The Kaiser's World: Speculating on a German victory in 1918

[WolfBear]

While I highly respect his expertise in terms of the military side of the equation, I do think he has allowed his focus on the German end to obscure the political and military conditions that would effect the Entente in this case. In particular, the comparison to WWII falls flat because, unlike that conflict, there is no Eastern Front consuming millions of German soldiers nor is the technology there for a sustained strategic bombing campaign like that the Anglo-Americans wielded historically to bring German industry to her knees. Further, unlike 1940, by 1918 the British have taken millions of casualties and the war weariness is biting in even with the Americans in; Lord Milner's note to Lloyd George is from June of 1918.

If the French are knocked out and the BEF forced off the conflict, it will take a least a year to rebuild said BEF while without French industry the Americans won't be ready until 1920. In that time, Germany will have had two years to settle the situation in the East to her benefit, granting the immense resources the Germans sought in two world wars while also granting two years of time during which Berlin could work to conserve its manpower and more effectively transfer forces from the East in a way the Germans didn't manage to in 1918. Thereafter, the Anglo-Americans would be faced with the daunting issue of how to even get at the Germans. Attacking Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands is right out the window, as is landing on the German coast directly. That leaves only the Italy/Balkans options with all that entails or effectively declaring war upon the (now neutral) French to do a landing there. Given how seriously the French reacted to Mers-el-Kebir, I don't imagine they would react well to this either...

All of this is also assuming, of course, that Anglo-American political willpower holds out for this long and manpower in general for the British. The Irish issue, for all that entails in Anglo-American relations, would also be quickly becoming an unavoidable problem.

I also wonder if an amphibious landing along the lines of D-Day would have actually been logistically feasible with the technology of the late 1910s even if the political will to launch such an invasion would have actually existed. Gallipoli certainly doesn't provide a good example here, after all. What do you think?

BTW, somewhat off-topic, but I disagree with you that the Allies would have been compelled to seek a compromise peace had the Germans maintained military discipline and continued the fight into 1919 (so, nothing changes until late 1918 relative to real life). Yes, taking the fortess of Metz might have very well resulted in a Verdun-like bloodbath for the Americans, but the Republicans who won control of the US Congress in November 1918 did not run on a pro-peace platform. If anything, they would have been inclined to criticize Woodrow Wilson from the right for being too soft on Germany. And AFAIK even Wilson believed that a lasting peace can only be achieved once the Kaiserreich system in Germany would be dismantled and Germany's political system would be rebuild in a more democratic direction, which suggests that it would require quite a lot of US casualties to make even Wilson think about pursuing a compromise peace with Germany.

After taking Metz, the Allies simply need to successfully broach the Rhine River fortifications and then they should be good to go, no? :

File:Rhine frontier fortifications, 1914.jpg - Wikimedia Commons

commons.wikimedia.org

As for the effects of having, say, 500,000 US deaths in World War I rather than real life's 116,500, it could certainly make the US more isolationist in the post-WWI years and decades. However, it could also have an effect in the sense that Wilson's term will be ending and thus a different US President might be handling the post-WWI aftermath in comparison to Wilson. That could have its own effects. And not to mention that a longer war could have effects on Germany as well. For instance, maybe Wilhelm Marx wins in 1925 rather than Paul von Hindenburg, in which case Weimar democracy gets a huge shot in the arm!

 

[WolfBear]

You can't really compare 18th Century and 20th Century warfare.


Königsberg was in fact an important harbour and military hub, holding both large supply stores and fortifications. This alone makes East Prussia worth it, let alone the millions of Germans who he Kaiser is sworn to protect (you still have not addressed this).


Again, there is no guarantee abandoning East Prussia from the outset would lead to any increased chance in German victory, quite the opposite in fact.


I'm not sure why you're obsessing over the religious denominations of the Teutonic Order and Hohenzollerns. By 1914 intra-religious differences had all but completely died away in Germany, with ethno-linguistic identity becoming triumphant. Any debate on who has the "right" to Marienburg, especially any weighted with religious arguments, is ridiculous, frankly. The Teutonic Order was a distant memory, what mattered was that Marienburg was German, and it was overwhelmingly so for a over a hundred years. Hell, even in 1919 less than 2% of the population voted to leave Germany and join Poland.


You have neither shown how abandoning East Prussia would win them the war, nor that sentimentalism is the only reason why they defended it.


So what? They were not annexed and enthusiastically founded the German Empire with Prussia five years later.


Again, so what?


Bavarians should care about all of Germany, including Prussia(ns) over all foreigners.


Again, the real world is not a paradox game where you can play Stalin and offer millions of citizens to the enemy to be raped, plundered, and murdered.

Abandoning East Prussia at the start of the war would mean Russian soldiers' boots on the Junkers' estates, which is likely to be intolerable to the German elite, especially those who believed in Teutonic superiority over the Slavs.

 

[WolfBear]

@History Learner: If you don't mind, I'd like to hear your thoughts as to how exactly Russia would develop in this scenario. That's where my ancestors actually lived back then. Well, that and Ukraine + Belarus.

It seems to me like Germany would be the Soviet Union to Russia's China in this scenario. In other words, Russia would initially be the junior partner to Germany but would eventually overshadow Germany due to its sheer population, which won't suffer from most of the extreme demographic devastation that Russia suffered during the 20th century in real life. Getting capital into Russia might be a problem considering that a defeated France will have less capital to spare--maybe Britain and/or the US, or perhaps even Japan could be considered as being major investors in Russia? But I don't know if any of them would actually be interested in doing this to the same level that the French were before World War I. And this is of course assuming that the Bolsheviks are quickly overthrown by the Germans after the Germans' World War I victory.

Of course, Russia could industrialize by itself if it could actually find some totalitarian strongman who would be willing to do this and who'd be able to use brutal force and coercion to get the job done. But it would likely be a right-wing totalitarian strongman rather than a left-wing one--which would still be better than Russia's fate in real life, all things considered. Russia had quite a lot of potential due to its huge population once it will actually have universal literacy--and it was definitely heading in that direction before World War I, with around two-thirds of Russian draftees being literate in 1913, if I recall correctly. And Russia's industry even before World War I was not particularly primitive--it's just that Russia didn't actually have all that much of it:

Russian Manufacturing Productivity on Par with France\'s. (In 1908).

Lychakov, N. I., Saprykin, D. L., & Vanteeva, N. (2020). Not Backward: Comparative Labour Productivity In British And Russian Manufacturing, Circa 1908 (WP BRP 199/HUM/2020). National Research University Higher School of Economics. (h/t @devarbol) This recent paper says that the Russian Empire...

www.unz.com

But this should eventually change over time even with a German victory in World War I. If China was able to climb out of poverty after decades of Maoist lunacy, then so can Russia after World War I and its civil war in this scenario.

I know from Adam Tooze's The Deluge that the Germans were flirting with returning Ukraine to Russia in exchange for German economic domination of all of Russia, but the question is just how long such an arrangement would have actually lasted. Eventually, Russia would have become sufficiently strong and could thus tell Germany to get lost. At that point in time, an outright invasion of Russia might end up being too costly for Germany, especially if it will take place in the 1940s or later. So, Yeah, it's an open question as to whether Germany ends up permanently keeping Ukraine as a satellite state--though I suppose that Germany could retreat west of the Dnieper River and give up only the eastern part of Ukraine to Russia.

This scenario would, of course, be much better for Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Jews, and Kazakhs relative to real life. No mass famines (Holodomor, et cetera), mass purges (the Great Purge of 1937-1938, et cetera), mass murders (Holocaust, et cetera), decades of living under Communist tyranny, misery, and oppression, et cetera.

 

[sillygoose]

@History Learner: If you don't mind, I'd like to hear your thoughts as to how exactly Russia would develop in this scenario. That's where my ancestors actually lived back then. Well, that and Ukraine + Belarus.

It seems to me like Germany would be the Soviet Union to Russia's China in this scenario. In other words, Russia would initially be the junior partner to Germany but would eventually overshadow Germany due to its sheer population, which won't suffer from most of the extreme demographic devastation that Russia suffered during the 20th century in real life. Getting capital into Russia might be a problem considering that a defeated France will have less capital to spare--maybe Britain and/or the US, or perhaps even Japan could be considered as being major investors in Russia? But I don't know if any of them would actually be interested in doing this to the same level that the French were before World War I. And this is of course assuming that the Bolsheviks are quickly overthrown by the Germans after the Germans' World War I victory.

Of course, Russia could industrialize by itself if it could actually find some totalitarian strongman who would be willing to do this and who'd be able to use brutal force and coercion to get the job done. But it would likely be a right-wing totalitarian strongman rather than a left-wing one--which would still be better than Russia's fate in real life, all things considered. Russia had quite a lot of potential due to its huge population once it will actually have universal literacy--and it was definitely heading in that direction before World War I, with around two-thirds of Russian draftees being literate in 1913, if I recall correctly. And Russia's industry even before World War I was not particularly primitive--it's just that Russia didn't actually have all that much of it:

Russian Manufacturing Productivity on Par with France\'s. (In 1908).

Lychakov, N. I., Saprykin, D. L., & Vanteeva, N. (2020). Not Backward: Comparative Labour Productivity In British And Russian Manufacturing, Circa 1908 (WP BRP 199/HUM/2020). National Research University Higher School of Economics. (h/t @devarbol) This recent paper says that the Russian Empire...

www.unz.com

But this should eventually change over time even with a German victory in World War I. If China was able to climb out of poverty after decades of Maoist lunacy, then so can Russia after World War I and its civil war in this scenario.

I know from Adam Tooze's The Deluge that the Germans were flirting with returning Ukraine to Russia in exchange for German economic domination of all of Russia, but the question is just how long such an arrangement would have actually lasted. Eventually, Russia would have become sufficiently strong and could thus tell Germany to get lost. At that point in time, an outright invasion of Russia might end up being too costly for Germany, especially if it will take place in the 1940s or later. So, Yeah, it's an open question as to whether Germany ends up permanently keeping Ukraine as a satellite state--though I suppose that Germany could retreat west of the Dnieper River and give up only the eastern part of Ukraine to Russia.

This scenario would, of course, be much better for Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Jews, and Kazakhs relative to real life. No mass famines (Holodomor, et cetera), mass purges (the Great Purge of 1937-1938, et cetera), mass murders (Holocaust, et cetera), decades of living under Communist tyranny, misery, and oppression, et cetera.

I'm assuming this is the post you wanted me to reply to. Russia would be defeated and having expropriated German property (factories mostly) in 1915 I doubt there would be much collaboration for some time. Besides at this point the Brest-Litovsk deal had been signed, so there is no need to work with Russia at all, just build up their puppet states in the East. Given the lower levels of industrialization and German need for raw materials likely these states exist as a resource farm for Germany with cheap manufacturing set up like Germany had done in Russia prior to WW1. They wouldn't be China as the population differential would be substantially less and if anything the German birthrate would remain pretty high given the lower losses, early end to the war, and lots of resources flowing in post-war. OTL defeat + peace deal was pretty devastating to Germany from 1919 onwards, so it would be a very different state had it actually won.

Once things settle down it would actually be better for all the puppet states than living under Stalin, as there was no series of devastating civil wars or Stalinist policies. Plus the CPs weren't the Nazis in terms of ruthlessly exploiting territories in the East.

Rump Russia on the other hand would be a basket case without the B-L territories and could potentially collapse. No one would give them capital if the Bolsheviks won the civil war and if the Germans actually won WW1 the Allies would not be in a position to help, both due to the French, British, and Italians being unable to pay back much if anything to the US if defeated and the US not having that money plus having a Germany in control over Europe's economy and politics. Rump Russia is screwed no matter who wins the civil war. Bolsheviks losing still wouldn't be able to honor Russia's debts and if they did the bulk of it was to France, which is under the German thumb now. Germany wouldn't necessarily even want to topple the Bolsheviks given their agreement to the B-L treaty terms and how that would leave them with a virtually economically non-viable state. "Nature" would take its course there.

So post this ATL WW1 Russia wouldn't be anything close to the state that existed pre-WW1, so don't even think about what they were then as a model for ATL Russia after this defeat, especially without capital to recover from the war and its core developed resource territories.

Remember this was the treaty of BL:

Treaty of Brest-Litovsk - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine became independent, while Bessarabia united with Romania.

Russia lost 34% of its population, 54% of its industrial land, 89% of its coalfields, and 26% of its railways. Russia was also fined 300 million gold marks.

At the insistence of Talaat Pasha, the treaty declared that the territory Russia took from the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), specifically Ardahan, Kars, and Batumi, were to be returned. At the time of the treaty, this territory was under the effective control of Armenian and Georgian forces.

Paragraph 3 of Article IV of the treaty stated that:

The districts of Erdehan, Kars, and Batum will likewise and without delay be cleared of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the reorganization of the national and international relations of these districts, but leave it to the population of these districts to carry out this reorganization in agreement with the neighboring states, especially with the Ottoman Empire.

Then they had a financial agreement with the Bolsheviks:

In the wake of Soviet repudiation of Tsarist bonds, the nationalisation of foreign-owned property and confiscation of foreign assets, and Entente forces landing on Russian territory, the Soviets and Germany signed an additional agreement on 27 August 1918. The Soviets agreed to pay six billion marks in compensation for German losses.

ARTICLE 2 Russia shall pay Germany six billion marks as compensation for losses sustained by Germans through Russian measures; at the same time corresponding claims on Russia's part are taken into account, and the value of supplies confiscated in Russia by German military forces after the conclusion of peace is taken into account.[35]

The amount was equal to 300 million rubles.[36] The Soviets additionally agreed to sell Germany 25% of the output of the Baku oil fields. Three secret clauses provided for German military action against Entente forces on Russian soil, as well as the expulsion of British troops from Baku.[30]

Question is whether the Allies would still land if defeated in France and if that would make a difference to the final treaty.

China after Mao and Russia in this situation are VASTLY different. China wasn't dismembered in the 1980s and was actually built up significantly after Mao figured out the cost of his stupidity.

As to Ukraine IIRC what Tooze was talking about was after the situation in France didn't go well. Unless there was a major uprising they couldn't put down or Bolshevik invasion that violated the treaty later they'd likely hold Ukraine they got under the treaty, since post-victory they'd have the manpower to do so. Ukraine had the potential to be quite developed though in time if held together and the Kiev-Berlin relationship was good, since Germany and Ukraine's economies complemented one another and Ukraine would be the bulwark in the East against a resurgent Russia.

Question is what happens to A-H in this timeline and if it falls apart since that would strain German resources. Ultimately though assuming things hold together post-war Europe would be in a particularly powerful position vis-a-vis the US, UK, and rump Russia, which probably prevents another war, though the remaining Allies probably have a pretty rough ride for the next couple of decades and have internal issues. Italy might go socialist, the UK could find itself broke and would face a major reckoning politically for the outcome of the war, the US too also left holding the bag for all the war debt from Europe plus now have unfavorable trade relations with their biggest trade partner, Europe, which likely has import/export policy run from Berlin and is in a position to play hardball with the Allies to ensure they are financially damaged by the war loans issue to lessen the post-war threat they pose.

 

[History Learner]

The Trans-Siberian railroad's operation depends on Russian goodwill, which is not guaranteed to last indefinitely. Remember that even if Russia loses Ukraine but keeps Central Asia, Russia's total population might be around 400 million by the early 21st century. Germany won't be able to economically bully Russia forever. Eventually, Russia will somehow have to crawl out of its slump; it certainly has the necessary levels of human capital for this--or at least would with universal education and whatnot.

Here, Germany would secure an alternative route for this that isn't dependent on Russian goodwill and would also help promote trade and commerce in Muslim countries. Due to Germany's alliance with the Ottoman Empire, Germany tried to make religious appeals to the Muslim world against Anglo-French colonialism (also "Haji Wilhelm" and all of that).

Of course, I wonder just how strained the German-Ottoman relationship will be if the Ottomans will keep Baku against the Germans' wishes. The Ottomans need something to show for all of their sacrifices in the war, you know? Plus controlling Baku will make them somewhat less dependent on Germany, if the Ottomans can actually permanently keep oil-rich Baku.

Russia presents the most direct route and a single central authority, instead of a longer route via quite literally half a dozen countries, many of whom Germany has much less leverage over. Ludendorff's intention was to establish a Russian puppet government, which would be beholden to German interests via economic and military ties. Should Russia emerge too strong to be contained in the future (TTL's Sino-Soviet split, perhaps?), then it would still be much weaker than the historical Soviet Union given the Germans will have control over the Ukraine, Baltics, the Caucasus, etc. That also removes any buffer space and natural defensive lines to contain a German offensive on this Russia, making it far easier to militarily defeat them it was historically.

 

[WolfBear]

Russia presents the most direct route and a single central authority, instead of a longer route via quite literally half a dozen countries, many of whom Germany has much less leverage over. Ludendorff's intention was to establish a Russian puppet government, which would be beholden to German interests via economic and military ties. Should Russia emerge too strong to be contained in the future (TTL's Sino-Soviet split, perhaps?), then it would still be much weaker than the historical Soviet Union given the Germans will have control over the Ukraine, Baltics, the Caucasus, etc. That also removes any buffer space and natural defensive lines to contain a German offensive on this Russia, making it far easier to militarily defeat them it was historically.

German influence in Persia and Afghanistan could be obtained through German economic penetration of those countries and through the use of Muslim religious appeals from the Ottoman Empire, no?

Also, the issue isn't that Germany will be unable to defeat Russia in a conventional war but that Germany will not be able to defeat a subsequent Russian insurgency. Look at Afghanistan in 2001 vs. 2021 for an example for what I'm talking about here. Sure, the Germans might very well be able to march onto Moscow and St. Petersburg, and maybe on some other Russian cities as well, but then what? The Russian people certainly aren't going to be very fond of any German puppet government in Russia, and some or even many of them might be willing to resist this with military force. Pacifying a huge country such as Russia is likely going to be quite a challenge, especially when Nazi methods such as extremely massive deportations are going to be off the table due to public outrage (the German Reichstag likely won't tolerate such measures, even against Russian rebels).

 

[History Learner]

German influence in Persia and Afghanistan could be obtained through German economic penetration of those countries and through the use of Muslim religious appeals from the Ottoman Empire, no?

Long lasting economic penetration of Eastern Europe could achieve the same, with far less authorities to deal with and again, on the most direct route from Germany.

Also, the issue isn't that Germany will be unable to defeat Russia in a conventional war but that Germany will not be able to defeat a subsequent Russian insurgency. Look at Afghanistan in 2001 vs. 2021 for an example for what I'm talking about here. Sure, the Germans might very well be able to march onto Moscow and St. Petersburg, and maybe on some other Russian cities as well, but then what? The Russian people certainly aren't going to be very fond of any German puppet government in Russia, and some or even many of them might be willing to resist this with military force. Pacifying a huge country such as Russia is likely going to be quite a challenge, especially when Nazi methods such as extremely massive deportations are going to be off the table due to public outrage (the German Reichstag likely won't tolerate such measures, even against Russian rebels).

The difference between Russia and Germany is less than the difference between the UK and India. More specifically, in the case of resistance, I like to cite Peter Liberman's Does Conquest Pay:

This book will argue that invaders can, in fact, make conquest "pay" in the limited sense that they can exploit seized industrial economies for their own purposes. To demonstrate this, I have assembled evidence on the imperial revenues, policing costs, and productivity of several twentieth-century occupations and empires. The evidence shows that modern societies can be mobilized intensively in the short run or controlled and "farmed" in the long run. This is true, however, only for ruthless oppressors. Invaders who are morally, internationally, or economically constrained from applying coercion and repression find their attempts at exploitation foiled by massive popular opposition.​

 

[WolfBear]

Long lasting economic penetration of Eastern Europe could achieve the same, with far less authorities to deal with and again, on the most direct route from Germany.

But would such a large country as Russia be as easy for Germany to economically penetrate indefinitely?

The difference between Russia and Germany is less than the difference between the UK and India. More specifically, in the case of resistance, I like to cite Peter Liberman's Does Conquest Pay:

This book will argue that invaders can, in fact, make conquest "pay" in the limited sense that they can exploit seized industrial economies for their own purposes. To demonstrate this, I have assembled evidence on the imperial revenues, policing costs, and productivity of several twentieth-century occupations and empires. The evidence shows that modern societies can be mobilized intensively in the short run or controlled and "farmed" in the long run. This is true, however, only for ruthless oppressors. Invaders who are morally, internationally, or economically constrained from applying coercion and repression find their attempts at exploitation foiled by massive popular opposition.​

If you'll notice, you'll see that it actually agrees with what I wrote above. Only ruthless and brutal oppressors are able to get their way in regards to occupations. Those who are too nice often don't. And when it comes to a German occupation of Russia, the German Reichstag will very likely aim to curtain Germany's worst excesses. You need to remember that the German Social Democrats weren't very fond of imperialism. Even in Eastern Europe, AFAIK, they wanted genuine independence for the various Eastern European countries as opposed to mere German satellite/puppet state status. Ditto for the German Zentrum Party.

 

[WolfBear]

I feel like I should also address the India argument here: Yes, Britain was able to subjugate India, but gradually, over the course of decades, if not centuries. It certainly wasn't able to do this in just a couple of years. If you want an example of an attempt to subjugate a country in just a couple of years, you could take a look at Japan's war in China in 1937-1945, but even then, Japan never actually managed to occupy all of China. Large parts of China, sure, but not all of China by any means. Had Japan stayed in China for 100 years and no other major changes (nukes, foreign intervention, et cetera) would have occurred, then Japan might have indeed been able to conquer all of China. But, again, it simply couldn't do this over a timeframe of just several years. At least not without extremely brutal Nazi-style methods. Would this be any different for Germany and Russia? Japan and China were fairly close to each other culturally speaking, no?

Honestly, I'm just not sure that the German people would actually be willing to tolerate having Germany stay in Russia for more than 5-10 years, unless perhaps it's an extremely small German troop commitment. If German troops will be returning home in body bags, then this might very well sour Germans on any German military intervention in Russia, especially when it is merely used to pursue German imperialistic aims. And again, the moderate and liberal German parties such as the Social Democrats and Zentrum certainly won't approve of Germany using Nazi-style methods in the East to ensure compliance with the new German order there.

 

[History Learner]

But would such a large country as Russia be as easy for Germany to economically penetrate indefinitely?

Forever? No, but then no Empire tends to be forever anyway too; Britain controlled India for about 150 years though.

If you'll notice, you'll see that it actually agrees with what I wrote above. Only ruthless and brutal oppressors are able to get their way in regards to occupations. Those who are too nice often don't. And when it comes to a German occupation of Russia, the German Reichstag will very likely aim to curtain Germany's worst excesses. You need to remember that the German Social Democrats weren't very fond of imperialism. Even in Eastern Europe, AFAIK, they wanted genuine independence for the various Eastern European countries as opposed to mere German satellite/puppet state status. Ditto for the German Zentrum Party.

Adam Tooze directly notes the Reichstag had lost its ability to fully reign in the Army by 1918, and certainly the Social Democrats were powerless to stop the Hereo Genocide in 1912. Really though, you don't need Eastern Front level atrocities; the Germans held a comparatively lighter hand in Western Europe, which is the focus of Chapter 3 of the book, to great effect for themselves.

 

[WolfBear]

Forever? No, but then no Empire tends to be forever anyway too; Britain controlled India for about 150 years though.

Yes, but it didn't swallow all of India in one gulp.

Adam Tooze directly notes the Reichstag had lost its ability to fully reign in the Army by 1918, and certainly the Social Democrats were powerless to stop the Hereo Genocide in 1912. Really though, you don't need Eastern Front level atrocities; the Germans held a comparatively lighter hand in Western Europe, which is the focus of Chapter 3 of the book, to great effect for themselves.

But wouldn't the Reichstag be capable of reasserting its control over the German military in peacetime? And it could also learn lessons from its relative powerlessness over the German military during World War I for use in future German wars.

Also, Germany didn't occupy all that much territory in western Europe in World War I. Just Belgium and heavily industrial parts of northeastern France.

 

[History Learner]

Yes, but it didn't swallow all of India in one gulp.

Sure, but then neither does Germany; it's a process starting in 1914 and the balance of power between Germany and occupied Russia is more favorable.

But wouldn't the Reichstag be capable of reasserting its control over the German military in peacetime? And it could also learn lessons from its relative powerlessness over the German military during World War I for use in future German wars.

Perhaps, but I don't it was force a weak hand on occupation policies if a firmer one is needed.

Also, Germany didn't occupy all that much territory in western Europe in World War I. Just Belgium and heavily industrial parts of northeastern France.

I was talking about WWII, but there's also a Chapter in the aforementioned book concerning these occupations. It's on Libgen too.

 

[WolfBear]

Sure, but then neither does Germany; it's a process starting in 1914 and the balance of power between Germany and occupied Russia is more favorable.



Perhaps, but I don't it was force a weak hand on occupation policies if a firmer one is needed.



I was talking about WWII, but there's also a Chapter in the aforementioned book concerning these occupations. It's on Libgen too.

OK, but the Brits had over a century to solidify their hold on India. Are the Germans actually going to have that long re: Russia? Worth noting that most Indians were still rural and illiterate even after over a century of them being ruled by Europeans (primarily Brits). But at least 2/3 of young adult male Russians were already literate in 1913 if Russian military conscript literacy data from that year is anything to go by!

AFAIK, though, the German liberals were generally more inclined to support national self-determination, at least for Europeans. German imperialism in Russia might not exactly be compatible with their vision of Russian national self-determination. You gotta keep in mind that AFAIK there was a sense of working-class solidarity among European socialists in different countries in the early 20th century.

Well, in World War II, the Nazis did have their occasional violent outbursts even in the West:

Oradour-sur-Glane massacre - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

AFAIK, that massacre was unauthorized, but still, it could be a good picture of what the Nazis could do if Westerners were much more restless. I mean the Westerners whom they will still be occupying.

 

[History Learner]

OK, but the Brits had over a century to solidify their hold on India. Are the Germans actually going to have that long re: Russia? Worth noting that most Indians were still rural and illiterate even after over a century of them being ruled by Europeans (primarily Brits). But at least 2/3 of young adult male Russians were already literate in 1913 if Russian military conscript literacy data from that year is anything to go by!

AFAIK, though, the German liberals were generally more inclined to support national self-determination, at least for Europeans. German imperialism in Russia might not exactly be compatible with their vision of Russian national self-determination. You gotta keep in mind that AFAIK there was a sense of working-class solidarity among European socialists in different countries in the early 20th century.

Well, in World War II, the Nazis did have their occasional violent outbursts even in the West:

Oradour-sur-Glane massacre - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

AFAIK, that massacre was unauthorized, but still, it could be a good picture of what the Nazis could do if Westerners were much more restless. I mean the Westerners whom they will still be occupying.

British control over India was achieved in a much shorter period than a century, really it was a process that took about 30 years to bring most of India under its control. Aiding the German effort is they want puppet states, rather than direct administration over Russia; economic deals, military limitations on the Russians themselves, etc.

 

[WolfBear]

British control over India was achieved in a much shorter period than a century, really it was a process that took about 30 years to bring most of India under its control. Aiding the German effort is they want puppet states, rather than direct administration over Russia; economic deals, military limitations on the Russians themselves, etc.

Interesting. And Yeah, Germany wants puppet states in places like Poland, Ukraine, the Baltics, and maybe the Caucasus but I was talking about what remained of Russia afterwards. In other words, rump Russia. Similar to Russia's post-1991 borders, I suppose, but also likely including Central Asia.

By the way, @History Learner, I've got another question for you: Which European countries are likely to end up being/becoming (and, of course, remaining) republics by 1950 in this scenario?

 

[WolfBear]

Also, some additional questions for @History Learner, @Skallagrim, and @stevep:

1. Is there any realistic way for Germany to eventually become a republic after winning WWI?

2. Is there any realistic way for Germany to keep the Bolsheviks in power in Russia after winning WWI?

3. What will the role of the Jews be in Mitteleuropa after a German WWI victory?

4. Just how much Eastern European (and Central European) immigration to Germany are we going to see between 1918 and 2022 in this TL?

 

[Skallagrim]

1. Is there any realistic way for Germany to eventually become a republic after winning WWI?

Many ways, but most are predicated on a second World War in which the revanchist former Entente powers destroy the German monarchy.

By itself, Germany is unlikely to make the change. If the Kaiser is just too much of an idiot, it's easier to force him to abdicate and replace him with his eldest son (or some other suitable relative).

2. Is there any realistic way for Germany to keep the Bolsheviks in power in Russia after winning WWI?

There are realistic ways in which they could fail to dislodge the Bolsheviks from power. I can't see Germany actively wanting to keep them in power.

3. What will the role of the Jews be in Mitteleuropa after a German WWI victory?

Habitual anti-semitism will continue. Given a victory, I don't expect Germany to produce a genocidal regime of fringe loonies. On the other hand, Russia may turn out to be extremely horrible. You may see prolonged civil war. You may see the Whites win. Or you may just see the Reds win, and then someone like Stalin rises to the top.

None of these scenarios would be good for the Jews (or, indeed, for any great number of others).

4. Just how much Eastern European (and Central European) immigration to Germany are we going to see between 1918 and 2022 in this TL?

Supposing that Germany has hegemony over these regions (Poland, Baltics, Belarus, Western Ukraine, Crimea), I'd expect more migration from those regions than in OTL, starting much earlier.

By contrast, the OTL Turkish migration to Germany would probably not occur as a result. (Why invite Turkish guest labourers when you already have a huge supply of Ukrainian guest labourers?)

 

[WolfBear]

Many ways, but most are predicated on a second World War in which the revanchist former Entente powers destroy the German monarchy.

By itself, Germany is unlikely to make the change. If the Kaiser is just too much of an idiot, it's easier to force him to abdicate and replace him with his eldest son (or some other suitable relative).


There are realistic ways in which they could fail to dislodge the Bolsheviks from power. I can't see Germany actively wanting to keep them in power.


Habitual anti-semitism will continue. Given a victory, I don't expect Germany to produce a genocidal regime of fringe loonies. On the other hand, Russia may turn out to be extremely horrible. You may see prolonged civil war. You may see the Whites win. Or you may just see the Reds win, and then someone like Stalin rises to the top.

None of these scenarios would be good for the Jews (or, indeed, for any great number of others).


Supposing that Germany has hegemony over these regions (Poland, Baltics, Belarus, Western Ukraine, Crimea), I'd expect more migration from those regions than in OTL, starting much earlier.

By contrast, the OTL Turkish migration to Germany would probably not occur as a result. (Why invite Turkish guest labourers when you already have a huge supply of Ukrainian guest labourers?)

Sucks that Germany can't become a republic without losing any wars.

What do you think is the most likely scenario for Russia here?

Russian Jews could find refuge in Mitteleuropa in such a scenario, no?

That makes sense. Also, could these guest workers eventually become permanent residents of Germany? That's what happened to the Turks, Yugoslavs, et cetera who moved to Germany in the post-WWII decades in real life, after all.

 

[WolfBear]

@History Learner When do you think Germany ends up successfully developing nuclear weapons in this TL? And do any other countries beat it to the punch in regards to this?

And do H & L both permanently retire after winning WWI for Germany in this TL?

 

[History Learner]

@History Learner When do you think Germany ends up successfully developing nuclear weapons in this TL? And do any other countries beat it to the punch in regards to this?

And do H & L both permanently retire after winning WWI for Germany in this TL?

Germany had a large lead in physics, and here would be so economically powerful I would have no doubt about it becoming the first nuclear power. With regards to H&L, it's a good question to which I have no answer. Hindenburg seems likely to retire as a Foch/Petain figure, while "L" is an open ended question.