but in 1941 soviets had as good or better stuff.

Not really, see above. Most Soviet equipment only existed on paper, much of it wasn't operable and if it was they were missing out on radios and other means to actually make it work as more than just a single isolated tank. There is a reason the Germans were able to shoot them down easily, they couldn't coordinate in action and had too small of turrets to operate effectively. Plus Soviet training wasn't particularly good either. And don't forget they were surprised on June 22nd, so were not ready for action, which meant many tanks broke down before they even reached combat.

 

[ATP]

You mean the new divisions they built up? Yes, but they had veteran troops, officers, and NCOs as well as extensive training based on successful combat experience of others.

How many casualties did the Soviets suffer against Finland? Yes that many may have fought, but at least half became casualties. Given that the Soviet military was 5 million men in 1941 that means less than 10% had combat experience in Finland given how many died or were disabled.


That may be, but if not used effectively the best weapon is useless.


Not really. Soviet spec never lived up to reality in this period. Build quality was a problem, lack of training and maintenance, etc. In 1941 over half of Soviet aircraft lost were non-combat losses, which means they crashed for whatever reason.
Apparently that numerical advantage doesn't matter when half were effectively useless.


No weapons to destroy them? 88mm FLAK, 105mm artillery (the SK18 were used in direct fire roles), aircraft, satchel charges, etc. Plus you can mission-kill a tank by damaging the gun or tracks and then pick it off later, which is what happened. Plus Soviet tank quality sucked, so they broke down regularly and were abandoned since a tank that can't operate is useless.

The claim that a single KV stopped an entire division is Soviet propaganda. It apparently held up a part of one division for several hours, but that's it.

Older Soviet tanks didn't run. Just because the Soviets never discarded old equipment doesn't mean it was useful even if it looks impressive on paper for Stalin. Plus the older tanks were all killable by the 37mm PAK, Czech 47mm gun, and all the heavier stuff too. German tanks didn't fight enemy tanks if possible, they exploited into the enemy's rear area; AT guns fought enemy tanks. That or Stukas bombed them.


Not really, see above. Most Soviet equipment only existed on paper, much of it wasn't operable and if it was they were missing out on radios and other means to actually make it work as more than just a single isolated tank. There is a reason the Germans were able to shoot them down easily, they couldn't coordinate in action and had too small of turrets to operate effectively. Plus Soviet training wasn't particularly good either. And don't forget they were surprised on June 22nd, so were not ready for action, which meant many tanks broke down before they even reached combat.

1.German newbies was trained by veterans - Then soviet was trained by people who fought,too.

2.Not used,abadonned without fight.During Boldin counterattack soviets had 7-8 artillery regiments,but german defenders reported one artillery battery which harassed them.

3.Against,abadonned on airfields when crew run.Still fully operational.And soviets delivered worst planes during war,when Sralin cared about numbers only,not before that.

4.88mm was Luftwaffe,not Wermacht weapon,and 105mm was heavy artillery - one-two battery per dyvision.Not designed to hit moving targets,like tanks.
And,in Boldin counter offensive case,they have 114 tanks operational 22.06.41,during counter offensive none was seen by germans - only later 8 used by soviet 24 infrantry dyvision which found them abadonned and used,which mean,that all was simply abadonned without fight.
Tanks was checked by army purged by Sralin,controlled by NKWD purged twice.If they wrote tat they were operational,they were operational.

And oder tanks with 45mm guns - it was enough to destroy every german tank then,they do not have Tigers yet.Worst,but could still fight and kill germans.

 

[sillygoose]

Then soviet was trained by people who fought,too.

After the great purges and expansion of the military? There were very few combat vets left and the ones that were there were scattered all over the USSR, not in training establishments. Meanwhile the Germans had millions of recent combat vets, so even if not training roles (which they were given the way that Germany formed new divisions by taking leaders and vets from veteran divisions as a cadre) the were still leading and imparting combat knowledge in new divisions.

2.Not used,abadonned without fight.During Boldin counterattack soviets had 7-8 artillery regiments,but german defenders reported one artillery battery which harassed them.

The one on June 24? Confusion, breakdown in communications, unpreparedness, air attacks, and concentration of panzers encircling them severely screwed up the Soviet ability to attack, let alone defend.

3.Against,abadonned on airfields when crew run.Still fully operational.And soviets delivered worst planes during war,when Sralin cared about numbers only,not before that.

Not from what I've read. On the first day 1800 planes were destroyed on the airfields and they many others were overrun by the unexpectedly rapid German advance.
The Soviets had bad planes before and during the war. Before mainly due to maintenance issues.

4.88mm was Luftwaffe,not Wermacht weapon,and 105mm was heavy artillery - one-two battery per dyvision.Not designed to hit moving targets,like tanks.

Luftwaffe FLAK was detached to Heer divisions. The army also had its own FLAK.
Despite not being designed for it they were capable of direct fire and were used during Barbarossa and the invasion of France in that role. In fact the Dicker Max experimental SP AT gun used the 105mm SK18.

And,in Boldin counter offensive case,they have 114 tanks operational 22.06.41,during counter offensive none was seen by germans - only later 8 used by soviet 24 infrantry dyvision which found them abadonned and used,which mean,that all was simply abadonned without fight.
Tanks was checked by army purged by Sralin,controlled by NKWD purged twice.If they wrote tat they were operational,they were operational.

Turns out whomever was supposed to reporting accurately on those tanks was lying, which was extremely common in the USSR, as the truth often meant death. I have no idea why you think Soviet reports were accurate, modern research into Soviet economic data shows that even the NKVD and KGB later had zero idea how many lies were being told which is a big reason why the USSR nearly lost the war and later collapsed.

And oder tanks with 45mm guns - it was enough to destroy every german tank then,they do not have Tigers yet.Worst,but could still fight and kill germans.

Potentially yes, but they'd have to hit first. Problem for the Soviets is the tanks broke down quickly in 1941, optics were not great or calibrated properly, two man tank turrets were highly inefficient, and the Germans were often much better at shooting and hitting first thanks to better training, team work, and communications. People tend to be too obsessed with things like armor thickness and penetration values of cannons without looking at important 'soft' factors like communications, organization, ergonomics, optics, training, etc.

 

[themarcksplan]

You're mistaken about the June 1941 casualties:
German casualties in Barbarossa 1941 - Axis History Forum

I don't trust those numbers (the AHF cite is to the wrong page, btw - p1020 of GSWW v.5/1, not p885). GSWW's source is the "10-day troop sickness certificates," which is a very odd source to use. Why would the administrative body tallying sickness certificates have any insight into how many were killed on the battlefield and never reached hospitals? GSWW sometimes has sketchy sources. In the graph cited (p1020), for example, it uses a source that gives no KIA figures for 1942 - only total casualties. Seems lazy and sketchy.

Of the sources replicated in the Wikipedia article, Deutsche Statistiches Jahrbuch is lower and only covers Feldheer+WSS. Non-Ostheer dead would have been similar to pre-Barb '41 or ~2k. IIRC Askey's stats align with mine.

Given that MIA were at least 18,000 I'd say a total of 35,000 KIA is probably closer to accurate than 27k.

Fair, let's say 35k then. I just grabbed the nearest Wikipedia cite.

Let's clarify on what we're disagreeing/discussing:

• Did the Germans lose more or fewer men per day in summer '41 against RKKA or while fighting the Westfeldzug?
• Did Soviet armies kill more or fewer Germans per RKKA-man-day in 1941 or 1943?

The second point wasn't clear, apparently. I say RKKA was better, per man, at killing Germans in 1941 than in 1943. Agree/disagree?

2 possible things:
1.German soldiers were superhumans for first 3 weeks
2.Almost all Soviet soldiers do not fought for the first 3 weeks.

This is massively simplistic. Nothing personal but I think we're too far apart in analytical tools for productive discussion.

That means the Soviets did fight, just not very well because they were seriously unprepared for what they faced

Whether the Soviets fought "very well"... What do we mean?

At the operational/strategic level they fought disastrously - obviously. Their logistics were terrible also.

At the tactical level it's pretty clear the Soviets fought better in 1941 than at any point later in the war. Again they killed as many Germans per day, with half the men and much worse equipment/supply, as they did in 1943. On my numbers they fought about as effectively as French/British soldiers also, which would be astounding.

they were able to survive and win despite being practically disemboweled in a matter of months in summer-autumn 1941.

yep. Amazing. Historians should take more seriously, however, that the 1941 disembowelling had permanent effects. Needing to use direct fire because you don't have enough well-trained artillerists, for example.

The new book Fortress Dark and Stern is a great discussion of the Soviet homefront - mind-boggling what they did without falling apart. And as the book convincingly argues, it wasn't a matter of state control only or even primarily. Soviets had to decide to fight/work/cooperate; the state lacked the ability to force them otherwise (a minority chose not to and most were unpunished).

 

[BlackDragon98]

Partisan warfare wasn't a big factor until well into 1942 and even then only ~10% of Ostheer was engaged in security operations (and the worst 10% of Ostheer at that).

Stragglers were an issue but what proportion of casualties inflicted? To argue that this is the main factor in 1941 German casualties, we'd have to see 30-50% of German casualties occurring behind the front lines. Is there any evidence that was the case? There's good evidence otherwise: straggler ambushes fell disproportionately on the rear area troops but we know that casualties were disproportionately concentrated in the front troops.

They were not partisans but rather regular Soviet soldiers that had been separated from their units and cut off by the rapid German advance.

The two are completely different things.

 

[themarcksplan]

They were not partisans but rather regular Soviet soldiers that had been separated from their units and cut off by the rapid German advance.

The two are completely different things.

My reply indicates the difference by addressing them separately.

 

[themarcksplan]

IIRC Askey's stats align with mine.

This is incorrect; I went back and checked. Reading the 10-day reports again from the archived ww2stats.com, I have to say that I can't support my earlier assertions about June 1941 Ostheer casualties. I can't remember why, at some point, I decided that the German Yearbook stats were more accurate. For various reasons I suspect the 10-day reports understate losses for this period but, again, I can't support those contentions right now.

As I said, trust in God all others (inc. me) need evidence (but also don't trust God).

-------------------------------

That said, let's take the first 40 days of Ostfeldzug as a comparison to the 47 days of Westfeldzug.

Ost: 46,470 KIA or 1,162/day.
West: ~35k dead or 744/day.

Even after correcting my earlier error, Ostfeldzug is still more costly per day.

Note that 10-day KIA ("gefallen") stats typically don't count those who later died of wounds, which increases the Ost dead count significantly (perhaps by 30%, so still not enough to vindicate my earlier figure of 22k dead).

 

[sillygoose]

They were not partisans but rather regular Soviet soldiers that had been separated from their units and cut off by the rapid German advance.

The two are completely different things.

Not exactly. Many became partisans after being cut off. The problem is the definition of the word partisan is rather nebulous. Does it refer only to specifically trained NKVD agents, anyone resisting the occupation/invasion, or somewhere in between those opposites?

This is incorrect; I went back and checked. Reading the 10-day reports again from the archived ww2stats.com, I have to say that I can't support my earlier assertions about June 1941 Ostheer casualties. I can't remember why, at some point, I decided that the German Yearbook stats were more accurate. For various reasons I suspect the 10-day reports understate losses for this period but, again, I can't support those contentions right now.

As I said, trust in God all others (inc. me) need evidence (but also don't trust God).

-------------------------------

That said, let's take the first 40 days of Ostfeldzug as a comparison to the 47 days of Westfeldzug.

Ost: 46,470 KIA or 1,162/day.
West: ~35k dead or 744/day.

Even after correcting my earlier error, Ostfeldzug is still more costly per day.

Note that 10-day KIA ("gefallen") stats typically don't count those who later died of wounds, which increases the Ost dead count significantly (perhaps by 30%, so still not enough to vindicate my earlier figure of 22k dead).

Sure, but can you also do a comparison of the number of operational Soviet aircraft and tanks vs. those of the Allies (including Dutch and Belgians)? And number of men on each side in the campaign? There were dozens more German divisions in the operation and in 47 days over 5 million Soviets encountered, which is a different scale of campaign as well.
The Germans had less aircraft in support as well.

The dead for the West in total was more like 49k, I dropped it to 35k because it eliminated things like died of wounds and KM casualties. Even at that higher total the Soviets still inflicted more casualties in a shorter time, but the numbers converge much more closely. The difference then could be said to be partisan related.

Plus none of that includes the Norwegian campaign, which was technically part of the spring-summer campaign of 1940.

I don't trust those numbers (the AHF cite is to the wrong page, btw - p1020 of GSWW v.5/1, not p885). GSWW's source is the "10-day troop sickness certificates," which is a very odd source to use. Why would the administrative body tallying sickness certificates have any insight into how many were killed on the battlefield and never reached hospitals? GSWW sometimes has sketchy sources. In the graph cited (p1020), for example, it uses a source that gives no KIA figures for 1942 - only total casualties. Seems lazy and sketchy.

Of the sources replicated in the Wikipedia article, Deutsche Statistiches Jahrbuch is lower and only covers Feldheer+WSS. Non-Ostheer dead would have been similar to pre-Barb '41 or ~2k. IIRC Askey's stats align with mine.

I'll leave this aside because it was addressed above with your later post.

Fair, let's say 35k then. I just grabbed the nearest Wikipedia cite.

Let's clarify on what we're disagreeing/discussing:

• Did the Germans lose more or fewer men per day in summer '41 against RKKA or while fighting the Westfeldzug?
• Did Soviet armies kill more or fewer Germans per RKKA-man-day in 1941 or 1943?

The second point wasn't clear, apparently. I say RKKA was better, per man, at killing Germans in 1941 than in 1943. Agree/disagree?

35k was comparing some different things, but if you want for the sake of argument we can run with that here.
At this point I'm not going to take a position, because 'better' requires a man-for-man calculation that factors in number of troops involved, heavy weapons like artillery, tanks, and aircraft if not other things I'm not considering. So really to arrive at that claim you need to control for variables. I'd say that in a very simplistic calculation like you did in a different post of number of casualties per day the Soviets did better, but there were more Soviets fighting than Allied troops, the Germans had more and better air support, the Soviets had a lot more heavy equipment, the front was much wider, etc. Surprise was a factor as well, partisans were an issue that didn't exist in the west, so on and so forth. IMHO the issue hasn't really been proven either way yet.

Not sure if Dupuy ever ran his equations on the Soviets vs. the French or 1940 British. Certainly he thought the Soviets did very poorly relative to the later American and British armies.

Whether the Soviets fought "very well"... What do we mean?

At the operational/strategic level they fought disastrously - obviously. Their logistics were terrible also.

At the tactical level it's pretty clear the Soviets fought better in 1941 than at any point later in the war. Again they killed as many Germans per day, with half the men and much worse equipment/supply, as they did in 1943. On my numbers they fought about as effectively as French/British soldiers also, which would be astounding.

The Soviets fought more resolutely in certain situations, as they were somewhat less willing to surrender than the Allies in 1940 for a variety of reasons. But then there were also a lot more of them and their quality and morale was quite variable. Without question they were willing to suffer many more losses than the Allies despite all their handicaps.

Do you have a source for the claim that the 1943 and 1941 rates were the same? Also the Germans in 1943 were a lot better equipped with weapons and had much more experience fighting the Soviets in 1943 than 1941. Though they were able to compensate the Germans did face some serious handicaps vs. the Soviets in 1941.

As to them fighting about as well as the French and British that is basically my take as well. When you account for the variables they certainly fought not worse despite the massive surrenders and were failed by their leadership at the strategic and operational levels. Does make you think how dangerous they would have been had they not been caught by surprise and wrong footed.

yep. Amazing. Historians should take more seriously, however, that the 1941 disembowelling had permanent effects. Needing to use direct fire because you don't have enough well-trained artillerists, for example.

I think that is generally acknowledged.
The Soviets never really recovered from 1941 even by 1945 and that should be acknowledged more rather than simply stating that the Soviets were the bestest ever in 1945, rather than the reality being that they were fighting a collapsing foe that was being overloaded on all fronts, so couldn't resist effectively especially when Hitler ceased to follow even basic logic. Frankly I think the Soviets got lucky that in 1944-45 Hitler was making major mistakes that played to their strengths; things could have been much bloodier for them otherwise.

The new book Fortress Dark and Stern is a great discussion of the Soviet homefront - mind-boggling what they did without falling apart. And as the book convincingly argues, it wasn't a matter of state control only or even primarily. Soviets had to decide to fight/work/cooperate; the state lacked the ability to force them otherwise (a minority chose not to and most were unpunished).

Yeah I have that book and have been meaning to read it (among many others, not enough time in the month!).
Frankly I think by 1941 the Soviet people had been so brutalized from 1914-1941 that they were psychologically broken into submission to authority. Like a cultist who cannot conceive of like outside the cult due to operant conditioning. So while people 'chose' to keep going along it seems that they really had no other choice because conceptually they couldn't conceive of anything else after a generation under Soviet domination and abuse. Of course we see this in modern society, where if you can induce fear in the public they can be very easily manipulated if authorities have some credibility.

 

[themarcksplan]

Do you have a source for the claim that the 1943 and 1941 rates were the same?

Sources and summary below, comparing July-Nov "Tot" for Feldheer+WSS in the East only.

1941:
July: 36.858
August: 41.039
Sept: 29.419
Oct: 24.056
Nov: 17.806

Total: 149.178

1943:
July: 34.874
August: 33.962
Sept: 20.264
Oct: 25.815
Nov:18.609

Total: 133.524

In 1941, RKKA fronts averaged perhaps 3mil per month; in 1943 twice that.

Per Krivosheev's data, RKKA's bloody losses peaked in 3Q '43. His data for 1941 show much lower numbers but probably can't be trusted. So it's hard to get a comparative bloody casualty attrition ratio and the 1941 real stats will probably never be known.

Nonetheless, it's not clear the Germans were killing as many Soviets in 1941 as in 1943 (required to equalize the bloody casualty ratio). '43 Heer had nearly as many men in July '43 as July '41 and in '43 it had much better weapons/ammo/logistics. We'd have to assume that Heer combat effectiveness declined dramatically, which is hard to argue for 1943.

Even if there's a feasible argument that bloody casualty ratios in '41 and '43 were equal, that the '41 RKKA achieved such parity with half the relative force ratio would indicate much higher Soviet combat effectiveness in 1941.

Though they were able to compensate the Germans did face some serious handicaps vs. the Soviets in 1941.

Sure but it's far from clear the Soviet handicaps weren't worse. They lost probably half of their ammo supply as the depots were overrun, for example, and few of their vehicles had sufficient spare parts.

As to them fighting about as well as the French and British that is basically my take as well

Does make you think how dangerous they would have been had they not been caught by surprise and wrong footed.

Yeah. The Suvorov/Nazi claims of imminent Soviet attack in 1941 are lies but Hitler absolutely would have been fucked had he let the RKKA grow for a few years while he battled the West. Stalin probably could have reached the Rhine or Seine before the Allies could have landed a substantial force in Europe.

I'm always amused when people respond to this point by saying "Oh you think Stalin would have attacked Hitler? That's what the Nazis say." It's like, what's your point? Are you saying that it's bad to attack Hitler? So Chamberlain and Daladier were criminals?

 

[ATP]

Sources and summary below, comparing July-Nov "Tot" for Feldheer+WSS in the East only.

1941:
July: 36.858
August: 41.039
Sept: 29.419
Oct: 24.056
Nov: 17.806

Total: 149.178

1943:
July: 34.874
August: 33.962
Sept: 20.264
Oct: 25.815
Nov:18.609

Total: 133.524

In 1941, RKKA fronts averaged perhaps 3mil per month; in 1943 twice that.

Per Krivosheev's data, RKKA's bloody losses peaked in 3Q '43. His data for 1941 show much lower numbers but probably can't be trusted. So it's hard to get a comparative bloody casualty attrition ratio and the 1941 real stats will probably never be known.

Nonetheless, it's not clear the Germans were killing as many Soviets in 1941 as in 1943 (required to equalize the bloody casualty ratio). '43 Heer had nearly as many men in July '43 as July '41 and in '43 it had much better weapons/ammo/logistics. We'd have to assume that Heer combat effectiveness declined dramatically, which is hard to argue for 1943.

Even if there's a feasible argument that bloody casualty ratios in '41 and '43 were equal, that the '41 RKKA achieved such parity with half the relative force ratio would indicate much higher Soviet combat effectiveness in 1941.



Sure but it's far from clear the Soviet handicaps weren't worse. They lost probably half of their ammo supply as the depots were overrun, for example, and few of their vehicles had sufficient spare parts.







Yeah. The Suvorov/Nazi claims of imminent Soviet attack in 1941 are lies but Hitler absolutely would have been fucked had he let the RKKA grow for a few years while he battled the West. Stalin probably could have reached the Rhine or Seine before the Allies could have landed a substantial force in Europe.

I'm always amused when people respond to this point by saying "Oh you think Stalin would have attacked Hitler? That's what the Nazis say." It's like, what's your point? Are you saying that it's bad to attack Hitler? So Chamberlain and Daladier were criminals?

Soviets in 1941 amassed troops on border,including artillery.Ammo was keep on the ground,and they do not planned built schelters for it.Soviet troops could live in winter in tents,but their ammo after such treatment would be scrap metal.

They have 16 paratrooper brigades with gliders for them,but not planned buiklt hangars - after winter it would be remnants of wooden construction.

So yes,soviets planned attack in 1941,and german backstabbed their allies first.Good for Europe,or not? after genociding 20% of western european,those who survive would not praise commies anymore.
And blasted system would fall thanks to economy anyway.