What if France sold Indochina to Japan after WWI?

[raharris1973]

What if France sold Indochina sometime after WWI to finance its postwar recovery, rearmament, or both? French Polynesia and New Caledonia could be offered as optional additional features.

I know this is extremely unrealistic. If you think ASB mind-control of French officials is needed to make them offer and go through with this, let's just say that happened, and work with the premise, and examine the consequences from there.

I imagine the *only* interested buyer post WWI would be Japan, other than the native inhabitants, and the native inhabitants don't have any money/resources the French can't steal anyway. Britain has a sagging economy and too much empire to pay for during the whole interwar, America is feeling isolationist and sort of regretting the Philippines and planning a very slow-motion exit. The Dutch figure "I'm alright Jacques" with the richer and easier to control East Indies.

Compared to this, the Japanese at various points have expansion fever, and if the sale isn't until the 30s, Japan got out of its Depression early, while France went into its own late.

I could imagine the French going for this at a couple different junctures.

• Within a year or two after Versailles (1920'ish, 1921) when Japan appears like a benign ally, and is enjoying a prosperous trade surplus, France is facing massive reconstruction costs, and France is learning that the U.S. is ditching the League and the U.S. and UK are not sincerely offering a tripartite alliance. Liquidating, for profit, the Far Eastern fragment of the overseas empire, that is overwhelming Africa and Mediterranean focused, may not seem like a bad strategy. Meanwhile Japan, would be keen at this time for a peaceful expansion opportunity.
• After the termination of the Ruhr occupation (1925) - For all the same reasons above, only reinforced. France sees even more starkly that US and UK don't have its back, and sympathize more with Germany. They know not to expect future reparations, even though the French economy is doing better. Meanwhile, the Japanese are doing okay, although doing earthquake reconstruction, and have more reasons to value a peaceful expansion opportunity with increased tariffs and immigration restrictions in the west.
• During the Depression (1934) - Hitler's arrived, German rearmament is getting more brazen, the Depression is just starting to pinch. Meanwhile, the Japanese economy is back on all cylinders, they want to expand, and there's been a decent interval since their last atrocity, since they're in a year of truce with China.

Here's where I'm quantitatively challenged. I'm not sure what the net costs of administration and protection for French Indochina were versus net profits and tax receipts, and I'm not sure what makes a profitable sales price, which would in turn would shape the military or industrial investments France could make with funds from the sale.

One thing I imagine is that as part of the sale, France would repatriate its own citizens but have nominal rights for private citizens to remain. It would have the Japanese promise (and they could honor, or not) to protect the Catholic Church and institutions. However, France, as a country of immigration, would also probably be very accepting of those French-speaking Catholic Indochinese or Indochinese with substantial French educations who wanted to migrate to France or elsewhere within the French Empire.

Meanwhile, how are Indochina, Japan, the Far East and colonial world changing with the soon-to-democratize parliamentary Japan of 1921 purchasing French Indochina, or the universal suffrage Japan of 1925 purchasing French Indochina, or the militaristic, hypernationalist but still parliamentary and not in a full China War Japan of 1934 purchasing French Indochina? Does the opportunity to expand by purchase, and the cost, and new strategic liability and focus southward have significant effects on Japan, and neighbors of the Indochina region, in any of those three eras?

 

[stevep]

What if France sold Indochina sometime after WWI to finance its postwar recovery, rearmament, or both? French Polynesia and New Caledonia could be offered as optional additional features.

I know this is extremely unrealistic. If you think ASB mind-control of French officials is needed to make them offer and go through with this, let's just say that happened, and work with the premise, and examine the consequences from there.

I imagine the *only* interested buyer post WWI would be Japan, other than the native inhabitants, and the native inhabitants don't have any money/resources the French can't steal anyway. Britain has a sagging economy and too much empire to pay for during the whole interwar, America is feeling isolationist and sort of regretting the Philippines and planning a very slow-motion exit. The Dutch figure "I'm alright Jacques" with the richer and easier to control East Indies.

Compared to this, the Japanese at various points have expansion fever, and if the sale isn't until the 30s, Japan got out of its Depression early, while France went into its own late.

I could imagine the French going for this at a couple different junctures.

• Within a year or two after Versailles (1920'ish, 1921) when Japan appears like a benign ally, and is enjoying a prosperous trade surplus, France is facing massive reconstruction costs, and France is learning that the U.S. is ditching the League and the U.S. and UK are not sincerely offering a tripartite alliance. Liquidating, for profit, the Far Eastern fragment of the overseas empire, that is overwhelming Africa and Mediterranean focused, may not seem like a bad strategy. Meanwhile Japan, would be keen at this time for a peaceful expansion opportunity.
• After the termination of the Ruhr occupation (1925) - For all the same reasons above, only reinforced. France sees even more starkly that US and UK don't have its back, and sympathize more with Germany. They know not to expect future reparations, even though the French economy is doing better. Meanwhile, the Japanese are doing okay, although doing earthquake reconstruction, and have more reasons to value a peaceful expansion opportunity with increased tariffs and immigration restrictions in the west.
• During the Depression (1934) - Hitler's arrived, German rearmament is getting more brazen, the Depression is just starting to pinch. Meanwhile, the Japanese economy is back on all cylinders, they want to expand, and there's been a decent interval since their last atrocity, since they're in a year of truce with China.

Here's where I'm quantitatively challenged. I'm not sure what the net costs of administration and protection for French Indochina were versus net profits and tax receipts, and I'm not sure what makes a profitable sales price, which would in turn would shape the military or industrial investments France could make with funds from the sale.

One thing I imagine is that as part of the sale, France would repatriate its own citizens but have nominal rights for private citizens to remain. It would have the Japanese promise (and they could honor, or not) to protect the Catholic Church and institutions. However, France, as a country of immigration, would also probably be very accepting of those French-speaking Catholic Indochinese or Indochinese with substantial French educations who wanted to migrate to France or elsewhere within the French Empire.

Meanwhile, how are Indochina, Japan, the Far East and colonial world changing with the soon-to-democratize parliamentary Japan of 1921 purchasing French Indochina, or the universal suffrage Japan of 1925 purchasing French Indochina, or the militaristic, hypernationalist but still parliamentary and not in a full China War Japan of 1934 purchasing French Indochina? Does the opportunity to expand by purchase, and the cost, and new strategic liability and focus southward have significant effects on Japan, and neighbors of the Indochina region, in any of those three eras?

I suspect at least some ASB influence would be required but its an interesting scenario. I suspect that Japan would be more concerned with gaining a colony, whether profitable or not, especially as FIC - or JIC as it would be now - would also secure its importance and also give a base to project power and influence, both in terms of China and also supply lines for imports.

Britain would be worried if/when Japan ceases to be an ally and Australia would be more seriously concerned I suspect. Not sure how the US would react but suspect it would be hostile given it views Japan as the power its most likely to go to war with.

 

[TheRomanSlayer]

Does Japan even have enough money to purchase French Indochina from the French though? Even if they have the money to purchase French Indochina, it might become more of a money sink for them than Korea. Keep in mind that 1919 is also the year that the Korean independence movement becomes a prominent anti-Japanese imperialist movement.

Realistically, could Japan turn French Indochina into a set of three separate protectorates, each with puppet rulers that answer to the Japanese Emperor? IOTL, this was actually done, albeit in the closing stages of WWII. If Japan does acquire French Indochina after WWI, they would have the time in the world to set up puppet regimes that would do what the Japanese ordered. Kinda like Manchukuo, but earlier.

 

[Buba]

Does Japan even have enough money to purchase French Indochina from the French though?

It might have. WWI was financially and economically a blessing for Japan. Industrial output up by 1/3rd, debt wiped out, Japan a lendor nation.
Thing is that Japan blew that money on:
- risky Chinese adventures/investments
- navy

I don't think that the Siberian Intervention was THAT costly.

Maybe the POD could be moved forward a bit - the WWI went slightly less favourably to the Entente than in OTL and Japan agreed to provide troops, with Indochina being part of "payment".
Maybe after Caporetto and Brest-Litovsk? With the German hordes massing on the Western Front the paniking paper tigers beg Stronk Japan for soccour, and Japan sends half a million troops to the ME and Balkans, allowing for the transfer of all French, British and Domion troops to France? This producing a very BIG IOU note which France (and UK) has to redeem somehow?
Combine this with a revolt in Indochina, something France has no money nor stomach to put down?

I imagine that a Japanese Indochina will make USA "excited". Could result to faster dumping of Phillippines by saner minds, though.

To my meager knowledge Japanese colonial rule was initially fairly benign, getting worse over time.
If Japan manages to treat Vietnam half way between OTL Taiwan and Korea it'd expect the locals to be moderately happy. It would also be a great boon for the Greater Coprosperity Sphere.

Being relatively distant from the Home Islands (unlike Korea) cooler heads might prevail and notions of integrating Indochina with Japan could be shot down immediately.
Of course, never underestimate human stupidity ....

 

[ATP]

It might have. WWI was financially and economically a blessing for Japan. Industrial output up by 1/3rd, debt wiped out, Japan a lendor nation.
Thing is that Japan blew that money on:
- risky Chinese adventures/investments
- navy

I don't think that the Siberian Intervention was THAT costly.

Maybe the POD could be moved forward a bit - the WWI went slightly less favourably to the Entente than in OTL and Japan agreed to provide troops, with Indochina being part of "payment".
Maybe after Caporetto and Brest-Litovsk? With the German hordes massing on the Western Front the paniking paper tigers beg Stronk Japan for soccour, and Japan sends half a million troops to the ME and Balkans, allowing for the transfer of all French, British and Domion troops to France? This producing a very BIG IOU note which France (and UK) has to redeem somehow?
Combine this with a revolt in Indochina, somethign France has no money nor stomach to put down?

I imagine that a Japanese Indochina will make USA excited. Could result to faster dumping of Phillippine by saner minds, though.

To my meagre knowledge Japanese colonial rule was initially fairly benign, getting worse over time.
If Japan manages to treat Vietnam half way between POTL Taiwan and Korea it'd be a great boon for the Greater Coprosperity Sphere.
Being relatively distant from the Home Islands (unlike Korea) cooler heads might prevail and notions of integrating Indochina with Japan could be shot down immediately.
Of course, never underestimate human stupidty ....

That would be probable. .Puppet kings would do nicely,and population treated better then korean would be loyal.
If so,we have stronger Japan which still lost,but - remaining countries would either deal with commies without USA troops,or fail ,but without Vietnam war.Stronger USA,as result.

If Japan not invade China in 1937/but still get Manchuria/,then we have another TL,becouse independent China would never be taken by Mao.Not mention,if Japan attacked soviets in 1941/possible here/,we would have Germany winning...till USA get a lot of A bombs.Commies supporter slowed mass producing them after 1945,now - not going to happen.Germany would glow in 1946.

 

[raharris1973]

With the German hordes massing on the Western Front the paniking paper tigers beg Stronk Japan for soccour, and Japan sends half a million troops to the ME and Balkans, allowing for the transfer of all French, British and Domion troops to France?

Of course this opens up the prospect for Japan, of the Japanese "mandates" of Iraq and Palestine, and "client state" of Yugoslavia.

Does Japan even have enough money to purchase French Indochina from the French though?

Good point.

Even if they have the money to purchase French Indochina, it might become more of a money sink for them than Korea.

I don't know that Korea was a net money sink.

Keep in mind that 1919 is also the year that the Korean independence movement becomes a prominent anti-Japanese imperialist movement.

Yeah, but they squashed that pretty well.

Realistically, could Japan turn French Indochina into a set of three separate protectorates, each with puppet rulers that answer to the Japanese Emperor? IOTL, this was actually done, albeit in the closing stages of WWII. If Japan does acquire French Indochina after WWI, they would have the time in the world to set up puppet regimes that would do what the Japanese ordered. Kinda like Manchukuo, but earlier.

Absolutely they could.

Maybe the POD could be moved forward a bit - the WWI went slightly less favourably to the Entente than in OTL and Japan agreed to provide troops, with Indochina being part of "payment".
Maybe after Caporetto and Brest-Litovsk? With the German hordes massing on the Western Front the paniking paper tigers beg Stronk Japan for soccour, and Japan sends half a million troops to the ME and Balkans, allowing for the transfer of all French, British and Domion troops to France? This producing a very BIG IOU note which France (and UK) has to redeem somehow?
Combine this with a revolt in Indochina, something France has no money nor stomach to put down?

Indeed, another way to go. Personally, even though the desperation motive can be greater in wartime, there's more risk of a psychological morale collapse if your people know you are selling territory off in wartime, so a sale in peacetime is safer. But it's a matter of preference and judgement, "potayto, potahto, tomayto, tomahto" and all that.

 

[Buba]

Of course this opens up the prospect for Japan, of the Japanese "mandates" of Iraq and Palestine, and "client state" of Yugoslavia.

I will channel Darth Vader once he had his new limbs on:
Nooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo!


I'd expect any top-tier Japanese politician suggesting this to be taken outside and being subject to
"beatings will continue until common sense returns"
treatment.

 

[ATP]

I will channel Darth Vader once he had his new limbs on:
Nooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo!


I'd expect any top-tier Japanese politician suggesting this to be taken outside and being subject to
"beatings will continue until common sense returns"
treatment.

Yugoslavia and Palestine - you are right.But Iraq had oil,and Japan needed it.

 

[raharris1973]

I will conjecture on each of these scenarios:

Within a year or two after Versailles (1920'ish, 1921) when Japan appears like a benign ally, and is enjoying a prosperous trade surplus, France is facing massive reconstruction costs, and France is learning that the U.S. is ditching the League and the U.S. and UK are not sincerely offering a tripartite alliance. Liquidating, for profit, the Far Eastern fragment of the overseas empire, that is overwhelmingly Africa and Mediterranean focused, may not seem like a bad strategy. Meanwhile Japan, would be keen at this time for a peaceful expansion opportunity.

Here, I imagine the French and Japanese had begun sidebar discussions on the edge of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921. Upon announcing the signature of the Naval Treaty in February 1922, the French and Japanese representatives also drop the diplomatic bombshell about their side-deal about the sale of Indochina to Japan.

Both the French and Japanese enjoy a little spring in their step from being able to surprise and one-up the generally more powerful Americans and British for a change. For the Japanese civilian ministry, the acquisition of a new colonial frontier in Southeast Asia, rich in rubber supplies, helps the Ministry's popularity and takes some of the sting out of the unpopular lower naval ratio compared to the US and UK.

The new Indochina frontier also offers new active Army and Naval Command assignments for officers seeking to build career paths for promotion in their services, Japanese civilian bureaucrats and administrators, expansionist Zaibatsu business enterprises. For the Army, the timing is good as the final with withdrawals from Shandong and the Soviet Far East are being completed at this time.

The Japanese and Indochinese, especially Vietnamese, will test each other early in their encounter. So rebellions in Vietnam in the 1920s will give the Japanese armed forces some opportunity for hyperactive suppression campaigns.

Longer-term, the results will be harder to predict. However, the Army will probably never be cut as deeply as in OTL's early 1920s because of its new Southeast Asians responsibilities. Optimistically, the civil government could be perceived as more triumphant in foreign policy and more friendly to the military, slowing the organization of off-duty army politicking. This may mean Taisho democracy extends into the 1930s, and that civilians and the Emperor are able to work with the top of the Army hierarchy to keep the Kwangtung Army out of Manchurian politics.

 

[ATP]

I will conjecture on each of these scenarios:



Here, I imagine the French and Japanese had begun sidebar discussions on the edge of the Washington Naval Conference of 1921. Upon announcing the signature of the Naval Treaty in February 1922, the French and Japanese representatives also drop the diplomatic bombshell about their side-deal about the sale of Indochina to Japan.

Both the French and Japanese enjoy a little spring in their step from being able to surprise and one-up the generally more powerful Americans and British for a change. For the Japanese civilian ministry, the acquisition of a new colonial frontier in Southeast Asia, rich in rubber supplies, helps the Ministry's popularity and takes some of the sting out of the unpopular lower naval ratio compared to the US and UK.

The new Indochina frontier also offers new active Army and Naval Command assignments for officers seeking to build career paths for promotion in their services, Japanese civilian bureaucrats and administrators, expansionist Zaibatsu business enterprises. For the Army, the timing is good as the final with withdrawals from Shandong and the Soviet Far East are being completed at this time.

The Japanese and Indochinese, especially Vietnamese, will test each other early in their encounter. So rebellions in Vietnam in the 1920s will give the Japanese armed forces some opportunity for hyperactive suppression campaigns.

Longer-term, the results will be harder to predict. However, the Army will probably never be cut as deeply as in OTL's early 1920s because of its new Southeast Asians responsibilities. Optimistically, the civil government could be perceived as more triumphant in foreign policy and more friendly to the military, slowing the organization of off-duty army politicking. This may mean Taisho democracy extends into the 1930s, and that civilians and the Emperor are able to work with the top of the Army hierarchy to keep the Kwangtung Army out of Manchurian politics.

Good idea,but taking Manchuria have resources which Japan needed.Problem was with invading China later,which they do not need.

 

[Chiron]

Meanwhile, how are Indochina, Japan, the Far East and colonial world changing with the soon-to-democratize parliamentary Japan of 1921 purchasing French Indochina, or the universal suffrage Japan of 1925 purchasing French Indochina, or the militaristic, hypernationalist but still parliamentary and not in a full China War Japan of 1934 purchasing French Indochina? Does the opportunity to expand by purchase, and the cost, and new strategic liability and focus southward have significant effects on Japan, and neighbors of the Indochina region, in any of those three eras?

Hmm...

Well the main reason the French fell apart so fast in 1940 is because they spent the bulk of their money building up a large navy and fighting colonial wars plus building up the Polish and Czechoslovakia defense industries. This meant they had a poorly trained military that was geared to fight Colonial Wars with reservists who got very brief training compared to German Reservists. They also had very bad quality controls. So when the battle began they fought a better trained, organized, and coordinated Army that was able to mass firepower at the critical points to pocket the bulk of the Allied Forces against the Sea while preventing the French from deploying their heavy artillery battalions which were never able to deploy.

Selling off French Indochina gives them at best a billion Francs if they really sell it. But other than removing a cause that brings Japan and the US to blows, I don't really see this as making any difference. In fact it may remove the US/Japanese conflict entirely as Japan would be well placed to sweep up north into China on a broader front earlier and with more force before Chiang can use his German Trained and Equipped Units to bleed out the IJA long enough for fresh units to be raised. Which in turn causes China to fall faster than US public opinion can be manipulated against Japan.

Now it is possible that selling Indochina to Japan at this time might even cause the fissures between Germany and Japan to widen and crack. While nominally "allies," neither Germany or Japan really helped each other and both basically fought separate wars and their "Alliance" nearly fell apart due to distrust. If not for US insistence on France and Britain severing Japanese ties, it was entirely possible that Japan would have DOW on Germany and did practically little as in WW1.

Even if the sale went through and Japan joined France and Britain in 1939, at best it would be mainly a naval task force and maybe a Corps or two of IJA who would get ran over by the German sickle cut. Following which, the European War is primarily a Land War in the USSR as Hitler isn't sending Rommel to Africa with a IJN Carrier Task Force cruising the Mediterranean, nor will the KM send out its heavies with a strong IJN force reinforcing the British. Odds will be against them.

 

[stevep]

Hmm...

Well the main reason the French fell apart so fast in 1940 is because they spent the bulk of their money building up a large navy and fighting colonial wars plus building up the Polish and Czechoslovakia defense industries. This meant they had a poorly trained military that was geared to fight Colonial Wars with reservists who got very brief training compared to German Reservists. They also had very bad quality controls. So when the battle began they fought a better trained, organized, and coordinated Army that was able to mass firepower at the critical points to pocket the bulk of the Allied Forces against the Sea while preventing the French from deploying their heavy artillery battalions which were never able to deploy.

Selling off French Indochina gives them at best a billion Francs if they really sell it. But other than removing a cause that brings Japan and the US to blows, I don't really see this as making any difference. In fact it may remove the US/Japanese conflict entirely as Japan would be well placed to sweep up north into China on a broader front earlier and with more force before Chiang can use his German Trained and Equipped Units to bleed out the IJA long enough for fresh units to be raised. Which in turn causes China to fall faster than US public opinion can be manipulated against Japan.

Now it is possible that selling Indochina to Japan at this time might even cause the fissures between Germany and Japan to widen and crack. While nominally "allies," neither Germany or Japan really helped each other and both basically fought separate wars and their "Alliance" nearly fell apart due to distrust. If not for US insistence on France and Britain severing Japanese ties, it was entirely possible that Japan would have DOW on Germany and did practically little as in WW1.

Even if the sale went through and Japan joined France and Britain in 1939, at best it would be mainly a naval task force and maybe a Corps or two of IJA who would get ran over by the German sickle cut. Following which, the European War is primarily a Land War in the USSR as Hitler isn't sending Rommel to Africa with a IJN Carrier Task Force cruising the Mediterranean, nor will the KM send out its heavies with a strong IJN force reinforcing the British. Odds will be against them.

I would say it was less the French army was poorly trained than it, possibly especially its higher ranks were badly trained to fight the previous war, which tends to be a problem for victorious armies. Plus given the huge losses of 1914-18 they lacked the will for another such slog so massive resources went into the Maginot Line, which the Germans simply bypassed. That was the primary resource sink for France which proved ineffective as it turned out.

Even then France had a large army with some good equipment but their C&C was their crippling weakness, along with the lack of an integrated air support system. Mind you the Germans could still have lost if either:
a) Hitler hadn't been talked out of an early winter 39 attack or
b) The loss of plans for the campaign hadn't resulted in the sickle attack.

The latter could well have resulted in a prolonged attritional battle somewhere in Belgium/NE France.

The idea of such a sale meaning worse relations between Japan and Germany is interesting but a lot would depend on the details. Does it still go deranged militaristic? If not then problem no clash with China at all. Even if it does but events in Europe forces the allies to bite their tongues over China and prevents a Pacific war then a huge advantage for the allies without the drains and disasters of 1941-42.

 

[Atarlost]

Well the main reason the French fell apart so fast in 1940 is because they spent the bulk of their money building up a large navy and fighting colonial wars plus building up the Polish and Czechoslovakia defense industries.

They're presumably still building up the Polish and Czechoslovakian defense industries, but in this scenario are they still building up as large a navy or fighting as many colonial wars? If not having a southeast Asian colony to worry about frees up more resources for the army does that make a difference? How much more army would there need to be in the northern pocket to break out and turn the German salient into a pocket or how much more army would there need to be south of the sickle cut for France to stay in the war?

Whatever happens with France the Allies win Africa handily. The Royal Navy has what would have been Force Z for the Med and Japan probably sends something substantial to try to build up favors and gain experience. Possibly even land troops. The Italians and Germans can't supply north Africa in the face of that.

I'm pretty sure there's no Pacific War if Japan DoWs Germany. If Japan has Indochinese rubber and the Free Dutch are selling them oil as a war ally they have no reason to pick a fight with any other Europeans, and if Roosevelt's sanctions are thus defanged they aren't on a timer for dealing with the US. Historical precedent at the time suggests the US Congress will do the IJN's job for them if left to their own devices.

 

[Buba]

Where are you people getting France paying for expansion of Polish and Czech defence industries?
Poland would had been delighted if France did so. Are you talking about the Rambouillet loan?
That money was to be mostly used to buy stuff in France, not build factories in Poland. The loan was for 2B Francs, of which de facto 1B to be spent in France. The terms were such that only part of that loan was used, especially the part involving expansion of Polish industry.
As to Czech defence industry - owned in large part by Schneider, BTW - AFAIK it was doing very nicely without any French investment ...
Do not forget that France hugely fucked up its defence industry with nationalisations. Hence enormous problems with manufacturing for the rearming army post '36. Plus various forms of communist sabotage for various reasons.
And the 12 month military service was a killer too.
There are many reasons for which the French army - in spite of being mobilised in early September '39 - nine months later was undertrained, underarmed, underequipped.

 

[Atarlost]

Where are you people getting France paying for expansion of Polish and Czech defence industries?

From Chiron. I know France wanted to prop up the Little Entente, but his post is the first I'd heard that they'd actually invested money. My questions don't have anything to do with French investment in the Little Entente as I assume it doesn't change and if there is none I still assume it doesn't change. I see no reason why the level of investment or lack of investment in the Little Entente would change in this scenario so it's good to know, but I think it can be set aside as a constant and not engaged with in exploring the AH scenario.

My questions are about whether the money, manpower, and industrial capacity not spent on the navy and colonial forces in Indochina translate into a significant enough force to impact the Battle of France without a second divergence of "Hitler does something stupid he didn't do OTL," or "Rommel is less lucky than OTL."

EDIT: referred to the poster below the one I'd been quoting not the poster I'd been quoting.

 

[Buba]

To finish the offtop - Poland was offered about 1B Francs for expansion of industry - but due to terms managed to spend at most 10%? 15%? of that ...
Also, let us remember that in September '36 France went off the Gold Standard and the Franc was in freefall.

 

[stevep]

From stevep. I know France wanted to prop up the Little Entente, but his post is the first I'd heard that they'd actually invested money. My questions don't have anything to do with French investment in the Little Entente as I assume it doesn't change and if there is none I still assume it doesn't change. I see no reason why the level of investment or lack of investment in the Little Entente would change in this scenario so it's good to know, but I think it can be set aside as a constant and not engaged with in exploring the AH scenario.

My questions are about whether the money, manpower, and industrial capacity not spent on the navy and colonial forces in Indochina translate into a significant enough force to impact the Battle of France without a second divergence of "Hitler does something stupid he didn't do OTL," or "Rommel is less lucky than OTL."

Sorry where am I saying that?? I can't see that in my post #12 and pretty certain I haven't said it elsewhere. France put a lot of resources into Russian logistics, especially railways prior to 1914 but not aware of anything in the run up to WWII.

I said even with events as OTL things could have gone badly for the Germans, especially if Hitler had insisted on an early winter 1939 attack against France. However that's nothing to do with events against Poland other than the losses and problems the Germans suffered there. [Manpower losses were pretty small but a lot of equipment was lost or damaged.

 

[Atarlost]

Sorry where am I saying that?? I can't see that in my post #12 and pretty certain I haven't said it elsewhere. France put a lot of resources into Russian logistics, especially railways prior to 1914 but not aware of anything in the run up to WWII.

I said even with events as OTL things could have gone badly for the Germans, especially if Hitler had insisted on an early winter 1939 attack against France. However that's nothing to do with events against Poland other than the losses and problems the Germans suffered there. [Manpower losses were pretty small but a lot of equipment was lost or damaged.

Sorry, I put the wrong name to the wrong post.

 

[Buba]

France put a lot of resources into Russian logistics, especially railways prior to 1914 but not aware of anything in the run up to WWII.

I did some reading on this. France did give out soft loans to Poland and Little Entente to buy armaments in French factories. But for rich France that was peanuts.
Factoid - when France could not meet orders - then Czechoslovakia provided the cannons or tanks, as Skoda was owned by Schneider.

 

[stevep]

Sorry, I put the wrong name to the wrong post.

OK thanks for clarifying.