sillygoose
Well-known member
Steve, you're right we're going round and round in circles, so I guess at this point we should just drop it and move on to other topics.
Thoughts on consequences of a total Polish defeat in the Soviet war of 1920
- Thread starter raharris1973
- Start date
What about Finland? Otherwise agreed with your analysis here.
3. Depends on whether Lenin's or Stalin's position ends up triumphing. I suspect that Trotsky will back Stalin here, FWIW. He was against going beyond the Curzon Line, IIRC.
4. Yep.
5. Makes sense.
6. It's "Bolsheviks", not "Bolesheviks".
Anyway, I want to make one point here: With the Polish question settled, Germany is likely to be considerably less revanchist in this scenario. German nationalists might still hope for an eventual Anschluss with Austria, but this could probably eventually be achieved through negotiation--or through force, if the Nazis still eventually come to power in Germany. A non-Nazi Germany won't press the Sudetenland issue very heavily and other than that, the only territory that Germany could potentially be interested in would be the Memelland and, of course, Eupen-Malmedy, both of which are fairly minor. And Germany could already get the Memelland if the rest of Lithuania becomes Soviet along with Latvia and Estonia after the fall of Poland to Communism.
If Hitler and the Nazis still come to power in Germany in this scenario, I wonder if war over Czechoslovakia in 1938 (or whenever) would be more viable in this TL due to the Soviets sharing a common border with Czechoslovakia. But if not (due to British fears of Communism spreading even further or whatever), then World War II might be completely avoided since after Czechoslovakia's fall, there won't be any Polish dispute, which will make it easier for the British, French, and Soviets to recreate the Triple Entente from World War I, which would likely make Hitler much more hesitant to go to war when he simultaneously had to fight on two fronts at once against Germany's entire World War I coalition (minus Italy).
raharris1973
Well-known member
I don't think there's anything objective in the strategic geography of Poland and the Baltic states that makes Finland more militarily vulnerable.
Now subjectively, the Finns in the interwar might *feel* more vulnerable, might be more panicky and right wing, and have a harder time representing their democratic left, potentially weakening their cohesion as a functioning democracy and healthy polity, which could boomerang to doom them down the road. But that doesn't have to happen at all.
That's all you've got to criticize? I think I'm doing pretty good.
Agree in general, and on Anschluss specifically.
Some specifically on Anschluss:
- Anschluss agitation is not exclusively dependent on Nazis - Anschluss with Austria will likely become a goal of a democratic Germany also, because it would be a goal supported by major German Democratic Parties, notably the Social Democrats and Catholic Center Party. From the Austrian side, the Social Democrats reciprocate that interest and overall Anschluss probably has more support in Austria than Germany, if the cross-border ideological stars are aligned correctly. Pretty much only the Prussian Junker chauvinistic old-right has enough anti-Catholic prejudice to object to the addition of millions more Catholics. Maybe some north German Protestant and Jewish liberals too. As a matter of general public opinion, in the Weimar era, the Austrian public almost always supported Anschluss at even higher rates than the German.
- On Anschluss - it will arguably become technically "legal" in international law by 1939 or 1942 at the latest. Versailles in 1919 only had language forbidding unification of the Austrian republic with Germany for 20 years. Some loans Austria received in 1922 extended this a little to 1942, by conditioning them on not joining Germany until 1942. After 1942, or possibly soon after 1939, with the expiration of those agreements, unless local party politicians get in the way, Germany and Austria are very likely to form a customs union, then a federation and political union under democratic conditions, even without Hitler and Nazis pushing things.
- Once Austro-German union is in effect, it will automatically raise the salience of the Sudeten German issue in greater Germany and Czechoslovakia. Democratic Germany won't turn it into a casus belli or brink or war issue, but it can be a prolonged irritant. Creative diplomats on the German and Czechoslovak side may try to resolve differences and manage tensions less by promoting separatism than by promoting economic and security cooperation and alliances directly at the Prague to Berlin level. A democratic, economically successful Germany, might have a chance to woo Czechoslovakia, but a Nazi one would be repellent to Prague.
Yes indeed, and even if Lithuania is independent, Memel is small enough beer that a land grab of Memel alone isn't likely to start a continent-wide war.
Abso-freakin'-lutely. First of all, for Czechoslovakia to be pressured not to fight and make concessions, it would not take only two countries (Britain and France) to convince the Czechs, but four countries, Communist Poland plus the USSR in addition to Britain and France to convince the Czechs not to fight.
The Soviets and Czechs can count on Communist Poland to grant Soviet forces free passage across its land or airspace to move forward to defend Czechoslovakia and attack Germany anywhere along the length of its long eastern frontier. That applies even if Britain and France stand aloof.
To the extent Stalin lets the Communist Poles advocate an opinion, they will favor standing with Czechoslovakia as a forward defense of their own southern flank, and would in some ways see a war with Germany as a way to get back ethnic Polish territory.
All things being equal, one would think Stalin would prefer any fighting to start as far west as possible, with the Czechs and Poles doing a disproportionate amount of the dying, even if he is a little concerned about his own force readiness.
But even if the Soviets advise the Czechs to back down, they may be more inclined to try their luck, figuring that once things get hot and shooting starts, one of the four allies, probably Communist Poland, the USSR, or France, will start helping them out if they start to lose, or will lend them their territory to retreat, regroup and counterattack, unwilling to tolerate a Nazi build-up next door.
It is good you said "a war over Czechoslovakia in 1938 (or whenever)", because although chances aren't great, in order to get more time to prepare, reduce chances of war, and prove the Socialist countries did everything for peace, the USSR and Poland may go along with the British and French in advising the Czechs to concede the Sudetenland.
But even then, since Poland and USSR will have territorial contiguity, they won't have to accept a German occupation of Prague as a fait accompli, they can rush in forces to oppose it, send in their own forces to preempt it, or throw in their Air Force against the Germans as soon as they move.
Agreed, this is an underrated consequence of Poland falling under Soviet hegemony early. I am indeed positing that if Poland is in the Soviet sphere during the interwar, but that a Hitler figure still takes power, any of his various acts to go for full rearmament, establish the Wehrmacht, militarize the Rhineland, or annex Austria may then and there stimulate an effective Entente between France, the USSR, and Poland, likely extending to other territories of mutual interest like the Low Countries and Czechoslovakia.
It is the ironic potential 'silver lining' of Poland falling to Communism over 25 years earlier than OTL. No WWII, and no Nazi genocides.
The dark lining in the cloud is of course, more time spent under communism. But state homicide per day/week/month/year under communism was objectively less in Poland under Communism than Nazism, even for Catholic and middle-class and upper-class Poles (not just for the obvious groups like Jewish and Gypsy Poles).
Now if Poland was made Communist earlier, in the interwar 20s and 30s, there are some genuine reasons to suspect it would have been more lethal for part of that time than it ever was in its OTL post 1945 incarnation.
In OTL post-WWII Polish communism, the authorities, even during Stalin's lifetime, never implemented agricultural collectivization. They continued a lighter system of agricultural requisition that involved that less destruction, violence, and death. But in the post-WWI era, that system hadn't been invented, and Communist Poland might have gone through everything Ukraine went through.
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Well, I was just wondering because the Reds came close to victory in the Finnish Civil War at least in one point in time, if I recall correctly. But that might have already been in the past by that point in time.
That's all you've got to criticize? I think I'm doing pretty good.
Just a pet peeve of mine.
South Tyrol Option Agreement - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
This could create a precedent for other countries with German minorities, after all.
As for the Sudetenland, if Germany was smart, it would offer to freeze the existing status quo in Czechoslovakia in exchange for greater German economic penetration of Czechoslovakia and perhaps the creation of some kind of Mitteleuropa economic union or at least customs union at some future point down the line. The same principles could also apply to Lithuania and Memel. Let Lithuania permanently keep it if it agrees to deep integration with Germany. As a side note, I wonder if Lithuania will build a giant port on its remaining tiny amount of Black Sea coastline if it will ever lose Memel to Germany. Thoughts? A Lithuanian Gdynia, if you will? Though I suppose that Lithuania could always rely on Riga's port if Latvia still remains independent.
Yep, but please see my post right above here.
If the Germans move onto Prague, then I would think that the Poles and Soviets would still want assurances that at least the French would be willing to act if they act. Ideally the British as well. They might not want to fight a long war with Nazi Germany over Prague by themselves, without any Western help whatsoever. They might be brutal totalitarian Communists, but they're not that stupid. They don't want to risk losing everything to Hitler!
Agreed and also you should probably include Britain in this Entente as well.
raharris1973
Well-known member
Of course they will *want* western pledges! And action! They *might* even wait for them before lifting a finger, not wanting to be stuck alone.
But they also may not want to wait inactive while Hitler gobbles up territory.
First of all, this alternative USSR has a history of winning its Polish war, so it may be more militarily confident, and that feeling of confidence may carry on forward through the 1930s, making the Soviets feel like if worst comes to worst, they can handle the Germans for a good while until the westerners feel like looting them.
Second, they could do a flexible talk/fight strategy, sending troops forward, engaging in combat, but holding secret talks with the Nazis about a new territorial dividing line in Czechoslovakia to go into effect if the west doesn't get in in a certain # of days. They can certainly strategically leak that things like that might be happening to try to spur western action.
Third, they could act in ways to spur Czech resistance and slow the Nazis down without irrevocably committing to war or cutting all diplomatic channels. Doing so by, encouraging the Czechs, even if only by unofficial, deniable means. Saying whatever Polish or Soviet forces are involved in Czechoslovakia are just self-organized "volunteers" like in Spain (or the OTL later Chinese in Korea), or by having Communist Poland, but not the USSR openly intervene in the Czech war, using the Poles as the meat shield for the Soviet Union but being able to cut losses short of the official USSR border if necessary.
That would be ideal, but I imagine the British would be the most stand-offish and last ones to join in after trying all other alternatives.
A German Czechia and Polish Slovakia plus Subcarpathian Ruthenia sounds like an interesting partition. Hungary would get the Hungarian-majority territories in the very south of Czechoslovakia and nothing else.
Would the French actually be willing to fight without them having the British as allies, even if they have both the Poles and the Soviets as allies?
Also, one more thing to consider: Theoretically speaking, the Nazis might be able to occupy Prague in as little as just one day.
@raharris1973 I don't want to create a separate thread for this, so I'll just post it here:
What if the Bolsheviks advanced up to the Curzon Line in the Polish-Soviet War, but no further? For instance, if the Bolshevik forces that are meant to capture Warsaw are sent to the Lwow area to help with the capture of that city instead, after which the Bolsheviks decide to embrace a Curzon Line western border in order to avoid appearing as a completely rogue state in Western eyes.
In such a scenario, with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia actually having a common border, would Britain and France actually be willing to fight for Czechoslovakia in 1938? And if not, would Poland have been more receptive to Hitler's offers of alliance the following year (1939) due to a lot of Poles still being left out of Poland, specifically in the Kresy? I'm sure that in such a scenario, the Poles would be absolutely enraged at all of the Polish victims of Stalin's purges, whose numbers are likely to be much higher in this TL due to the Soviet control over the Kresy. But at the same time, would the Poles really want to ally with Hitler and thus eventually risk fighting an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance?
What if the Bolsheviks advanced up to the Curzon Line in the Polish-Soviet War, but no further? For instance, if the Bolshevik forces that are meant to capture Warsaw are sent to the Lwow area to help with the capture of that city instead, after which the Bolsheviks decide to embrace a Curzon Line western border in order to avoid appearing as a completely rogue state in Western eyes.
In such a scenario, with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia actually having a common border, would Britain and France actually be willing to fight for Czechoslovakia in 1938? And if not, would Poland have been more receptive to Hitler's offers of alliance the following year (1939) due to a lot of Poles still being left out of Poland, specifically in the Kresy? I'm sure that in such a scenario, the Poles would be absolutely enraged at all of the Polish victims of Stalin's purges, whose numbers are likely to be much higher in this TL due to the Soviet control over the Kresy. But at the same time, would the Poles really want to ally with Hitler and thus eventually risk fighting an Anglo-Franco-Soviet alliance?
raharris1973
Well-known member
OK - and I think this is actually somewhat more likely to happen and be a stable result than the alternative in the OP of the Soviets seizing Warsaw and all of Central/Congress Poland, Posen, Galicia.
Maybe, and maybe not, but the Czechs would be willing to fight, and the Soviets would probably at least engage with aid and Soviet and international "volunteers", fighting to the last Czechoslovakian, and last inch of Czechoslovakia.
I tend to be a skeptic of this idea, even though it is somewhat popular. I don't believe the Poles would be willing to accept Hitler's likely price, territorial concessions over Danzig and the corridor, and military rights of way through Poland. Poland I could imagine accepting an "alliance"/non-aggression pact with the Nazis and an anti-Soviet stance, if it involved no territorial sacrifices on its part and no foreign troops on its soil.
If they are there, they will be purged in large numbers, but I wonder if the end of the war will be accompanied by mass migrations, forced or voluntary, during the 1920s, that will drastically reduce the Polish (or Polish Catholic) population of the USSR. Stalin was already commissar of nationalities, not sure if he was obsessed with keeping ethnicities in tidy boxes yet, and international movement restrictions on Soviet citizens weren't as strict in the 20s as they later became with the introduction of the 5 year plans.
TBH, I think that the Soviets seizing all of Poland might also be stable if they don't subsequently aim for Germany. If they do, then they could trigger a European crusade to push them back and perhaps even to liberate Poland, with or without the Kresy (eastern Poland).
Interesting.
FWIW, if Hitler was smart, he could keep the status quo situation in Danzig indefinitely. After all, the status quo for Germans in Danzig was much more tolerable than the status quo for Germans in South Tyrol, and yet Hitler was willing to sell the latter group out to Mussolini. If Hitler will want Poland as an ally that badly, then he could tell the Danzig Germans to suck it up and permanently accept the status quo or, alternatively, go and move to Germany if they want to live under German rule so badly. The extraterritorial road through the Corridor was not an unreasonable German demand, though.
Foreign troops on Poland's soil might be necessary for such a pact to work since otherwise Nazi Germany wouldn't have any way of invading the Soviet Union unless it wants to exclusively do so through the Baltics. At the very least, Poland will need to provide basing rights pre-invasion and transit rights for any German troops who will be fighting in the Soviet Union.
I'm skeptical that there will be mass migrations due to the fact that in real life, there were still plenty of Poles in western and central Ukraine in 1926:
Here's more granular data for this:
And some of their descendants were still there in 2001:
Poles in Ukraine - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
So, maybe some Poles left later on, but possibly not before 1926. Compare the 1926 data with the 1897-1900 data, though the 1897-1900 data includes all of Ukraine within its present-day borders rather than only 1926 Soviet Ukraine (so, the westernmost parts of Ukraine are also included):
Poles in Ukraine - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
As for why exactly Soviet Poles might have been initially unwilling to move to Poland, one possible reason might be the lack of a desire to leave and abandon their homes and property and also the lack of available jobs in Poland. AFAIK, Poland was suffering from mass unemployment in the interwar era, so even if Soviet Poles would have moved to Poland, there wouldn't have necessarily been many jobs actually waiting for them in Poland, and the Poles in other parts of Poland might have resented them for stealing their jobs. All of these factors would still be relevant here. Anyway, even if there would have been a mass exodus of Soviet Poles in this scenario (which, again, I'm skeptical of), the Polish exiles could still form a large lobbying group similar to the post-WWII German expellees in real life, who were able to prevent Germany from definitively recognizing the Oder-Neisse Line for over 40 years. Granted, territorial revision by force was not a realistic option for post-WWII Germany since they'd certainly get crushed in any new such attempt, but this wouldn't have necessarily also been the case for 1930s or 1940s Poland in this TL.
AFAIK, countries generally allied with Hitler either when they wanted his help in acquiring additional territory (Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria) or when they were really desperate (Slovakia, 1940 Romania, pre-1941 coup Yugoslavia). Poland would qualify for this in this TL in a way that it did not in our TL.
It's worth noting that, in real life, relatively few of the Kresy (eastern Polish) Poles actually resettled in indisputably Polish territories west of the Curzon Line after the end of World War II. Rather, most of them resettled in the Recovered Territories, which, other than Masuria and western Upper Silesia, were ethnically German for centuries (and even in Masuria and western Upper Silesia, the Poles who lived there were pro-German, at least after the end of World War I):
There's a simple reason for this: Specifically the fact that the ability of central Poland to accomodate newcomers probably wasn't that large whereas the Recovered Territories had much more capacity for this due to their German population being expelled en masse. Here, central Poland might still not be capable of accomodating a large number of newcomers (due to a lack of available jobs, housing, et cetera), but there won't be any Recovered Territories for Kresy Poles to resettle in to compensate for this. Quite a dilemma!
Poland West & North Territories: Post WWII Settlement - Axis History Forum
forum.axishistory.com
There's a simple reason for this: Specifically the fact that the ability of central Poland to accomodate newcomers probably wasn't that large whereas the Recovered Territories had much more capacity for this due to their German population being expelled en masse. Here, central Poland might still not be capable of accomodating a large number of newcomers (due to a lack of available jobs, housing, et cetera), but there won't be any Recovered Territories for Kresy Poles to resettle in to compensate for this. Quite a dilemma!
sillygoose
Well-known member
Politically that was not viable. The Poles were squeezing Danzig economically, the German people demanded it returned, and most of the power brokers in the country wanted it dealt with, especially if Hitler was going to make a final deal on the border. Technically Hitler not making an issue of the rest of the Corridor other than having an extraterritorial RR and highway to East Prussia WAS making major concessions to Poland, as by rights they could have demanded revisions under the Lacarno Treaty and due to the ethnic makeup of West Prussia.
As Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany, told Chamberlain Hitler was the most moderate German on the Danzig issue.
Technically speaking, the Locarno Treaty merely allowed Germany to make territorial claims in the East. It didn't actually mean that the Western Powers would actually recognize these territorial claims. And the ethnic makeup of the Polish Corridor was actually Polish-majority; it was Danzig that was German-majority.
FWIW, though, I do think that Germany's claim to Danzig was a fair one, as evidenced by the post-World War II mass expulsion of the Danzig Germans to Germany. So, Germany ultimately ended up getting the Danzig Germans, just not Danzig itself!
sillygoose
Well-known member
No point in opening the door to revisions if you're just going to deny them all. The entire point of the treaty though was to revise the ToV and it apparently pissed off Poland quite a bit when it was signed, since they realized it would mean that the border was open to revision.
Sure the majority of the West Prussia was linguistically Polish or Polish related, but that doesn't mean everyone there would vote with Poland in a plebiscite as Poland found out in Upper Silesia. That said there were German majority parts that could have been claimed if a plebiscite was held; as to Danzig since it was nearly all German it not being part of Germany really made no sense, especially since the public in that city wanted to rejoin their country.
By Poles. The Kashubians didn't necessarily think of themselves as Polish and did more often than not vote to stay with Germany as I recall.
BTW your map doesn't show up.
Here's the map:
West Prussia - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
Also, territorial revisions would not have been possible without a new war with Poland, especially when they would have involved sovereign Polish territory like Weimar (unlike Hitler) wanted. And West Germany also kept the door open to territorial revision in the 1949-1990 time period but ultimately it didn't go anywhere other than German unification because no one else would actually support them in this.
FWIW, you're right. We don't know how a plebiscite in West Prussia would have turned out. But since France insisted on not holding a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine, it would have been unfair to expect Poland to agree to hold a plebiscite in the Polish Corridor, which was Polish for three centuries prior to the late 18th century Polish partitions. Had a plebiscite been held in Alsace-Lorraine, well, a plebiscite could have also been held in the Polish Corridor. Though the question would be whether recent German settlers would/should be allowed to vote in it. But AFAIK Weimar Germany never insisted on a plebiscite in the Polish Corridor--it simply demanded its automatic return. And TBF, Hitler wasn't always willing to play the plebiscite game either: He insisted on the Sudetenland's return without a plebiscite.
FWIW, I think that the best compromise over Danzig would have been a free city for 20 or 30 years until Poland can build its own port at Gdynia followed by Danzig's return to Germany. Honestly, if I was in charge of Poland in 1939, I'd have agreed to negotiate the return of Danzig but not the Polish Corridor to Germany, though I would approve of an extraterritorial German road through the Polish Corridor. But anyway, this isn't about what I would have done but rather about what the Polish leadership in 1939 would have done in this TL. Would the Poles have decided to close the Danzig issue for good, perhaps in exchange for German promises of territorial gains in the East in the future? Or would the Poles have preferred to bide their time and to risk war over this issue, with the hope of getting not only Danzig, but also some other German territories after the end of this war, as was indeed the case in real life?
I do want to point out one thing, though: When it came to Imperial German Reichstag elections, the Polish Corridor, other than its southernmost part, consistently voted for the Polish Party between 1871 and 1912. Meanwhile, in Upper Silesia, voting for the Polish Party only began on a huge scale in the early 20th century if I recall correctly, and even then this voting trend was primarily limited to eastern Upper Silesia, which did, in fact, vote for Poland in the 1921 plebiscite there.
Here's a map of the 1912 German Reichstag elections:
en.wikipedia.org
And here's a map of the 1867 North German Confederation Reichstag elections:
en.wikipedia.org
Poles in the Polish Corridor, other than in the very southern part, really do appear to have consistently liked the Polish Party. Go and look at all of the election maps for this time period if you want. This pattern won't change.
Here's a map of the 1912 German Reichstag elections:
1912 German federal election - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
And here's a map of the 1867 North German Confederation Reichstag elections:
February 1867 North German federal election - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
Poles in the Polish Corridor, other than in the very southern part, really do appear to have consistently liked the Polish Party. Go and look at all of the election maps for this time period if you want. This pattern won't change.
sillygoose
Well-known member
I'll reply more when I have time, but IOTL it was actually Poland who first raised the Danzig issue in September just days before the Munich Conference. When Ribbentrop brought it up in October with a formal offer Beck apparently actually actively studied the proposal until he was ordered to abandon the study by the government and was ordered to deny any further requests. So I'm not sure if it was a discussion started on Beck's own initiative and when it became a serious consideration his bosses cut it off or if something came up after Munich that caused Poland to think they wouldn't have to deal after all.
Yes, please do. That said, though, did Germany really need Danzig all that much as a port when most of the territories south of Danzig were Polish? I would presume that Silesia could rely on Stettin as a port instead, for instance. And East Prussia had Konigsberg as a port.
Silesia and the eastern lands lost to Germany would be retaken during the chaos by different Freikorps.
USA and UK would probably release Germany from the ToV. Both countries send expeditionary forces to Russia in 1919.
I doubt the Red Army has the strength to march onto the Germany. The German communists had been crushed already, their personnel either executed or scattered.
Though the Reichswehr was not large or powerful, there were dozens of Freikorps across Germany. An invasion of Germany would see them rising to challenge and carving their way through the communist hordes with MP 18 and trench mace in hand.
USA and UK would probably release Germany from the ToV. Both countries send expeditionary forces to Russia in 1919.
I doubt the Red Army has the strength to march onto the Germany. The German communists had been crushed already, their personnel either executed or scattered.
Though the Reichswehr was not large or powerful, there were dozens of Freikorps across Germany. An invasion of Germany would see them rising to challenge and carving their way through the communist hordes with MP 18 and trench mace in hand.
Could we see a right-wing paramilitary "state within a state" emerging in Weimar Germany in this TL? Similar to present-day Iraq or Lebanon, but with the Freikorps filling in the role of Shi'a militias such as Hezbollah?