Thoughts on consequences of a total Polish defeat in the Soviet war of 1920

[sillygoose]

Here's the map:

West Prussia - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Thanks

Also, territorial revisions would not have been possible without a new war with Poland, especially when they would have involved sovereign Polish territory like Weimar (unlike Hitler) wanted. And West Germany also kept the door open to territorial revision in the 1949-1990 time period but ultimately it didn't go anywhere other than German unification because no one else would actually support them in this.

Not necessarily. The problem was FDR got involved behind the scenes and forced Chamberlain to take a hardline stance beyond even what public pressure had required as well as convincing the Poles that the US would be behind them, so Germany simply could not win and Poland would get more German territory and they could push out the German minority during the war.

West Germany's position on the eastern border was a function of trying not to alienate the expellees and lose their votes; Adenauer admitted privately that the border was never going to change and it was a pointless policy beyond the domestic politics angle.

FWIW, you're right. We don't know how a plebiscite in West Prussia would have turned out. But since France insisted on not holding a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine, it would have been unfair to expect Poland to agree to hold a plebiscite in the Polish Corridor, which was Polish for three centuries prior to the late 18th century Polish partitions. Had a plebiscite been held in Alsace-Lorraine, well, a plebiscite could have also been held in the Polish Corridor. Though the question would be whether recent German settlers would/should be allowed to vote in it. But AFAIK Weimar Germany never insisted on a plebiscite in the Polish Corridor--it simply demanded its automatic return. And TBF, Hitler wasn't always willing to play the plebiscite game either: He insisted on the Sudetenland's return without a plebiscite.

According to this the British viewed the Corridor as a subject for revision 10 years out from the treaty, which the Lacarno treatie were a step towards:

Anna M

acienciala.ku.edu

Pomorze or the "Corridor" with its predominantly Polish population, was to go to Poland. Most British statesmen, aware of German resentment against the separation of East Prussia from Germany, looked on the Danzig-Pomorze compromise as a temporary arrangement, expecting a revision in Germany’s favor within 10 years or so.

As to the lack of plebiscites for the corridor:

In April 1919, the German Cabinet decided not to request plebiscites in the Polish Corridor, Prussian Poland and Upper Silesia for fear of losing the vote. However, later German governments accused the Western Powers of injustice in not holding plebiscites in all the territories lost by Germany.

I think that was in part because of the favortism the Allies were showing to Poland in the treaty, which would mean there would be the chance the vote would be set up in such a way as to give Poland the win. That and not realizing the non-German (specifically Masurians and Szlonzoks) population would be more interested in staying in Germany in certain cases. Later of course a new government, which apparently did not know about the position of the 1919 government, brought up the issue of the lack of plebiscites.

Hitler did do a plebiscite in Austria. He treated the election of Heinlein by overwhelming majorities as the plebiscite in the Sudetenland. Also there was no demand on the Corridor by Hitler other than the extraterritorial connection, which only came up once Poland started shutting down lines to the Germans to put pressure on Danzig and East Prussia; he didn't ask for any territory in the Corridor otherwise despite being within his rights under the Lacarno treaties to do so.

FWIW, I think that the best compromise over Danzig would have been a free city for 20 or 30 years until Poland can build its own port at Gdynia followed by Danzig's return to Germany. Honestly, if I was in charge of Poland in 1939, I'd have agreed to negotiate the return of Danzig but not the Polish Corridor to Germany, though I would approve of an extraterritorial German road through the Polish Corridor. But anyway, this isn't about what I would have done but rather about what the Polish leadership in 1939 would have done in this TL. Would the Poles have decided to close the Danzig issue for good, perhaps in exchange for German promises of territorial gains in the East in the future? Or would the Poles have preferred to bide their time and to risk war over this issue, with the hope of getting not only Danzig, but also some other German territories after the end of this war, as was indeed the case in real life?

That should have been written into the treaty with a provision to keep Polish rights to trade out of the port; from what I've been able to find the Germans couldn't deny the Poles use of the port anyway, since the economy of the city depended on Polish trade through the port. Germany couldn't afford to pay for all the lost business in the city.

The reason the Polish government put the kibosh on Beck's efforts to work out a deal seems to have been largely fears of how the public would react to any deal since they considered the port symbolic of Poland's standing in the world; for the government to give it up would be admitting weakness. Like Germany Poland too was hamstrung by the will of the public in terms of making deals over what seems obvious to us today. Plus the Polish public also had the memory of defeating Russia in 1920 in mind, views of how strong their allies were, unreasonable trust in Stalin to uphold the nonaggression pact, and an overinflated sense of their military strength based on propaganda by the dictatorship of colonels.

Hitler did offer the Poles territory in Ukraine for Danzig as well as the extraterritorial RR/road and Polish entry into the anti-comintern pact among other offers (recognizing the borders as set, a 25 year nonaggression pact), but was turned down due to the Polish policy of maintaining a 'third way' in the East between Germany and the USSR; that of course was a pipedream as no one in the region really wanted to work with Poland after their Czechoslovakia actions.

Well ITTL if Poland is defeated in 1920 then they wouldn't be a country, so what they'd do in 1939 is moot.

 

[raharris1973]

Help me out in case I'm color-blind. I noticed the label for the anti-semitin party is brown in the legend. The splotches of brown appear sort of randomly places on the map, one in southwest Pomerania, one in Saxony, and a cluster around Hesse. Is that where all y'all see these fuckers concentrated?

 

[sillygoose]

Could we see a right-wing paramilitary "state within a state" emerging in Weimar Germany in this TL? Similar to present-day Iraq or Lebanon, but with the Freikorps filling in the role of Shi'a militias such as Hezbollah?

The Black Reichswehr was that. Besides the actual Reichswehr.

Yes, please do. That said, though, did Germany really need Danzig all that much as a port when most of the territories south of Danzig were Polish? I would presume that Silesia could rely on Stettin as a port instead, for instance. And East Prussia had Konigsberg as a port.

No the port itself was besides the issue and in fact the port depended on Poland for business, so the Nazis couldn't even leverage it against Poland if they wanted to without entirely destroying the economy. The only reason Hitler cared was due to public pressure and what his Prussian generals wanted, he tried to forget the entire thing. Ultimately it seems that for Germans it was a prestige issue and one of removing the last vestige of the humiliating ToV.

 

[WolfBear]

Help me out in case I'm color-blind. I noticed the label for the anti-semitin party is brown in the legend. The splotches of brown appear sort of randomly places on the map, one in southwest Pomerania, one in Saxony, and a cluster around Hesse. Is that where all y'all see these fuckers concentrated?

Yep, that's where I likewise see this color on that map. Upper Silesia is different because it is gray, which stands for the Catholic Center Party (Zentrum).

 

[WolfBear]

Well ITTL if Poland is defeated in 1920 then they wouldn't be a country, so what they'd do in 1939 is moot.

I'll respond to the rest of your post here in a bit, but in regards to this part, I was actually thinking of Poland remaining independent west of the Curzon Line in 1920 while becoming Soviet east of the Curzon Line:

Curzon Line - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In such a scenario, I wonder if Soviet territory will be more attractive for Poland after Hitler comes to power in Germany since it's going to contain much more Poles if they wouldn't have already fled since then.

In real life, the attractiveness of additional Soviet territories for Poland was minimal because Poland already got the overwhelming majority of the Polish-heavy territories there anyway:



Thus, in real life, there simply weren't that many remaining Soviet Poles for Poland to get to.

 

[sillygoose]

I'll respond to the rest of your post here in a bit, but in regards to this part, I was actually thinking of Poland remaining independent west of the Curzon Line in 1920 while becoming Soviet east of the Curzon Line:

Curzon Line - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In such a scenario, I wonder if Soviet territory will be more attractive for Poland after Hitler comes to power in Germany since it's going to contain much more Poles if they wouldn't have already fled since then.

Problem is that the Soviets wanted all of Poland, so they'd take it all since they'd have conquered it given the OP's scenario saying Poland is totally defeated. We also know that von Seeckt negotiated with Lenin to allow the Soviets to take back their 1914 border in exchange for Germany getting the same. So total Polish defeat at the hands of the Soviets means not only does Poland get redivided (with non-1914 German territory going to the Soviets), but likely the Baltic states (other than Memel and other parts of the 1914 border) falling to the Soviets as well. Very smart on von Seeckt's part since it makes the Soviets public enemy number 1 for the Allies and Germany looks innocent just reclaiming the 1914 border in the face of the Red Army.

In real life, the attractiveness of additional Soviet territories for Poland was minimal because Poland already got the overwhelming majority of the Polish-heavy territories there anyway:



Thus, in real life, there simply weren't that many remaining Soviet Poles for Poland to get to.

Poland actually brought up Ukraine if you check out the German documents on the Ribbentrop talks with the Polish representative. So they had a vested interest going back to their invasion in 1920:

Polish–Soviet War - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[WolfBear]

Problem is that the Soviets wanted all of Poland, so they'd take it all since they'd have conquered it given the OP's scenario saying Poland is totally defeated. We also know that von Seeckt negotiated with Lenin to allow the Soviets to take back their 1914 border in exchange for Germany getting the same. So total Polish defeat at the hands of the Soviets means not only does Poland get redivided (with non-1914 German territory going to the Soviets), but likely the Baltic states (other than Memel and other parts of the 1914 border) falling to the Soviets as well. Very smart on von Seeckt's part since it makes the Soviets public enemy number 1 for the Allies and Germany looks innocent just reclaiming the 1914 border in the face of the Red Army.


Poland actually brought up Ukraine if you check out the German documents on the Ribbentrop talks with the Polish representative. So they had a vested interest going back to their invasion in 1920:

Polish–Soviet War - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Well, then this would require a change in the Soviet mentality in 1920.

Interesting. But didn't Poland say that they wouldn't know what to do with such a gift (Ukraine) in their Nazi talks?

 

[sillygoose]

Well, then this would require a change in the Soviet mentality in 1920.

Interesting. But didn't Poland say that they wouldn't know what to do with such a gift (Ukraine) in their Nazi talks?

From what I can find that isn't the Polish White Book (should be obvious why we have to be skeptical of its claims) the offers of Ukraine was not the territory actually, but recognizing it as Poland's sphere of influence. That was the January 5th 1939 meeting of Hitler and Beck. The Ribbentrop meeting the next day with Beck was about soothing the concerns about the German secret service's activities in Soviet Ukraine. What he offered was further concessions on the Ukraine issue, but required Polish reciprocation, which meant a political deal to put to rest all outstanding issues (aka the well known offer of returning Danzig, the extraterritorial routes to East Prussia, and Poland entering the anti-comintern pact) otherwise Hitler would not consider they had mutual interests and chart their own course in Soviet Ukraine. From the German internal documents, as the Allies captured the German diplomatic files, which seem trustworthy since they were only intended for consumption by policy makers, not for public release, the above was how the discussion played out. There was not an offer to attack the Soviets nor was there the offer of the physical territory. Beck even talked about Polish interests in Ukraine 'still being alive' in the same meeting. What the disagreement was about was Poland being concerned that entry into the anti-comintern pact would mean Stalin would start treating Poland as hostile and act accordingly, which would raise the threat of war and destabilization if the Soviets riled up the oppressed minorities in the East (Beck doesn't mention that specifically in the meeting, but it was a concern the Polish regime had).

Beck mentions against the Polish desires for Ukrainian territory and a port on the Black Sea in a meeting in Warsaw on January 26th, but said in his memoirs he made it clear (which is not in the German report on the meeting) that that could only happen if the USSR broke apart internally, so it was a rather moot issue. As an aside from the reports it would be very difficult to get the Polish people to go along with an alliance given the sentiments against Germany, especially if it meant being Germany's buffer zone in the event of war as well as the junior partner in the arrangement.

It seems only in the Polish White Book and the Soviet version of the captured German files (which are extremely suspect in terms of manipulation) that there was the claim that the Germans talked about an attack on the Soviets.

 

[WolfBear]

From what I can find that isn't the Polish White Book (should be obvious why we have to be skeptical of its claims) the offers of Ukraine was not the territory actually, but recognizing it as Poland's sphere of influence. That was the January 5th 1939 meeting of Hitler and Beck. The Ribbentrop meeting the next day with Beck was about soothing the concerns about the German secret service's activities in Soviet Ukraine. What he offered was further concessions on the Ukraine issue, but required Polish reciprocation, which meant a political deal to put to rest all outstanding issues (aka the well known offer of returning Danzig, the extraterritorial routes to East Prussia, and Poland entering the anti-comintern pact) otherwise Hitler would not consider they had mutual interests and chart their own course in Soviet Ukraine. From the German internal documents, as the Allies captured the German diplomatic files, which seem trustworthy since they were only intended for consumption by policy makers, not for public release, the above was how the discussion played out. There was not an offer to attack the Soviets nor was there the offer of the physical territory. Beck even talked about Polish interests in Ukraine 'still being alive' in the same meeting. What the disagreement was about was Poland being concerned that entry into the anti-comintern pact would mean Stalin would start treating Poland as hostile and act accordingly, which would raise the threat of war and destabilization if the Soviets riled up the oppressed minorities in the East (Beck doesn't mention that specifically in the meeting, but it was a concern the Polish regime had).

Beck mentions against the Polish desires for Ukrainian territory and a port on the Black Sea in a meeting in Warsaw on January 26th, but said in his memoirs he made it clear (which is not in the German report on the meeting) that that could only happen if the USSR broke apart internally, so it was a rather moot issue. As an aside from the reports it would be very difficult to get the Polish people to go along with an alliance given the sentiments against Germany, especially if it meant being Germany's buffer zone in the event of war as well as the junior partner in the arrangement.

It seems only in the Polish White Book and the Soviet version of the captured German files (which are extremely suspect in terms of manipulation) that there was the claim that the Germans talked about an attack on the Soviets.

Having Ukraine in Poland's sphere of influence won't be worth very much without the territory itself due to the extremely totalitarian nature of Communist rule in Ukraine, no? Unless of course the Soviet Union will eventually collapse, but that won't occur until several decades later and wasn't foreseeable ahead of time to many people.

 

[sillygoose]

Having Ukraine in Poland's sphere of influence won't be worth very much without the territory itself due to the extremely totalitarian nature of Communist rule in Ukraine, no? Unless of course the Soviet Union will eventually collapse, but that won't occur until several decades later and wasn't foreseeable ahead of time to many people.

My read is that it was diplomatic speak for ending secret operations and contact with Ukrainians on all levels and in the event of anything happening Poland was given a free hand to do with the territory as it pleased, since Poland had expressed concern over German contacts and operations in Soviet Ukraine. Apparently the Axis had quite a lot of operatives in the USSR at the border regions, which dramatically helped the advance in 1941.

 

[WolfBear]

My read is that it was diplomatic speak for ending secret operations and contact with Ukrainians on all levels and in the event of anything happening Poland was given a free hand to do with the territory as it pleased, since Poland had expressed concern over German contacts and operations in Soviet Ukraine. Apparently the Axis had quite a lot of operatives in the USSR at the border regions, which dramatically helped the advance in 1941.

What was Poland's beef with German operations in the Ukrainian SSR? That this could eventually fuel violent Ukrainian separatism in Poland itself?

 

[sillygoose]

What was Poland's beef with German operations in the Ukrainian SSR? That this could eventually fuel violent Ukrainian separatism in Poland itself?

Basically. The 2nd Republic did not have a great history as far as treating its minorities decently and IIRC the Ukrainian minority was the largest in the Republic at about 5 million people and that region had basically been conquered in 1919; even during the A-H Empire the Poles were the dominant ethnic group in the region and had tried to Poland-ized the Ukrainians of East Galicia which led them to support the invading Russians in 1914. The later Ukrainian ethnic cleansing of Poles in Galicia in 1943-44 didn't come out of nowhere, though obviously violence against civilians wasn't justified.

Pacification of Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

So any efforts by the Germans to train and arm Soviet Ukrainians against the government would undoubtedly spill over into Polish Galicia and Poland had enough problems domestically. As it was there was already a pretty serious separatist movement in East Galicia since the 1920s that worried Warsaw:

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

By 1939 despite Ribbentrop's claims that the Germans weren't supporting the OUN in Galicia there were undoubtedly links with intelligence and the Ukrainians and there was no way to actually geographically limit the OUN to just Soviet Ukraine.

Not that Ukrainians didn't have a reason to be upset:

Second Polish Republic - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

II Rzeczpospolita – Wikipedia, wolna encyklopedia

pl.wikipedia.org

The 1937 Peasant Strike involved not just Poles, but also Ukrainians and Belorussians as well, so in addition to nationality issues the economic situation even as late as 1937 was quite bad for a huge part of the Polish population both as a result of the Great Depression and economic policy from Warsaw:

Strajk chłopski (1937) – Wikipedia, wolna encyklopedia

pl.wikipedia.org

And the Poles had their own version of 'Drang Nach Osten' that treated minorities as people to be 'civilized':

Kresy myth - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Polish members of the board probably have their own views of how this all played out in this period, but my read is that the 2nd Polish Republic was quite unstable and a significant part of the antagonism between Germany and Poland starting in 1939 was the result of internal issues and regime fears of their positions being insecure. German links then to the Ukrainians was a substantial cause for concern since there were already serious dissent and the problem of balancing the desires of different populations within the country; plus the Czechoslovak example of what happens when large minority populations get riled up was fresh on the minds of everyone.

 

[WolfBear]

Basically. The 2nd Republic did not have a great history as far as treating its minorities decently and IIRC the Ukrainian minority was the largest in the Republic at about 5 million people and that region had basically been conquered in 1919; even during the A-H Empire the Poles were the dominant ethnic group in the region and had tried to Poland-ized the Ukrainians of East Galicia which led them to support the invading Russians in 1914. The later Ukrainian ethnic cleansing of Poles in Galicia in 1943-44 didn't come out of nowhere, though obviously violence against civilians wasn't justified.

Pacification of Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

So any efforts by the Germans to train and arm Soviet Ukrainians against the government would undoubtedly spill over into Polish Galicia and Poland had enough problems domestically. As it was there was already a pretty serious separatist movement in East Galicia since the 1920s that worried Warsaw:

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

By 1939 despite Ribbentrop's claims that the Germans weren't supporting the OUN in Galicia there were undoubtedly links with intelligence and the Ukrainians and there was no way to actually geographically limit the OUN to just Soviet Ukraine.

Not that Ukrainians didn't have a reason to be upset:

Second Polish Republic - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

II Rzeczpospolita – Wikipedia, wolna encyklopedia

pl.wikipedia.org

The 1937 Peasant Strike involved not just Poles, but also Ukrainians and Belorussians as well, so in addition to nationality issues the economic situation even as late as 1937 was quite bad for a huge part of the Polish population both as a result of the Great Depression and economic policy from Warsaw:

Strajk chłopski (1937) – Wikipedia, wolna encyklopedia

pl.wikipedia.org

And the Poles had their own version of 'Drang Nach Osten' that treated minorities as people to be 'civilized':

Kresy myth - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The Polish members of the board probably have their own views of how this all played out in this period, but my read is that the 2nd Polish Republic was quite unstable and a significant part of the antagonism between Germany and Poland starting in 1939 was the result of internal issues and regime fears of their positions being insecure. German links then to the Ukrainians was a substantial cause for concern since there were already serious dissent and the problem of balancing the desires of different populations within the country; plus the Czechoslovak example of what happens when large minority populations get riled up was fresh on the minds of everyone.

Interesting. Thank you. I wonder if things would have been simpler had Danzig been set to return to Germany in 1940 (after around 20 years) as a part of the original Versailles Treaty. Or would Nazi Germany have still insisted on Poland joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, with Poland still refusing to do this for fear of provoking the Soviet Union?

 

[sillygoose]

Interesting. Thank you. I wonder if things would have been simpler had Danzig been set to return to Germany in 1940 (after around 20 years) as a part of the original Versailles Treaty. Or would Nazi Germany have still insisted on Poland joining the Anti-Comintern Pact, with Poland still refusing to do this for fear of provoking the Soviet Union?

Not sure to be honest. I have a mixed read on the anti-comintern pact part, especially because Hitler wanting the commitment to the pact from Poland was due to knowing about their past double deals to try and get France to attack Germany and entering the pact would signal Poland moving into Germany's camp and away from the Allies and Soviets.

 

[WolfBear]

Not sure to be honest. I have a mixed read on the anti-comintern pact part, especially because Hitler wanting the commitment to the pact from Poland was due to knowing about their past double deals to try and get France to attack Germany and entering the pact would signal Poland moving into Germany's camp and away from the Allies and Soviets.

FWIW, Poland was rather restrained in its foreign policy in the interwar era, other than in 1938, of course. It didn't make any moves for Danzig in 1923 like Lithuania did for Memel during the same time, for instance.

 

[sillygoose]

FWIW, Poland was rather restrained in its foreign policy in the interwar era, other than in 1938, of course. It didn't make any moves for Danzig in 1923 like Lithuania did for Memel during the same time, for instance.

Restrained in what capacity? They didn't launch more invasions after the early 1920s, but that was more to do with the state of the economy and fighting several costly wars which did not help things. Why would they need to move on Danzig when they effectively already had everything they wanted with it thanks to the ToV?

 

[WolfBear]

Restrained in what capacity? They didn't launch more invasions after the early 1920s, but that was more to do with the state of the economy and fighting several costly wars which did not help things. Why would they need to move on Danzig when they effectively already had everything they wanted with it thanks to the ToV?

Well, why did Lithuania make a move on Memel?

 

[sillygoose]

Well, why did Lithuania make a move on Memel?

Unlike Poland Lithuania didn't get a port during Versailles so they took one.

 

[WolfBear]

Unlike Poland Lithuania didn't get a port during Versailles so they took one.

Their narrow pre-1923 coastline didn't contain a port? Then why not build one from scratch like Poland did with Gdynia?

 

[sillygoose]

Their narrow pre-1923 coastline didn't contain a port? Then why not build one from scratch like Poland did with Gdynia?

Harbors require specific conditions and Memel was the only option for a significant port.