Thanks. Also, off-topic, but I want to figure out how an alt-WWI starts in 1917: Franz Joseph dies, Franz Ferdinand is about to be crowned, the Hungarian nobles say "No!" to FF until he agrees to renounce his universal suffrage plans, FF says "No!" and implements Plan U, which fails similar to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Romanian Transylvanians, with Romanian support, push for a restoration of the Transylvanian Diet after the end of the war and threaten a separatist uprising if they do not get it. Does FF agree? Could Transylvania vote for both its own Diet as well as for the Hungarian Parliament? And does Bosnia use this A-H civil war as an opportunity to declare independence and join Serbia? Bosnia did have its own Diet (Landtag), IIRC. Would Bosnia be the spark for an alt-WWI here? I don't think that French socialists would actually be willing to fight for a reactionary Magyar Hungarian regime that opposes universal suffrage, after all. So, it's either support Transylvanian Romanian separatists if they can't reach a deal with FF or support Bosnian separatists--or both, I suppose! And do the Italians in Tirol demand separate autonomy for Italian-majority southern Tyrol, with Italian support? Could that be the flashpoint for an alt-WWI in this TL?
What would be the impact if *both* Italy and the Ottoman Empire remained neutral throughout all WWI?
- Thread starter raharris1973
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Thanks. Also, off-topic, but I want to figure out how an alt-WWI starts in 1917: Franz Joseph dies, Franz Ferdinand is about to be crowned, the Hungarian nobles say "No!" to FF until he agrees to renounce his universal suffrage plans, FF says "No!" and implements Plan U, which fails similar to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Romanian Transylvanians, with Romanian support, push for a restoration of the Transylvanian Diet after the end of the war and threaten a separatist uprising if they do not get it. Does FF agree? Could Transylvania vote for both its own Diet as well as for the Hungarian Parliament? And does Bosnia use this A-H civil war as an opportunity to declare independence and join Serbia? Bosnia did have its own Diet (Landtag), IIRC. Would Bosnia be the spark for an alt-WWI here? I don't think that French socialists would actually be willing to fight for a reactionary Magyar Hungarian regime that opposes universal suffrage, after all. So, it's either support Transylvanian Romanian separatists if they can't reach a deal with FF or support Bosnian separatists--or both, I suppose! And do the Italians in Tirol demand separate autonomy for Italian-majority southern Tyrol, with Italian support? Could that be the flashpoint for an alt-WWI in this TL?
sillygoose
Well-known member
Apologise about the late response but I'm busy during the week currently so only visiting at weekends.
Interesting thanks. Its more a cause of social collapse and the government, both Czarist and Republican lacking a clear understanding of the facts on the ground about the impact of mobilizations. There are also railway problems which are further increased by the instability and attacks on grain shipments but the initial problems are on the farms.
It does mean that there is little scope for continuing grain exports as a source of both food for their allies and also revenue for the government. Which sinks one of my ideas.
I did say that I thought the big push in terms of supplies would be 1916 onward as the allies get their own production ramped up - plus possibly neutrals supplying the new market expanding their production to meet demand.
To be fair an active allied intervention is an option being considered for some of the men and resources now available to the allies with a neutral Turkey. They may be used elsewhere, predominantly on the western front - or eastern for the Russians released.
If they are then they will tie down a number of Austria [possibly also German] forces the size of which depending on CP understanding of the situation and their own plans. This could be relatively small - say what was used initially by the Austrians in the initial attacks against Serbia - or larger if they either fear successful allied attacks or desire to clear out that theatre. After all the conquest of Serbia was the initial excuse for the war. It will be a drain on the allies as well but less than the OTL forces committed against the Ottomans and less than the continued drain on the CP.
Possibly Austria has more forces depending on the previous point. The other question is whether the Austrian forces on the offensive can have much impact on Russian defences. They lost much of their well trained and motivated forces in 1914 and while they could hold a line their effectiveness in offensive actions seem to have become more limited as time went on and morale faltered.
However the argument is that with the CPs continually on the offensive through 1915-16 there won't be any Brusilov offensive but instead defensive actions while its the CPs doing the attacking. The question is how deep into Russia can they extend their advance while the Russian army is still fighting and not demoralised by expensive offensives.
As such is it likely that Germany will be considering offensive actions at all in the west unless/until Russia is defeated?
They don't have Bulgaria or Turkey to link up with but the desire to crush Serbia will still be there in Vienna, if only to avoid loss of face and also there could be a desire to crush the allies in the Balkans to clear out that front and release the CP forces tied up there. It all depends on what the CP aims are and how they interpret the situation.
I had thought the grain shortages were a function of the breakdown in the rail system per Norman Stone's book, but this article indicates it was a multi-factoral problem that was simply inherent in mobilizing so many men and horses and taking them away from food production, since Russian agriculture was based on the small family farm:
Russia in the Great War: Mobilisation, grain, and revolution
Prior to World War I, many authorities believed that countries with substantial agrarian sectors and grain exports, including the Russian Empire, could overcome war hardships more easily than those countries that imported grain. This column asks why the experts got it wrong in the case of...cepr.org
It's a longer article, but has substantial data in it so would encourage anyone interested to read the whole thing, as it gets into more than just the problem of manpower mobilization. Peasant hoarding was also a major issue and one insurmountable without using Soviet levels of force...which explains Stalin's behavior later on.
The important point though is that exporting grain would be a disaster for Russian food supplies given the mobilization of so many farmers and horses and peasant refusal to sell especially at government prices. I mention horses more than the article does, but the same dynamic played out in Germany and A-H once the labor and manure of horses were lost to farmers.
This article indicates social breakdown, with peasants and local authorities pillaging train shipments before they got to the cities:
Interesting thanks. Its more a cause of social collapse and the government, both Czarist and Republican lacking a clear understanding of the facts on the ground about the impact of mobilizations. There are also railway problems which are further increased by the instability and attacks on grain shipments but the initial problems are on the farms.
It does mean that there is little scope for continuing grain exports as a source of both food for their allies and also revenue for the government. Which sinks one of my ideas.
I did say that I thought the big push in terms of supplies would be 1916 onward as the allies get their own production ramped up - plus possibly neutrals supplying the new market expanding their production to meet demand.
To be fair an active allied intervention is an option being considered for some of the men and resources now available to the allies with a neutral Turkey. They may be used elsewhere, predominantly on the western front - or eastern for the Russians released.
If they are then they will tie down a number of Austria [possibly also German] forces the size of which depending on CP understanding of the situation and their own plans. This could be relatively small - say what was used initially by the Austrians in the initial attacks against Serbia - or larger if they either fear successful allied attacks or desire to clear out that theatre. After all the conquest of Serbia was the initial excuse for the war. It will be a drain on the allies as well but less than the OTL forces committed against the Ottomans and less than the continued drain on the CP.
Possibly Austria has more forces depending on the previous point. The other question is whether the Austrian forces on the offensive can have much impact on Russian defences. They lost much of their well trained and motivated forces in 1914 and while they could hold a line their effectiveness in offensive actions seem to have become more limited as time went on and morale faltered.
For the Austrian perspective on OTL operations in Autumn 1915 here is the english translation of volume 3 of the A-H official history:
(p.189 is an overview of autumn operations in East Galicia that could well be changed ITTL with extra Austro-German forces not needed to finish off Serbia or go to the Italian Front). If they achieve their goals ITTL of liberating East Galicia and splitting Russian forces the Russian Southwest Front would be pretty decisively beaten and a strong defensive line would be anchored on prime terrain and reserves then freed up to use elsewhere. Brusilov's offensive then wouldn't be able to achieve anything in 1916 even with greater Entente materials support given that there would be better defensive lines and no diversion of resources to Italy as well as a chance to preempt by the A-Hs thanks to having only 2 active fronts and plans to invade Ukraine in 1916. That would mean Verdun might have a shot of working ITTL since there wouldn't need to be major German diversions from the West if A-H could hold its own in the Balkans and Ukraine and perhaps even the proposed spoiling attack against the build up of British forces on the Somme could be launched with German reserves freed up:
100 Years Ago at the Somme: A Brilliant Idea Not Implemented
By the spring of 1916 the staff of Germany's 2nd Army, deployed north and south of the River Somme, had concluded that a major Allie...roadstothegreatwar-ww1.blogspot.com
However the argument is that with the CPs continually on the offensive through 1915-16 there won't be any Brusilov offensive but instead defensive actions while its the CPs doing the attacking. The question is how deep into Russia can they extend their advance while the Russian army is still fighting and not demoralised by expensive offensives.
As such is it likely that Germany will be considering offensive actions at all in the west unless/until Russia is defeated?
They don't have Bulgaria or Turkey to link up with but the desire to crush Serbia will still be there in Vienna, if only to avoid loss of face and also there could be a desire to crush the allies in the Balkans to clear out that front and release the CP forces tied up there. It all depends on what the CP aims are and how they interpret the situation.
Hmmm....many WW1 generals were incompetent,so maybe...
sillygoose
Well-known member
Especially on the Entente side generals were not selected for competence pre-war...or really during the first half of the war. By 1916 the good generals had been identified, but then the CPs had learned too, so good or not the limitations in technology made the attack much tougher than the defense.
sillygoose
Well-known member
I don't have time to respond to everything, but I can answer this relatively quickly now:
Assuming that were possible (many ifs here) for attacks to continue in 1915 if the CPs were able to maintain pressure rather than having to take an extended pause to transfer forces to defeat Serbia (which would not be possible with the intervention of the Franco-British army of the Orient) in late 1915 (there were major strategic reasons for that involving Gallipoli), then the Russian army would be on the verge of a substantial morale collapse due to the unending series of defeats and extremely heavy losses suffered from Gorlice-Tarnow through the Russian Great Retreat of 1915. IOTL they were allowed to recover in Ukraine due to the need to go after Serbia. Logistically it shouldn't be that big of an issue as the Germans were able to advance considerably further than what A-H did historically from Gorlice-East Galicia. It seems from what I can find that the issue was lack of forces due to the transfers to the Balkans and the constant build up to counter Italian offensives, neither of which would be an issue here.
Yes, because their entire plan in 1915 was to knock Russia out of the war to eliminate one of their Entente members; they deemed that impossible after Russia decided to continue fighting despite the Great Retreat. Falkenhayn decided then on attacking France, because they had hit peak manpower and were the most vulnerable major power to being attritioned to death. Attacking in the west then was a strategic imperative due to how concern Falkenhayn was about the growing material and manpower superiority of the Entente and impact of the blockade.
I remember cruel joke about that:
How we get veteran regiment?
by sending fresh dyvision in frontal attack on enemy HMG.
Sadly,it was reality in many cases.Worst was that italian idiot,i forget name.
Did tanks change the calculation in regards to this in 1918? And why was the Eastern Front (including the Ottoman Fronts) more mobile relative to the Western Front? Was it because the Western Front was narrower and more compact (higher railway density, for instance) than the Eastern Front was?
sillygoose
Well-known member
sillygoose
Well-known member
Tanks, trucks, aircraft, and radio.
Lower troop density. East was so big that outside some critical areas it was hard to achieve a densely manned front as well as continual coverage. With more gaps and chances to more easily smash through without ready enemy reserves things stayed more mobile.
Much lower troop density because of the length of the front and poorer defensive capacity by the Russians and Austrians especially. [Less trained troops, poorer overall officer quality and markedly less artillery and the like.
In case of Russia - they prepared good and well-balanced artillery for their units/76 and 107mm guns,122 and 152 howitzers/,but failed to built enough factories to made ammo.
Result - from 1915 they fought practically without artillery.It is kind of miracle,that they do not break earlier.
The Russians lasted long enough for the Americans to enter the war, which eventually paved the way for the CPs' doom. Ironically, it would have been better for the Russians themselves had the Americans not entered the war since in a CP victory TL the Germans would have likely overthrown the Bolsheviks in Russia after winning WWI.
Does the same logic also apply in the Donbass in the present-day Russo-Ukrainian War? As in, because the Donbass is so densely packed and populated, it's very hard for an army to make sizable military advances there?
Possibly although it could be more that modern weapons have longer range, are more accurate and a lot more lethal. Hence you have to dig in and hide a lot unless and until you can break either/both the enemies heavy weapons/morale. After initial losses, once the Ukrainians organised and started getting support and the Russian weaknesses emerged things have been largely static other than the Ukrainian break-through SE of Kharkov. Modern firepower/organisation can allow rapid attacks and progress if the enemy is outclassed but if similar in power it can still be a fairly static front.
Makes sense and reasonably analysis. And it's also quite interesting how rapidly the Russians advanced in the north at the start of the war but were then halted at the outskirts of Kiev, similar to the Germans being halted at the Marne in 1914:
Russians at the Gates of Kiev: Victims of an Almost-Success
Too far to go back, too far to go forward
antiempire.substack.com
The Russians failed to even encircle Kiev in spite of them trying very hard to do so.
Indeed.Germans were cyvilized people then,and horrified of what soviets did then.
And tried to find one russian party which agree to peace with them,so they could replace Lenin with somebody better.
Nobody agreed,all wanted die for Entente.WHAT THEY WERE,POLES OR RUSSIANS?
Becouse they were stupid as our politicians in 1939.
But - everything,even german Europe,would be better then soviets.
Yes,that is what they should do.Russia would be really second world army now,and probable economy,too.
Not mention 100 millions communism victim less.
Better world for everybody,with possible excemption of Poland - but,we supposed to suffer for World salvation,so it would be OK !